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The increased outsourcing of many traditionally military functions, together with the 
fact that international armed conflicts are increasingly being fought in predominantly 
civilian locations, is contesting the international humanitarian law (IHL) presumption 
that civilians are necessarily non-participatory spectators in the theatre of war. The 
legal lacunae which surrounds non-State actors like: private military and security 
contractors (PMSCs), under-aged child soldiers, voluntary human shields (VHSs), 
relief workers and journalists, is complicating the legal assessment of their primary 
IHL status, obscuring crucial determinations around whether their actions amount to 
direct participation in hostilities, and confounding certainty around the legal regime 
applicable to them upon capture. Through critical analysis of customary and treaty 
based IHL, this project explores the primary IHL status of each of these types of 
non-State actors. Thereafter it seeks, through practical application of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, to draw specific 
conclusions on the range of activities that might compromise their civilian immunity 
against direct targeting. In the final analysis the study concludes that engaging in 
combat functions, operating weapons systems, participating in direct support 
functions, conducting training for predetermined hostile acts, sabotaging military 
capacity, guarding captured military personnel, gathering intelligence for use in 
marking targets, divulging tactical information or acting as a lookout will amount to 
direct participation in hostilities. Through similar investigation, the study concludes 
that mere interference, defensive guarding or shielding of civilian or other dual-use 
sites, and the defense of military installations against criminal elements, fails to rise 
to the threshold required to compromise a civilian non-State actor’s immunity 
against attack. While dispelling the misconception that civilian status itself can be 
 vi 
legally forfeited, the project explores the practical legal consequences of civilian 
direct participation in hostilities: including legitimate direct targeting of these non-
State actors for so long as their participation or membership of the combative group 












































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Research hypothesis and rationale 8 
i Hypothesis and rationale for selecting these five particular non-State 
actors 8 
ii Hypothesis and rationale for limiting this analysis to the legal regime 
applicable to international armed conflicts 9 
iii Hypothesis and rationale for addressing the issue of status under 
IHL 13 
iv Hypothesis and rationale for canvassing the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities 14 
1.2 Research framework 15 
i Literature review 15 
ii Published chapters 16 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW CONCEPT OF  
COMBATANT STATUS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 19 
2.1 Introduction 19 
2.2 Defining the term ‘combatant’ 20 
i Non-combatant members of the armed forces 21 
ii Hors de combat 22 
iii Military and religious personnel 22 
2.3 The privileges attached to the authorisation to participate in hostilities:  
 immunity from prosecution and secondary POW status 23 
2.4 The consequences attaching to combatant status: continuous lawful  
targeting and prosecution for violations of IHL 24 
2.5 Forfeiture of POW status and exposure to criminal prosecution 25 
2.6 Combatant status prior to the IHL conventions 27 
2.7 Combatant status under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 28 
2.8 Combatant status under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 29 
i Regular armed forces 30 
 ii Irregular armed forces 32 
 iii Persons accompanying the armed forces 37 
iv Merchant mariners, civil aviators and the levée en masse 37 
2.9 Combatant status under Additional Protocol of 1977 38 
i Defining ‘armed forces’ 38 
ii Combatant and POW status 40 
iii The inviolability of combatant and POW status 40 
 iv Forfeiture of POW status 41 
 v Presumptive POW status 47 
2.10 Combatant status under customary international law 47 
2.11 Conclusion 48 
 
CHAPTER 3:  
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW CONCEPT OF CIVILIAN  
STATUS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 49 
3.1 The historic emergence of the concept of civilian status 49 
 viii 
3.2 Defining the term ‘civilian’ 50 
3.3 Presumptive civilian status 52 
3.4 The privileges attached to civilian status: immunity against targeted  
attacks 52 
3.5 The consequences attaching to civilian status: the notion of civilian   
 direct participation in hostilities 53 
3.6 Civilian direct participation in hostilities: the ‘unlawful combatant’, and  
the forfeiture of civilian status 54 
i Unlawful combatant: legal term or misleading descriptor? 54 
ii Forfeiture of civilian status 58 
3.7 The consequences of unauthorised direct participation in hostilities  
on the part of civilians 59 
3.8 Persons accompanying the armed forces 60 
3.9 Conclusion 64 
 
CHAPTER 4:  
UNDERSTANDING AND OBSERVING THE INTERNATIONAL  
HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION  
IN HOSTILITIES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 65 
4.1 A brief introduction to of the notion of direct participation in  
hostilities 65 
4.2 The treaty and customary international law basis for the rule limiting 
civilian direct participation in hostilities 67 
i Direct participation in treaty law 67 
ii Direct participation in customary IHL 68 
4.3 A brief introduction to the ICRC's Interpretive Guide on the notion of  
direct participation in hostilities under IHL 69 
i The drafting process and the legal implications of the guide 69 
ii Introductory comments on the guide’s limitations & controversies 71 
4.4 The specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in  
hostilities 73 
i The threshold of harm 74 
Military harm 75 
Attacks against protected persons 75 
Examples of activities which satisfy the threshold of harm  
requirement 76 
Examples of activities which fall short of the threshold of harm  
requirement 77 
Critique of the ‘threshold of harm’ requirement 78 
ii The direct causation requirement 79 
Examples of activities that satisfy the direct causation requirement 81 
Examples of activities which fall short of the direct causation  
requirement 82 
Critique of the direct causation requirement 84  
iii The belligerent nexus requirement 86
Examples of activities which satisfy the belligerent nexus  
requirement 87 
Examples of activities which fall short of the belligerent nexus  
requirement 88 
Critique of the belligerent nexus requirement 88 
 ix 
iv General comments regarding the specific hostile acts which  
amount to direct participation in hostilities 88 
4.5  The temporal scope of the loss of protection ‘for such time as’  
civilians take a direct part in hostilities 89 
i The parameters of the ‘for such time’ window: execution,  
preparation, deployment and withdrawal 91 
ii A critique of the ‘revolving door’ concept 93 
4.6  The ‘continuous combat function’ and its implications for civilians  
participating directly in hostilities 96  
i The rationale behind the concept of the ‘continuous combat function’ 96 
ii Activating the loss of protection based upon a ‘continuous combat  
function’ 97  
iii Exclusion and cessation of the ‘continuous combat function’  
classification 98 
iv A critique of the continuous combat function 99 
4.7 Presumptions in assessing direct participation in hostilities 103 
i Critique of the presumption’s application to assessments of direct  
participation 103 
4.8 The legal consequences for civilians found participating directly in  
hostilities 105 
4.9 Conclusion 105 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
THE COMBATANT STATUS OF ‘UNDER-AGED’ CHILD SOLDIERS  
RECRUITED BY NON-STATE-ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL  
ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES 109 
5.1 Introduction 109 
5.2 International law response to the issue of recruiting under-aged child  
soldiers: IHL, international and regional human rights law,  
international criminal law, and evolving customary international law  115 
i International humanitarian law 115 
ii International and regional human rights law 118 
iii International criminal law 120 
iv Evolving customary international law 123 
5.3 The combatant status of under-aged child soldiers recruited  
into non state-armed groups in international armed conflicts 126 
i An introduction to combatant status under IHL 126 
ii Under-aged child soldiers ‘recruited’ into non-state-armed groups  
– ‘civilians’ participating directly in hostilities   129 
Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in  
hostilities on the part of civilians 133 
The temporal scope of the loss of civilian immunity on the part of  
child soldiers: the ‘for such time as’ or the ‘continuous combat  
function’ test  140 
5.4 Under-aged child soldiers recruited to participate directly in  
hostilities in non-state-armed groups - assessing combatant and  
POW status  145 
 
 x 
5.5 Prosecuting under-aged child soldiers recruited into non-state-armed  
groups  155 
5.6 Conclusion  159 
 
CHAPTER 6:  
THE COMBATANT STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND  
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED  
CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES 161 
6.1 Introduction 159 
6.2 The importance of primary status under IHL and its legal  
consequences 165 
6.3 PMSCs as ‘combatants’ 169 
i Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict 171 
 Regular armed forces 171 
Irregular armed forces 172 
 ii Non-combatant members of the armed forces 178 
Hors de combat 178 
Religious and medical personnel 179 
Persons accompanying the armed forces 179 
Levée en masse, merchant mariners and civil aviators 180 
PMSC – can they enjoy combatant status in international armed  
conflicts in terms of customary IHL?  180  
a) Acting on behalf of, or belonging to a party to a conflict 180 
b) Subordinating themselves to the Party’s command 184 
c) Behaving in accordance with the laws of war 186 
Concluding remarks on the combatant status of PMSCs 187 
6.4 PMSCs as ‘civilians’ 188 
i ‘Persons accompanying the armed forces’ 189 
ii PMSCs as civilians or ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’ 193 
6.5 Are PMSCs, today’s mercenaries in a new guise? 195 
i Defining a mercenary under IHL 198 
Are PMSCs ‘specially recruited’?   199 
Do PMSCs take a direct part in international hostilities?  200 
Are PMSCs motivated by the desire for private gain, substantially  
in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks  
and functions?    201 
Are PMSCs not nationals of a Party to the conflict or residents of  
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict?   202 
Are PMSCs not member of the armed forces of a Party to the  
conflict? 203 
Are PMSCs sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on  
official duty as a member of its armed forces? 203 
6.6 Conclusions on the primary status of PMSCs 204 
6.7 PMSCs and the notion of direct participation in hostilities 206 
i The ICRC’s ‘Interpretive Guide’ 209 
ii Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in  
hostilities 210 
The threshold of harm 211 
 xi 
a) Military harm  211 
b) Attacks against protected persons 212 
The direct causation requirement 216 
The belligerent nexus requirement 221 
Conclusions regarding PMSCs and the specific hostile  
acts 221 
iii The temporal scope of the loss of protection ‘for such time as’  
civilians take a direct part in hostilities 222 
ii Continuous combat function 235 
6.8 Conclusion 241 
 
CHAPTER 7:  
ASSESSING THE COMBATANT STATUS OF VOLUNTARY HUMAN  
SHIELDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION 
OF CIVILIAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 245 
7.1 Introduction 245 
7.2 Distinguishing voluntary human shields from the IHL concept of  
‘human shields’ 247 
7.3 IHL on the subject of human shield 250 
7.4 IHL on the subject of VHSs 253 
i Acceptable collateral damage and the proportionality principle 254 
ii Precautions in attack 255 
iii Effective advance warning of an attack 256 
7.5 The notion of IHL combatant/civilian status 257 
i Combatants (belligerents)  257  
Non-combatant members of the armed forces 259 
 Medical and religious personnel 260 
ii Civilians 261 
Levée en masse 262 
Persons accompanying the armed forces 263 
iii The unlawful belligerent and spies 264 
7.6 Conclusion on the status of VHSs under current IHL 265 
i VHSs as combatants 265 
VHSs as the levée en masse 266 
VHSs and non-combatant members of the armed forces 266 
ii VHSs as civilians 267 
VHSs as persons accompanying the armed forces 268 
iii VHSs as unlawful belligerents 269 
7.7 VHSs and the notion of direct participation in hostilities 271 
i Introducing the concept and controversies surrounding the IHL  
notion of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ 271 
ii IHL treaty-law references to the notion of direct participation in  
hostilities 274 
iii The customary IHL approach to direct participation in hostilities 275 
iv  ‘Direct participation in hostilities’ as interpreted by the ICRC 277 
Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in 
hostilities 278 
The temporal scope of the loss of protection ‘for such time as’  
civilians take a direct part in hostilities 284 
 xii 
v. Conclusions regarding VHSs and direct participation in  
hostilities 285 
7.8 The nature of the shielded sites (civilian objects, single-use military  
objects, and dual-use installations)   286 
i Civilian and other protected sites 286 
ii Military objectives 286 
iii Dual-use installations 287 
7.9 Targeting decisions regarding VHSs 288 
VHSs who are found to be ‘directly participating in hostilities’ 290 
VHSs deemed not to be participating directly in hostilities 291 
7.10 IHL obligations upon the captors of VHS: prosecution and  
detention 294 
7.11 Conclusion 296 
 
CHAPTER 8:  
ASSESSING THE COMBATANT STATUS OF JOURNALISTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF  
CIVILIAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 299 
8.1 Introduction 299 
8.2 Understanding the term ‘journalist’ under IHL 303 
i Military journalists 303 
ii War correspondents 303 
iii  ‘Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions’ 304 
8.3 Journalists under IHL 304 
i 1863 Lieber Code 304 
ii Hague Law 304 
iii Geneva Conventions (GC I-IV) 305 
iv Additional Protocol’s (AP I and AP II) 306 
v Customary international law 307 
8.4 The primary IHL status of journalists, and the legal consequences  
which flow from their status 307  
i Journalists with combatant status 308 
 ii Journalists with civilian status 309 
 Civilian journalists with POW status upon capture 309 
 Civilian journalists without POW status upon capture 310 
8.5 Targeting decisions in international armed conflicts where journalists  
are implicated 313 
 i Distinction 313 
 ii Military necessity 314 
iii Proportionality 315 
iv Advance warning 315 
v The principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality and  
advanced warning, and their impact on targeting decisions  
involving journalists 316 
 Civilian broadcasting facilities: the dual-use dilemma 317 
Civilian journalists (not accredited to the armed forces) 320 
 War correspondents 322 
Military journalists 322 
8.6 The activities of journalists in light of the notion of civilian  
 xiii 
direct participation in hostilities 323 
 i Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in  
hostilities 325 
Threshold of harm requirement 325 
The direct causation requirement 327 
 The belligerent nexus requirement 328 
ii Conclusions on the role of civilian journalists and the notion 
of civilian direct participation in hostilities 329 
 Non-embedded civilian journalists 329 
Embedded journalists/war correspondents 330 
8.7 The temporal scope of the loss of civilian immunity and the legal  
consequences for journalists found participating directly in  
hostilities  331 
Civilian journalist found participating directly in hostilities 333 
 Embedded journalist found participating directly in hostilities 334 
8.8 Conclusions 334 
 
CHAPTER 9:  
ASSESSING THE COMBATANT STATUS OF RELIEF WORKERS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF 
CIVILIAN DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 337 
9.1 Introduction 337 
9.2 Defining ‘relief workers’ 343 
9.3 Existing international law provisions aimed at protecting relief  
workers  344 
 i IHL provisions 345 
 Geneva law 345 
 Customary IHL 347 
 Soft law 349 
ii International criminal law 350 
9.4 IHL and relief workers: the consequences and limitations of default  
civilian status 351 
9.5 Relief workers: a case for special status? 354 
The UN Convention on the Safety of U.N. and Associated  
Personnel 355 
Symbol of humanitarianism 356 
9.6 Private military and security contractors (PMSCs) ensuring the  
 safety of relief workers  357 
9.7 The notion of direct participation in hostilities and the role of relief  
workers 361 
 i The threshold of harm requirements 363 
ii The direct causation requirement 364 
iii The belligerent nexus test  366  
9.8 The issue of detention for relief workers with default IHL civilian  
status 368 
9.9 Conclusion 370  
 
CHAPTER 10:  
CONCLUSION 373 
 xiv 
i Assigning primary IHL status 375 
ii Assessing the activities of non-State actors in light of the  
notion of civilian direct participation in hostilities 377 
iii Exploring the legal consequences for non-State actors  
participating directly in hostilities 379 
Concluding remarks: the way forward 380  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 383 
















Present day international humanitarian law (IHL), was born out of ‘a number 
of ancient and widely embraced codes’1, which had at their core the 
motivation to alleviate ‘as much as possible the calamities of war’2, by limiting 
human suffering and ‘sparing civilians from the brutality of warfare’3. At its 
core, IHL operates from the position that ‘armed conflict is a contest between 
the opposing armed forces’4, and that the civilian population (who are 
precluded from engaging in hostilities) are consequently protected from 
attack. Maintaining this delicate balance between ‘the dictates of military 
necessity’5 and humanitarian considerations, requires that ‘a clear distinction6 
[be] made between combatants and civilians’7.  
This principle of distinction was born out of the humanistic philosophy 
which posits that ‘the least that can be done in order to make wars more 
humane is to exclude as many persons as possible from the scope of 
belligerence’8. The principle was alluded to in the preamble of the 1868 St 
Petersburg Declaration, which specified that ‘the only legitimate object which 
States could endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
force of the enemy, not civilians who support the enemy or their property 
(objects), but the enemy’s military force’9. And in 1863 the Lieber Code 
endorsed its importance in clear terms: ‘all enemies in regular war are divided 
into two general classes – that is to say, into combatants and non-
                                                
1 Daphné Richemond-Barak (2011) ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ in William C. Banks 
(ed) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare at 2407-16. 
Columbia University Press: New York.  
2 Yoram Dinstein (2004) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict Cambridge University Press at 5. 
3 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2407-16; Mahmoud Cherif 
Bassiouni ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by 
Non-State Actors’ (2008) 98:3 Journal of Criminal law and Criminology 711 at 726. 
4 Who are disciplined to ‘respect the laws and customs of warfare’ (Won Kidane ‘The Status 
of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 38:3 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 361 at 380). 
5 Nils Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 831 at 833; Michael N Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ (2010) 42 
International Law and Politics 697 at 713.  
6 ‘The principle of distinction requires that ‘military objects be distinguished from civilian 
objects prior to attack’ (Jefferson D Reynolds ‘Collateral Damage on the 21st Century 
Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict and the Struggle for a Moral High 
Ground’ (2005) 56 Air Force Law Review 1 at 24). 
7 Anthony P V Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3 at 11. 
8 Shlomy Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant 
Belong?’ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 378 at 380. 
9 Gary Solis (2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War. 
Cambridge University Press: New York at 251. 
 2 
combatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government’10. Every IHL 
treaty (from Hague law11 to Geneva law12) subsequent to the Lieber code was 
drafted on the foundation13 of the principle of distinction ‘between civilians and 
combatants’14. As Jensen asserts: 
 
‘It [the principle of distinction] is the foundation on which the 
codification of the laws and customs of war rest: the civilian population 
and civilian objects must be respected and protected in armed conflict, 
and for this purpose they must be distinguished from combatants and 
military objectives’15. 
                                                
10 In particular ‘article XXII invokes distinction when it documents the turn from warring on non 
combatants’ (Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’at 2459-69). 
11 1988 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (the Hague) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/150?OpenDocument (accessed 12 September 2012); 1907 
Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of 
War on Land (Hague V) (1908) 2 Americal Journal of International Law Supplement 1117; 
1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Hague 
Convention IV of 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations ‘HR’) 1910 U.K.Treaty Series 9 also 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195 (accessed 14 July 2012). 
12 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (GC I) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 31; 1949 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 8; 
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III) of August 12 
1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 
287; 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty 
Series 1391. 
13 Toni Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ (2004) 86 International Review of the 
Red Cross 93 at 104. 
14 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2459-69. 
15 Eric T Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C Banks (ed) ‘New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia’ (Columbia 
University Press: New York) (ebook version) at 1879-88. ‘Many of the rules governing the 
conduct of war stem from this absolute principle, such as the types of targets that are 
legitimate' (Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2318-26; David M 
Crane and Daniel Reisner (2011) ‘Jousting at Windmills’ in William C Banks (ed) New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia University Press: 
New York (ebook version) at 1492-99; Pilloud C, Sandoz Y and Zimmermann B (1987) ICRC 
Commentary on Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 
1949 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Geneva at 598; Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law in War at 252. There are other principles which also form part 
of the core concepts upon which IHL is built, including:  
1. Military necessity requires that the legal use of military force must be justified and that 
the unintentional killing or injuring of civilians and their property is an accepted and 
justified corollary to a valid and legal military actions’ (Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at 
Windmills’ at 1499-1508).  
2. Proportionality according to AP I article 52(2) restricts attacks ‘to those objects whose 
partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the 
Law of International Armed Conflict at 4). The principle of proportionality concedes 
that ‘at times collateral damage to civilians may be inescapable, but as long as 
civilian losses are not inflicted deliberately or indiscriminately, and as long as they are 
not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated 
these losses cannot be branded as a breach of the principle of distinction’.  
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Despite widespread acceptance that the principle of distinction amounted to 
customary international law, ‘the principle of distinction per se went 
unmentioned in IHL conventions and treaties until 1977 when it was expressly 
stated in Additional ProtocoI I (AP I): 
 
‘in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives’16.  
 
The cardinal17 importance of this principle has been confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), who referred to it as an ‘intransgressible 
principle of international customary law’18. In view of the Court’s statements, 
the International Law Commission considered it ‘justified to regard the 
principle of distinction as part of jus cogens’19. As Dinstein puts it: ‘marking 
out separate status groups constitutes the very bedrock of IHL… this is the 
hallmark of IHL: remove the “principle of distinction” and the entire IHL system 
collapses’20. So important is this principle of assigning either combatant or 
                                                                                                                                      
(Yoram Dinstein (2007) ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ in 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and Volker Epping (eds) International Humanitarian Law 
Facing New Challenges Springer: Berlin at 147).  
16Article 48. According to Fenrick ‘insofar as people are concerned, lawful targets include 
combatants, participants in a levée en masse and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities’ 
(William J Fenrick ‘ICRC Guide on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2009) 12 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 287 at 287); Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International 
Humanitarian Law in War at 252; Fritz Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld (2011) Constraints on 
the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (4th ed) Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge at 99. Several other provisions in AP I also refer to the principle 
of distinction: article 44(3) ‘requires combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population’ by wearing a uniform (Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 104) or 
distinguishing sign (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 
at 254). AP I article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks which ‘strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction’. AP I article 52 entitled ‘General Protection of 
Civilian Objects’ also makes reference to the fact that: 
 ‘1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are 
all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.  
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are 
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.  
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is 
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be 
presumed not to be so used’. 
17 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 33 and 
124. 
18 Legality of the Threat on Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1996 International 
Law Reports 100 at 163 ss78ff. 
19 Nils Melzer (2009) Targeted Killings in International Law Oxford University Press: Oxford at 
301; Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 82. 
20 Dinstein ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ at 146. 
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civilian21 status, that according to IHL there is no ‘intermediate status’22 and 
every person who falls into enemy hands ‘must have some status under 
international law’23, either combatant or civilian. ‘Nobody in enemy hands can 
be outside the law'24. Moreover, when there is doubt as to an individual’s 
status, he is presumed to ‘be a civilian until indicated otherwise’25.  
While classification as a combatant affords a person the privilege to 
participate in hostilities and to target military objectives26 with a certain degree 
of immunity27 from prosecution, it is also the sanctity of the principle of 
distinction which motivates severe punishments and strips combatants of their 
privileges (such as POW status28 and legal immunity from prosecution for 
their hostile acts29) when they disguise themselves as civilians in order to 
mislead the opposition30. Similarly, the principle of distinction also lies behind 
the principle that civilians who participate directly in hostilities will face 
prosecution, since to date ‘the waging of war by other private persons’ (who 
do not enjoy combatant status) remains outlawed31. The rights, privileges, 
obligations and legal consequences extended to individuals in the theatre of 
                                                
21 Under IHL, a civilian is defined as any person who is not a combatant (AP I article 50(1)). 
22 Jean Pictet (ed.) (1958) Commentary: Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of 
Civilians ICRC: Geneva at 51. 
23 Pictet Commentary: Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians at 51. 
24 Ibid. The IHL treaties operate in such a way that those individuals who fail to satisfy the 
POW status requirements set out in GC III (captured combatants), will automatically fall within 
the ambit of protected civilian status under GC IV (provided that the article 4 requirements 
which define a protected person are satisfied (Prosecutor v Delalic et al (Celebici case) 
(1998) ICTY IT-96-21-T at para 271; Luisa Vierucci ‘Prisoners of War or Protected Persons 
Qua Unlawful Combatants? The Judicial Safeguards to which Guantánamo Bay Detainees 
are Entitled’ (2003) Journal of International Criminal Justice 284 at 299; Silvia Borelli ‘Casting 
Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the “War on 
Terror”’ (2005) 87:857 International Review of the Red Cross 39 at 49. According to Solis 
‘there no longer are statuses of “quasi-combatant” or “semi-civilian”’ (Solis The Law of Armed 
Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 188). 
25 Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1527-35. 
26 Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 105. 
27 Because it is the State and not the individual who is the enemy, the individual combatants 
themselves, while subject to being targeted legitimately during hostilities, cannot be punished 
for their participation in the hostilities. Moreover, once they are rendered hors de combat, or 
fall into enemy hands, they are no longer deemed to be a threat to the enemy and are thus 
afforded necessary medical treatment and secondary POW status (Kurt Ipsen (1995) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in 
Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 65-67). 
28 Kurt Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 79. ‘A primary status 
is a status that the particular individual possesses as a matter of his or her assignment by his 
or her State as a combatant or a non-combatant. A secondary status is a status that arises 
out of the primary status but attaches as a result of a change in circumstances… the prisoner 
of war status can then be considered a secondary status that emanates from the primary 
status of being a lawful combatant’ (Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 377). 
29 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
377. 
30 Idem at 380. 
31 Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 110. 
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armed conflict are directly linked to their primary IHL status as a civilian32 or a 
combatant, and to their observance of the principle of distinction33. 
The substance of the IHL principle of distinction remains as pertinent 
today as it was in 1949, however this strong reliance on a distinction between 
the two groups assumes that it is easy to establish who are combatants34 and 
who are civilians35. The reality is that ‘modern combatants look increasingly 
unlike the army regulars around whom the Geneva Conventions were 
drafted’36. And it is painfully obvious that ‘the Conventions and Protocols 
contain significant fault lines that limit their effectiveness in restraining the 
excesses of contemporary war’37 – one of these being their ability to apply the 
principle of distinction. The distinction between combatants and civilians may 
have been easily applied on the sterile battlefields which characterised wars 
fought prior to 1949, where civilian participation in hostilities was considered 
exceptional38.  However in modern warfare the principle of distinction is 
complicated by the reality that ‘fighters purposefully dress and live as civilians 
but fight as combatants’39 without ‘uniforms, identification cards, or formal 
affiliation procedures’40. Sadly the humanitarian usefulness of the principle of 
                                                
32 Civilians are inherently immune from targeted attack and are to be respected and protected 
(Marco Sassòli and Antoine Bouvier (2006) How Does Law Protect in War? Vol 1 (2nd ed) 
ICRC: Geneva at 203; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65, Ipsen (2008) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 79). 
33 Mirko Sossai (2011) ‘Status of Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law 
of International Armed Conflict’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzotti (eds) War By 
Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors Oxford University Press 
at 197. 
34 It is also worth stating that once an individual has been classified as either a combatant or 
civilian, there is no room for additional classifications such as ‘unprivileged’ or ‘unlawful 
enemy combatant’ which is currently employed by the U.S. to deny IHL rights to the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees (Michael Cowling and Shannon Bosch ‘Combatant Status at 
Guantanamo Bay – International Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ (2009) 42 
Comparative and International Law Quarterly of South Africa 1). In the words of the Justice 
Barak ‘terrorists should be classified as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities’ (Crane and 
Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1668-77). While it must be said that there are ‘deficiencies 
in the existing law that grant unreasonable advantages to non-law-abiding non-State actors’, 
the ‘international community… are extremely hesitant to accept radical changes to existing 
international humanitarian legal structures’ (Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 
1728-35). 
35 Richard Baxter ‘So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerillas and Saboteurs’ 
(1951) 28 British Yearbook of International Law 323. 
36 Christopher Kutz ‘The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and 
War’ (2005) 33:2 Philosophy & Public Affairs 148 at 155. 
37 Anthony Dworkin ‘Guerilla War, “Deadly Deception”, and Urban Combat’ (26 March 2006) 
Crimes of War Project available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/iraq-guerilla-
print.html (accessed August 2007). 
38 Dale Stephens and Angeline Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ 
(2006) 9 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 25 at 27.  
39 ‘When individuals are not wearing uniform or carrying arms openly, the soldier is required 
to assess their status on the basis of supporting information, such as location, behavior, or 
intelligence’ (Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1551-59). 
40 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guide on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 291; Richemond-Barak ‘Non-
State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2326-33. 
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distinction is ‘only as effective as the accuracy with which… the line between 
combatant and civilian is drawn’41. 
When one appreciates that over the last century and a half conflicts 
have played out in predominantly civilian locations42 which naturally results in 
‘increased intermingling of civilians with armed actors’43, it is not surprising 
that civilians have constituted ‘an increasing proportion of the casualties in 
armed conflict’44. Moreover, while previously civilian participation in conflict 
was seen as exceptional, in recent years it ‘has become commonplace’45 and 
‘the prevalence today of civilians on the battlefield and their increasing 
participation in conflicts presents one of the greatest challenges to armed 
forces’46. The result of greater civilian involvement in armed conflicts brings 
with it not only a greater risk that truly innocent ‘civilians are more likely to fall 
victim to erroneous or arbitrary targeting’, but also greater hazards for 
combatants who are ‘unable to properly identify their adversary’, and 
consequently ‘run an increased risk of being attacked by persons they cannot 
distinguish from the civilian population’47.  
Not only are civilians playing a greater role in modern international 
armed conflicts, but modern warfare also feature an increasing ‘array of non-
State48 participants playing central roles in hostilities’49 and undertaking a 
                                                
41 Kenneth Watkin ‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the 
Struggle over Legitimacy’ (2005) 2 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research: 
Harvard University Occasional Paper Series at 10. 
42 Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay – International Humanitarian 
Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 1. ‘New warfare generally involves States in combat with 
non-State forces and fighting in highly populated areas with a blurring of the lines between 
military forces and civilian persons and objects.’ (Laurie R Blank ‘Updating the Commander’s 
Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2010) 1:3 PRISM 59 at 
61); ICRC (2009) Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
IHL (Interpretive Guide) available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 (accessed 7 August 2011) at 11. 
43 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 11. 
44 Bill Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 741 at 741; Geraldine Van Beuren ‘The 
International Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts’ (1994) 43 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 809 at 809. 
45 Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 27.  
46 Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1515-19. 
47 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 11. 
48 ‘Non-State actors are those actors on the international plane that are not members of the 
United Nations’. This category includes ‘inter-governmental organisations, NGO’s, and 
individuals – natural and juridical’ (Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 
2333-41). 
49 Ibid. According to Kritsiotis, ‘that non-State actors have assumed increased significance in 
the authorship and perpetration of acts of violence is not an undisputed fact of international 
life’ (Dino Kritsiotis (2009) ‘International Law and the Violence of Non-State Actors’ Chapter 
14 in Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad and Michael Bohlander (eds) International Law and Power: 
Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice : Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden at 344). In 2004, of the nineteen major conflicts documented by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme all nineteen involved ‘at least one non-State actor’, 
moreover between 1989 and 2008, 401 conflicts were recorded which were fought entirely 
between non-State actors (Caroline Holmqvist (2005) ‘Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in 
Post-Conflict Settings’ Chapter 3 in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) Security 
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range of traditionally military functions50. These non-State actors appear well 
suited to adopting both civilian and combative functions ‘without existing 
international legal instruments having been formally adopted to respond to 
these evolutions’51.‘The hybrid nature of non-State entities’ makes an 
application of the principle of distinction to these entities extremely difficult52. 
While the principle of distinction is intended to assist commanding 
officers in making legally defensible targeting decisions by locating a specific 
target in one of two IHL categories (lawful combatants53 or civilians who take 
no part in hostilities54) the reality is that these supposedly clear-cut 
categories55 cannot provide clear cut answers in modern international armed 
conflicts. The dilemma with modern day conflicts is that these new non-State 
actors seem to inhabit the grey middle ground, somewhere between these 
two categories, where IHL is ‘at best – blurred’56, and ‘the application of the 
current laws of war to these actors often leads to absurd or inconsistent 
outcomes’57. This uncertainty has given rise to ‘the deliberate targeting of 
non-combatants’ as a ‘key characteristic if modern day conflicts’58, and a 
myriad of human rights abuses59 at the hands of detaining powers who simply 
do not know what legal regime applies to those who they have detained. This 
uncertainty not only adversely affects the interests of non-State participants, 
                                                                                                                                      
Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces: Geneva 45 at 45). 
50 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guide on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 288; ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian 
Law at 11). Since the end of the Cold War many States have opted to ‘downsize’ the armed 
forces, and in so doing have ‘outsourced… many of the functions performed by military 
personnel… to civilians’ (Fenrick ‘ICRC Guide on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 291). 
‘While this practice offers substantial benefits to States… it brings with it the risk of violating 
the law of war by inappropriately involving civilians in combat operations’ (John Ricou Heaton 
‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ 
(2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 155 at 157). By late 2009 the U.S. ‘central command was 
contracting for the services of 242,230 civilians and while many performed relatively benign 
functions, such as cooking or participating in reconstruction projects… others accomplished 
military logistics and intelligence duties, and well over 10,000 provided security to the 
Coalition forces and associated personnel’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 700). 
51 International Law Association ‘Second Report of the Committee on Non-State Actors in 
International Law: Lawmaking and Participation’ 2012 Sofia Conference at 11. 
52 For the most part non-State actors cannot be party to IHL conventions as they are not a 
high contracting parties, ‘having said that the Application of IHL and Fundamental Human 
Rights in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities are Parties Resolution adopted at the 
Berlin Session 25 August 1999, states that ‘all parties to armed conflicts in which non-State 
entities are parties, irrespective of their legal status… have the obligation to respect IHL as 
well as fundamental human rights’ (article ii) (Andrew Clapham (2006) Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors Oxford University Press: Oxford at 276; ILA (2010) Report of 
the 74th Conference (the Hague) 1st report of the Committee at page 631). 
53 Who always constitute a legitimate target. 
54 Who are completely immune against attack. 
55 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2341-47. 
56 Blank ‘Updating the Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the Law of 
Armed Conflict’ at 59. 
57 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2355-47. 
58 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict (8 September 1999) S/1999/957. 
59 Garth Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary Safety”: The Guantanamo Bay 
Internees and Combatant Status’ (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 829 at 832-5. 
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‘but also (and perhaps most importantly) hurts the civilian population, whose 
protection cannot be properly ensured’60. 
The sum total of all of this is that international armed conflicts are not 
the beast that they once were, and new non-State actors are clamouring to 
lay claim to some form of protected IHL status, thus demanding the principle 
of distinction to offer an almost impossible solution.  
 
1.1 Research hypothesis and rationale  
 
i. Hypothesis and rationale for selecting these five particular non-State 
actors 
 
Recent international and non-international armed conflicts have witnessed 
greater levels of involvement by a variety of non-State actors. Amongst these 
are five particular actors, which have shown an increase in both their 
prevalence, and their degree of participation in recent armed conflicts, and 
which I have chosen to examine in this thesis. They are: 
1. under-aged child soldiers recruited by non-State armed groups 
(chapter 5);  
2. private military and security contractors (PMSC) (chapter 6);  
3. voluntary human shields (VHS) (chapter 7);  
4. journalists (chapter 8) and  
5. relief workers (chapter 9).  
Some of these actors, like VHS and PMSC, are relatively new to the theatre of 
hostilities. Others, like child soldiers; journalists and relief workers, have 
already featured in past conflicts, but their more recent activities reveal a new 
level of involvement that is peculiar to contemporary armed conflicts.  
The emergence of these actors, and their new levels of involvement in 
recent armed conflicts, has raised questions around how IHL deals with actors 
which either were simply not contemplated at the time the various IHL 
conventions were drafted, or whose degree of involvement in the hostilities 
was never anticipated. So for example, while there is ample evidence of IHL 
provisions limiting the recruitment of children into the armed forces, ‘relatively 
less attention has been directed at reconsidering the legal status of children 
participating directly in hostilities, and the rules for their targeting’61. Similarly, 
while the drafters of the IHL conventions included provisions aimed at 
outlawing mercenarism, they simply never envisaged a 300 billion US dollars 
private security industry, which might circumvent the mercenary definition62. 
Likewise, there is evidence that those tasked with drafting the IHL treaties 
appreciated the plight of the human shield, and consequently outlawed their 
                                                
60 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2792-99. 
61 Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen ‘Children as Direct Participants in Hostilities’ in William C Banks 
(ed) (2011) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia 
Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at 2867-74 (ebook version). 
62 Renée De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ (2009) 40 Security 
Dialogue available at http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/40/2/169 (accessed 10 July 2012) at 
175; Jennifer K Elsea, Moshe Schwartz and Kennon H Nakamura ‘Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’ (2008) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf (accessed 10 July 2012) at 9-11; Andrew 
Clapham ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 88:863 
International Review of the Red Cross 491 at 498. 
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use in armed conflicts, but they never considered the possibility, or intended 
for these treaty provision to be applied63 to individuals who might voluntarily 
choose to shield an object from direct targeting. In the same manner, the 
degree to which journalists and relief workers would be present and involved 
in the theatre of hostilities, and the extent to which they would face deliberate 
targeting64, and consequently need to employ the services of their own 
PMSCs65, was never fully comprehended when the IHL conventions were 
drafted.  
In spite of these deficiencies in the existing legal regime, IHL is and must 
‘remain, responsive to the evolving nature of warfare’66.  If these non-State 
actors are present in contemporary armed conflicts then IHL needs to: 
a. clarify the primary status of these actors under IHL; 
b. advise these actors of the legal obligations, and the legal limitations 
upon their actions, pursuant to the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities;  
c. guide belligerent commanders tasked with making targeting decisions 
in the face of such actors; and  
d. advise belligerents parties of their legal obligations, in the event that 
these non-State actors are captured or detained. 
 
ii. Hypothesis and rationale for limiting this analysis to the legal regime 
applicable to international armed conflicts 
 
IHL is divided into two legal regimes, one that applies to international armed 
conflicts, and another vastly different legal regime that applies to non-
international (or internal) armed conflicts67. While there is certainly a degree of 
                                                
63 Rewi Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 313 
at 315. 
64 In a study undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) in 2008, it was found that 
‘relatively speaking, the rates of attacks directed at aid workers had increased by sixty-one 
percent’ (Peter Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of 
the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ in Victoria Wheeler and 
Adele Harmer (eds) Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military–
Humanitarian Relations (2006) 22 HPG Report at 6).  
65 Not surprisingly relief workers are ‘choosing to arm themselves’ (Kjell Bjork and Richard 
Jones ‘Overcoming Dilemmas Created by the 21st Century Mercenaries: Conceptualising the 
Use of Private Security Companies in Iraq’ Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: A Quixotic 
Beginning to the `Global Democratic Revolution' (2005) 26:4/5 Third World Quarterly 777 at 
785) and PMSCs are increasingly being contracted as a ‘matter of routine’ to ‘provide security 
to humanitarian NGOs’ (Åse Gili Østensen ‘ U.N. Use of Private Military and Security 
Companies’ (2011) 3 SSR Paper available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-
Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-Practices-and-Policies (accessed 4 September 
2012) at 49); Christopher Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, 
International Private Security Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’ (2008) 39 Security 
Dialogue at 363. 
66 Ibid. 
67Cherif Bassiouni ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
conflict by Non-State Actors’ at 728. 'Some armed conflicts are in part international and in part 
non-international; some mutate from non-international to international; and some, like “wars of 
national liberation” in the context of colonialism and settler regimes, covered by article 1(4) of 
AP I, are deemed to be of an international character, even though one set of combatants are 
non-State actors’ (Cherif Bassiouni ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law 
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commonality between these two legal regimes68, there is also much which 
distinguishes them, beginning with the fact that each regime is regulated by a 
distinct set of treaties and specific treaty provisions. International armed 
conflicts are defined and regulated primarily by GC I-IV69 and AP I70, while 
non-international armed conflicts are regulated only by common article 3 
found in the Geneva Conventions I-IV and APII71. 
Not only is the source of each regime to be found in distinct treaties, 
but more fundamentally there are far fewer treaty provisions which deal with 
non-international armed conflicts72. While APII was intended to supplement 
the basic standards contained in common article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions, it did so in a meager fifteen articles, and with much less detail 
than the eighty articles found in its sister treaty, API, which governs 
international armed conflicts73.  
Moreover the levels of State ratification of those treaties regulating 
non-international armed conflicts is much lower then the levels achieved in 
respect of treaties governing international armed conflicts74. Consequently, 
where ratification of APII is lacking, States engaged in non-international 
armed conflicts are governed solely by the ‘rudimentary framework of 
minimum standards’75 contained in common article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions and customary international law.  
Given the lower levels of State ratification, and the paucity of treaty 
provisions dealing specifically with conflicts of a non-international nature, it 
comes as no surprise that the legal regime applicable to conflicts of an 
international nature is widely regarded as being better established and less 
                                                                                                                                      
of Armed conflict by Non-State Actors’ at 713; Rikke Ishøy (2008) Handbook on the Practical 
Use of International Humanitarian Law (Revised edition) Danish Red Cross: København at 
45-46). 
68 So for example both regimes are founded upon the principle of distinction, and 
consequently the notion of only targeting those who participate directly in hostilities is 
common to both regimes (ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 70). 
69 Common article 2, found in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, defines what 
constitutes an ‘international armed conflict’ as, ‘all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the State of war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all 
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance’. 
70 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty 
Series 1391 
71 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (AP II) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty 
Series 609 
72 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (2005) Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at xxxiv. These 
include only common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions; APII; the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons; the Rome Statute; the Ottawa Convention banning anti-
personnel landmines, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property and its Second Protocol (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
Customary International Humanitarian Law at xxxv.). 
73 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at xxxv. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Idem at xxxiv. 
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controversial76. While the legal regime applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts suffers from ‘a lack of rules, definitions, details and requirements in 
treaty law’77. In fact some of the principles which form the very bedrock of IHL, 
like the principles of distinction and proportionality, which are extensively 
defined and regulated in AP I (and applied in conflicts of an international 
nature), are not even regulated or defined in AP II78, which is applicable to 
non-international armed conflicts. 
Another important aspect which distinguishes these two legal regimes 
is the manner in which individuals are categorised under each regime. The 
legal regime applicable in situations of international armed conflict is peculiar 
in that the regime has at its foundation the notion that every individual in the 
theatre of international armed conflict has a specific primary status under IHL: 
as either a combatant79 or a civilian. Moreover, it is this primary status that 
determines one’s secondary POW status upon capture. It is uncontroversial 
that this notion of primary and secondary status is a feature of ‘common 
article 2 conflicts only’80, and consequently is an issue that is peculiar to 
international armed conflicts81. This status classification, which is recognised 
under both customary and conventional IHL, ‘is strictly limited to international 
armed conflicts’82. As Solis notes, ‘there are no “combatants”, lawful or 
otherwise, in common article 3 conflicts’ (i.e. non-international conflicts)83. 
Consequently ‘a person who would otherwise qualify as a lawful combatant in 
a conflict of an international character becomes a common criminal in a 
conflict of a non-international character’84.   
 
  
                                                
76 Ibid.  
77 Idem at xxxv. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Or ‘belligerent’, as is sometimes referred to in older texts dating back to the 1874 Brussels 
Conference, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences and codified in the 1907 Hague 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at 
War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 169).  
80 Common article 2 refers to conflicts of an international nature, while common article 3 
refers to conflicts of a non-international nature (De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and 
the Laws of War’ at 173; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at 11; Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in 
War at 238; Robert Goldman and Brian Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ (2002) ASIL Task Force Paper available at 
www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012) at 23, Pictet Commentary: 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians at 23). 
81 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 238; Goldman 
and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 23, Pictet Commentary: 
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians at 23; Blank ‘Updating the 
Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the Law of Armed Conflict’ at 64; 
David Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 699 at 
701. 
82 Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 1.  
83 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 191. 
84 Cherif Bassiouni ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
conflict by Non-State Actors’ at 727. 
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While there is certainly academic value in assessing the activities of these five 
new actors in the light of both legal regimes, such an exercise would render 
enough material for two full dissertations. In short, an analysis which 
attempted to assess all five groups in terms of both legal regimes 
simultaneously, would no doubt end up compromising a thorough rendering 
on the topic, and settling for a superficial analysis across both of the legal 
regimes. For this reason I believe that it would be a more beneficial exercise 
to conduct these two studies separately, and that the first analysis should be 
in respect of the legal regime which is commonly felt to be the most settled 
and least uncontroversial – that being the regime applicable in international 
armed conflicts. It is worth nothing at this juncture that although the legal 
regime applicable in conflicts of an international nature is more established 
and less contested, an analysis of these five groups of non-State actors has 
not yet been the subject of extensive legal scrutiny and remains contested 
and in need of evaluation. 
For these reasons I have elected to proceed with the analysis of these 
five new groups of actors in terms of only one of these legal regimes: the 
regime applicable in conflicts of an international nature85, as defined by 
common article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions (GC I-IV), and as later 
amended by AP I article 1(4)86. In short this will cover ‘all hostilities directed 
against the armed forces or the territory of one State by forces representing 
another State or acting de facto under the direction or control of another 
State’87. This will include instances of internal armed where ‘(i) another State 
intervenes in that conflict through its troops88, or alternatively if (ii) some of the 
participants in the internal armed conflict, act on behalf of that other State’89. 
International armed conflicts can also arise in situations of an occupied 
territory, when ‘an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups – whether 
or not they are terrorist in character’ are engaged in an armed conflict90, as 
was the finding of the Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee 
                                                
85 Françoise J Hampson (1996) ‘Legal Protection Afforded to Children Under International 
Humanitarian Law’ Report for the Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children by 
University of Essex available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000578.html 
(accessed 12 September 2012). What is beyond the scope of this piece is situations which do 
not amount to armed conflict (e.g. ‘armed force by criminal or organised terrorist activities’), 
since in these instances IHL does not apply (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 
7). 
86 AP I article 1(4), includes within the parameters of an international armed conflict, ‘armed 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self determination’. 
87 Marco Sassòli (2007) ‘Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law’ 
(9-10 March 2007) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard 
University available at http://www.tagsproject.org/_data/global/images/Sassoli.pdf (accessed 
12 September 2012) at 4. ‘Similarly and more controversially, the law of international armed 
conflict applies when a State is directing hostilities against a transnational armed group on the 
territory of another State without the agreement of the latter State’ (Idem at 5). 
88 For example the US and Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. 
89 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic ICTY IT-94-1-A at para 34. Goldman and Tittemore conclude 
that this would include the Taliban in 2001 Afghanistan or possibly Hezbollag in 2006 in 
Lebanon (Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 23). 
90Antonio Cassese (2005) International Law Oxford University Press: Oxford at 420.   
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against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel91. 
In conducting this analysis I hope to establish a innovative and useful 
baseline for understanding the status and consequent legal obligations of 
these new actors in light of a legal regime which is relatively uncontested92, 
well supported by extensive treaty and customary IHL, and which has at its 
core a strong focus on the importance behind determining the primary status 
of all those found in the theatre of international armed conflicts. 
iii. Hypothesis and rationale for addressing the issue of status under IHL 
 
As already mentioned, every individual in the theatre of an international armed 
conflict must be classified as either a combatant or a civilian. The body of IHL 
which deals with how we assign combatant or civilian status in international 
armed conflicts is relatively well established, and will be spelt out further in 
chapters 2 and 3. While the law may be settled, the application of the law and 
the determination of one’s primary status under IHL, has life and death 
consequences, and has not yet been undertaken in respect of these five 
groups of non-State actors. One’s legal status dictates not only whether one is 
immune from attack, and how one is to be treated upon capture, but crucially 
whether one is authorised to participate in the hostilities. In short, it is 
imperative that every actor in an international armed conflict know, not only 
their own primary IHL status, but also the primary status of those individuals 
they encounter during hostilities. Moreover, once individuals fall into enemy 
hands their primary status will determine whether they can be detained, how 
they are to be treated whilst in detention, and whether they qualify for 
secondary POW status during their period of detention.   
As the presence of these new actors becomes more prevalent in the 
theatre of international armed conflicts, the legal regime is placed under strain 
to assign primary status to these new actors, whose recent involvement in 
armed conflict was not envisaged at the time the IHL conventions were 
drafted. While these new actors appear to occupy a hybrid ‘grey area’ 
between the two mutually exclusive IHL categories of: combatant and civilian, 
legally speaking no such grey-area can exist. There is an urgent need for the 
status of these new actors to be clarified so that their status can be accurately 
factored into any targeting decisions, and so that they can understand the 
parameters and limitations placed upon their actions. The legal quagmire 
which surrounded the Guantanamo Bay detainees93 provides a warning as to 
what can result when confusion surrounds the legal status of new actors in 
international armed conflicts. It is this lacuna, in the application of the existing 
legal regime of assigning combatant or civilian status, which I seek to 
elucidate in respect of under-aged child soldiers recruited by non-State armed 
groups; PMSCs; VHS; journalists and relief workers.  
 
                                                
91 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 18. 
92 This basis would then form a useful starting point for a later analysis of these new actors in 
light of the more controversial and less settled legal regime applicable to conflicts of a non-
international character. 
93 Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay – International Humanitarian 
Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 1. 
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iv. Hypothesis and rationale for canvassing the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities 
 
It is un-contested that serious legal ramifications flow from a determination 
that a civilian has participated directly in hostilities94. First and foremost 
civilians can be made the target of a direct attack, for so long as their 
participation persists, and upon capture they can face criminal prosecution for 
participating in the hostilities without combatant authority. At the heart of this 
important assessment is understanding when one’s actions amount to ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’. Until very recently IHL had failed to provide a ‘clear 
definition of what constituted direct participation in combat’95 in either the four 
Geneva Conventions or their two additional protocols96. States had exploited 
this lacuna in the law, and had ‘taken advantage of this ambiguity to further 
increase civilian participation’97, by contracting out previously military 
functions to civilians.  
The controversy surrounding what activities amount to ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’ prompted the ICRC to convene a series of expert 
meetings, and to publish The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law. The 
Interpretive Guide addresses the notion of direct participation in both 
international and non-international conflicts synonymously98. However that 
synonymous interpretation of the notion of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ is 
applied to two different definitions of what constitutes a ‘civilian’. In the legal 
regime applicable in international99 armed conflicts,  
‘civilians are defined negatively as all persons who are neither 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor participants 
in a leve ́e en masse’100. 
This definition reflects the customary IHL position in situations of 
international armed conflict101. While in non-international armed conflicts, the 
guide refers to civilians as: 
‘all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized 
armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, 
entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities. In non- international armed conflict, 
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State 
party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous 
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat 
                                                
94 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
95 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 157. 
96 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Idem at 44. 
99 ‘For the purposes of the principle of distinction in international armed conflict, all persons 
who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor participants in a 
leveé en masse are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’ (Idem at 16). 
100 Idem at 21. 
101 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 5. 
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function”)’.  
These diverse definitions of civilian status, endorsed by the Interpretive 
Guide, once again provide further justification for separating the analysis of 
these actors in light of the two distinct legal regimes applicable to international 
and non-international armed conflict. For this added reason I will restrict my 
focus to an analysis of these new actors in terms of the definition of what 
constitutes a civilian in an international armed conflict, and then proceed to 
assess their actions against the guide’s test for ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’. 
As the presence of new actors has become more prevalent in 
international armed conflicts, questions have emerged around the legal effect 
of their actions in light of their primary status under IHL and the notion of 
‘direct participation in hostilities’. When one appreciates that under IHL 
‘civilians… were never meant to participate directly in hostilities on behalf of a 
party to the conflict’102, one can appreciate the legal confusion which results 
when actors like child soldiers, PMSC, VHS and the like enter the fray. Not 
only is there confusion as to whether these actors are susceptible to direct 
targeting on the basis that their actions compromise their civilian immunity, 
but the confusion persists when they are detained, and it is unclear whether 
they should face prosecution for their unauthorised actions. 
The rationale for this study is to not only assist those who must assess 
the primary status of these new non-State actors, but also to elucidate the 
types of activities which they may perform in international armed conflicts 
without compromising their civilian immunity from attack. In addition I will spell 
out which activities do constitute ‘direct participation in hostilities’, and which 
will potentially compromise their civilian immunity against direct targeting, and 
expose them to potential prosecution upon capture. 
 
1.2 Research framework  
 
i. Literature review 
 
I will begin my exploration by giving a brief overview of the existing literature 
which form the basis for my analysis. In chapter 2 I will explain the IHL 
concept of combatant status, exploring: who qualifies under IHL for combatant 
status; what privileges and legal consequences attach to combatant status; 
and whether combatant status can, legally speaking, be forfeited. In chapter 3 
I explain the IHL notion of primary civilian status, and in doing so consider the 
special protections afforded civilians, the limitations placed upon their 
participation in hostilities, and whether individuals can forfeit their civilian 
status. In chapter 4 I will explore the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
and the impact this has upon civilians. I explore the treaty and customary law 
precursors to the ICRC’s interpretation of the concept, and then explain the 
ICRC’s test set out in the recently released Interpretive Guide, as a means to 
determine when a specific hostile act amounts to direct participation in 
hostilities. In exploring the Interpretive Guide I discuss the criticisms leveled at 
the test for direct participation, the revolving door of protection and the notion 
                                                
102 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 38. 
 16 
of ‘continous combat function’. While this review of the existing literature 
forms the basis for my analysis, it must be noted that the five types of non-
State actor upon which I focus my writings are currently either not mentioned 
at all, or are only given a very cursory treatment in existing IHL treaty and 
customary law. It is this lacunae in the law which I seek to address in a series 
of published chapters. 
 
ii. Published chapters 
 
I then turn to offer a chapter dedicated to each of the five non-State actors in 
turn. Within each chapter I interrogate two key issues in respect of each type 
of non-State actor: first, I apply the existing IHL regime to determine their 
primary IHL status.  Second I apply the test set out in the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guide in order to ascertain whether, and if so when, their actions amount to 
direct participation in hostilities.  
These chapters, which have been updated and reproduced here with 
the kind permission of the publishing journals, are based on ten original 
articles103. Five of these have been published in peer-reviewed SAPSE 
accredited journals104, and a further two have been accepted for publication in 
a peer-reviewed SAPSE accredited journals in 2013105. One article is still 
undergoing review for 2013 publication, while the remaining two articles are 
ready for submission for publication in peer-reviewed and SAPSE accredited 
journals for publication in 2013 and 2014.  Eight of the ten articles were 
written under supervision, subsequent to my registration for the degree of 
PhD by publications in 2009.   
 
Chapter 4, which is entitled ‘Understanding And Observing The International 
Humanitarian Law Notion of Direct Participation In Hostilities: A Literature 
Review’, is based on one article:  
• Shannon Bosch ‘The International Humanitarian Law Notion Of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities – A Review of the ICRC Interpretive Guide 
and Subsequent Debate’ (ready for submission for publication)106.  
 
Chapter 5, which is entitled ‘The Combatant Status of ‘Under-aged’ Child 
Soldiers Recruited by Non-State-armed Groups in International Armed 
Conflicts, in Light of the International Humanitarian Law Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’, is based on two articles:  
• Shannon Bosch ‘Targeting and Prosecuting ‘Under-Aged’ Child 
Soldiers in International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the International 
Humanitarian Law Prohibition Against Civilian Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2012) XLV:3 Comparative and International Law Quarterly 
of South Africa 324-364107; and 
 
                                                
103 With a total word count of 90748 words. 
104 With a total word count of 42019 words. 
105 Bringing the total word count for published work to 61369  words. 
106 Word count 11635. 
107 Word count 9824. In hindsight and after reconsideration, I concede that the use of the 
word prohibition should more accurately be replaced with the term ‘notion’. 
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• Shannon Bosch ‘The Combatant Status of ‘Under-aged’ Child Soldiers 
Recruited by Non-state Armed Groups in International Armed Conflicts’ 
(2013) African Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
(forthcoming)108.  
 
Chapter 6, which is entitled ‘The Combatant Status of Private Military and 
Security Contractors in International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the 
International Humanitarian Law Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ is 
based upon two articles: 
• Shannon Bosch ‘Private Security Contractors and International 
Humanitarian Law – a Skirmish for Recognition in International Armed 
Conflicts’ (2007)16:4 African Security Review 34109; and 
• Shannon Bosch ‘Private military and security contractors: a face-off 
with the notion of direct participation in hostilities, in international armed 
conflicts’ (2013) Journal for Juridical Science (forthcoming)110.  
 
Chapter 7, entitled ‘Assessing the Combatant Status of Voluntary Human 
Shields in International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ is based upon two articles: 
• Shannon Bosch ‘Voluntary Human Shields: Status-less in the 
Crosshairs?’ (2007) XL:3 Comparative and International Law Quarterly 
of South Africa 322111 and; 
• Shannon Bosch ‘Targeting Decisions involving Voluntary Human 
Shields in International Armed Conflicts: in Light of the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ submitted for publication to the Comparative 
and International Law Quarterly of South Africa (undergoing review)112.  
 
Chapter 8, entitled ‘Assessing the Combatant Status of Journalist in 
International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ is based on the following article:  
• Shannon Bosch ‘Journalists: Shielded from the Dangers of War in their 
Pursuit of the Truth’ (2009) 34 South African Yearbook of International 
Law 70113. 
 
Chapter 9, which is entitled ‘Assessing the Combatant Status of Relief 
Workers in International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ is based on two articles:  
• Shannon Bosch ‘Relief Workers: the Hazards of Offering Humanitarian 
Assistance in the Theatre of War’ (2010) 35 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 56114.  
• Shannon Bosch ‘Private Security Contractors and Neutral Relief 
Workers – An Unlikely Marriage’ (submitted to AYIHL for peer review 
                                                
108 Word count 9602. 
109 Word count 6485. 
110 Word count 8930. 
111 Word count 8594. 
112 Word count 7196. 
113 Word count 9784. 
114 Word count 7614. 
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and possible publication in 2013/2014)115. 
                                                




THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW CONCEPT OF 
COMBATANT STATUS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As already mentioned, at the heart of international humanitarian law (IHL) is 
the concept that every individual in the theatre of war possesses a recognised 
primary status: as either a combatant or a civilian1. There is no middle ground 
between these two status’2, and ‘you are either a combatant or a civilian, you 
cannot be both’3. 
Consequently, combatant or civilian status forms one of the chief 
enquiries around which the laws of war are organised. Not only does one’s 
primary status determine what legal regime applies to one’s actions4, but it 
also determines what legal consequences flow from one’s actions5 and the 
IHL obligations imposed upon one’s captors6. Given the seriousness of the 
consequences which flow from a determination that an individual is either a 
privileged combatant or an immune civilian, it is of fundamental importance 
that IHL give clear directives as to how one assigns such status. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that at almost every conference convened to codify IHL, 
the subject of who should be afforded combatant versus civilian status has 
proved to be the sticking point. 
                                                
1 Knut Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1st ed) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 65. 
2 Gary Solis (2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 
Cambridge University Press: New York at 235. ‘If an individual is not entitled to the 
protections of GC I-III he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of GC IV, provided that its 
article 4 requirements are satisfied’ (Garth Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary 
Safety”: The Guantanamo Bay Internees and Combatant Status’ (2004) 121 South African 
Law Journal 829 at 847). The so-called nationality requirement of article 4 affords ‘protected 
persons status’ to all detained individuals who are of a different nationality to their captors. 
The ‘nationals of the detaining State, neutrals and co-belligerents, could resolve their 
detention problems through the available diplomatic offices of the detainees own State’ (Solis 
The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 235). However the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has said that article 4 ‘may now be given a wider construction so that 
persons may be accorded protected status, notwithstanding the fact that he is of the same 
nationality as his captors’ (Prosecutor v Tadic ICTY (15 July 1999) IT-94-1-A at para 164 and 
169). Being the tribunal’s minority view it is not binding on other tribunals (Solis The Law of 
Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 236). 
3 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 233; Prosecutor 
v Delalic et al (Celebici case) ICTY Judgement (16 November 1998) IT-96-21-T available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf (accessed 18 September 
2012) at para 271. 
4 Anthony PV Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3-34 at 27. 
5 One’s primary status can make the ‘difference between a criminal trial for murder in a 
domestic court’ (for example when a civilian kills someone during hostilities) and POW status 
with full immunity from prosecution for the very same act when it is committed by a combatant 
(Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65; Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law in War at 186). 
6 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 238; Ipsen 
(1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65. 
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2.2 Defining the term ‘combatant’ 
 
The term ‘combatant’ (or ‘belligerent’, as is sometimes referred to in older 
texts7) is used to ‘denote a particular status in international armed conflicts’8. 
In IHL the term combatant ‘is a term of art’9, it brings with it very particular 
privileges and obligations. Although ‘there is no consensus definition of the 
term combatant in international law’10, ‘most international law scholars agree 
… that at least the class of persons who are lawful combatants is fairly 
clear’11. If put on the spot to provide a working definition12, most academics 
refer to article 4A(2) of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III)13, which provides a ‘criteria for 
determining Prisoner of war (POW) status’14, which in turn they would argue is 
a secondary IHL status which is only conferred upon those who already have 
primary combatant status15. However, the ICRC is correct to point out that 
strictly speaking the requirements set out in GC III article 4A(2) ‘constitute 
conditions for the post-capture entitlement of irregular armed forces to 
combatant privilege and prisoner- of-war status’16, and are not per se a 
definition of combatant status. 
It is important to note that ‘no one is born a combatant… without being 
a civilian first’17. Once a civilian becomes a ‘member of the armed forces of a 
                                                
7 Dating back to the 1874 Brussels Conference, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace 
Conferences and codified in the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land (John Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 155 at 169).  
8 Laurie R Blank ‘Updating the Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the 
Law of Armed Conflict’ (2010) 1:3 PRISM 59 at 64; David Whippman ‘Redefining 
Combatants’ (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 699 at 701. 
9 Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ at 701. 
10 Eric T Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C Banks (ed) ‘New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare’ (Columbia University Press: 
New York) (ebook version) at 1888-97. While some argue that a definition can be found in the 
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty Series 
1391 articles 43 and 44. This ‘definition is disputed by a number of nations, including the U.S.’ 
(Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1888-97; Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ at 
701). ‘As James Spaight stated in 1911, the delegates to the 1907 Conference had “almost 
shirked their task — a task of great difficulty, it must be admitted” in attempting to define 
combatant status’ (Kenneth Watkin ‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged 
Belligerents, and the Struggle over Legitimacy’ (2005) 2 Program on Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research: Harvard University Occasional Paper Series at 3-4). 
11 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1888-97. 
12 Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ at 701. 
13 (1950) 75 U.N.Treaty Series 135.  
14 Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ at 701. 
15 As Ricou-Heaton points out ‘POWs are, in most circumstances, simply combatants who fall 
into the hands of the enemy, the definition of who is entitled to POW status is all but 
synonymous with who is a combatant’ (Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the 
Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 169). 
16 ICRC (2009) Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL 
(Interpretive Guide) available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 (accessed 7 August 2011) at 21-22. 
17 Shlomy Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant 
Belong?’ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 378 at 390. 
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belligerent party’18, they are presumed to acquire primary combatant status, 
and with that the potential for acquiring secondary prisoner of war (POW) 
privileges upon capture19. Moreover, this combatant status is granted 
irrespective of the ‘specified task assigned to an individual within the military 
apparatus’20, be it a combative task (i.e. fighting on the frontlines) or one that 
does not involve engaging in combat (i.e. cooking)21. The rule that combatant 
status derives from one’s mere membership in the armed forces, rather then 
one’s function22, is widely acknowledged without any State practice to the 
contrary23.  
 
i. Non-combatant members of the armed forces 
 
While for most combatants they will be ‘trained to engage in combat and fire 
weapons’, a substantial proportion of the membership of the armed forces 
‘serve in auxiliary or administrative positions (ranging from legal advisors to 
cooks)’, and do not engage in combat operations24. Consequently, within the 
conglomerate25 classification of ‘combatant’, one finds ‘cooks, court reporters, 
judges, government officials, blue–collar workers’26, medics and chaplains. 
These service personnel within the ranks of the armed forces are ‘denied 
authorisation to use a weapon or a weapons system’27 and are consequently 
called non-combatant28 members of the armed forces29. Since this limitation 
on their authorisation to participate in combat stems from national legislation, 
it has no impact on the international law position which affords blanket 
combatant status to all members of the armed forces30.  
Moreover, even though these members of the armed forces play a non-
combatant role, they remain subject to the ‘dangers arising from military 
                                                
18 This is irrespective of whether they are ‘regular or irregular’ and ‘including paramilitary units 
incorporated de facto in the armed forces’ (Robert Goldman and Brian Tittemore 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2002) ASIL Task Force Paper available 
at www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012) at 11).  
19 Ibid; GC III article 4A (1) and (3). 
20 Yoram Dinstein (2004) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 33. 
21 David M Crane and Daniel Reisner (2011) ‘Jousting at Windmills’ in William C Banks (ed) 
New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia University 
Press: New York (ebook version) at 1535-44. 
22 Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1595-1604. 
23 Dale Stephens and Angeline Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ 
(2006) 9 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 25 at 30. 
24 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 33. 
25 Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 30. 
26 Knut Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 99. 
27 Idem at 81; AP I article 43(2). 
28 The 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the 
Hague Convention IV of 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations ‘HR’) 1910 U.K. Treaty Series 
9 available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195 (accessed 14 July 2012) at article 3. 
29 Nevertheless, ‘non-combatants, too, have the right to defend themselves or others against 
any attacks… the attack activates the latent combatant status irrespective of whether the 
attack was in contravention of the laws of war’ (Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 103-104). 
30 Idem at 99. 
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operations’31. The ‘general protection against the dangers arising from military 
operations which API article 51… affords to the civilian population and to 
individual civilians’32 does not extend to non-combatant members of the 
armed forces because their membership of the armed forces precludes them 
from enjoying primary civilian status33. Since they are not civilians, and the 
actions of these non-combatants do contribute to the ‘effective military 
operations’34, the opposition forces are relieved of the burden of having ‘to 
differentiate during their attack between combatant and non-combatant 
members of the adverse armed forces’35. 
 
ii. Hors de combat 
 
Within the sub-category of ‘non-combatants’ we also find ‘those who, but for 
their injuries, would be classified as ordinary combatants (the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked)’36. When a combatant ‘becomes hors de combat… he does 
not become a civilian; but he is entitled to special protections and he must be 
accorded privileges of POW’37. 
 
iii. Military and religious personnel 
 
Medical and religious personnel enjoy the protection of a distinct legal regime, 
with their own unique primary IHL status, dating back to 1864 and developed 
through subsequent Geneva conventions38. They form a peculiar sub-
category of non-combatant members of the armed forces. They are ‘expressly 
prohibited from participating directly in hostilities and enjoy special protection 
as a result of this limitation’39. In order to highlight their unique status in the 
theatre of operations, they are issued with special armbands40 to ‘mark the 
wearers as non-combatants and not lawful targets’41. Unlike other non-
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 API article 50(1) provides a negative legal definition: ‘a civilian is any person who does not 
belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in articles 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of GC 
III and article 43 of API’ (Ibid). 
34 Idem at 100. 
35 Provided that no medical or religious personnel are present at the location (Ibid). 
36 A combatant is rendered hors de combat ‘through surrender or incapacitation’ (Dinstein 
The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 34). The 
protections afforded these non-combatants are explored comprehensively in GC I (1949 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (GC I) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 31) and GC II 
(1974 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. 
Treaty Series 85). 
37 Yoram Dinstein (2007) ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ in 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and Volker Epping (eds.) International Humanitarian Law 
Facing New Challenges Springer: Berlin at 148. 
38 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 102; GC III article 4(c) states: ‘this 
article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in 
article 33 of the present Convention’. 
39 GC I articles 24, 26 and 27; Dinstein ‘The System of Status Groups in International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 147. 
40 These bear a red cross or crescent on a white background. 
41 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 192. 
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combatant members of the armed forces, military and religious personnel 
cannot be made the target of a legitimate attack. Moreover, were they to fall 
into enemy hands, they would not hold POW status strictu sensu, ‘although 
they are POWs to all outward appearances’42. Technically their legal status is 
one of ‘retained personnel’43. 
 
2.3 The privileges attached to the authorisation to participate in 
hostilities: immunity from prosecution and secondary POW status 
 
At the heart of any understanding of combatant status is an appreciation for 
the fact that combatants are for the most part authorised to participate in 
hostilities44. This international law authorisation does not vest in them on an 
individual level45, ‘but results from the affiliation of the combatant to an organ 
(i.e. the armed forces) of a party to the conflict, which is itself a subject of 
international law’46. It is the fact that they act for the ‘sovereign’, which clothes 
them with authorised combatant status47 and distinguishes them as lawful 
belligerents. Since the 1856 Paris Declaration declared in article 1 that 
‘privateering is, and remains, abolished’48, the legal position is that in order to 
enjoy lawful combatant status one needs to act on behalf of a sovereign49. 
Since combatants are acting as ‘agents of a sovereign’ they are 
exempt from personal liability for their ‘authorised acts’50. It is the State and 
not the individual combatant which is the enemy, thus individual combatants, 
while subject to being targeted legitimately during hostilities, cannot be 
punished for their participation in the hostilities, on account of the fact that 
they were specifically authorised to participate in hostilities. Their lawful 
authorisation to engage in combat precludes them from being ‘criminally 
prosecuted for their belligerent acts’51. Without this combatant status, they 
                                                
42 Idem at 191.  
43 ‘Retainees include dentists, surgeons and other medical doctors’ but exclude ‘medical 
orderlies and chaplain’s assistants’ (Ibid). However ‘if a physician or a chaplain refuses to 
employ his professional abilities… he will be removed from the category of retained personnel 
and be detained as an ordinary POW’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict at 42).  
44 Although in terms of national legislation that authorisation may be limited, as is the case 
with non-combatant members of the armed forces. 
45 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 66-67. 
46 It is worth mentioning at this juncture that in an armed conflict, only a recognised subject of 
international law can clothe their armed forces with authorised combatant status.  
47 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2020-28. 
48 Won Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2010) 38:3 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 361 at 381. 
49 ‘Private citizens and independent armed groups have always been excluded from 
entitlement to the combatant privilege and POW status’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law in War at 197). ‘There is no room for hostilities in an 
international armed conflict being conducted by individuals on their own initiative’ (Dinstein 
The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 43). 
50 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1897-1906 and 1906-14. 
51 GC II article 87 gives expression to the customary international law principle that a 
detaining power cannot try ‘POW’s for acts which do not violate the laws of war’ (Zachary 
‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ at 380; 
Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 4). 
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would otherwise be criminally liable for killing ‘enemy combatants’52. That 
said, their authorisation does come with the caveat that they are required to 
observe the laws of war53.  
The privilege of being an authorised combatant also brings with it the 
benefit of presumptive54 secondary POW status in the event that the 
combatants ‘become hors de combat, surrender55, or fall into enemy hands 
whilst participating’56 in hostilities. The rationale for this progression of their 
primary combatant status into secondary POW status, is based on the fact 
that as a detained combatant ‘their ability to fight is limited and they are no 
longer deemed to be a military threat to the enemy’57. Since they were 
authorised combatants they cannot as POWs be regarded as criminals for 
their participation in the hostilities58. Neither is their detention seen as 
punitive, it is simply a preventative ‘way of putting combatants hors de combat 
for the duration of the conflict’59. At the cessation of hostilities those lawful 
combatants (held as POWs) are repatriated ‘to their own country, free to 
continue life unimpeded by their lawful hostile acts’60. 
 
2.4 The consequences attaching to combatant status: continuous lawful 
targeting and prosecution for violations of IHL 
 
In exchange for the immunity combatants enjoy from prosecution by virtue of 
their combatant status, they also ‘accept the risks associated with identifying 
themselves openly as members of the party to the conflict’61. Probably the 
most daunting consequence flowing from one’s status as a combatant is that  
a combatant can be the legitimate target of an attack by opposing forces at all 
times and at all locations62, a position which is undisputed according to the 
Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel 
                                                
52 Michael Brough ‘Combatant, Noncombatant, Criminal: The Importance of Distinction’ 
(2004) 11 Ethical Perspectives 176 at 177. 
53 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 67 and 86; Goldman and Tittemore 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 2. The ‘breach of the laws of war does 
not, however, result in the forfeiture of their secondary POW status, unless they also 
breached the fundamental obligation of distinction’ (AP I article 44 (4); Ipsen (1995) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 81).  
54 ‘Should any doubt arise as to whether a person who has taken part in hostilities and fallen 
into the hands of the adversary shall be deemed a combatant or civilian, that person shall 
continue to be treated as a POW until such time as his or her status has been determined by 
a competent tribunal’ (Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95-96).  
55 Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1535-44. 
56 Provided they are not ‘nationals of the national holding them’ (Solis The Law of Armed 
Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 197; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 65-6; HR article 3(2); GC III article 4A(1-3) and (6); AP I articles 43 and 44(1).  
57 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65-66.  
58 Brough ‘Combatant, Noncombatant, Criminal: The Importance of Distinction’ at 177. 
59 Nathaniel Berman ‘Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction 
of War’ (2004) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1 at 5; Zachary ‘Between the 
Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ at 380. 
60 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1906-14. 
61 Idem at 2020-28. 
62 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 34. 
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('PCATI') v Government of Israel63. ‘Whether eating, washing, watching 
television, or even sleeping, a lawful combatant is targetable by an opposing 
force at any time, regardless of his actions’64. Moreover, since their combatant 
status flows from their membership of the armed forces, they remain 
legitimate military targets whether in or ‘out of uniform’65, ‘even when they are 
not on active duty’’66. They remain a ‘continuing lawful target’67 for as long as 
they retain membership of the armed forces, until they retire from the 
military68 or ‘gain immunity from attack by becoming hors de combat’69.  
A second consequence which attaches to their combatant status, is 
that their authorisation to participate in hostilities comes with the condition that 
they observe the laws of war. Lawful combatants can be prosecuted for their 
failure to observe the laws of war although such failure to observe the laws of 
war does not result in the loss of their primary ‘combatant status or [their] right 
to be treated as a POW’70. They shall nevertheless ‘be called to account in 
accordance with the military or military penal law of their party to the 
conflict’71. IHL views seriously each party’s ‘obligation to punish such 
violations’ of the laws of war committed by combatants.72 
 
2.5 Forfeiture of POW status and exposure to criminal prosecution 
 
As mentioned in the introductory comments, the objective of ‘insulating 
civilians from the prospect of attack in war’73 can only be achieved if it is clear 
to the belligerents who are combatants and who are civilians. The principle of 
distinction dictates that ‘combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in military 
operations preparatory to an attack’74. If combatants attempt to disguise 
themselves as civilians they erode the ‘the lawful combatant’s presumption’ 
that individuals who do not identify themselves as combatants, can be 
assumed to be civilians who present no danger to him75. 
It has generally been assumed that the ‘agreed practice of States was 
that members of regular armed forces would wear their uniform’76, while 
                                                
63 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 29. 
64 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2020-28. 
65 Dinstein ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ at 150-151. 
66 Ibid; Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 188. 
67 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 188. 
68 Once they have been fully discharged from duty or made a ‘deactivated reservist’ they are 
rendered once again a civilian (ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 23). 
69 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2197-2204. 
70 Claude Pilloud, Yves Sandoz and Bruno Zimmermann (1987) ICRC Commentary on 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Geneva at 511; Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95. 
71 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 82. 
72 Idem at 95; AP I articles 85 and 86. 
73 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 35. 
74 AP I article 44(3). 
75 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 209-210. 
76 AP I article 44(7). It must be stated at this juncture that camouflage is not prohibited. ‘[T]he 
issue is not whether combatants can be seen, but lack of desire on their part to create the 
false impression that they are civilians’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict at 38). What is important is ‘whether members of the adversary 
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irregular armed groups were required to identify themselves as combatants 
‘by wearing a fixed distinctive emblem, recognisable at a distance perhaps on 
an armband’77. Interestingly, as a result of the assumption that the State’s 
armed forces78 would always be uniformed79, the IHL conventions make no 
reference to the need for the traditional armed forces to be uniformed. 
Pfanner, after an extensive survey of the relevant literature and research, 
concludes that although there is a ‘practice to wear uniforms in armies, there 
is not an obligation in IHL to wear them’80. Consequently, under Geneva law, 
the State’s armed forces enjoy full combatant and POW status without any 
requirements or proof of uniform81. 
Since many provisions in IHL depend on the principle of distinction 
being observed, there is a very serious sanction82 imposed on those ‘seeking 
to abuse the standing of a civilian while in fact he is a disguised combatant’83. 
Whether a combatant abandons his uniform or distinctive emblem, or if he 
fails to observe ‘the obligation of minimal distinction’ (i.e. that of carrying his 
armaments openly84), the net result is the same: he will forfeit85 his POW 
status and be deprived ‘of the privileges of a POW’86 if captured while 
participating in hostilities87. 
While the sanction imposed on combatants who feign protected civilian 
status is harsh, it has not been uncommon for armies to send their 
‘combatants behind enemy lines disguised as civilians’88. However, they do so 
knowing that if captured they will be classified as combatants without POW 
                                                                                                                                      
forces are able to recognise the person concerned as a combatant, and therefore a legitimate 
target, rather than a civilian who is protected under international law’ (Rogers ‘Unequal 
Combat and the Law of War’ at 11). 
77 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 11; Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 89. 
78 This includes the volunteer and militia forces who are part of the State’s armed forces. 
79 Toni Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ (2004) 86 International Review of the 
Red Cross 93 at 103. 
80 Idem at 104. 
81 Michael Cowling and Shannon Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay – 
International Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ (2009) 42 Comparative 
International Law Quarterly of South Africa 1 at 11; Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of 
War’ at 94. 
82 The imposition of the sanction is recognised ‘under customary international law’ (Dinstein 
The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 35). 
83 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 209-210. 
84 AP I article 44(3) 2nd sentence. 
85 Interestingly, while GC III article 85 stipulates that ‘POW’s prosecuted for acts committed 
prior to capture shall retain benefits of the convention, this provision cannot assist a soldier 
captured while feigning civilian status, since he never achieved POW status to retain’ (Solis 
The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 223).  
86 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 35. 
87 Idem at 37; AP I article 44 (4); Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War at 223. 
88 So for example, in Iraq it was not uncommon to find the American Army Delta and Special 
Forces soldiers in jeans, t-shirts and baseball caps, whilst in Afghanistan American Special 
Forces ‘wore flowing abah’, and grew their hair and beards so as to better blend in with the 
local Afghan male (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 
221). While it is not considered a war crime ‘to remove one’s uniform or other fixed distinctive 
sign in favour of civilian garb’, it does come with the risk that ‘if an otherwise lawful combatant 
engages in combat without a uniform… and is captured, they are not entitled to POW status’ 
(Idem at 221 and 224).  
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privileges89. It is worth re-stating that at no time do they lose their combatant 
status since they remain members of the armed forces. Some use the term 
‘unprivileged combatant’90 to refer to these combatants who disguise 
themselves as civilians91. But I would argue it is more accurate to say that 
they are combatants who have forfeited their POW privileges. So for example, 
even if military spy was captured whilst behind enemy lines and feigning 
civilian status, he would nevertheless remain a ‘member of the armed forces’ 
although he would not ‘have the right to POW status’92 and would be ‘liable for 
punishment’93.  
A further consequence which flows from the failure to distinguish 
oneself as a combatant, is that these individuals (despite being combatants) 
forfeit their ‘combatant immunity from prosecution for acts undertaken whilst 
they failed to distinguish themself as a combatant’94. While the act of wearing 
‘non distinguishing clothing is not prohibited under IHL’, it is considered 
perfidious and a prosecutable95 violation of IHL96, to ‘engage in combat while 
doing so’97. 
 
2.6 Combatant status prior to the IHL conventions 
 
The idea that those fighting on behalf of a sovereign in armed conflicts 
enjoyed ‘privileged combatancy’ was already recognised as customary law 
even before IHL was codified in the Hague and Geneva conventions98. The 
Lieber code of 1863 already prohibited a detaining power from punishing99, or 
‘targeting for revenge’100, those combatants which they had captured101, 
                                                
89 ‘Each belligerent party is at liberty to factor in a cost/benefit calculus… if members of 
Special Forces units are fighting behind enemy lines, and if the enemy has a demonstrably 
poor track record in… the protection of hors de combat enemy military personnel, the 
conclusion may be arrived at that on the whole it is well worth assuming the risk of (potential) 
loss of POW status upon capture while benefitting from the (actual) advantages of disguise’ 
(Idem at 224). 
90 Included under the category ‘”unprivileged combatants” would be spies and mercenaries’ 
(Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary Safety”: The Guantanamo Bay Internees 
and Combatant Status’ at 847). 
91 Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 10. 
92 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 110. 
93 Idem at 110 and 113; HR article 29; Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 22. 
94 Blank ‘Updating the Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the Law of 
Armed Conflict’ at 64. 
95 Although subject to ‘regular judicial procedures’ (Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 108; Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary Safety”: The 
Guantanamo Bay Internees and Combatant Status’ at 847).  
96 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 222. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 3. For 
example, GC II article 87 prohibits a detaining power from trying POWs for their actions prior 
to detention (provided those acts did not violate the laws of war). 
99 On account of ‘their pre-capture warlike acts’ (Ibid).  
100 Article 56: ‘A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is 
any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by 
cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity’. 
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because once ‘a man is armed by a sovereign government… his warlike acts 
are not individual crimes or offences’102. These principles have not only been 
re-iterated by various war crimes tribunals103 but are also reflected in many 
States’ municipal laws104.  
 
2.7 Combatant status under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907  
 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and their regulations (collectively 
referred to as Hague law), were an attempt to codify existing customary law 
applicable in situations of armed conflict. Already under Hague Law it was 
acknowledged that ‘a State’s armed forces may consist of combatants and 
noncombatants’105 and it was up to States to determine which members of its 
armed forces would carry out combative functions, and which were limited to 
non-combative activities106.  
Those who qualify to perform combative functions are defined in article 
1 of the Hague Conventions107. The tenor of the Hague law was to focus on 
the ‘activity performed by the soldier’, ‘particular whether they bore arms and 
were involved in combat’108 as crucial for the purposes of determining who 
could be a legitimate military target109. ‘Subsequent legal instruments 
abandon this activity-based approach to combatant status in favor of one 
                                                                                                                                      
101 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), 
24 April 1863 available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument (accessed 12 
September 2012).  
102 Article 57: ‘So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's 
oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual 
crimes or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class, color, 
or condition, when properly organised as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public 
enemies’. 
103 For example U.S.v List (the hostage case) Nuremberg Military Tribunal 1228 (1950) at 
1238.  
104 U.S. (1951) Manual for Courts-Martial ss351. 
105 HR article 3; Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 169. 
106 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 14. HR article 13 states that ‘individuals 
who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as newspaper correspondents and 
reporters, sutlers and contractors, who fall into the enemy’s hands and whom the latter thinks 
expedient to detain, are entitled to be treated as POWs, provided they are in possession of a 
certificate from the military authorities of the army which they were accompanying.’ This 
provision gives expression to the present day understanding that not all individuals who 
accompany the armed forces participate in combative functions (Stephens and Lewis ‘The 
Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 34). 
107 ‘The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:  
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;  
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance;  
3. To carry arms openly; and  
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
(conditions 1 and 2 are dispensed with in the case of the levée en masse) 
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are 
included under the denomination “army”’.     
108 Daphné Richemond-Barak (2011) ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ in William C. Banks 
(ed) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia University 
Press: New York at 2469-77.  
109 Ibid. 
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based upon membership’110. Nevertheless from the Hague law definition we 
see that distinguishing themselves by use of an emblem and carrying their 
arms openly are conditions for their being awarded combatant privilege, once 
again highlighting the importance of the principle of distinction.  
 
2.8 Combatant status under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
When a conference was called to draft the four Geneva Conventions (GC I-
IV)111 in 1949, the drafters were once again guided by the rationale 
underpinning the ‘principle of distinction… protecting innocent, harmless, 
individuals’112. In GC III article 4A the drafters listed ‘the categories of those 
entitled to POW status’113. 
 
‘Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are 
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have 
fallen into the power of the enemy:  
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as 
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of 
such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer 
corps, including those of organised resistance movements, 
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside 
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that 
such militias or volunteer corps, including such organised 
resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a 
distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognised by the Detaining 
Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually 
being members thereof, such as civilian members of military 
aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members 
of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
                                                
110 Idem at 2469-77  
111 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (GC I) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 31-83; 
1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. 
Treaty Series 85; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(GC III) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135; 1949 Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) of August 12 1949 
(1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287.  
112 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2517-25. 
113 Idem at 2372-79. The criteria set out in GC III article 4A(2) are sometimes termed ‘the 
“legal test for POW status”’ (Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 115). 
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armed forces, provided that they have received authorisation, 
from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide 
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed 
model. 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, 
of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the 
Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable 
treatment under any other provisions of international law. 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach 
of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular 
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the 
laws and customs of war’. 
 
This provision has been ‘widely held as defining114 the meaning of 
“combatant”’115 (in the absence of an explicit definition)116, since only a 
combatant can qualify for POW privilege. While the criteria for POW status set 
out in CG III article 4A is strongly reminiscent of the definition found in the 
Hague regulations117, there is one important respect in which Geneva law and 
Hague law differ. Instead of adopting an approach that focuses on the 
individual’s activities in assessing his combatant status, GC III shifted the 
focus to a membership-based understanding wherein ‘all members of the 
armed forces are combatants, regardless of what their function within the 
armed forces might be’118. Put another way ‘membership in an identifiable and 
organised armed force’ is what determines whether one qualifies for 
combatant status119 under Geneva law. 
 
i. Regular armed forces 
 
Legally speaking, the list of criteria set out in article 4A(2) is applicable to 
irregular armed forces seeking combatant status. That said, a cursory 
examination of GC III article 4A suggests that there appears to be a strong 
presumption which operates so as to automatically120 clothe members of the 
regular armed forces with secondary POW privilege121 (and, by implication, 
also primary combatant status). As Goldman explains, according to the 
                                                
114 Albeit in a rather inconvenient place, in a convention dealing with the rights of POWs 
(Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2477-85). 
115 Idem at 2372-79. 
116 Idem at 2517-25. 
117 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 169. Geneva law incorporated the four 
requirements set out in the HRs and then added a fifth and sixth requirement: that of 
being organised and belonging to a belligerent party (Dinstein The Conduct of 
Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 43). 
118 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ at 2477-85. 
119 Idem at 2386-94; Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 115; Ipsen (2008) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 86. 
120 Pfanner notes that based on an ‘ordinary reading of GC III article 4A(1) and the travaux 
preparatoires, it is clear that the regular armed forces (including members of militia and 
volunteer corps forming part of them) do not have to formally fulfil the four criteria in order to 
qualify as POW’ (Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 115). 
121 Which is activated when they fall into enemy hands. 
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Geneva Conventions of 1949, the right of the members of the regular armed 
forces to ‘combatant and POW status is “unconditional if not absolute”’122. The 
reality is such that the regular armed forces ‘by their very nature’, and with 
very little additional effort, are presumed to ‘meet the conditions of eligibility to 
POW status, but the presumption can definitely be rebutted’123. In dealing with 
this issue, the Privy Council in the Mohamed Ali case of 1968 established that 
‘even members of the armed forces must observe the conditions imposed on 
irregular armed forces, notwithstanding the fact that it is not stated expressis 
verbis in the GC or the HR’124. Pfanner concurs: ‘State parties are expected to 
take the requisite steps to give effect to these implied elements’ (i.e. the 
conditions of eligibility for POW status)125. Pfanner goes on to say that any 
member of the armed forces who falls into enemy hands will in any event 
have to comply with ‘every individual criterion indicated in GC III article 4A(2) 
in order to qualify as POW, as only those elements describe properly a 
member of the armed forces’126.  
One of those unspoken requirements is that members of the regular 
armed forces are to observe the principle of distinction. Traditionally the 
State’s armed forces have distinguished their members by making use of 
uniforms127. Since it was simply assumed that the regular armed forces would 
always be uniformed128, it is not surprising that the drafters of GC III make no 
explicit reference to any IHL obligation upon states to ensure that their regular 
armed forces wear uniforms129. ‘In fact the expectation that combatants would 
be uniformed was so unquestioningly assumed that no effort was made in any 
of the IHL treaties to define what constitutes a uniform’130 for the purpose of 
conferring combatant status. Pilloud et al argue that this omission has left the 
term uniform being used very loosely to apply to any myriad of ‘distinguishing 
symbols’ and even to camouflage dress131. As Dinstein points out, the ‘special 
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forces often wear non-standard uniforms, a phenomenon which is 
unobjectionable provided that the combatants retain some distinctive feature 
telling them apart from civilians’132. And as Watkin correctly points out, 
‘camouflage and disguise as an “ordinary civilian going about his normal 
pacific activities are different”’133. It is worth remembering that the principle of 
distinction is not concerned so much with whether ‘combatants can be seen, 
but whether (if observed) they are likely to be mixed up with civilians’134. 
 
ii. Irregular armed forces 
 
As war evolved and other militia135 and voluntary groups136 began to 
participate more regularly in the theatre of war (often without the luxury of 
clothing their militia men and women in a traditional military uniform), the 
question of ‘whether and under what conditions irregular combatants, not 
members of the regular armed forces, would be entitled to privileged 
combatant and POW status’137 became paramount. In response to the tales of 
poor treatment received by organised resistance movements during WWII138, 
the provisions relating to irregular combatants were re-stated in GC III article 
4 A(2)139, with a few changes. Amongst the changes made to the Hague law, 
GC III sought to ‘explicitly recognise independent irregular militias, volunteer 
corps’ and now also organised resistance movements140, on condition that 
they could prove that they belonged to a party to the conflict141. Secondly, GC 
III sought to extend the protections of privileged combatancy to instances 
where these irregular combatants operated ‘both within and outside their own 
territory irrespective of whether the territory was occupied’142, doing away with 
any limitation that linked their combatant privilege to situations of territorial 
occupation.  
Whenever States have gathered to discuss the issue of who should be 
granted combatant and POW status, there has been resistance to proposals 
which might expand the pool of those who could claim combatant status. For 
the most part, those opposed to extending the granting of combatant status 
have raised the fact that relaxing the uniform requirement would undermine 
the longstanding IHL principle of distinction, which in effect would increase the 
risk to ordinary civilians143. Given this sort of resistance it was not surprising 
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that irregulars and non-State armed groups (‘who fight alongside or as part of 
the armed forces of a High Contracting Party to the GC’s in a conflict of an 
international character’) had to meet more stringent criteria144 before they 
could be afforded full combatant status, while it was ‘simply presumed that 
their colleagues who served as members of the traditional armed forces would 
fulfill these requirements as a matter of course’145.  
Firstly, irregulars had to show that they belonged146 to an organised 
group. Once irregulars could show even the ‘most rudimentary elements of 
military organisation’147 the second requirement was to prove that, as a group, 
they belonged to or were fighting on behalf of a State party to an international 
armed conflict148. According to the commentary, any form of tacit 
authorisation, or control by the party to an international armed conflict149, or a 
‘de facto150 relationship between the resistance organisation and the State’151 
is sufficient to satisfy this requirement152. Richemond-Barak maintains that the 
belonging requirement set out in article 4A(2) did not require either ‘formal 
incorporation into the State’s forces nor the authorisation of all the armed 
group’s activities by the State’153. In short it was included as a requirement to 
ensure that the ‘customary law proscription against individuals or groups 
engaging in “private warfare” against a State party involved in an armed 
conflict’154, would be observed155.  
Thirdly, ‘irregulars had to show that they belonged to a group which 
was commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates’156, and 
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fourthly, that the group members had ‘a fixed, distinctive sign recognisable at 
a distance’157. There is little by way of guidance in either treaty law or soft law 
as to what ‘constitutes a distinctive sign’158. What is clear however is that 
there is certainly ‘no treaty based or customary norm that requires that 
irregulars… wear traditional military dress159… with a proper insignia’160. 
Goldman suggests that provided ‘the dress or sign worn be such that it is 
visible during daylight, and detectable at a distance by the naked eye’161, the 
requirement would be satisfied. The rationale behind the requirement is that ‘it 
must identify and characterise the armed force using it’ and ‘the armed force 
is not allowed to confuse the enemy by ceaselessly changing its distinctive 
emblem’162. From various legal opinions, it is probably safe to conclude that 
the following items are sufficient to constitute a distinctive sign recognisable at 
a distance: a helmet, headdress, cap, scarf, coat, shirt, badge, emblem, 
armlet, ‘coloured sign worn on the chest’163 or brassard permanently affixed to 
clothing164. Once the armed group has adopted its ‘identifying emblem’165, it is 
then ‘up to the individual to wear the emblem as required, his failure to do so 
will not contaminate the other members of the group’166.  
The fifth requirement is also motivated by the principle of distinction, 
and requires that the group ensure that its members carry their arms openly. 
In essence this is meant to ensure that the opposition are not unfairly taken by 
surprise by irregulars ‘who approach with pistols concealed beneath their 
clothing’167.  
Lastly the group must ‘ensure that its members conduct their 
operations in accordance with the laws of war‘. Very briefly this would require 
the observance of the basic principles on which IHL is based: observing 
civilian immunity against attack and not causing ‘disproportionate civilian 
casualties' or ‘unnecessary suffering and destruction’168. The rationale behind 
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this provision was to ensure that combatants who did not observe IHL were 
‘estopped from relying on that body of law when desirous of reaping its 
benefits’169.  
Authorities generally agree that all six conditions170 are applicable to 
the irregular group as a collective. More specifically the first three conditions 
(that the armed group as a whole is organised, belongs to a belligerent party 
and has a responsible commander) are addressed to the irregular group 
collectively and not to any members personally, whereas the last three 
conditions (a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; carrying arms 
openly; and conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war) are also applicable to individual members, and must be met 
‘continuously and not intermittently’ 171. However, if irregular members 
‘generally meet all six conditions all the of the time then an individual member 
who fails to observe any of the last three requirements will not lose his 
privileged combatant or POW status upon capture’172. 
While the actions of a few ‘bad apples’ in a group will not strip the 
entire group of its combatant status (provided the majority of the group 
observe IHL173), it will certainly expose those rogue combatants to ‘individual 
judicial or administrative prosecution’ for their violations of IHL174. Although, 
according to Commander Fenrick, if ‘a majority of the members of the group 
fail to meet all or any of the six conditions at any time, then all of the members 
will not qualify as privileged combatants’ and will instead be classified as 
civilians participating directly in hostilities175. Similarly, if the group is in the 
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habit of flouting IHL, ‘each individual will have to answer for the group’s 
misdeeds - the group’s general pattern of behaviour will be extrapolated to 
him’176. 
When one looks at the criteria for POW status set out in article 4A(2) 
as applicable to irregular armed forces, it is obvious that ‘these conditions are 
fashioned on the operations of regular armed forces: who are organised, are 
subject to hierarchical discipline and normally belong to a belligerent party, 
they have a proud tradition of wearing uniforms and carrying their arms 
openly, they are trained to respect LOIAC, and the issue of allegiance 
scarcely arises’177. Richemond-Barak argues that the ‘highly formalistic, 
membership based’ notion of combatant status ‘excludes a number of non-
State entities from the definition’178.  
 Given this argument, one can appreciate that it becomes extremely 
problematic to assess compliance with these six requirements in order to 
grant combatant status to irregular armed forces in the theatre of conflict. Not 
only is the matter complicated for the forces who face irregular armed groups, 
but it is apparent that providing the evidence necessary to satisfy the stringent 
criteria might very well endanger the rest of the group’s security by giving up 
‘their individual identities and the group location’179. Over time the 
requirements of article 4A(2) have proved ‘extremely difficult if not, in fact, 
impossible for irregulars to comply with without jeopardising their military 
operations’180. 
It therefore seems especially harsh to expect irregulars to satisfy the 
second criteria, that of belonging to a party to the conflict, when this 
requirement is easy for the opposition to dispute, particularly if the irregulars 
are fighting on ‘behalf of a government in exile’181. As for the requirement that 
irregulars must wear a distinctive sign at all times, it seems unduly exacting to 
demand this of fighters who are only engaged on a part time basis. In fact, 
Goldman states that ‘it would be suicidal for irregular’s to wear their distinctive 
emblem when not engaged in fighting, yet it is expected of them’182. Lastly the 
fact that irregular forces will lose their combatant status on account of any 
non-compliance with IHL seems a particularly onerous requirement, when one 
appreciates that regular soldiers can breach the laws of war without losing 
combatant and POW status (although they can be tried in a court martial for 
these breaches)183. In short there is very little, if any, incentive for irregular 
fighters to observe the principle of distinction if in the end it is near impossible 
to adhere to the demands of the six criteria, without seriously endangering 
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one’s own life and the security of the group. The net result is likely to involve a 
greater risk to the civilian population184. 
 
iii. Persons accompanying the armed forces 
 
GC III article 4A(4) includes under the umbrella of those enjoying POW status:  
 
‘Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, 
war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of 
services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that 
they have received authorisation from the armed forces which they 
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity 
card similar to the annexed model’. 
 
This is an interesting category to find in a discussion on combatant 
status since these ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’ lack the 
membership link to the armed force necessary to clothe them with 
combatant status. They are, however, given POW status in the event 
that they fall into enemy hands. So while it is possible to contend that all 
POWs coming from the regular and irregular armed forces must 
necessarily have enjoyed primary combatant status, this is not the case 
for the category of POWs who were classified as ‘persons 
accompanying the armed forces’. These essentially civilian contractors 
enjoy primary civilian status185 as a consequence of the non-combative 
function which they carry out in armed conflicts. I will discuss this 
category further under in chapter three where I review the literature 
pertaining to those with civilian status. 
 
iv. Merchant mariners, civil aviators and the levée en masse 
 
For sake of completeness it is worth mentioning that POW status is also 
extended to: 
 
‘members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of 
the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties 
to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment 
under any other provisions of international law’186,  
and: 
‘the inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach 
of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular 
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the 
laws and customs of war’187.  
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I will not explore these two categories any further here since they are 
not relevant to my discussion of the five groups of non-State actors 
(voluntary human shields, private military and security contractors, relief 
organisations, journalists and under-aged child soldiers recruited in 
organised armed groups) which are the focus of this dissertation. 
 
2.9 Combatant status under Additional Protocol of 1977 
It became apparent that irregular forces found it especially difficult to comply 
with the stringent criteria set out in GC III article 4(A)(2), prompting some to 
label the GC III article 4(A)(2) requirements unworkable188. At the same time, 
there was an increased appreciation (based upon the right to self 
determination), that those individuals fighting wars of national liberation were 
entitled to international recognition and IHL protections189. When the ICRC 
convened a diplomatic conference in the 1970s on IHL applicable in armed 
conflict190, the issue of relaxing the requirements for combatant status for 
‘freedom fighters’ was at the top of the list191. The conference was tasked with 
‘fashioning new rules applicable to irregular forces that would strike a 
compromise’192 between the two distinct legal regimes which characterised 
the Geneva Conventions, thereby creating ‘a single and non-discriminatory 
set of rules applicable to all combatants regular and irregular alike… and to 
provide presumptions and procedures to prevent abuse of the exceptions’193. 
The compromise is reflected in API, articles 43-47, under the heading 
‘combatant and POW status’. At the heart of API is the recognition that in 
modern warfare, irregular armed groups are comprised of mostly part time 
fighters. In essence these articles aim to ‘relax the rigid requirements of the 
Hague and the Geneva standards sufficiently, to provide guerillas a possibility 
of attaining privileged combatant status without exposing the forces fighting 
them to the danger inherent in the use of civilian disguise in order to achieve 
surprise’194.  
 
i. Defining ‘armed forces’  
 
In article 43(1) we find a new definition of ‘armed forces’195, described as  
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‘all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, 
even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognised by the adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to 
the internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict’. 
 
In essence what this new activity or functionality196 based definition of the 
armed forces achieved, was to do away with the previous ‘distinction between 
regular and irregular voluntary corps, militia and other organised groups (that 
existed in the HR and GC III)’197, thereby widening ‘the scope of actors’ who 
are afforded combatant status198. Unlike the previous199 membership based 
regime, now ‘an indirect or implicit relationship between a non-State entity and 
the State party’ is sufficient to establish combatant status200. The six onerous 
‘rules for combatant status’ previously set out in GC III were replaced by two 
conditions:  
‘1. responsible command under a party to the conflict and, 
 2. behaviour in accordance with the laws of war’201.  
 
As Rogers points out: ‘it is a matter of organisation and discipline, which goes 
to the root of the definition of armed forces’202. A simple ‘factual enquiry’ into 
the existence of a ‘measure of organisation, a responsible command’, and ‘an 
internal disciplinary system which enforces the laws of war’203 is demanded of 
all combatants, not only irregular combatants. The relationship of belonging 
may ‘be officially declared, but may also be expressed through tacit 
agreement or conclusive behaviour that makes it clear for which party the 
group is fighting’204. A key element is that irregulars must ‘conduct hostilities 
on behalf and with the agreement of that party’205. While previously it was 
simply assumed that the regular armed forces would operate under command 
responsibility, now it is ‘an express prerequisite for their falling within the 
definition of an armed force in terms of API’206. Now, in light of the new 
definition given in API, ‘all members of armed forces are put on equal 
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footing’207, and no longer do irregulars have to prove ‘use of a uniform208, that 
they carried their arms openly209 or that they enjoyed political recognition’210.  
 
ii. Combatant and POW status 
 
Article 43(2) then goes on to state that: ‘all members of the armed forces 
(other then the medical personnel and chaplains) are combatants having the 
right to directly participate in hostilities’, effectively clothing all these newly 
defined ‘armed forces’ with full combatant status. Not surprisingly, given the 
link between combatant and POW status, article 44(1) confirms that ‘any 
combatant (as defined by article 43), who falls into the power of the adverse 
party, shall be a POW’211. Consequently, there is no longer a burden on the 
irregular armed combatant to ‘disclose information pertaining to the structure 
of their group, the identity of his colleagues, or their compliance with the laws 
of war, in order to secure him his POW status’212. This provision effectively 
shifts the burden to the detaining power to justify their denial of POW status in 
such instances. 
 
iii. The inviolability of combatant and POW status 
 
Given the importance which attaches to POW status upon capture, API article 
44(2) stipulates that: 
 
‘while all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflicts, violation of these rules 
shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant, or… his 
right to be a POW’213.  
 
This is a remarkable change from the regime which used to pertain to 
irregular armed forces under GC III, where they were always at risk of losing 
their POW status, based on their failure to observe IHL214. Prior to API, ‘if a 
member of the regular armed forces was captured while participating directly 
in hostilities, and was not wearing the appropriate uniform, or if a militia or 
                                                
207 Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 18. 
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voluntary corps member does not wear a permanent distinctive sign, then a 
breach of the duty of distinction and additionally a charge of perfidy would be 
considered’215. 
Now, under the new API regime, once an individual is clothed with 
combatant status they cannot lose that status, even by actions prior to their 
capture which might have violated IHL216. Moreover, all armed forces are held 
to the same standard, and any failure to observe the rules of war will be an 
offence for which they can be court martialled and face punishment217, but 
they will nevertheless continue to be treated as combatants and enjoy full 
POW privileges218. Moreover, even if it is found that an individual has 
committed a war crime219, that fact will not result in the revocation of their 
POW status220. 
Having said that, the new API regime does take the obligation to 
observe the principle of distinction very seriously. Some academics have said 
that API article 48 (which requires that parties shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants), is API’s ‘most cardinal 
provision’221. Moreover, API transfers the liability to observe the principle of 
distinction up the chain of command, ‘thereby making commanders who elect 
not to court martial their soldiers for failing to distinguish themselves, 
personally liable for violating articles 86 and 87 of API’222. In fact Rogers 
argues that a pattern of consistent violations of IHL (which goes unpunished) 
‘is strong evidence that the group does not qualify as “armed forces”, since it 
fails to meet the criterion of an internal disciplinary system’223. In effect what 
Rogers proposes is that ill-disciplined forces might not enjoy full combatant 
status224.  
 
iv. Forfeiture of POW status 
 
While combatant and POW status seems more inviolable under the API 
guidelines225, the importance of the principle of distinction is still emphasised. 
API follows:  
 
                                                
215 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 93. 
216 Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary Safety”: The Guantanamo Bay Internees 
and Combatant Status’ at 844. 
217 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 93, AP I article 44(3). 
218 Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 20. 
219 ‘Colonel Draper states bluntly that members of the armed forces who persistently violate 
the laws of war do not lose their POW status upon capture’ (Idem at 10).  
220 ‘Any guerrilla who fails to distinguish himself during such military operations… can be 
punished only by applicable disciplinary or penal sanctions, not by forfeiture of his status as a 
lawful combatant or… as a POW’ (George Aldrich ‘New Life for the Laws of War’ (1981) 75 
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224 Ibid. 
225 As per AP I article 44(2). Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An 
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 87. 
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Article 44(3) 
‘Recognising, however that there are situations in armed conflicts where, 
owing to the nature of hostilities an armed combatant cannot so 
distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided 
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible226 to the adversary while he is 
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launch of an attack 
in which he is to participate. Acts which comply with the 
requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as 
perfidious within the meaning of article 37(1)(c)’. 
 
Article 44(4)  
‘A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to 
meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 
shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be 
given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners 
of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection 
includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by 
the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and 
punished for any offences he has committed’.  
 
While the question of forfeiture of POW status was not mentioned in the 
Geneva Convention, the question of forfeiture appears to have crept into the 
language of API through article 44 227. In short ‘if a combatant falls into the 
power of the adversary “while failing to carry his arms openly during each 
military engagement and during such time as he is visible to the adversary 
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launch of an 
attack in which is to participate” – he shall forfeit his right to be a POW’228. 
According to Pfanner there is both ‘State practice and jurisprudence which 
indicate clearly that combatants who do not distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population while engaged in an attack or in a military operation prior to 
an attack shall forfeit their rights as POWs’229.  
While the mention of forfeiture of POW status might be new to the API 
regime, the IHL prohibition against perfidy230 is one with a long history since it 
was recognised in Hague law231 and under customary international law232. In 
                                                
226 At the time of signing up to the protocol some States ‘made interpretative statements, for 
… that “visible” included visibility due to electronic or other forms of surveillance’, which 
‘would include binoculars and night sights’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 
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227 Pilloud ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Convention of 12 August 1949 at 522. 
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230The prohibition is set out in AP I article 37 (1)(c). ‘A lawful combatant must abstain from 
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Conflict at 39).  
231 Article 23. 
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essence perfidy is committed when combatants intentionally feign protected 
status (as a non-combatant/civilian), in order to betray the confidence of the 
opposition and thereby gain an advantage over the opposing forces233. The 
prohibition against perfidy has always operated to preclude certain activities 
from the realm of acts which are covered by the IHL understanding of 
combatant privileged.  
So while ‘API requires combatants to distinguish themselves in the best 
possible manner, and in traditional terms this means that participants should 
ordinarily wear military uniforms’234, ‘in these exceptional and limited 
circumstances [described in API article 44(3)] the combatant’s failure to 
observe the full requirements of distinction as set out in API, will not be seen 
as an perfidious act’ (‘which marks a significant change from the Hague and 
Geneva legal systems’235), and ‘shall not have the affect of forfeiting him his 
POW status and making him liable to be tried for all his hostile acts’236.  
In order to limit the potential scope of application of the API article 
44(3) exception, some States maintained that it only pertained to ‘occupied 
territories237 and in armed conflicts of the kind described in API article 4(1) 
(i.e. wars of national liberation)’238. Rogers maintains that such an 
interpretation is ‘unduly narrow… since the exception would also be of use to 
special forces conducting long-range patrols in enemy-held territory’239. In 
fact, reading further in article 44(7) it is apparent that the drafters of API did 
contemplate that ‘“regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict” 
may conduct operations while meeting the more relaxed standards of 
combatancy’240.  
It is however generally accepted that ‘the exceptional rule will in 
practice only be applied to guerilla fighters… it does not change the generally 
accepted practice of States concerning the wearing of uniforms’241. API article 
44(7) points out that ‘this article is not intended to change the generally 
accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by 
combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the 
                                                                                                                                      
232 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds) (2005) Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at rule 65 states 
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239 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 12. ‘So a member of the special forces 
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conflict’242. It was felt that an interpretation of this exception which allowed 
combatants to oscillate between combatant and civilian identifications243 
would ‘severely undermine any progress that this article has achieved’244. 
Even in these rare instances where the exception might apply, some measure 
of distinction is required, ‘at the point where distinction becomes fundamental 
to an equitable armed engagement – in the act of attack’. The ‘second 
sentence of API article 44(3) suggests that the open carrying of arms is the 
minimum requirement’245. As a pragmatic response to the realities of modern 
war, ‘it appears that… the underlying standard is that participants on all sides 
should carry their arms openly in preparation for and during military 
operations’246 in order to enjoy secondary POW status. 
As Watkin points out, this provision introduces ‘a temporal element that 
was not present in the obligation to wear a fixed distinctive sign’247. The 
temporal aspect however is only applicable to an enquiry into whether, once 
captured, the belligerent is entitled to POW status. In terms of API article 
44(5) a belligerent can only risk forfeiting his POW status if he ‘falls into the 
power of an adverse Party’ while failing to observe the minimum requirement 
of carrying his armed openly while ‘engaged in an attack or in a military 
operation preparatory to an attack’248. If he carries out an ‘unprotected attack’ 
and escapes being captured, he will not, if captured during later hostilities, 
forfeit his right to POW status on account of these prior activities in violation of 
article API article 44(4)249. In short, combatants need only carry their 
armaments openly when ‘engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack’, and the consequences of forfeiture of POW status 
are limited to those captured during such times250. 
 All the other consequences which flow from combatant status, 
including legitimate targeting, are not limited by the temporal aspect of this 
provision. Consequently, even ‘while off duty (i.e. while pursuing their civilian 
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vocations) these part-time combatants may be lawfully targeted, much like 
regular uniformed combatants may be targeted prior to capture’251. That said, 
it would not be an IHL violation if a belligerent fell into enemy hands whilst in 
civilian clothing, ‘provided he [had] not engaged in combat while in civilian 
clothing’252. It is also worth noting that while these article 44(3) fighters ‘might 
still enjoy POW status’, they can nevertheless still ‘be tried for breach of laws 
of war for failing to fully distinguish themselves as per the 1st sentence of 
article 44(3)’253. Similarly, not only would a combatant ‘who acted perfidiously 
and failed even the minimum requirement of carrying their arms openly’, forfeit 
his secondary POW status in the event that he fell into enemy hands, but he 
could also ‘be tried for all his hostile acts’254 under ‘the national criminal law of 
the detaining power’255. While the idea of forfeiting ones POW status has 
serious legal implications, the matter is somewhat fudged by a further reading 
of API article 44(4) which states that even once one’s POW status is forfeited, 
one ‘shall, nevertheless, be given protection’s equivalent in all respects to 
those accorded to POWs by the Third Convention and by this Protocol.’ 256 
Thus, ‘on capture, although not a POW, such combatants enjoy the 
procedural and substantive protections enjoyed by POW’257. 
While API articles 43 and 44 seem pragmatic, they have not been 
without controversy258. In fact it is these provisions which have ‘been identified 
as the main reason why the United States decided not to ratify the 
protocol’259. The United States maintains that API ‘article 44 does not reflect 
customary international law and that, by diminishing the distinction between 
combatants and civilians, it undercuts the effectiveness of LOIAC’260. Banks 
agrees that ‘the insignia rule is central to the principle of distinction and the 
very reason that combatants garner special privileges, because by 
differentiating themselves they make themselves available as targets’261. 
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Those States who have ‘not ratified API often inaccurately refer to 
GCIII article 4A(1) and (2) in order to define armed forces or combatants 
under IHL’262. Melzer maintains that this is an incorrect interpretation and that 
‘when defining armed forces for the purposes of the principle of distinction’263 
the GC do not provide a definition of armed forces, combatants or civilians 
which would be ‘sufficiently precise for the purposes of distinction’264. He 
recommends that the proper means of analysis should be ‘conducted based 
on universally recognised principles of IHL and not domestic legislation’265. 
Melzer argues that it is a ‘highly unsatisfactory result’ to adopt a position in 
which there can be ‘two different standards of what constitutes lawful 
combatancy’266. 
On the issue of whether one can truly forfeit one’s combatant status, 
there are competing interpretations of the law. Ratner, for example, maintains 
that ‘if a fighter does not carry his arms openly during the engagement as well 
as during the deployment before an attack while visible to the adversary, he is 
not a lawful combatant (entitled, for example to POW status)’267. At the end of 
the day, the most important requirement of combatant status is membership 
of a particular group that is recognised as an armed force268 that is a party to 
a conflict269. ‘Thereafter if individuals who claimed combatant status failed to 
distinguish themselves through uniforms, distinctive emblems or through 
carrying their armed openly in preparation for an attack’ they are in effect 
breaching the laws of war and will forfeit their POW270 status and may face 
court martial for breaching the laws of war271. ‘They do not forfeit their 
combatant status on account of these breaches’272. To suggest that a 
combatant (once clothed with combatant status) can forfeit that status ‘flies in 
the face of IHL which dictates that once a detainee is afforded combatant 
status and that is confirmed by a tribunal, no actions on the part of the 
detainee during the conflict can give rise to the forfeiture of this status’273.  
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Some academics argue that the concept of forfeiting combatant status is 
misconstrued.  
 
v. Presumptive POW status 
 
API article 45(1) establishes a presumption that ‘a person who participated in 
hostilities is entitled upon capture to POW status if he claims that status, 
appears entitled thereto, or his party claims it for him’. Not only are captured 
combatants entitled to claim POW status, but article 45(2) now affords 
combatants the ‘right to assert POW status before a judicial tribunal and have 
the issue adjudicated’274. API article 45(1) now affords irregular combatants 
the privilege which was always extended to their colleagues in the regular 
armed forces. Thus, the only determination that a detaining power can make 
concerning the status of a captured participant is establishing whether or not 
such person is a member of an armed group that is a party to a conflict. If this 
is the case then such person enjoys combatant status. If not, that person is 
classified as a civilian and may be punished for mere participation275.  
 
2.10 Combatant status under customary international law 
 
According to the ICRC’s study into the customary status of these IHL 
provisions, the definition of the ‘armed forces’ contained in API article 43(2), 
including both regular and irregular armed forces, is considered a ‘norm of 
customary international law applicable in international armed conflicts’276. Not 
only is this position ‘reflected in numerous military manuals’277, but it is also 
supported by official statements and reported practice’, and ‘no official 
contrary practice was found’278.  
Moreover the API article 43(1) requirement that ‘the armed forces of a 
party to the conflict consist of all organised armed forces, groups and units 
which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its 
subordinates’, is also considered a ‘norm of customary international law 
applicable in international armed conflicts’279. This understanding is reflected 
in the military manuals of many States280, and likewise ‘is supported by official 
statements and reported practice’281.  
According to the ICRC study, it is accepted as customary IHL that ‘it is 
therefore no longer necessary to distinguish between regular and irregular 
armed forces’ and all those fulfilling API article 43’s conditions are deemed to 
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be ‘armed forces’282. Moreover, it is also considered customary that ‘only the 
failure to distinguish oneself from the civilian population (see rule 106) or 
being caught as a spy (see rule 107) or a mercenary (see rule 108) warrants 




Consequently we can conclude that as IHL stands at present, the two 
determinants for combatant status are:  
1. membership of an armed force (which is subject to command 
responsibility and participating in an international armed conflict), and  
2. observance of the requirement that combatants (at a minimum) carry 
their weapons openly during and in preparation for any military 
engagement.  
 
Once these two conditions are met, the individual enjoys the legal 
authorisation to participate directly in hostilities, but will be exposed to 
continuous lawful targeting. This authorisation will ensure that they will be 
immune from prosecution for those lawful hostile acts, and will guarantee 
them secondary POW status should they fall into enemy hands. Once granted 
combatant status, that classification in inviolable and cannot be forfeited, even 
if their actions violate the laws of war. However, combatant status and 
secondary POW status does not shield them from criminal prosecution for 
violations of the laws of war. 
In accordance with the cardinal principle of distinction, combatants are 
expected to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. While that 
does not require the use of a military uniform, it does require at a minimum 
that they carry their weapons openly in preparation for and during an attack.  
Failure to observe this minimum requirement will risk the forfeiture of their 





                                                





  CHAPTER 3 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW CONCEPT OF CIVILIAN 
STATUS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
3.1  The historic emergence of the concept of civilian status 
The concept of a ‘civilian’ is a relatively recent addition to the laws of war1. 
The first inkling of a notion akin to civilian status can be found during the 
‘medieval Christendom’, where it was acknowledged that there were 
individuals ‘who did not have the occupation or social function of making war, 
and should not have war made against them’2. These individuals were listed 
in the Canonical lists as including ‘monks, pilgrims, travellers, peasants 
cultivating the soil, women, children, the infirm and aged, and those of 
unsound mind’3.  
Despite this acknowledgement, many of the early multilateral treaties 
that codified the laws of war made no express mention of civilians as a distinct 
category, except to imply that their entitlement to immunity from the effects of 
war was linked to ‘their peaceful behaviour’4. In the late 1800’s and early 
1900’s the term civilian was used in ‘contradistinction’5 to the notion of a 
soldier, and the first ‘codification of the actual term “civilian” was used only in 
an article about spies’6. The term civilian is briefly mentioned in the Hague 
Regulations (HR) of 19077 and the 1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial 
Warfare8, and in 1938 the International Law Association approved a Draft 
Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of 
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Humanitarian Law 13-52 at 34. 
2 Ibid. 
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8 The Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare 
Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague (December 1922 - February 1923) available 
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/275?OpenDocument (accessed 20 September 2012) at 
article 22 prohibits ‘aerial bombardment’ intended to terrorise the ‘civilian population’ (Roberts 
‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 36). 
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War9, which was aimed at establishing ‘safety zones for certain classes of 
non-combatants’10. During the inter-war years the International Committee for 
the Red Cross (ICRC) prepared a ‘draft convention on the protection of 
civilians in war’11, which was succeeded in 1934 by the ICRC’s Draft 
International Convention on the Condition and Protection of Civilians of 
Enemy Nationality who are on Territory Belonging to or Occupied by a 
Belligerent12. Sadly, ‘the outbreak of the Second World War intervened before 
a new binding agreement could be reached’13. Finally in 1949 the IVth 
Geneva Convention14 (GCIV) became ‘the first treaty devoted exclusively to 
the protection of civilians in time of war’15. GC IV focused chiefly on ‘the 
treatment of civilians in the hands of the adversary, whether in occupied 
territory or in internment’16. GC IV was subsequently supplemented by the two 
Additional Protocols (AP I and AP II)17 in 1977 which in a series of detailed 
provisions address the ‘protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities; 
relief in favour of the civilian population; and treatment of persons in the 
power of a party to the conflict’18.  
 
3.2  Defining the term ‘civilian’ 
 
In the Hague and Geneva law treaties, the term ‘civilian’ is not expressly 
defined19. What we do find, however, in both the Hague regulations (HR) and 
the four Geneva Conventions, is the suggestion that the concepts of civilian 
and combatant ‘are mutually exclusive20, and that every person involved in, or 
                                                
9 Available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/345?OpenDocument (accessed 20 September 
2012). 
10 Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 36. 
11 However it failed to garner interest at the 1929 Geneva Diplomatic Conference, ‘which 
revised the 1906 Geneva Convention on Wounded and Sick Armed Forces in Land Warfare 
and also adopted the Convention on POWs’ (Idem at 37). 
12 Available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/320?OpenDocument (accessed 20 
September 2012); Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 37. 
13 Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 37. 
14 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC 
IV) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287. 
15 Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 37. 
16 GC IV deals with situations ‘which arise when people fall into enemy hands in the course of 
an international war. It does not deal extensively with situations in which citizens are exposed 
to other hazards of war, nor does it (except in common article 3) address problems arising in 
non-international armed conflict, still less the protection of individuals abused by their own 
government’ (Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 38). 
17 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty 
Series 1391; 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (AP II) (1979) 1125 
U.N. Treaty Series 609.  
18 API articles 48-78. 
19 ICRC (2009) Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL 
(Interpretive Guide) available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 (accessed 7 August 2011) at 21. 
20 GCIV states that ‘persons protected by the convention are those who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the 
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’. It then 
goes on to note that those individuals ‘protected by the other 1949 Geneva Conventions (the 
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affected by, the conduct of hostilities falls into one of these… categories’21. 
Moreover there ‘is no intermediate category’22 and ‘no body in enemy hands 
can be outside the law’23. In 1977, AP I article 50(1) provided ‘the first codified 
definition of “civilian”’24 in IHL: 
‘A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of 
persons referred to in GC III article 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) and API article 
43’25.  
In short ‘all persons who are not members of State armed forces, or organised 
armed groups of a party to the conflict, nor participants in a levée en masse 
are civilians’26. It may seem unusual to see a term defined in the negative: AP 
I does not ‘tell us who or what the protected persons and objects are. They tell 
us who or what the protected persons and objects are not’27. However when 
one recalls that ‘concepts of the civilian population and the armed forces are 
only conceived in opposition to each other’28, as mutually exclusive, it is 
entirely appropriate that the definition be expressed in this way. More recent 
jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia confirms that civilians are ‘persons who are not, or no longer, 
members of the armed forces’29. In 2006 the Israeli High Court of Justice, in 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel, 
also endorsed the definition of a ‘civilian’ being opposite to that of a 
combatant30. The way the definition is expressed ensures that ‘there is no 
undistributed middle between the categories of combatants (and military 
objectives), and civilians (and civilian objects)’31. Another notable 
characteristic of the AP I definition is that it ‘omits the condition of being “in the 
hands of” a belligerent’, which had characterised GC IV. At the heart of any 
IHL definition of a civilian are two characteristics: civilians are not ‘members of 
                                                                                                                                      
wounded and sick, shipwrecked, and POWs) would not be considered to be civilians’ 
(Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 38). 
21 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 21. 
22 Ibid. 
23 ‘He is either a POW and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by 
the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who 
is covered by the First Convention’ (Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 38). 
24 Nils Melzer (2009) Targeted Killings in International Law Oxford University Press: Oxford at 
at 310. 
25 David M Crane and Daniel Reisner (2011) ‘Jousting at Windmills’ in William C Banks (ed) 
New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia University 
Press: New York (ebook) at 1604-12. 
26 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 20 and 27; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-
Beck (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge at rule 5. 
27 Claude Pilloud and Jean Pictet (1987) Commentary of the Additional Protocols: Article 50 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Geneva 609 at 610; ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 21. 
28 Pilloud and Pictet Commentary of the Additional Protocols: Article 50 at 610; ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 21. 
29 Prosecutor v Blaškić ICTY (2000) IT-95-14-T at para 180. 
30 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 26. 
31 Yoram Dinstein (2004) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 123. 
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the armed forces’, and they are not authorised to participate directly in 
hostilities32. 
 
3.3  Presumptive civilian status 
 
As a result of the mutual exclusivity of the IHL concepts of combatants vs 
civilians, IHL operated on the ‘presumption that in cases of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian’33. In 
practical terms, this means that a combatant may only fire upon persons of 
uncertain status if he is convinced that they are enemy combatants34. Some 
have agued that this presumption gives ‘non-State entities potential 
advantages over regular armies on the battlefield when non-State fighters 
choose not to wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population’35. 
 
3.4 The privileges attached to civilian status: immunity against targeted 
attacks  
 
One of the cardinal principles at the heart of IHL is that ‘there is an absolute 
prohibition on the targeting of civilians’36.  
 
‘In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives’37. 
 
As the ICTY Appeal Chamber noted, ‘the prohibition is not subject to any 
exceptions, and military necessity cannot be invoked as a justification’38 for 
violating the principle. This view was endorsed by the Israeli High Court of 
Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government 
                                                
32 Idem at 121 and 34. 
33 AP I article 50(1). 
34 Fritz Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld (2011) Constraints on the Waging of War: An 
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (4th ed) Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge at 101. 
35 Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1544-51; Laurie R Blank ‘Updating the 
Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2010) 1:3 
PRISM 59 at 65; Kenneth Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 
641-695 at 667. 
36 Prosecutor v Blaškić ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment (29 July 2004) IT-95-14-A available 
at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf (accessed 19 September 
2012) at para 109; Legality of the Threat on Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) 
(1996) International Law Reports 100 at 257; Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 
1978-87. 
37 Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 38-39. 
38 Prosecutor v Galić ICTY Appeals Chamber (30 November 2006) IT-98-29-A available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf (accessed 19 September 
2012) at para 130; Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict at 124. 
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of Israel39, and is considered so ‘intransgressible, that the drafters of the 
Rome Statute saw fit to include it in article 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) and (iv) as constituting 
a war crime’40. 
Despite this legal position, ‘there can be no assurances that attacks 
against combatants and other military objectives will not result in civilian 
casualties in or near such military objectives’41 as the ‘unintended by product 
of an attack directed against lawful targets’42. Consequently ‘each military 
commander is duty bound, to the maximum extent feasible, to remove civilian 
objects and individuals from the vicinity of military objectives’43, so as to avoid 
causing unnecessary civilian ‘collateral damage’44 ‘during the attacks on 
"combatants"’45, a view which has been endorsed in several judicial decisions, 
including the Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture 
in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel.  
This principle is expressed in AP I articles 51(5)(b) and article 
57(2)(a)(iii) and gave rise to what is called the proportionality enquiry:46 ‘in 
determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine 
whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual 
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her 
could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack’47. 
Consequently when civilian casualties result from an attack which satisfies the 
proportionality requirement, its does ‘not constitute a violation of the laws of 
war’48. 
 
3.5 The consequences attaching to civilian status: the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities  
 
Soldiers are trained not to open fire on civilians precisely because civilians are 
not considered a legitimate military target. Soldiers expect civilians to act in a 
peaceable manner, and so long as civilians go about their peaceful activities 
there is no military advantage gained by attacking them. This expectation of 
civilians is the foundation upon which much of IHL is built49. 
 With the sole exception of the levée en masse50, civilians are not 
                                                
39 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 26. 
40 Ibid; Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 
130. 
41 Idem at 125. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Idem at 131. 
44 Idem at 128. 
45 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 26. 
46 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 128.  
47 Prosecutor v Galić ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment (5 December 2003) available at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/8148 (accessed 19 September 2012) at para 808. 
48 Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1535-44. 
49 Sadly, when civilians betray their civilian identity so as to launch a surprise attack, their 
actions make the armed forces understandably suspicious that other so-called civilians might 
well also pose a threat to them. 
50 ‘Where inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form 
themselves into regular armed units’ (GC III article 4 A(6); Anthony P V Rogers ‘Unequal 
Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 18). 
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authorised to participate directly in hostilities51. It is this restriction which 
serves to shield civilians from the effects of hostilities and protects the civilian 
population from being the legitimate target of a direct military attack52. If 
civilians are found to be abusing this protection, and using their protective 
status to attack unsuspecting combatants, their actions are viewed as 
perfidious. The moment civilians begin to participate in hostilities, they pose a 
threat to the opposition, and are exposed to legitimate direct targeting53 ‘for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’54. As participants in the 
hostilities they are considered ‘legitimate military targets’, ‘whether or not they 
distinguish themselves from ordinary civilians’55 and irrespective of whether 
their participation is ‘permanent, intermittent, or only once off’56. Moreover, 
their capture now constitutes a legitimate military advantage.  
 
3.6 Civilian direct participation in hostilities: the ‘unlawful combatant’, 
and the forfeiture of civilian status 
 
i. Unlawful combatant: legal term or misleading descriptor? 
 
The term ‘unlawful combatant’ was first coined in the 1942 US Supreme Court 
decision in Ex Parte Quirin57 to describe ‘a combatant who conducted his 
belligerence in an unlawful manner’58 and ‘had not fulfilled certain conditions 
which are indispensible to the acquisition of qualification for the status of 
POW’59. When the ICRC convened a diplomatic conference to draft and adopt 
                                                
51 1949 Geneva Conventions, common article 3. 
52 Hans-Peter Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 210. 
53 Solis suggests that ‘carrying heavy arms on one’s person is equally an invitation for 
attack… yet, civilians may possess light weapons for hunting or self defence, without losing 
their protection from attack, as long as these weapons are not carried or used in questionable 
circumstances’ (Gary Solis (2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law 
in War Cambridge University Press: New York at 208). 
54 Ibid; Eric T Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C Banks (ed) ‘New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia’ (Columbia 
University Press: New York) (ebook) at 2028-36. 
55 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 15; Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ 
at 39. 
56 Blank ‘Updating the Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the  
Law of Armed Conflict’ at 65. 
57 In 1942 a group of German ‘saboteurs, apparently belonging to the German Marine 
Infantry’ arrived by submarine at the American West Coast, and were captured while in 
civilian dress (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 25). In an application for 
habeas corpus the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that: 
‘the laws of war distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between lawful 
combatants and unlawful ones. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention 
as POW’s by the opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to 
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military 
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful’ (Ex Parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1 
30-31 (1942); Shlomy Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where Does the 
Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 378 at 385). 
58 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 
at 415.  
59 In the Mohammed Ali case (317 U.S. 1 (1942) 59), soldiers who conducted belligerent acts 
while wearing civilian clothes, were denied POW status because of their breach of the laws of 
war, since ‘such unprivileged belligerents, though not condemned by international law, are not 
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the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the term ‘unlawful combatant’ was not 
mentioned at all60.  
  Only two years after the Geneva Conventions were drafted, Richard 
Baxter already recognised the existence of certain types of fighters ‘who do 
not easily fit into the categories of the Geneva Conventions’61. Once again the 
term unlawful combatant came to the fore, however what differed from 
references made in Ex Parte Quirin, was that now the term was being used as 
‘shorthand for persons - civilians - who have directly participated in hostilities 
in an international armed conflict without being members of the armed forces 
(as defined by international humanitarian law - IHL) and who have fallen into 
enemy hands’62. They are viewed as a combatant of sorts ‘in the sense that 
they can be lawfully targeted by the enemy’63 the moment they elect to 
participate directly in hostilities, and yet ‘unlawful’ in that they cannot ‘claim 
the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy’64, because they lack the 
requisite authority to participate directly in hostilities.  
  Legally speaking the term ‘unlawful combatant’ is completely novel65 in 
that it has ‘remained unused in the legal terminology of armed conflict’ since 
the Quirin judgment66’, and is ‘not acknowledged or otherwise mentioned in 
the Laws of War’, the Geneva Conventions or in any other IHL treaty67 or 
                                                                                                                                      
protected by it’ (Idem at 386). Zachary correctly points out that this determination of them 
being unprivileged belligerents ‘does not create a new status, but only links the lawfulness of 
belligerence with the entitlement of POW status’ (Ibid). Yoram Dinstein (2007) ‘The System of 
Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ in Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and Volker 
Epping (eds.) International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges Springer: Berlin at 154. 
Similarly in the Hostages Case members of resistance movements not having lawful 
combatant status were referred to as “unlawful belligerents” ((Nuremberg Trials of War 
Criminals 1950 (available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-8.pdf 
(accessed 21 September 2012)). 
60 Zachary argues that ‘the term was probably ignored intentionally’ (Zachary ‘Between the 
Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ at 386). Some criticise 
the term for being an oxymoron, since ‘if a combatant is by definition someone with lawful 
authorisation to participate in hostilities, then anyone acting without authorisation cannot 
enjoy the label combatant at all’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War at 226). 
61 Baxter defines these ‘unprivileged belligerents’ as ‘persons who are not entitled to 
treatment either as peaceful civilians or as POWs, by reason of the fact that they have 
engaged in hostile conduct without meeting the qualifications established by article 4 of the 
Geneva POW Convention of 1949’ (Richard Baxter ‘So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: 
Spies, Guerillas and Saboteurs’ (1951) 28 British Yearbook of International Law 323); 
Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 40. 
62 ICRC 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts' (2007) 867 International Review of the Red Cross 719 at 727; Solis The Law of 
Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 208 and 238; Zachary ‘Between the 
Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ at 385. 
63 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 36. 
64 Idem at 29; Nathaniel Berman ‘Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal 
Construction of War’ (2004) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1 at 7. 
65 ICRC 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts' at 727. 
66 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 
at 387. 
67 Luisa Vierucci ‘Prisoners of War or Protected Persons Qua Unlawful Combatants? The 
Judicial Safeguards to which Guantánamo Bay Detainees are Entitled’ (2003) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 284 at 295. 
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customary IHL68. ‘Initially the International Committee for the Red Cross 
(ICRC) maintained that there was no such category, but they have since 
admitted that the term “unlawful combatant” has been used over the last 
century in legal literature, military manuals69 and case law’70. In fact, what 
started out as a descriptor in Ex Parte Quirin soon took on the status of a  
‘legal’ phrase71’ and the initial term ‘unlawful combatant’72 is now mentioned in 
some military manuals alongside terms like ‘unprivileged belligerents’73, and 
most recently ‘unlawful’ enemy combatant’74. 
 Dinstein suggests that these unlawful combatants ‘inhabit the grey area 
in between the lands of the combatant and the civilian’75. Many academics 
question ‘whether such a third status (unlawful combatants) really exists in 
international law’76. The problem with sub-dividing ‘combatants’ into lawful 
and unlawful sub-categories is that IHL operates on the fundamental principle 
that everyone in the theatre of armed conflict enjoys primary IHL status as 
either an authorised combatant77 (and is protected by GC III) or a civilian (and 
is protected by GC IV78), and there is no status in-between. Consequently, if a 
                                                
68 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 
at 385. 
69 For example the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (2004) The Manual of the Law of 
Armed Conflict Oxford at 279 para 11.4. 
70 Michael Cowling and Shannon Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay - 
International Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ (2009) 42:1 Comparative and 
International Law Quarterly of South Africa 1 at 18; Adam Roberts ‘Appendix 9: 
Supplementary Memorandum 26’ (2002) available at  
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/93/93ap10.htm (accessed 3 November 2012). 
71 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 
at 385. 
72 Kenneth Watkin ‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the 
Struggle over Legitimacy’ (2005) Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 
Harvard University Occasional Paper Series (Winter) No 2 at 6; Robert Goldman and Brian 
Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2002) ASIL Task Force 
Paper available at www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012) at 4; 
Knut Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 68. 
73 Baxter ‘So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerillas and Saboteurs’ at 328; 
Watkin ‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle 
over Legitimacy’ at 6; Berman ‘Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal 
Construction of War’ at 7. 
74 Hamdi v Donald H Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) where the term ‘enemy 
combatant’ was used in reference to captured Taliban and Al-qaeda fighters. 
75 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 36. 
76 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 
at 379. 
77 As Watkin explains, ‘the inclusion of unlawful combatants within the category of combatants 
appears prima facie to be inconsistent with the historical linkage between legitimacy and 
combatant status’ (Watkin ‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, 
and the Struggle over Legitimacy’ at 11). 
78 ‘He might be a protected person under the Geneva Civilian Convention but, if he is a 
national of a State that is not a party to the armed conflict, he might fall outside the ambit of 
that convention’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 24). The following 
‘civilians’ are precluded from relying on GC IV in times of international armed conflict:  
‘1. a national of the belligerent party in whose hands he is;  
2. a national of any other State not a contracting party to the convention’ (although, as the 
Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified, this exemption is no longer 
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participant in hostilities does not fulfill the conditions for combatant status (ie 
membership in an armed group), then they necessarily remain civilians (as 
they were at their birth)79.  
Those opposed to the introduction of a third IHL status argue that  
‘unlawful combatant… has a exclusively descriptive character… and does not 
corroborate the existence of a third category of persons’80. The Israeli High 
Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v 
Government of Israel concluded, after analysing the literature, treaty and 
custom, that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the 
term ‘unlawful combatant’ constituted a third status under IHL81. There is also 
growing concern that such a move would re-introduce the ‘concept of “quasi-
combatant” which was used to justify direct attacks on civilian factory workers 
during World War II’82. Those who reject the introduction of this third category 
argue that it is legally unacceptable to create a further category for the sole 
reason of reducing ‘the individual protection below the minimum standard of 
human rights’83.  
These academics who reject a third IHL status, maintain that ‘unlawful 
combatants/unprivileged belligerents are not a third battlefield category but a 
subcategory of civilian’84. The ICRC maintains that ‘these individuals still fall 
within the protections of GC IV, the convention protecting civilians’85. This 
viewpoint has been ‘endorsed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia when it held ‘there is no gap between the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Convention and that if an individual is not entitled to protections of the 
Third Convention... he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention 
                                                                                                                                      
relevant in practice);  
‘3. a national of a co-belligerent State maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the 
belligerent in question or; 
4. a national of a neutral country maintaining normal diplomatic representation in the 
State in whose hands they are’.  
(Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 47; 
Rikke Ishøy (2008) Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law 
(revised edition) Danish Red Cross: København at 121). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 208. 
81 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 28. 
82 Watkin ‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle 
over Legitimacy’ at 10. 
83 Knut Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 83. 
84 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 207; Watkin 
‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle over 
Legitimacy’ 74-75. 
85 Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay – International Humanitarian 
Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 26; Johannes Van Aggelen ‘A Response to John C. Yoo: 
“The Status of Soldiers and Terrorists under the Geneva Conventions”’ (2005) Chinese 
Journal of International Law June 167 at 174. 
 58 
IV.’86 Moreover in the Al-Marri87 case the court simply ‘did not recognise the 
legal category of enemy combatant’88.  
Jensen suggests that we call these ‘civilians who are not lawful 
combatants but still involve themselves in hostilities… direct participants’89. 
Admittedly, ‘civilians taking a direct part in hostilities lose civilian immunity 
from attack, but not the “civilian” status itself’90. But ‘when an unlawful 
combatant has ceased taking a direct part in hostilities, even temporarily, he 
regains the status of an ordinary civilian, a full-fledged ‘protected person’ who 
is not a legitimate military target’91.  
We need to appreciate therefore that the term “civilian” might be 
confusing because it includes within its ranks, protected persons and those 
who by their actions have made themselves legitimate targets92. As Blank 
explains, ‘even though they are fighting, they retain their civilian status in the 
traditional framework because they do not fit the definition of combatant’93. A 
civilian’s unauthorised participation in hostilities prior to capture does ‘not 
deprive him or her of civilian status, but may lead to some, limited, waiving of 
rights and privileges’94. 
 
ii. Forfeiture of civilian status 
 
Linked to the somewhat misconstrued notion that a civilian who participates in 
hostilities can become an unlawful combatant, has emerged the notion that 
one can forfeit one’s primary civilian status. So for example some academics 
argue that ‘a person who engages in military raids by night, while purporting to 
be an innocent civilian by day’ forfeits his civilian status’95.  
The notion that an individual can forfeit their IHL status crept into the 
language of AP I in the provisions dealing with POW status. However, on 
closer inspection it becomes apparent that the notion that one can forfeit 
one’s primary status is at odds with IHL - a combatant might forfeit his 
secondary POW status (for failing to observe the principle of distinction), but 
neither combatants nor civilians can ever do anything to forfeit their primary 
status per se. Their actions (by participating directly in hostilities) may affect 
                                                
86 Prosecutor v Delalic et al (Celebici case) ICTY Judgement (16 November 1998) IT-96-21-T 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf (accessed 18 
September 2012) at para 271; Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay – 
International Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 26. 
87 487 F.3d at 184–85. 
88 Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay – International Humanitarian 
Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 26; Gregory Shill ‘Enemy Combatants and a Challenge to 
the Separation of War Powers in Al-Marri v Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007)’ (2008) 31:1 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy at 2. 
89 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1969-78. 
90 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 27. 
91 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant Belong’ 
at 393. 
92 Blank ‘Updating the Commander’s Toolbox: New Tools for Operationalising the Law of 
Armed Conflict’ at 65. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 121; Solis The 
Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 207; Crane and Reisner 
‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1621-28. 
95 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 29. 
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the extent to which they enjoy the privileges associated with their primary 
status (ie by exposing them to direct targeting for so long as they participate in 
hostilities), but that alone does not change the fact that their primary status is 
civilian. Failing to act like a civilian will not make one a combatant96, likewise 
failing to observe the principle of distinction will not render a combatant a 
civilian (rather, they will remain a combatant but will forfeit their POW 
privileges).  
 
3.7 The consequences of unauthorised direct participation in hostilities 
on the part of civilians 
 
The reason why these civilian belligerents are sometimes labelled unlawful is 
because they lack the required authorisation to participate in hostilities97. If it 
is clearly established by a court that a person is not entitled to POW status 
according to GC III article 4(A)(1), (2), (3) or (6), or AP I articles 43 or 44(1), 
then his or her direct participation in hostilities was also unauthorised. 
A civilian who does participate in hostilities ‘does not thereby become a 
combatant entitled to prisoner-of-war (POW) status upon capture’98. As a 
consequence of their lack of authorisation, civilians who participate directly in 
hostilities do not enjoy the privileges afforded legitimate combatants99 (like 
‘POW status upon capture and immunity from prosecution’100 for lawful hostile 
acts).  
While engaging in hostilities without authorisation is not a war crime101, 
as an unprivileged belligerent the individual is exposed to criminal 
prosecution102 under domestic ‘criminal legislation’103 for ‘all acts committed 
against the adversary’104 even if they had otherwise observed the laws of war.  
                                                
96 Ibid. All combatants were initially civilians before they fulfilled certain conditions which were 
‘indispensible to the acquisition of qualification for the status of POW’ (Dinstein ‘The System 
of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ at 150). Likewise, when a member of the 
armed forces retires, he once again reverts to being a civilian. 
97 Unlawful combatants differ from their lawful colleagues in that they can face prosecution for 
participating in hostilities without authorisation (Vierucci ‘Prisoners of War or Protected 
Persons Qua Unlawful Combatants? The Judicial Safeguards to which Guantánamo Bay 
Detainees are Entitled’ at 296). 
98 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23. 
99 Their failure to meet the requirements for full combatant status comes as the ‘price of… 
forfeiting the immunity of a lawful combatant’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International 
Humanitarian Law in War at 211). 
100 As Ipsen explains, ‘a detainee shall not be prosecuted for his participation in hostilities 
unless he or she has been positively identified as an unlawful combatant’ (Ipsen (2008) 
‘Combatants and non-combatants’ at 105). 
101 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 211. Although 
Rogers argues that ‘any individual or group not belonging to these categories that takes a 
direct part in hostilities commits a war crime by violating the laws and customs of war’ 
(Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 25). 
102 Won Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2010) 38:3 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 361 at 386. 
103 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 37; 
Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 4; Leslie 
Green (2001) The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2 ed) Manchester University Press: 
Manchester at 347; AP I article 45. Despite this, they are still entitled to basic humane 
treatment, fundamental human rights guarantees, and fair judicial procedures upon capture 
(AP I article 75, Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 68; Crane and Reisner 
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Moreover, civilians who participate in hostilities are at particular risk for being 
found to have conducted their hostilities in a way which ‘may amount to 
perfidy in violation of customary and treaty IHL’105, since they seldom 
distinguish themselves as combatants. 
These ‘judicial proceedings may be conducted before either military or 
domestic courts’106. While they are exposed to criminal prosecution they ‘do 
have a legitimate claim to certain fundamental guarantees (enshrined in API 
article 75) which include the right to humane treatment and proper judicial 
procedure’107. While a POW is only required by law to provide details of his 
‘name, rank, military number and date of birth’, a civilian who is captured 
whilst participating directly in hostilities without the requisite authorisation is 
‘subject to standard criminal interrogation, in accordance with the internal 
criminal procedures of the State’108. 
 
3.8 Persons accompanying the armed forces 
 
In IHL treaties since the 1893 Lieber code109 (including HR article 13110 and 
GC III article 4A(4)111) there is reference made to ‘persons who accompany 
the armed forces without actually being members thereof’112. Oddly, while IHL 
openly states that these individuals lack the membership link to the armed 
forces required to afford them full combatant status, they are nevertheless 
mentioned within the treaty provisions which ordinarily deal with the privileges 
afforded to combatants.  
Some texts refer to these individuals as private contractors or 
civilian employees of the armed forces113. Whatever label one uses, 
when we talk of ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’ we are 
referring to non-enlisted personnel who for ‘centuries… have 
                                                                                                                                      
‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1544-51; Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 25; 
Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 37). 
104 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 106. 
105 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 85. 
106 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 211. 
107 Idem at 208; Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 82. 
108 Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant 
Belong?’ at 392. 
109 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) 
(24 April 1863) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/73cb71d18dc4372741256739003e6372/a25aa5871a04919bc1256
3cd002d65c5?OpenDocument (accessed 21 September 2012).  
110 ‘Individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as newspaper 
correspondents and reporters, sutlers and contractors, who fall into the enemy's hands 
and whom the latter thinks expedient to detain, are entitled to be treated as POW, 
provided they are in possession of a certificate from the military authorities of the army 
which they were accompanying’. 
111 ‘Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such 
as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, 
members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, 
provided that they have received authorisation, from the armed forces which they 
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the 
annexed model’. 
112 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 107. 
113 Ibid. 
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participated in a series of significant functions’114 like: war 
correspondents, military aircraft technicians; those ‘managing and 
servicing battle-related equipment’115; members of labour units, supply 
contractors, those who prepare and sell food or those providing 
services responsible for the welfare of the soldier116. It is also worth 
noting that the list enumerated above was not meant to be 
exhaustive117. By whatever name, the fact remains that ‘parties to 
armed conflicts have increasingly employed private contractors and 
civilian employees in a variety of functions traditionally performed by 
military personnel’118.  
Since these persons who ‘accompany the armed forces’119 are not 
members of the armed forces, with full combatant status, they could not 
otherwise ‘claim the status of POW awarded to combatants’120, were it not for 
the fact that they are specifically afforded secondary POW by the IHL treaties. 
This secondary POW status is afforded these individuals on account of the 
fact that they perform their activities121 in ‘geographic and organisational’122 
proximity of military objectives and military units involved in belligerent 
campaigns’, and thereby face increased risk of incidental injury123 (as 
acceptable collateral damage)124 and falling into enemy hands125, even if they 
do not take a direct part in hostilities126. 
                                                
114 Dale Stephens and Angeline Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed 
Conflict’ (2006) 9 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 25 at 33; Dinstein The Conduct 
of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 49. 
115 Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 49. 
116 GCIII article 4(A)(4); Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 21; Stephens and 
Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 33; Dinstein The Conduct of 
Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 49. 
117 Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 35. 
118 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 37. 
119 According to the treaty only those civilian contractors who actually accompany the armed 
forces are afforded this special status. ‘Contractors providing support to other branches of the 
State administration…during an armed conflict cannot claim this status’ (Giulio Bartolini 
(2011) ‘Private Military and Security Contractors as “Persons who Accompany the Armed 
Forces”’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzotti (eds) War By Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors Oxford University Press at 220). 
120 Idem at 219. 
121 ‘Activities traditionally performed by contractors classified as “persons who accompany the 
armed force” are not considered as direct participation in hostilities’ (Idem at 220). 
122 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 107. 
123 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ 
at 384. 
124 When an attack is directed at an ‘objective containing civilians accompanying armed 
forces’, API article 57(2)(a) demands that care is taken ‘in order to keep collateral injuries to 
the civilians accompanying the armed forces to a minimum’ (Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and 
Non-combatants’ at 107). 
125 Bartolini (2011) ‘Private Military and Security Contractors as “Persons who Accompany the 
Armed Forces”’ at 219. ‘Although the capturing party may decide to simply let these persons 
go, it is entitled to detain them… and if it does detain them, it is obliged to treat them as POW’ 
(Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 47). POW status brings with it the benefit of being ‘repatriated to their 
country as soon as hostilities cease’ (Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 384). 
126 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 37. 
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The only condition which was attached to this privileged, was that they 
had to carry with them the necessary identity cards127 ‘confirming their 
status’128 and their right to claim POW privileges upon capture. Rogers rightly 
points out ‘it is probably better if they do not wear uniforms’ and ‘any arms 
should be for personal self-defence and this should be reflected in the training 
and rules of engagement of such personnel’129.  
While it is tempting to classify this group of individuals as non-
combatant members of the armed forces, it is important to note that the two 
groups are in fact distinct from each other130. While both non-combatant 
members of the armed forces and these ‘persons accompanying the armed 
forces’ are denied ‘authorisation to fight as a combatant’, the grounds for this 
denial is different131. ‘Non-combatants, despite their membership of the armed 
forces’, are denied authorisation to participate directly in hostilities because of 
the function that they serve132. ‘Persons who accompany the armed forces’, 
on the other hand, do not enjoy authorisation to participate in hostilities 
‘because of their primary status’133 as civilians. As civilians, these private 
contractors are ‘entitled to protection against direct attack ‘unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities’ as is the case with any civilian134. 
Furthermore they do not lose this civilian status ‘simply because they 
accompany the armed forces and/or assume (non-combative) functions… that 
would traditionally have been performed by military personnel’135.  
 The majority of ‘private contractors and civilian employees 
currently active in armed conflicts have not been incorporated136 into 
State armed forces’137 and consequently, for the most part, they do not 
‘assume functions’138 which amount to direct participation in 
                                                
127 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 10; GC III article 4 (A)(4) states:  
‘provided that they have received authorisation, from the armed forces which they 
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the 
annexed model’. The card ‘requires the identification of the issuing authority and must 
specify exactly what the bearer is authorised to do’ (Kidane ‘The Status of Private 
Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 382-383). 
128 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 21. 
129 Ibid. 
130 The fact that both groups are entitled to POW status ‘does not equate to having privileged 
combatant status’ (Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed 
Conflict’ at 33; Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict at 49).  
131 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 79 and 105. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Idem at 65, 79, 105 and 107; GC III article 4A(4) and AP I article 50(1). 
134 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 37. 
135 Idem at 38. 
136 A determination that a party belongs to the state requires integration into the armed forces 
command structure, either by way of a formal process (made possible by national 
legislations) or as a consequence of being given a ‘continuous combat function’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 39; Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed 
Conflict’ at 35). In such instances their membership of ‘an organised armed force, group, or 
unit under a command responsible to a party to the conflict’ would strip them of their primary 
civilian status and clothe them with combatant status (ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 39). 
137 Idem at 37. 
138 Ibid. 
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hostilities139. However as the ICRC points out, it can be challenging to 
ascertain ‘the civilian or military nature of contractor activity’140. It is 
however imperative that those armed forces employing such private 
contractors ensure that they do not permit them to partake in activities 
which are ‘are inherently governmental and remain military in nature’141. 
Serious ‘repercussions’ result if it is found that these ‘civilian 
contractors’ are indeed participating directly in hostilities142. For one, 
they lose both their civilian immunity from attack143 and may be subject 
to direct targeting144. Furthermore they stand to forfeit their POW 
status145, and they ‘may be prosecuted146 for war crimes and other 
related forms of criminal offenses’147 because they do not enjoy the 
combatant privilege afforded to members of the armed forces in 
international armed conflicts148.  
In short, were it to be concluded that a private contractor had 
participated directly in hostilities ‘without the express or tacit 
authorisation of the State party to the conflict’149, or without being 
incorporated into the armed forces, ‘they remain civilians’ but ‘lose their 
protection against direct attack for such time as their direct participation 
lasts’150. Where there is doubt as to whether the private contractor has 
overstepped the mark and is potentially participating directly in 
hostilities, ‘the general rules of IHL on precautions and presumptions in 




                                                
139 The test applied to determine whether their actions amount to direct participation in 
hostilities is the same test that is applied to all ordinary civilians (Ibid). 
140 ‘For example, the line between the defence of military personnel and other military 
objectives against enemy attacks (which amount to direct participation in hostilities), and the 
protection of those same persons and objects against crime or violence unrelated to the 
hostilities (which does not amount to direct participation in hostilities), may be thin’ (Idem at 
38). 
141 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and non-combatants’ at 108. 
142 Idem at 107; Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 385. 
143 While a private contractor who does not participate in hostilities may not be targeted 
directly, and will be afforded POW status should he fall into enemy hands, this privilege is not 
extended to those private contractors who do participate without authorisation.  
 
144 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 107. 
145 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ 
at 385; Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 35; 
Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 49 and 
121. 
146 The risk of prosecution is the same as for ‘all other civilians who are prohibited from taking 
a direct part in hostilities’ (Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 105 and 107). 
147 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ 
at 385. 
148 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 108. 
149 Stephens and Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ at 35. 
150 Ibid; ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 39. 
151 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 38. 
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3.9  Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, given the mutually exclusive nature of the civilian/combatant 
distinction, and the fact that no one can fall outside of these two IHL 
categories, all persons who are not members of organised armed groups152 
(which are party to a conflict), are classified as civilians153. Once classified, or 
presumed to possess civilian status, these individuals enjoy civilian immunity 
against direct targeting (subject to considerations of acceptable and 
proportional collateral damage). In exchange for this immunity their actions 
are restricted by the notion of direct participation in hostilities. This restriction 
is absolute, and civilians who are found to be abusing their protected status 
are exposed to direct targeting for so long as their participation persists. 
Thereafter, since they do not enjoy authorisation to partake in hostilities (as is 
the case with combatants), they will be liable to face domestic criminal 
prosecution and possibly even charges of perfidy. While any civilian direct 
participation in hostilities compromises their civilian immunity against direct 
targeting, it is unhelpful to refer to them as anything other than ‘civilians who 
are participating directly in hostilities’, certainly there is no legal relevance in 
terms such as ‘unlawful combatant’ or ‘unlawful belligerent’. Moreover, the 
idea that civilian status can be forfeited is not legally accurate. What is valid, 
however, is that a civilian who elects to breach this limitation on his 
participation in hostilities, will have his civilian rights and privileges curtailed. 
Civilian contractors who ‘accompany the armed forces’ (with the 
necessary identity cards) inherently enjoy civilian IHL status, with its attendant 
rights and obligations. That said, they nevertheless are afforded the unusual 
privilege of POW status upon capture, in light of the non-combative functions 
which they carry out in close proximity to hostilities. In order to ensure the 
these civilian contractors desist from any combative activities, they stand to 
lose not only their civilian immunity against direct attack but also their POW 
privileges if they choose to partake in hostilities. Moreover, as is the case with 





                                                
152 I include the levée en masse in this category. 
153 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 20 and 27; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-
Beck (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge 





UNDERSTANDING AND OBSERVING THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
4.1 A brief introduction to the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities 
 
The phrase ‘direct participation in hostilities’1 has a very specific meaning in 
the realm of international humanitarian law (IHL) and refers to ‘combat-related 
activities2 that would normally be undertaken only by members of the armed 
forces’3. As a general rule, all those with combatant4 status are authorised to 
participate directly in hostilities, and are immune from prosecution5 for their 
participation. Civilians, on the other hand, enjoy immunity against attack6 
precisely because they refrain from any such direct participation in hostilities – 
                                                
1 Some texts use the phrase interchangeably with ‘taking a direct part’ or ‘taking an active 
part’ in hostilities. So for example in the English text of the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. 
Treaty Series 287, reference is made to ‘active’ participation. In the 1977 Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty Series 1391 the same concept 
is referred to as ‘direct participation’. In the French text of the GC IV and AP I the phrase 
“participent directement”’ is used throughout, demonstrating that ‘the terms “direct” and 
“active” refer to the same quality and degree of individual participation in hostilities’ (ICRC 
(2009) Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL 
(Interpretive Guide) available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609 (accessed 7 August 2011) at 43); Nils Melzer (2009) 
Targeted Killings in International Law Oxford University Press: Oxford at 335. 
2 Rogers distinguishes these activities from ‘support activities, such as provision of supplies 
and services… which do not amount to taking a direct part in hostilities’ (Anthony PV Rogers 
‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
3 at 19). 
3 Outside of the ranks of the armed forces we find one other category of persons who 
participate in hostilities despite not being properly authorised to do so, the so-called levée en 
masse (who are civilian by definition but who acquire the secondary protections afforded 
combatants when they are forced to take up arms spontaneously) (Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III) of August 12 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. 
Treaty Series 135 at article 4(6)). 
4 Traditionally, the individual members of the armed forces enjoy this status (as a result of 
their affiliation to the State) (Kurt Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter 
Fleck (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: 
Oxford at 66-67). However, as an exception to this general rule, there are a number of groups 
of service personnel within the ranks of the armed forces who are denied authorisation (by 
national legislation) to ‘use a weapon or a weapons system’ and are consequently called non-
combatants (AP I article 43(2); The Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Annex to the Hague Convention IV of 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations ‘HR’) 1910 
U.K. Treaty Series 9 also available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195 (accessed 14 July 
2012) at article 3).  
5 Provided they adhere to the limitations imposed upon them by IHL regarding the methods 
and means of warfare (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65-66 and 68; HR 
article 3 and AP I article 43(2)). 
6 ‘Those who do not participate in the hostilities shall not be attacked’ (Michael N Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ (2010) 42 
International Law and Politics 697 at 715). 
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a principle which has been endorsed by the Israeli High Court of Justice in 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel7. 
As civilians, they remain protected ‘for so long as they do not act to 
compromise their protected status, by engaging in ‘combat related activities’8. 
The Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel 
('PCATI') v Government of Israel point out that when a civilian participates 
directly in hostilities without the requisite combatant authority, they retain their 
civilian status, but temporarily9 lose their immunity from direct attacks10, and 
their ‘protection against the dangers arising from military operations’11 under 
international law. Instead, as long as a civilian persists in performing a 
combatant function, ‘he is subject to the risks which that function entails and 
ceases to enjoy the protection granted to a civilian from attack’12. 
Consequently they are exposed to direct targeting as a legitimate military 
target13. Moreover they may be subject to prosecution in terms of the ‘internal 
state penal law’14, without the benefit of the privileges extended to 
combatants15, like for example POW status and immunity from prosecution16.  
This area has been the subject of much controversy since ‘neither the 
Geneva Conventions nor their Additional Protocols17 provide a definition of 
what activities amount to “direct participation in hostilities”’18. This lacuna in 
the law is of particular concern in light of the realities of contemporary 
international armed conflict: where non-State actors (often dressed as 
                                                
7 The judgment states that anyone who is not clothed with combatant status (ie a civilian) 
‘must refrain from directly participating in hostilities’ ((2006) HCJ 769/02 at para 3). 
8 Idem at 714. As the ICRC Commentary on AP I article 51(3) explains: ‘the immunity afforded 
individual civilians is subject to an overriding condition, namely, on their abstaining from all 
hostile acts…. thus a civilian who takes part in an armed combat, either individually or as part 
of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target, though only for as long as he takes part in 
hostilities’ (Eric T Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C Banks (ed) 
‘New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare’ (Columbia University 
Press: New York) (ebook version) at 1995-2003). 
9 ‘Once he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection under this 
section… and he may no longer be attacked’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 
1995-2012).  
10(2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 26. 
11 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
12 Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 31. 
13 Without concern for issues of proportionality (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 703). 
14 PCATI v Government of Israel at para 26; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
15 PCATI v Government of Israel at para 26. 
16 ‘As long as he preserves his status as a civilian – that is, as long as he does not become 
part of the army – but takes part in combat, he ceases to enjoy the protection granted to the 
civilian, and is subject to the risks of attack just like a combatant, without enjoying the rights of 
a combatant as a prisoner of war’ (Ibid at para 31). 
17 William J Fenrick ‘ICRC Guide on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2009) 12 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 287 at 292. 
18 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. It is surprising that prior to the turn of the century there 
was very little academic investigation into ‘State practice, customary law… legal literature or 
case law’ on the topic of direct participation in hostilities (Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 287). 
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civilians) are playing an increasing role, States are outsourcing military 
functions to private contractors, and civilians are increasingly active as 
‘farmers by day, fighters by night’19. Now more than ever there is a dire need 
for a consensus understanding of exactly what constitutes direct participation 
in hostilities20, especially when considering to what extent such activities 
might be deemed to compromise civilian immunity against direct targeting. 
 
4.2 The treaty and customary international law basis for the rule limiting 
civilian direct participation in hostilities  
 
i. Direct participation in treaty law 
 
Reference is made to the concept of direct participation in hostilities in many 
treaty provisions of IHL, including: GC common article 321 and AP I article 
51(3)22. In the commentary on AP I article 51 it is explained that: 
 
‘direct participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose 
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the 
enemy armed forces’ 23. 
 
The commentary goes on to differentiate ‘direct participation’ from general 
support of the ‘war effort’, which is often simply expected of the whole 
population24. This view was endorsed by the Israeli High Court of Justice in 
PCATI v Government of Israel25. The ICRC commentary limits ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’ to: 
 
‘acts of war which are intended26 by their nature and purpose to hit 
specifically the personnel and matériel of the armed forces of the 
adverse Party’27. 
                                                
19 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2003-12. 
20 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the 
Forum’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 637 at 637. 
21 Article 3(1) states: ‘Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria’; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
22 ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities’. At the ‘Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of 
the Additional Protocols, Mexico stated that article 51 of Additional Protocol I was so essential 
that it ‘cannot be the subject of any reservations whatsoever since these would be 
inconsistent with the aim and purpose of Protocol I and undermine its basis’, and in the end 
there were no reservations made to this provision when States signed up to AP I (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds) (2005) Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 23). 
23 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 711. 
24 In modern conflicts, almost any ‘activities of the nation contribute to the conduct of 
hostilities, directly or indirectly’ (Ibid). 
25 (2006) HCJ 769/02 at para 34. 
26 A ‘relatively direct nexus between that action and the resulting harm should exist; in other 
words, direct participation must be distinguishable from indirect participation’ (Idem at 712). 
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In the final analysis, the commentary to AP I ‘suggests a narrow interpretation 
of direct participation in hostilities’28. 
While IHL treaty law makes reference to this concept, the law ‘does not 
define direct participation in hostilities’29, or specify definitively ‘what actions 
might amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities’30. 
 
ii. Direct participation in customary IHL 
 
At a national level, the principle that civilians lose their immunity against direct 
attack when they participate in hostilities, is endorsed by several States’ 
military manuals31. This position is also endorsed ‘by official statements; 
reported practice’ and judicial decisions32, even by States that were not party 
to AP I33. According to the ICRC’s study into the customary international law 
status of this provision, no ‘official contrary practice was found’34 and on the 
whole the principle (that civilians lose their immunity from prosecution when 
they participate in hostilities) was seen as a ‘valuable reaffirmation of an 
existing rule of customary international law’35. The Israeli High Court of 
Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government 
of Israel endorsed the conclusion that it is a recognised principle under 
customary international law that when a civilian takes a direct part in the 
hostilities, they lose the ‘protection granted to a civilian who is not taking a 
direct part in the hostilities’36, for so long as their participation in the hostilities 
persists. While some States’ military manuals give examples of ‘acts which 
constitute direct participation in hostilities (e.g. serving as guards, intelligence 
agents, lookouts on behalf of military forces37… spies or couriers)’38, most 
maintain that an ‘assessment of direct participation has to be made on a case-
by-case basis’39, although very few actually explain what activities amount to 
                                                                                                                                      
27 Ibid. 
28 John Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying 
the Armed Forces’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 155 at 177. 
29 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41. 
30 Idem at 12. 
31 Australia; Belgium; Ecuador; El Salvador; India; Netherlands; United States; and 
Yugoslavia (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
22). 
32 The Israeli Supreme Court concurred in Public Committee against Torture in Israel 
('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from 
http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html (accessed 23 September 2008) at s37; Melzer 
Targeted Killings in International Law at 337. 
33 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23. 
34 Ibid. 
35 This was the expressed view of the United Kingdom at the Diplomatic Conference (Ibid).  
36 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 26. 
37 Ecuador (Naval Manual); United States (Naval Handbook) (Idem at 22). 
38 Report on the Practice of the Philippines (Ibid). 
39 Ibid; Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the 
SFRY at para 6; Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina at para 2.5; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Case 
11.137 (Argentina); U.N. Secretary-General’s Bulletin at section 5.2; the practice of Australia; 
Belgium; Benin; Canada; Colombia; Croatia; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; France; 
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direct participation. The Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee 
against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel endorsed the 
conclusion ‘that an agreed upon definition of the term "direct" in the context 
under discussion does not exist’40, and that with out a definition the best 
means of assessing the application of the phrase would be on a case by case 
basis41. 
At a regional level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
understands the term ‘direct participation in hostilities’ to mean ‘acts which, by 
their nature or purpose, are intended to cause actual42 harm to enemy 
personnel and materiel’43. 
As evidenced by the ICRC’s study into customary international law, ‘a 
precise definition of the term “direct participation in hostilities” does not exist’44 
in either State practice or international jurisprudence45. What is clear however 
is that civilian ‘use of weapons or other means to commit acts of violence 
against human or material enemy forces’ is prohibited46. Short of this very 
obvious occurrence, States are having to interpret ‘the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities …in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to its constituent terms in their context and in light of the 
object and purpose of IHL’47. 
 
 
4.3  A brief introduction to the ICRC's Interpretive Guide on the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities under IHL 
 
i. The drafting process and the legal implications of the guide 
 
Between 2003 and 2008, more than forty legal experts (drawn from 
‘academic, military, governmental, and non- governmental circles’48) came 
                                                                                                                                      
Germany; India; Indonesia; Italy; Jordan; Kenya; Madagascar; Malaysia; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Spain; Sweden; Togo; United Kingdom; United States; Yugoslavia (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 22). 
40 (2006) HCJ 769/02 at para 34. 
41 Ibid. 
42 These acts were to be distinguished from ‘civilians whose activities merely support the 
adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities such 
as selling goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of 
one of the parties or, even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the 
armed parties’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
22). The Special Representative of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights for El Salvador 
had also made reference to the need to distinguish between direct forms of participation and 
indirect participation (Idem at 23). 
43 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on Human Rights in Colombia 
(Idem at 22). 
44 Ibid. 
45 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at 23. 
46 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23. 
47 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41. 
48 The ICRC ‘is an extremely important institution for IHL purposes’ (Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance 
on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 288), some go so far as to call it the ‘custodian of IHL’ 
(Damien Van der Toorn (2009) ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical 
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together on five occasions at the invitation of the ICRC. The resultant 
discussions informed the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide49 on the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities under IHL50. Initially the ICRC had sought a 
unanimous consensus at these expert meetings, but it soon became apparent 
(when some experts wanted to remove their names from the final report51) 
that seeking unanimity might scuttle the whole project52. In the end, the ICRC 
elected to omit all the names of the external experts, and instead had the 
Assembly of the ICRC adopt the final version of the guide on 26 February 
200953.  
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guide was not intended to change the existing 
and ‘binding rules of customary or treaty IHL’54, but rather to offer a 
‘comprehensive legal analysis’55 as to how the term ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’ was to be interpreted, giving careful consideration to balancing both 
‘humanitarian and military interests’56. The ten recommendations (supported 
by commentary57) strove to ‘reflect the ICRC’s institutional position as to how 
existing IHL should be interpreted in light of the circumstances prevailing in 
contemporary armed conflicts’58. While the Interpretive Guide is not legally 
binding59, the ICRC had hoped that their recommendations would have 
‘substantial persuasive effect’60 ‘for States, non-State actors, practitioners, 
and academics alike’61. Some argue that the Interpretive Guide ‘may even be 
viewed as a secondary source of international law… analogous to writings of 
the “most highly qualified publicists”’62. Until it becomes binding, or is 
acknowledged as having crystallised into customary IHL, Fenrick warns that ‘it 
is unlikely that the guidance will be adopted in totality by all legal advisers to 
                                                                                                                                      
Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ available at 
http://works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 (accessed 14 July 2012) at 22). 
49 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 9. 
50 The Interpretive Guide also draws on ‘the ICRC’s institutional expertise… as a 
humanitarian organisation, having been operational for almost 150 years in countless armed 
conflicts all over the world’ (Nils Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 831 at 914). 
51 Adam Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ (2009) 12 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 13 at 41. 
52 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 288. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The Interpretive Guide drew on the following sources of law: customary IHL; treaty IHL 
(including the ‘travaux préparatoires of treaties); international jurisprudence; military manuals 
and standard works of legal doctrine’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 9). 
55 Idem at 10. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 288. 
58 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 9. 
59 ‘A legally binding interpretation of IHL can only be formulated by a competent judicial organ 
or, collectively, by the States themselves’ (Idem at 10). 
60 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 300. 
61 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 10. 
62 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 22.  
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foreign ministries and defence departments’63 unless it can be shown that 
these recommendations are ‘well researched, well thought out, relevant and 
persuasive’64.  
 
ii. Introductory comments on the guide’s limitations & controversies 
 
It is worth stating at the outset that the Interpretive Guide makes it explicit that 
the document only speaks to the notion of direct participation in hostilities in 
so far as it impacts on decisions regarding ‘targeting and military attacks’; it 
does not propose to deal with issues of ‘detention65 or combatant immunity’66.  
Once it is ascertained that an issue of direct participation has an impact 
on targeting decisions, the first enquiry that the Interpretive Guide directs is to 
whether the ‘specific hostile act’67 falls within the ambit of those restricted acts 
which amount to direct participation in hostilities68. Determining which specific 
activities amount to direct participation in hostilities is not dependent on one’s 
‘status, function, or affiliation’69, neither does it matter whether the act is 
carried out by civilians or members of the armed forces ‘on a spontaneous, 
sporadic, or unorganised basis; or as part of a continuous combat function 
assumed for an organised armed force or group belonging to a party to the 
conflict’70.  
Even prior to the first meeting of the experts it was apparent that there 
were very divergent opinions on how one should interpret the concept of 
direct participation in hostilities. Some academics adopted a ‘more restrictive 
interpretation of the term direct participation in hostilities’71, equating ‘actual 
combat operations with direct participation in hostilities’72. Others believed a 
more liberal interpretation was appropriate73. ‘The liberal school of thought 
                                                
63 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 300. 
64 Idem at 288. 
65 ‘Its conclusions are not intended to serve as a basis for interpreting IHL regulating the 
status, rights and protections of persons outside the conduct of hostilities, such as those 
deprived of their liberty’ (Kenneth Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the 
ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Interpretive Guide’ (2010) 42 International Law and 
Politics 641 at 670).  
66 Goodman and Jinks ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum’ at 638.  
67 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 45. This will be dealt with in greater detail later on in this 
chapter. 
68 ‘The notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by 
individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 46). 
69 Idem at 10. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See for example: Orna Ben-Naftali and Keren R Michaeli ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow 
of the Law: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings’ (2003) Spring Cornell 
International Law Journal 233; Roy S. Schondorf ‘Are “Targeted Killings” Unlawful? The 
Israeli Supreme Court’s Response: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2007) May Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 301. 
72 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 335. 
73 See for example: Michael N Schmitt (2004) Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st 
Century Armed Conflict available at http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/Schmitfinal.pdf 
(accessed 15 May 2012); Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of 
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ 155. 
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proposed an approach… which essentially encompasses all conduct that 
functionally corresponds to that of government armed forces, including not 
only the actual conduct of hostilities, but also the activities such as planning, 
organising, recruiting and assuming logistical functions’74. These competing 
approaches were not new to the ICRC. Already in the commentary on AP I 
the ICRC noted that ‘to restrict this concept to combat and active military 
operations would be too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort 
would be too broad’75. 
Given this background it was not surprising that ‘key features of the 
guidance have proven highly controversial’76. At the heart of much of the 
generalised criticism leveled at the Interpretive Guide is its alleged failure to 
adequately balance humanitarian concerns and military necessity in a way 
which ‘adequately reflect[s] the key object and purpose of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols’77. Schmitt and Boothby are critical of 
what they claim is an overly restrictive interpretation78. Boothby argues that 
‘the ICRC interprets the concepts of preparation, deployment, and return too 
restrictively’79, and Schmitt is concerned with the fact that the definition 
‘excludes support activities not directly causing harm to the enemy’80. On the 
contrary, ‘other experts would criticise the Interpretive Guide’s definition as 
too generous because, in certain circumstances, it might allow the targeting of 
civilians who do not pose an immediate threat to the enemy’81. Some 
academics have concluded that ‘the deficiencies identified demonstrate a 
general failure to fully appreciate the operational complexity of modern 
warfare’82. Others have questioned whether the Interpretive Guide achieves 
what it set out to do, or whether it has merely ‘raised more questions than it 
answers’83. Some have argued that, rather than ‘re-stating exiting law’84 in a 
manner that would prove useful for practitioners and courts, terms like 
‘”revolving door of protection,” “continuous combat function,” and “persistent 
recurring basis” inject new, confusing, and difficult-to-justify concepts into the 
                                                
74 As Melzer notes that the liberal approach ‘stands in contradiction not only to the prevailing 
opinion in the doctrine, but also to State practice, and to the express distinction drawn in 
convention law between direct participation in hostilities on the one hand, and work of a 
military character, activities in support of military operations and an activity linked to the 
military effort, on the other hand’ (Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 338-339). 
75 ‘In modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort to some extent, albeit 
indirectly. The population cannot on this ground be considered to be combatants’ (Idem at 
336). 
76 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 698. 
77 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 45. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 741 at 743. 
80 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 835. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 699.  
83 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 694. 
84 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 837. 
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lexicon of IHL’85.  
In response to these criticisms, Melzer maintains that the Interpretive 
Guide adopted a neutral, impartial and balanced approach86, resisting 
proposals coming from both extremes while ensuring ‘a clear and coherent 
interpretation of IHL consistent with its underlying purposes and principles’87. 
Aside from these differences in the degree of interpretation aside, there is 
much less controversy around the all important heart of the guidance: 
determining how one defines ‘direct participation in hostilities’88. All in all, after 
careful consideration of the critiques prepared by Watkin, Schmitt, Boothby, 
and Parks, nothing indicates that the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide is 
‘substantively inaccurate, unbalanced, or otherwise inappropriate, or that its 




4.4 The specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in 
hostilities 
 
The notion that direct participation in hostilities might compromise one’s 
immunity against direct targeting is only intended to be applicable to those 
who qualify as civilians, and it is the means of determining when their actions 
result in the loss90 of their otherwise protected civilian immunity91. According 
the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide ‘international humanitarian law neither prohibits 
nor privileges civilian direct participation in hostilities’92. Consequently when 
civilians participate directly in hostilities they can be targeted directly for such 
time as their participation persists93. However once they desist they once 
again regain their full civilian immunity from direct attack, but may face 
                                                
85 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 693. 
86 Melzer argues that much of the critique comes from a position which weighs military 
necessity without being ‘balanced by equally important considerations of humanity’ (Idem at 
914). For those whose concerns pertain to issues of military necessity, the guide concedes 
‘that organised armed groups belonging to a non-State belligerents are not civilians but 
constitute legitimate military targets according to the same principles as regular combatants… 
for as long as they assume a continuous combat function and for the entire duration of their 
formal or functional membership’(ibid). For those supporting humanitarian causes, the guide 
‘presumes entitlement to protection in case of doubt’ and allows civilians to ‘regain their 
protection once their personal involvement in a hostile act or operation ends’ (Ibid). 
87 Ibid. 
88 That said, the application of the three criteria (discussed in the next section) to some 
specific activities ‘such as voluntary human shielding and hostage taking, still gave rise to 
significant disagreement among the participating experts’ (Idem at 834). 
89 Idem at 915. 
90 Until such time as the civilian’s actions amount to direct participation in hostilities, any ‘use 
of force against him or her must comply with the standards of law enforcement or individual 
self-defence’ (Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation 
in Hostilities’ at 755-756). Since the ‘loss is temporary’, Melzer suggests that it is ‘better 
described as a “suspension” of protection’ (Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 
347). 
91 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 704. 
92 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 83. 
93 Ibid. 
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prosecution for any violations of domestic or international law which were 
committed during that period of participation94.  According to the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide, ‘a specific act must meet three cumulative criteria’95, 
before it can be said to amount to direct participation in hostilities: 
 
‘1.The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct 
attack (threshold of harm), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely 
to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment 
of another (belligerent nexus)’96. 
 
i. The threshold of harm 
 
The first criteria, also called the ‘threshold of harm’ determination, requires 
that harm97  
a) ‘of a specifically military nature’, or98  
b) harm (‘by inflicting death, injury or destruction’99) of a protected person 
or object,  
must be reasonably expected to result from a civilian’s actions before the 
civilian can be said to be participating directly in hostilities100. Or to put it 
another way, in order for a civilian to lose their immunity from direct attack 
‘they must either harm the enemy’s military operations or capacity, or they 
must use means and methods of warfare directly against protected persons or 
objects’101. All that is required is the ‘objective likelihood102 that the act will 
                                                
94 Ibid. 
95 Idem at 46. 
96 Idem at 47. 
97 The degree of harm includes ‘not only the infliction of death, injury, or destruction on 
military personnel and objects, but essentially any consequence adversely affecting the 
military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict’ (Ibid). 
98 From a cursory examination of the criteria, it is apparent that the test is framed in the 
alternative, that is, ‘the harm contemplated may either adversely affect the enemy or harm 
protected persons or objects’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constituent Elements’ at 713). 
99 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 862. 
102 In other words, ‘harm which may reasonably be expected to result from an act in the 
prevailing circumstances’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 47). As was discussed at the expert 
meeting, ‘wherever a civilian had a subjective “intent” to cause harm that was objectively 
identifiable, there would also be an objective “likelihood” that he or she would cause such 
harm’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
724). 
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result in such harm’, not necessarily the actual ‘materialisation of harm’103. 
Moreover, it is not the ‘quantum of harm caused the enemy’, which 
determines whether it reaches the necessary threshold of harm criteria104, but 




As Melzer points out, military harm is the ‘most common form of harm inflicted 
during the conduct of hostilities’105. Even though it is relatively common, the 
term military harm only applies to objects which ‘contribute militarily’, and not 
to civilian objects (even if they may sometimes contribute to a belligerent’s 
success in the conflict)106. This interpretation, in line with the universally 
accepted definition of what constitutes a ‘military objective’107, excludes those 
political, economic and psychological108 contributions which might play a role 
in a military victory, but alone are not considered military objects109. The term 
military harm encompasses ‘not only the infliction of death, injury, or 
destruction on military personnel and objects, but essentially any 
consequence adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity of 
a party to the conflict’110.  
 
 
Attacks against protected persons 
 
In accordance with treaty law, even when no military harm results111, the 
actions of civilians might still constitute direct participation in hostilities when 
their actions amount to attacks112 specifically ‘directed against civilians and 
                                                
103 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 33. Schmitt concedes that this is a sensible requirement 
since it would be ‘absurd to suggest that a civilian shooting at a combatant, but missing, 
would not be directly participating because no harm resulted’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 724). 
104 Schmitt observes that perhaps the choice of the label ‘threshold’, which is a quantitative 
concept was ‘unfortunate’, when the substance of the test talks to the ‘nature of the harm’, the 
performance of a specified act, and not that the act reaches a ‘particular threshold’ (Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 716). 
105 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 858. 
106 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 717. 
107 Ibid. 
108 For example when a ‘broadcast station is used to demoralise the enemy civilian 
population’ by ‘broadcasting negative messages to the enemy civilian population’ (Ibid). 
109 Ibid. 
110 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
111 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 860. 
112 The Interpretive Guide relies on AP I article 49’s definition of ‘attack’ which ‘does not 
specify the target, but the belligerent nexus of an attack, so that even acts of violence 
directed specifically against civilians or civilian objects may amount to direct participation in 
hostilities’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 723). Legal precedence for this position can be found in the jurisprudence 
emerging from the ICTY, where it was concluded that ‘sniping attacks against civilians and 
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civilian objects’113. ‘In the absence of military harm… the specific act must be 
likely to cause at least death, injury, or destruction of these civilians or civilian 
objects’114, as distinct from other forms of harm, such as ‘political, diplomatic, 
economic, or administrative measures’115 like for example deportation’116. 
These harmful actions which target protected persons must ‘in some way be 
connected to the armed conflict’117 or, as Melzer puts it, they must be an 
‘integral part of armed confrontations’118. The Israeli High Court of Justice in 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel 
endorse the conclusion that hostile acts directed against the civilian 
population of the state also fell with in the ambit of the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities119. However, even harmful acts directed at protected 
persons and objects will not amount to direct participation in hostilities where 
they fall ‘short of the required threshold of death, injury or destruction’ or 
where they ‘lack the belligerent nexus’120. 
 
Examples of activities which satisfy the threshold of harm requirement121:  
 
• ‘acts of violence122 against human and material enemy forces’;  
• sabotaging or causing ‘physical or functional damage to military 
objects, operations or capacity’123; 
                                                                                                                                      
bombardment of civilian villages or urban residential areas’, constitutes an ‘attack’ in the IHL 
sense of the word (Ibid).  
113 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 49. It is worth noting that these attacks would also 
constitute ‘grave violations of IHL or even war crimes’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between 
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 861). 
114 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 49. 
115 Examples of these include: ‘building of fences or road blocks; the interruption of electricity, 
water, or food supplies; and the manipulation of computer networks not directly resulting in 
death, injury, or destruction. While all of these activities may adversely affect public security, 
health, and commerce, they would not, in the absence of military harm, qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 862). 
116 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
723. 
117 For example, a ‘prison guard may kill a prisoner for purely private reasons’ without his 
actions amounting to direct participation in hostilities, but were he to engage in ‘a practice of 
killing prisoners of a particular ethnic group during an ethnic conflict’, those actions would 
meet the standard (Ibid). 
118 This aspect is covered by the third prong of the enquiry (the belligerent nexus) (Melzer 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 861). 
119 (2006) HCJ 769/02 at para 33. 
120 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 862. 
121 According to Schmitt, most of these examples proved uncontroversial (Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 715). 
122 For example the ‘killing and wounding of military personnel’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 48). 
123 Idem at 47-48. 
 77 
• restricting or disturbing military ‘deployments, logistics and 
communications’124; 
• exercising any form of control, or denying the military use of ‘military 
personnel, objects and territory, to the detriment of the adversary’125; 
• clearing mines placed by the opposition;  
• ‘guarding captured military personnel to prevent them being forcibly 
liberated’126;  
• electronic interference, exploitation or attacks upon ‘military computer 
networks’127; 
• ‘wiretapping the adversary’s high command or transmitting tactical 
targeting information for an attack’128; 
• violent acts specifically directed against civilians or civilian objects129; 
• ‘building defensive positions at a military base certain to be 
attacked’130; 
• ‘repairing a battle-damaged runway at a forward airfield so it can be 
used to launch aircraft’131.  
 
Examples of activities which fall short of the threshold of harm requirement:  
 
• ‘building fences or roadblocks’132; 
• interrupting ‘electricity, water, or food supplies’133;  
• appropriating cars and fuel134;  
• manipulating computer networks135;  
• arresting or deporting persons who may have a ‘serious impact on 
public security, health, and commerce’136; 
• refusing ‘to engage in actions that would positively affect one of the 
parties’137; 
                                                
124 Idem at 48. 
125 For example: ‘denying the adversary the military use of certain objects, equipment and 
territory’ (Ibid). 
126 Ibid. 
127 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
715. 
128 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 48. 
129 For example: ‘sniper attacks or the bombardment of civilian residential areas’ (Gary Solis 
(2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War Cambridge 
University Press: New York at 203; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 49). 
130 Because it is likely to directly and adversely affect the enemy’s impending attack (Melzer 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 859). 
131 On the grounds that it ‘constitutes a measure preparatory to specific combat operations 
likely to directly inflict harm on the enemy’ (Ibid). 
132 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 





137 For example a civilian who refuses to provide information (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 719). 
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• civilian rescuing of enemy aircrew members138; 
•   the development and production of improvised explosive devices139.  
 
Critique of the ‘threshold of harm’ requirement: 
 
The ‘threshold of harm’ requirement has been criticised mainly for being 
under-inclusive and unduly difficult to satisfy. Jensen gives expression to this 
when he comments that the ‘“actual harm” standard from the ICRC 
commentary is too restrictive in that it fails to address individuals who, 
although they are not members of an armed group that is party to the conflict, 
still openly support hostilities by constructing, financing, or storing weapons 
and materials of warfare’140. He is in favour of an interpretation which would 
see some differentiation between those civilians found ‘constructing, financing 
or storing weapons’, and civilians ‘who disdain hostilities and comply with their 
status’141. Jensen would also support an interpretation of direct participation 
which would ‘include not only those who cause actual harm, but those who 
directly support those who cause actual harm… this would also include those 
who gather intelligence142, or act as observers and supply information to 
fighters, those who solicit others to participate in hostilities, and those who 
train them on military tactics’143. 
Schmitt, in his critique, raises a similar concern: the ‘strict application of 
the threshold of harm constitutive element would exclude conduct that by a 
reasonable assessment should amount to direct participation’144. Having said 
that, Schmitt himself concedes that the treaty definition of a ‘military objective’ 
‘supports restricting the notion of direct participation to harm which is military 
in nature’, and that ‘an act of direct participation must impact the enemy’s 
military wherewithal’145. Nevertheless, Schmitt argues that the military harm 
requirement is ‘under-inclusive because it excludes loss of protection for 
support activities which do not adversely affect the enemy’146. In respect of 
attacks which target protected persons, Schmitt disputes the ICRC’s 
interpretation which requires death or destruction, because he argues such an 
interpretation will exclude ‘unlawful conduct such as the deportation of 
                                                
138 Unless these activities are ‘designed to harm the enemy’s capacity or effort to target or 
capture able-bodied military personnel’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 860). 
139 This is considered to only amount to ‘general war effort’ (Ibid). 
140 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2221-28. 
141 Ibid. 
142 The Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v 
Government of Israel endorsed this conclusion in their judgment ((2006) HCJ 769/02 at para 
35). 
143 Ibid. 
144 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
714. 
145 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 859. 
146 Ibid. Melzer questions whether Schmitt can ‘support his argument as a matter of law’ and 
‘demonstrate that the Interpretive Guidance’s wide concept of military harm is “under-
inclusive” as a matter of practice’ (Idem at 861).  
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civilians or hostage taking’147. Instead he suggests ‘a better standard is one 
which includes any harmful acts directed against protected persons or 
objects, when said acts are either part of the armed conflict’s ‘war strategy… 
or when there is an evident relationship with ongoing hostilities’, even if such 
acts do not result in death or destruction148. Schmitt argues that this strict 
requirement clearly favours humanitarian concerns at the ‘expense of those of 
military necessity’149. 
Heaton is also critical of this strict interpretation for its failure to include 
within its ambit the ‘essential links in the chain immediately preceding that 
final step’150. Heaton argues that the final act of the combatant is heavily 
reliant on the ‘support personnel’, which makes combative actions possible151.  
In response to these critiques Melzer warns that any proposal to lower 
the required threshold of harm, in order to ‘extend loss of protection to a 
potentially wide range of support activities’, will result in ‘undermining the 
generally recognised distinction between direct participation in hostilities and 
mere involvement in the general war effort’152. 
 
ii. The direct causation requirement 
 
The second requirement, also termed the ‘direct causation’ test, was included 
as a response to the controversy traditionally surrounding questions about 
whether ‘general war effort’153, and activities aimed at sustaining war154, would 
amount to direct participation in hostilities155. While it is certainly true that war 
sustaining activities156 are indispensable to the war effort, which in effect does 
                                                
147 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
723. 
148 According to Melzer ‘under this formula, almost any act occurring for reasons related to an 
armed conflict, and perceived as harmful to the civilian population could be regarded as direct 
participation in hostilities, including unlikely examples such as economic sanctions, travel 
restrictions, and political propaganda’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 861). 
149 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
714. 
150 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 37. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 877. 
153 This includes all activities ‘objectively contributing to the military defeat of the adversary’, 
for example ‘design, production and shipment of weapons and military equipment; 
construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure 
outside the context of concrete military operations’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 53). 
154 This would additionally include ‘political, economic or media activities supporting the 
general war effort’(Ibid). For example ‘political propaganda, financial transactions, production 
of agricultural or non-military industrial goods’ (Ibid). 
155 Idem at 52. 
156 As the ICRC Interpretive Guide points out, ‘both the general war effort and war-sustaining 
activities may ultimately result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as 
direct participation in hostilities, in fact… some of these activities may even be indispensable 
to harming the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to the armed forces 
and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of hostilities, which is 
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harm the adversary, a line must be drawn between the two degrees of 
involvement157. All the experts present at the ICRC’s expert meetings were 
‘agreed on the centrality of a relatively close relationship between the act in 
question and the consequences affecting the ongoing hostilities’158. Schmitt 
expresses it well: ‘sometimes causation is so direct that the shield of 
humanitarian considerations must yield in the face of military necessity, while 
in other situations the causal connection is too weak (or indirect) to overcome 
humanitarian factors’159. Consequently, and in order to avoid depriving much 
of the civilian population of their protected status, there must be ‘a sufficiently 
close causal relation between the act and the resulting harm’ for it to amount 
to direct participation in hostilities160.  
According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, ‘direct causation should be 
understood as meaning that the harm in question must be brought about in 
one causal step’161. Clearly excluded are activities that indirectly cause 
harm162. Moreover, ‘temporal or geographic proximity cannot on its own, 
without direct causation, amount to a finding of direct participation in 
hostilities’163. In cases of collective operations, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide 
does recognise that ‘the resulting harm does not have to be directly caused164 
by each contributing person individually, but only by the collective operation 
                                                                                                                                      
designed to cause the required harm, the general war effort and war sustaining activities also 
include activities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to cause such harm’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 52). 
157 During the expert meetings, emphasis was placed on the ‘idea that direct participation in 
hostilities is neither synonymous with “involvement in” or “contribution to” hostilities, nor with 
“preparing” or “enabling” someone else to directly participate in hostilities, but essentially 
means that an individual is personally “taking part in the ongoing exercise of harming the 
enemy” and personally carrying out hostile acts which are “part of” the hostilities’ (Idem at 53).  
158 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
725. 
159 Idem at 726. 
160 Ibid. 
161 The act must not only be causally linked to the harm, but it must also cause the harm 
directly. For example ‘the assembly and storing of an improvised explosive device (IED) in a 
workshop, or the purchase or smuggling of its components, may be connected with the 
resulting harm through an uninterrupted causal chain of events, but, unlike the planting and 
detonation of that device, do not cause that harm directly’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 54 and 
55). In short, where an ‘individual’s conduct… merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a 
party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm’, these actions do 
not amount to direct participation in hostilities’ (Idem at 53); Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance 
Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 866. 
162 The Interpretive Guide illustrates the direct-indirect distinction by way of two case studies: 
‘driving a truck delivering ammunition to positions at the front line would constitute “direct” 
participation, whereas the transport of ammunition from a factory to a storehouse for shipping 
to the conflict zone would only be indirect participation’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 56). This 
view was endorsed by the Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in 
Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 769/02 which concluded ‘in our opinion, if 
the civilian is driving the ammunition to the place from which it will be used for the purposes of 
hostilities, he should be seen as taking a direct part in the hostilities’ (para 35). 
163 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 56. 
164 In other words, in one causal step. 
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as a whole’165. Consequently, where a specific act does not ‘on its own 
directly cause the required threshold of harm, their actions might still amount 
to direct participation where the individuals are part of a collective 
operation’166. In these instances the direct causation criteria would still be 
fulfilled, and the civilians would lose their immunity from attack, as the 
individual act ‘constitutes an integral part of a concrete and coordinated 
tactical (or collective) operation that directly causes such harm’167.  
 
Examples of activities that satisfy the direct causation requirement 
 
• ‘bearing, using or taking up arms’168; 
• ‘taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or 
operations’169; 
• ‘participating in attacks against enemy personnel, property or 
equipment’170; 
• ‘coordinated tactical operations which directly cause harm’171; 
• engaging in sabotage of military installations172;  
• manning an anti-aircraft gun173;  
• supervising the operation of weaponry174; 
• ‘gathering tactical intelligence on the battlefield’175; 
• transmitting military information for immediate use176; 
                                                
165 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 866. 
166 Idem at 865; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
167 Examples of such acts would include, inter alia, ‘the identification and marking of targets; 
the analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to attacking forces; and the instruction 
and assistance given to troops for the execution of a specific military operation’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 55); Fritz Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld (2011) Constraints on the 
Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (4th ed) Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge at 102. 
168 Including ‘armed fighting or combat’ (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups 
and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707; Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 708). 
169 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
170 Ibid. 
171 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
172 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708; Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 35. 
175 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 867; Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 177-8; Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 708. 
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• ‘identifying and marking targets’177; 
• ‘instruction and assistance given to troops for the execution of a 
specific military operation’178; 
• transporting weapons in proximity to combat operations179;  
• transporting ‘unlawful combatants to or from the place where the 
hostilities are taking place’180; 
• ‘serving as guards, intelligence agents, lookouts181, or observers on 
behalf of military forces’182;  
• ‘capturing combatants or their equipment’183;  
• ‘sabotaging lines of communication’184; 
• performing mission-essential work at a military base’185;  
• ‘providing logistical support’186; 
• ‘delivering ammunition to combatants’187. 
 
Examples of activities which fall short of the direct causation requirement 
 
• designing, producing and shipping weapons188;  
• ‘transporting arms and munitions’189; 
•  purchasing materials in order ‘to build suicide vests’190; 
                                                                                                                                      
176 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
177 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
180 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708; Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 35. 
181 On the other hand, simply because a civilian’s actions fail to assist or ‘collaborate with a 
party to a conflict’ (as a lookout or informant for example) will not mean that their conduct will 
be ‘interpreted as adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity of a party’ 
(ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 49). 
182 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
183 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 177-8. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
188 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 293. 
189 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. While the ‘act of driving a munitions truck might not 
amount to direct participation in hostilities… the truck itself remains a targetable military 
objective’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 710). 
190 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865. 
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• purchasing, smuggling, assembling or storing ‘improvised explosive 
devices’191; 
• gathering and transmitting military information192; 
• work undertaken by civilians in military vehicle maintenance depots193;  
• work undertaken by civilians in munitions factories194;  
• ‘driving military transport vehicles’ where the driver is a civilian195; 
• ‘activities in support of the war or military effort’196; 
• ‘the recruitment197 and general198 training of personnel’199; 
• ‘providing specialist advice regarding the selection of military 
personnel, their training, or the correct maintenance of the weapons’200; 
• ‘general strategic analysis’201; 
• ‘voluntary human shielding’202; 
• ‘expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties to the 
conflict’203; 
• distributing propaganda in support of one of the belligerent parties204; 
• ‘failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the parties to the 
conflict’205; 
                                                
191 Ibid.  
192 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
193 Idem at 706.  
194 Idem at 710. 
195 Idem at 706.  
196 Idem at 707. Including working in canteens (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 710). 
197 Including the ‘recruitment of suicide bombers’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between 
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 865). 
198 ‘General training of recruits undeniably contributes to a party’s military prowess; effective 
recruit training will often be the difference between eventual victory and defeat on the 
battlefield. Nevertheless, the causal link between the training and subsequent combat action 
is attenuated’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 728). However, ‘training for a particular type of mission’ where the training may 
‘reasonably be regarded as a preparatory measure integral to a predetermined hostile act or 
operation’ may qualify as direct participation in hostilities (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance 
Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 867). 
199 While it ‘may be indispensible, it is not directly causal, to the subsequent infliction of harm’ 
(Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 204). 
200 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
201 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708; Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 35. 
202 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865. 
203 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
204 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 708; 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 35. 
205 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
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• contributing funds to a “cause”206;  
• ‘economic sanctions’207; 
• ‘providing an adversary with supplies (for example food and medicine) 
and services’208.  
 
Critique of the direct causation requirement 
 
Schmitt raises a number of technical issues in respect of the ICRC’s 
explanation relating to the direct causation requirement. His first critique 
questions why the guidance settled on direct causation being linked to a 
physical act causing harm, when in modern warfare ‘acts that directly 
enhance the military capacity or operations of a party, without resulting in 
direct and immediate harm to the enemy’209 may have a marked effect on the 
belligerent’s capacity to win.210 Schmitt argues that ‘the key is whether the 
acts in question are sufficiently causally related to the resulting harm/benefit 
to qualify as directly caused’211. Moreover, Schmitt argues, the effect of the  
‘one causal step’ requirement is that a range of ‘capacity-building activities’212 
(which Schmitt concedes are indirect in nature213) are excluded from those 
parameters214. Schmitt prefers the ‘integral part test’215 which makes it 
possible to ‘extend participation as far up and downstream as there is a 
causal216 link’217. In a similar vein, Watkin argues that the ‘role of logistics or 
the scope of such a function in a military sense has not been properly 
                                                
206 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 727 
and 708. 
207 Idem at 728. 
208 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 728. 
Including ‘selling goods to one of the parties to the conflict’ and ‘accompanying and supplying 
food to one of the parties to the conflict’ (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups 
and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707; Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 708; Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 769/02 at 
para 34). 
209 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 736. 
210 Idem at 725.  
211 Idem at 736; Melzer warns that ‘it is important to recall that immunity from direct attack 
does not preclude the permissibility of the use of force, even on a significant scale, if 
necessary to prevent the commission of grave crimes. It merely entails that the force used 
against perpetrators not qualifying as legitimate military targets remains governed by the 
standards of law enforcement and individual self-defense and not by those of the conduct of 
hostilities’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 862). 
212 Melzer notes that ‘States frequently use civilian contractors or employees to carry out 
roughly equivalent activities’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 865). 
213 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 727. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Idem at 729. 
216 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 867. 
217 Idem at 866.  
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recognised’218 in the direct causation requirement. Watkin warns that the 
causal chain requirement limits responses to a ‘reactive posture focused on 
“acts” rather than on the capacity of an opponent to plan and attack in the 
future’219. 
Van der Toorn raises a related criticism when he suggests a sound 
interpretation of direct participation in hostilities should extend beyond the 
‘specific operations’220, to ‘include precursor operational activities221 that 
facilitate and are closely connected with the materialisation of harm’222.  
As the ICRC’s interpretation stands at the moment, ‘participation is equated to 
the single, discrete acts’ which allow civilians to interrupt their hostilities with 
numerous ‘intervening periods when they are engaged in their peaceful 
civilian vocations’223. Van der Toorn argues that the ICRC’s direct causation 
requirement needs to ‘achieve a greater balance between the ability to 
achieve military objectives and the protection of innocent civilians’224. In this 
regard his proposal would ‘permit the targeting of the precursor operational 
activities that make possible the ultimate infliction of harm’225. 
Melzer warns that Schmitt’s ‘integrated part test’ would translate into an 
‘extremely permissive’ understanding of direct causation, and that in effect 
‘any act connected with the resulting harm through a causal link would 
automatically qualify as “direct” participation in hostilities, no matter how far 
removed the act may be from the final harm caused’226. According to Melzer, 
                                                
218 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 684. 
219 Idem at 658. 
220 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 39. 
221 Which might include: ‘operational level planning; general intelligence activities; military 
logistics; military communications; and IED assembly and combat instruction’ (Ibid). 
222 So under Van der Toorn’s proposal if ‘a civilian were to (over a period of a week) take 
several steps from sourcing the components to assembling and eventually planting and 
detonating an IED on day seven, while each day returning to the civilian vocations, each of 
the weeks activities would not individually amount to direct participation in hostilities (baring 
the planting and final detonation)’ according to the ICRC’s interpretation, while it would 
amount to direct participation on his understanding (Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in 
Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 39). The Interpretive 
Guide states definitively that ‘the assembly and storing of an improvised explosive device 
(IED) in a workshop, or the purchase or smuggling of its components, may be connected with 
the resulting harm . . . but, unlike the planting and detonation of that device, do not cause that 
harm directly’ (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 658). Van der Toorn argues that such a 
‘change would promote a better balance between the achievement of military objectives and 
the protection of innocent civilians’ (Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal 
and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 39 and 40). In particular he is keen to 
favour an interpretation which might look at ‘a series or chain of acts by an individual’ and 
view ‘the entire chain of acts’ as amounting to direct participation in hostilities’ (Idem at 32). 
223 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 30. 
224 Idem at 32. 
225 Idem at 37. 
226 According to Melzer if we were to apply Schmitt’s proposal then ‘not only the planting or 
detonation of an improvised explosive device, but also its assembly and storage, as well as 
the purchase or smuggling of its components, would make legitimate military targets of all 
those involved, no matter how far their action is removed from the actual causation of harm’ 
(Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
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‘this approach would seem to permit direct attacks against any civilian who, 
somehow and at some point, causally contributes to the success of a hostile 
act, no matter how far his action is removed from the potential materialisation 
of harm’227. Melzer warns that such an ‘extreme relaxation of the requirement 
of direct causation would invite excessively broad targeting policies, prone to 
error, arbitrariness, and abuse’228. According to Melzer, there is no indication 
by way of ‘general opinio juris of States’, that would favour Schmitt’s 
integrated part interpretation over the ICRC’s direct causation requirement229. 
 
iii. The belligerent nexus requirement 
 
According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, the final requirement is that the 
specific harm must have a link to the hostilities230. The belligerent nexus 
requirement is there to ensure that those criminal activities which are ‘merely 
facilitated by the armed conflict’231, and not ‘designed to support one party to 
the conflict by directly causing the required threshold of harm to another 
party’232, are excluded from the purview of direct participation in hostilities. As 
Rogers points out, in ‘the case of children throwing petrol bombs or stones at 
enemy military patrols’, members of the patrol will have to assess carefully 
whether it is just ‘criminal activity’ or whether the children have forfeited their 
‘civilian immunity’233. 
In short, this leg of the test requires that ‘an act must be specifically 
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm, in support of a 
party to the conflict and to the detriment of another’234. In other words, ‘in 
order to amount to direct participation in hostilities, an act must not only be 
objectively likely to inflict harm that meets the first two criteria, but it must also 
be specifically designed to do so in support of a party to an armed conflict and 
to the detriment of another’235. ‘Armed violence which is not designed to harm 
a party to an armed conflict, or which is not designed to do so in support of 
                                                                                                                                      
Hostilities’ at 867). Fenrick argues that ‘those involved in the production and storage of IEDs 
might better be regarded as belonging in the same category as those providing tactical 
intelligence instead of equating them with workers in munitions factories’ (Fenrick ‘ICRC 
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 293). 
227 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 878. 
228 Idem at 867. 
229 Idem at 868. 
230 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 62. 
231 It is not uncommon for gangsters to engage in criminal activities in situations of armed 
conflict. 
232 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 63 and 64. 
233 Thereby entitling the military to ‘use necessary force in self-defence’ (Rogers ‘Unequal 
Combat and the Law of War’ at 19). 
234 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 872. 
235 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 64; and Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging 
of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 102. 
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another party236, cannot amount to any form of “participation” in hostilities 
taking place between these parties’237. So for example if civilians are found 
causing harm: 
 
‘(a) in individual self-defence or defence of others238,  
(b) in exercising power or authority over persons or territory,  
(c) as part of civil unrest against such authority, or  
(d) during inter-civilian violence’,  
 their acts will not be regarded as participating in hostilities. 
 
These acts lack the ‘belligerent nexus required for a qualification as direct 
participation in hostilities’239. Moreover ‘when civilians are totally unaware of 
the role they are playing in the conduct of hostilities240… or when they are 
completely deprived of their physical freedom of action241... they cannot be 
regarded as performing an action in any meaningful sense and, therefore, 
remain protected against direct attack despite the belligerent nexus of the 
military operation in which they are being instrumentalised’242.  
 
Examples of activities which satisfy the belligerent nexus requirement 
 
• the ‘preparatory collection of tactical intelligence’243;  
• ‘transporting personnel’244;  
• ‘transporting and positioning weapons and equipment’245; and 
• loading explosives in a suicide vehicle’246.  
  
                                                
236 For example ‘looting or civil unrest that merely take advantage of the instability incident to 
conflict’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ 
at 735). 
237 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 873. 
238 So for example, ‘although the use of force by civilians to defend themselves against 
unlawful attack or looting, rape, and murder by marauding soldiers may cause the required 
threshold of harm, its purpose clearly is not to support a party to the conflict against another. 
If individual self-defence against prohibited violence were to entail loss of protection against 
direct attack, this would have the absurd consequence of legitimising a previously unlawful 
attack. Therefore, the use of necessary and proportionate force in such situations cannot be 
regarded as direct participation in hostilities’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 61). 
239 Consequently they must be dealt with by means of the regular law enforcement 
mechanisms (Idem at 64; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 873; Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A 
Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 19). 
240 For example when a driver is ‘unaware that he is transporting a remote-controlled bomb’ 
(ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 60). 
241 For example when involuntary human shields are ‘physically coerced into providing cover 
in close combat’ (Ibid). 
242 Ibid. 





Examples of activities which fall short of the belligerent nexus requirement 
 
• ‘hiding or smuggling weapons’247; and 
• ‘financial or political support of armed individuals’248. 
 
Critique of the belligerent nexus requirement 
 
While Schmitt supports the notion that there must be a link to the hostilities, 
he is in favour of reformulating the belligerent nexus test in the alternative, 
such that it reads: ‘in support of a party to the conflict or to the detriment of 
another’249. Melzer cautions against a ‘disjunctive reading of the two 
elements’250. His reason is that it can give rise to situations where it would be 
permissible to respond with military force against criminal elements who had 
no connection to the armed conflict251. Melzer argues that if ‘either element is 
missing’252 the ‘violence in question becomes independent of the armed 
struggle taking place between the parties to a conflict’253. Without establishing 
a link between an individual and a belligerent party, IHL ‘simply does not 
permit categorising persons as legitimate military targets’ and leaves these 
instances to be dealt with as any other threat to security254. 
 
iv. General comments regarding the specific hostile acts which amount to 
direct participation in hostilities  
 
Schmitt concedes that ‘the three constitutive elements reflect factors that 
undoubtedly must play into such an analysis’255. However the thrust of his 
criticism is that there are ‘deficiencies’ to be found in each of the elements 
which give rise to what he considers an ‘under-inclusive’256 notion of direct 
participation in hostilities. Schmitt’s concern is that this pro-humanitarian 
treatment of the concept of direct participation, ‘reflects a troubling ignorance 
of the realities of 21st century battlefield combat’257. Rogers is of the opposite 
view and supports a narrow interpretation of direct participation, lest ‘the rule 
of distinction and civilian immunity… be put in serious jeopardy’258. To this 
end Melzer notes that there were several safeguards built into the three 
constitutive elements to ensure that ‘erroneous or arbitrary targeting of 
                                                
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: the Constituent Elements’ at 736. 
250 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 873. 
251Ibid. 
252 That is: support of a party to the conflict, and the intention to acts to the detriment of 
another party. 
253 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 873. 
254 Ibid. 




258 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19. 
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civilians’ would be avoided259. Despite their criticism, many like Schmitt 
concede that the Interpretive Guide is ‘superior to the various ad hoc lists 
because it provides those tasked with applying the norm on the battlefield with 
guidelines against which to gauge an action’260. 
 
4.5 The temporal element of the loss of protection: ‘for such time as’ 
civilians take a direct part in hostilities 
 
In terms of IHL, civilians normally enjoy complete immunity against attack for 
such time as they refrain from any direct participation in hostilities. However, 
as soon as civilians compromise their civilian immunity by electing to 
participate directly in hostilities, their actions expose other truly innocent 
civilians to ‘erroneous or arbitrary attack’261. Consequently, in order to 
dissuade civilians from abusing their civilian immunity, IHL condones the 
temporary suspension of their civilian ‘protection against direct attack’262, for 
so long as they participate directly in hostilities263. Expressed another way, 
‘considerations of military necessity are presumed to override those of 
humanity for such time as a civilian ‘directly participates in hostilities’264. While 
their civilian immunity is temporarily suspended, this has no effect on their 
primary IHL status as civilians265. At no time do they lose their civilian status 
and assume primary combatant status266. Moreover when they cease their 
unauthorised participation, they resume full civilian immunity against attack. 
This temporary suspension of a civilian’s immunity against direct attack is only 
afforded ‘civilians who participate in hostilities in a spontaneous, unorganised 
or sporadic basis’267. Consequently, once it has been determined that a 
civilian has carried out a specific act which amounts to direct participation in 
hostilities, the next level of enquiry must address when the beginning and end 
of the loss of civilian immunity results268.  
The notion that direct participation has a temporal limitation has a 
                                                
259 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 877. 
260 Ibid. 
261 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 71. 
262 Idem at 70. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 331. 
265 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 70. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Idem at 71. The same cannot be said however of civilians who become members of 
organised armed groups belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict. While this 
category of participant also loses immunity from direct attack, as is the case with any civilian, 
in this case they ‘cease to be civilians… for as long as they assume their continuous combat 
function’ and for the duration of their membership of the group (Idem at 70; Melzer ‘Keeping 
the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 883). 
268 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 65. Until the civilian is performing functions which amount 
to direct participation in hostilities, all actions which amount to ‘the use of force against him or 
her must comply with the standards of law enforcement or individual self-defence’ (Idem at 
70). 
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longstanding history269 in IHL since the mid-nineteenth century. The phrase 
‘for such time as’, as it appears in API ‘is binding as a matter of treaty law 
on…approximately eighty-five percent of the world’s States’270. When the 
state of Israel argued that the phrase ‘for such time’, as it appears on API 
article 51(3), did not yet constitute customary international law, the Israeli 
High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v 
Government of Israel rejected this position, and concluded that ‘all of the parts 
of article 51(3) of The First Protocol express customary international law’, 
including the time dimension expressed in the phrase ‘for such time as’271. Not 
surprisingly, the ICRC’s study into the customary international law status of 
the phrase ‘and for such time as’, concluded that it was widely recognised as 
constituting customary international law272. 
While the ‘for such time as’ criteria might reflect customary international 
law, its practical implementation has not been without controversy. For the 
most part the controversy lies in that fact that when a civilian is no longer 
engaged in direct participation, and consequently no longer poses a threat to 
the opposition, they regain their full civilian immunity273 from direct attack, 
giving rise to what is called the ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection274. The 
terminology ‘revolving door’, whereby civilians might vacillate275 between 
being a belligerent, and reserving the right to reclaim their civilian status, was 
first coined by Hays Parks276 in his 1990s commentary on the practical effect 
of AP I. 
 
 
                                                
269 ‘In his Code for use by the Union side in the American Civil War, Dr. Francis Lieber denied 
prisoner of war (POW) rights to persons who commit hostilities “without being part… of the 
organised hostile army” and who do so “with intermitting returns to their homes… or with the 
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the 
character or appearance of soldiers”’ (Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time 
Dimensions to Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 774). 
270 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 884. 
271 (2006) HCJ 769/02 available in English from http://elyoni.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html 
(accessed 23 September 2008) at para 30 and 38.  
272 Boothby points to the U.S. and Israel as evidence for his claim that the ‘for such time as’ 
requirement is not uncontroversially accepted as having crystallised into customary 
international law. However, even after citing these examples, Boothby himself concedes that 
the Israeli High Court has nevertheless expressly recognised ‘that all of the parts of article 
51(3) of the first Protocol express customary international law’ (Idem at 885). In short, 
‘Boothby’s doubt as to the customary nature of the phrase “unless and for such time” remains 
unsubstantiated’ (Idem at 886). 
273 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 71. 
274 Idem at 70.  
275 The net affect of the ‘for such time as’ interpretation is that ‘civilians lose and regain 
protection against direct attack in parallel with the intervals of their engagement in direct 
participation in hostilities’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 883). 
276 Hays Parks used the phrase disparagingly (William Hays Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of 
War’ (1990) 32:1 Air Force Law Review 1 at 87-88); Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised 
Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 686. 
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i. The parameters of the ‘for such time’ window: execution, preparation, 
deployment and withdrawal 
 
The Interpretive Guide expressly recognises that the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities includes not only the obvious individual armed 
activities, but also the ‘unarmed activities which adversely affect the 
enemy’277. Uncontroversially, the ‘execution phase of a specific act’, which 
satisfies the three pronged test for direct participation in hostilities, will fall 
within the ‘for such time’ window, and amount to a temporary loss of immunity 
from attack278. And in accordance with the ‘collective nature and complexity of 
contemporary military operations’, an interpretation of direct participation in 
hostilities must include those activities which only cause harm ‘in conjunction 
with other acts’279. Consequently, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide includes 
‘measures preparatory280 to the execution of a specific act…as well as the 
deployment to and the return from the location of its execution’281 as 
‘constituting an integral part of the specific hostile act’282. The ICRC guide 
cites as examples: ‘equipping, instructing, and transporting personnel; 
gathering intelligence; and preparing, transporting and positioning weapons 
and equipment’283, if these are carried out as preparation for the undertaking 
of a specific hostile act. The Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee 
against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel endorsed the 
conclusion that ‘a civilian bearing arms (openly or concealed) who is on his 
way to the place where he will use them against the army, at such place, or 
on his way back from it, is a civilian taking "an active part" in the hostilities’284.  
These preparations, for a specific hostile act, are to be distinguished 
from preparatory activities which merely establish ‘the general capacity to 
                                                
277 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 882. 
278 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 65. So for example, ‘delivery by a civilian truck driver of 
ammunition to an active firing position at the front line’ would amount to direct participation in 
hostilities because of its ‘integral part in combat’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between 
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 880-881). 
279 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 882. 
280 The guide stipulates that these preparatory measures must be linked to ‘specific hostile 
acts’ of direct participation before they amount to direct participation in hostilities (Boothby 
‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 750; 
Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 880-881). 
281 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 65. 
282 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 882-883. 
283 Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 747. 
284 Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel284 (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 34. 
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carry out hostile acts’285, which do not amount to direct participation in 
hostilities. Preparations which are part of a generalised ‘campaign of 
unspecified operations’286, or general ‘capacity building to undertake military 
activity’287, do not fall within the scope of the activities for which civilian 
immunity can be forfeited. Examples of such general preparations include ‘the 
purchase, smuggling, production, and hiding of weapons288; recruitment and 
training of personnel; and financial, political, and administrative support to 
armed actors’289. 
Where the specific hostile act requires no prior deployment290, the loss 
of civilian immunity ‘will be restricted to the immediate execution of the act 
and preparatory measures forming an integral part of that act’291. However, 
where the specific ‘hostile act requires prior geographic deployment’292, that 
preparatory deployment ‘already constitutes an integral part of the act in 
question’293, and results in the loss of civilian immunity. For an activity to 
amount to a deployment which will compromise a civilian’s immunity, 
deploying individual must ‘undertake a physical displacement’294 with the aim 
of carrying out the specific hostile act. Similarly, if the military withdrawal from 
the execution of a hostile act remains an ‘integral part of the preceding 
operation’295, it constitutes a part of the ‘for such time’ window296, and civilian 
immunity is only restored once the individual in question has physically 
separated from the operation’297. Such physical disengagement can be 
demonstrated ‘for example by laying down, storing or hiding the weapons or 
other equipment used, and resuming activities distinct from that operation’298. 
As the Israeli High Court of Justice pointed out in Public Committee against 
Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel , once a civilian detaches 
himself from his prior participatory activities, ‘he is not to be attacked for the 




                                                
285 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 881.  
286 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 66. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 747. 
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297 Ibid. 
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299 At para 39. 
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ii. A critique of the ‘revolving door’ concept 
 
Probably the most common academic300 critique leveled at the ‘revolving door’ 
phenomenon301 was that ‘it creates a significant operational advantage for 
civilians who alternate between civilian life and engagement in hostilities’302. It 
is argued that the revolving door would give rise to an ‘uneven legal playing 
field on the battleground’303, permitting attacks to be leveled at regular 
combatants (be they cooks or infantry) at all times, while affording civilian 
belligerents the advantage of a shield, behind which to ‘repeatedly claim the 
protection associated with that status’304, and yet launch ‘spontaneous, 
unorganised or sporadic’305 attacks from behind these protected positions306. 
Watkin agrees that ‘the ability to hide behind a revolving door, and thereby 
gain a tactical advantage through a claim to civilian status is difficult to 
justify’307. Particularly since there is no ‘clear guidance308 on the number of 
times a civilian can walk back through the “revolving door”… it is suggested 
that a civilian can go through the revolving door on a “persistently recurring 
basis”’309. Moreover, there is always potential for this interpretation of the 
‘revolving door of protection’ to be abused by non-State actors310.  
Some writers, like Boothby argue that ‘at customary law there is no 
revolving door of protection, and thus the ICRC’s interpretation of the word 
“participates” in the treaty rule excessively narrows the notion of [direct 
participation in hostilities] by inappropriately excluding the notion of 
continuous participation’311. Boothby, is critical of the fact that the Interpretive 
Guide does not provide in its interpretation a way to deal with what he terms 
the ‘persistent civilian participator’312. Boothby argues that there must be a 
way to distinguish between ‘isolated and sporadic acts by civilians’, and 
‘repeated or persistent acts’ of direct participation in hostilities313. Boothby 
‘proposes that the time dimension to the rule must permit the targeting of 
those who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, choose to participate on a 
persistent or regular basis in the conflict, whether they are or are not 
                                                
300 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 687.  
301 Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 41. 
302 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 24 and 45. 
303 Idem at 1. 
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309 Idem at 662. 
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ICRC Guidance’ at 45. 
311 Boothby ‘“And for such time as”: The time dimensions to direct participation in hostilities’ at 
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members of organised armed groups’314. Boothby argues that States (like 
Israel315 and the U.S.316) are unlikely to adopt an interpretation which would 
afford the benefit of the revolving door to ‘unorganised but regular direct 
participation by a civilian’317, when he suggests they should lose their 
protected status ‘while such persistent or repeated involvement in hostilities 
continues’318.  
The Interpretive Guide warns that it would be ‘impossible to determine 
with a sufficient degree of reliability whether civilians not currently preparing or 
executing a hostile act, have previously done so on a persistently recurring 
basis, and whether they have the continued intent to do so again’319. 
Moreover, as Melzer points out, Boothby fails to provide ‘operational forces 
with any reliable guidance as to how the proposed distinction between 
“sporadic” and “repeated” hostile acts should be made in practice’320. And as 
Jensen asserts, ‘any extension of the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities beyond specific acts would blur the distinction made in IHL321 
between temporary activity-based loss of protection (due to direct participation 
in hostilities) and continuous, status- or function-based loss of protection (due 
to combatant status or continuous combat function)’322. It does seem 
‘incongruous to argue that a civilian who has directly participated in hostilities, 
and shown continuing intent to do so, should be immune from targeting’323. 
Melzer maintains however that ‘persistently recurrent direct participation in 
hostilities’ by civilians, who have no ‘affiliation to an organised force or group’, 
is not likely to present a ‘major problem in practice’324. In the rare instances 
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voluntarily or under pressure, does not allow a reliable prediction as to future conduct’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 71); Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 687-688. 
320 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 892. 
321 ‘The treaty text leaves no doubt that loss of civilian protection attaches to individual activity 
(direct participation in hostilities) rather than status or function, and is temporary (“unless and 
for such time”) rather than continuous’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 887). Moreover this ‘interpretation of the 
term “participation” as referring to individual involvement in specific hostile acts or operations 
is also supported by the commentaries’ (Ibid). 
322 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2101-8. 
323 Idem at 2108-16. 
324 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 891. 
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where it does occur325, ‘the threat posed by these civilians in the interval 
between hostile acts is more adequately addressed through means and 
methods of law enforcement’326.  
Another aspect of the temporal approach adopted by the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide which has come under criticism, is its interpretation of 
which preparatory, deployment or withdrawal activities amount to unprotected 
direct participation in hostilities. Jensen proposed that ‘a modern view of “for 
such time” must include the full time that an individual is directly participating, 
not just the time that results in actual harm’327. Consequently, Jensen is of the 
view that the ‘individual who conducts training for individuals to take part in 
hostilities is targetable until he ceases all training activities’328. Boothby is 
critical of what he describes as a ‘restrictive’ interpretation of the preparatory 
activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities329. According to 
Boothby, ‘“participate” could also refer to individual involvement in “groups or 
sequences of activity spread over a period,” with the effect that the civilian in 
question would lose protection for the entire period of his involvement, 
including in the intervals between specific hostile acts’330. Boothby favours an 
interpretation which regards ‘preparatory acts, pure and simple, as direct 
participation’331. Boothby also favours an interpretation where ‘deployment 
with the explicit purpose of doing something preparatory to an act, that itself 
amounts to direct participation in hostilities’, also amount to direct 
participation332. 
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guide acknowledges that the net effect of the 
‘revolving door’ phenomenon will limit attacks on civilian participants333. It 
justifies the revolving door position as being a necessary part, rather then a 
‘malfunction’334, of the guide, in order ‘to protect the civilian population from 
erroneous or arbitrary attack’335 at times when they do not constitute a military 
objective. Any interpretation which ‘increases the risks to the innocent, 
uninvolved civilian, must conflict’ with a reading of the ‘terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’336. 
 
                                                
325 For example, ‘teenagers using every opportunity to throw “Molotov cocktails” at occupation 
forces, or civilians being forced to perform limited acts of direct participation in support of an 
armed group each time it operates in the vicinity of their village’ (Ibid). 
326 Ibid. 
327 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2235-41. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Boothby ‘“And for such time as”: The time dimensions to direct participation in hostilities’ at 
797. 
330 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 886. 
331 Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 752. 
332 Idem at 750. 
333 Idem at 757. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2235-41. 
336 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 886. 
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4.6 The ‘continuous combat function’ and its implications for civilians 
participating directly in hostilities 
 
i. The rationale behind the concept of the ‘continuous combat function’  
 
The term ‘continuous combat function’ was first coined337 at the expert 
discussions which gave rise to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide338. During the 
discussions the view was expressed that, since the revolving door of 
protection was only intended to apply to those spontaneous and unorganised 
acts of participation, it should not also be applied to ‘members of organised 
armed groups belonging to a non-State party’339, since their activities were 
oftentimes neither unorganised nor spontaneous340. If the revolving door were 
to be applied to such ‘organised armed groups’ (who fell short of the 
requirements for full combatant status) it would give these ‘farmers by day 
and fighters by night’… a significant operational advantage’341 over the ‘State 
armed groups engaging in hostilies against them, who as a result of their 
combatant status ‘can be attacked on a continuous basis’342. While there is 
under IHL no ‘express right for civilians to directly participate in hostilities’, that 
does not necessarily translate into ‘an international prohibition (or 
criminalisation) of such participation’343. Nevertheless, at the expert meetings 
the concern was raised that such inequality between the States’ armed forces 
and organised non-State armed groups would ‘undermine respect for IHL, 
thereby endangering innocent civilians’344. Rogers agrees that ‘there is 
certainly a case for arguing that a person who becomes a member of a 
guerrilla group, or armed faction that is involved in attacks against enemy 
armed forces, forfeits his protected status for so long as he participates in the 
activities of the group’345. 
As a consequence of these concerns, the general consensus at the 
expert discussion was that there was a legitimate and defensible346 need for a 
special legal regime applicable to ‘organised armed groups’ who participated 
in hostilities in a more organised, structured and continuous manner, as 
compared with those civilians who only participated intermittently in hostilities, 
                                                
337 Prior to this, the term ‘continuous combat function’ did not appear in any IHL treaties 
(Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 655). 
338 Ibid. 
339 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 71. 
340 Until such time as the actions of the levée en masse became ‘continuous and organized’ 
they would not fall within the purview of an organised armed group liable for direct targeting 
for their continuous combat function (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity 
and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 840). 
341 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 19. 
342 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 72. 
343 Idem at 83. 
344 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 19.  
345 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19. 
346 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 209. 
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and who benefitted from the revolving door of civilian immunity. Rather than 
apply the revolving door of protection, which only limits their protection from 
attack ‘for such time as they participate directly in hostilities’, as is the case 
with civilians, this group of participants lose their civilian protection ‘for as long 
as they remain members’ of the organised group, by virtue of their ‘continuous 
combat function’347. In other words, the ‘revolving door of protection starts to 
operate based on membership’348 in the organised group, and the door 
revolves again, rendering the individual once again a protected civilian, but 
only once their membership of the group has ceased. The net effect of this 
regime for non-State actors, who like child soldiers and PMSCs are 
affiliated349 with organised armed groups, is that they stand to ‘lose their 
entitlement to protection against direct attack’350 not only during their 
continuous combative acts, but ‘even when they put down their weapons and 
walk home for lunch with their family’351. 
While this approach does draw on notions of group membership, it is 
nevertheless different from the regime applicable to those who are members 
of the regular armed forces. For members of the State’s armed forces, their 
status as combatants is determined by their formal membership of the armed 
group, regardless of the function the individual might perform, and until the 
individual leaves the force352. As Melzer points out any legal regime aimed at 
organised armed groups needs to take into consideration the ‘more informal 
and fluctuating membership structures of irregularly constituted armed forces 
fighting on behalf of State and non-State belligerents’353.  
 
ii. Activating the loss of protection based upon a ‘continuous combat function’  
 
The effect of this regime is that, once it is de facto evidenced that individual 
members of the organised armed group354 have functioned in a continuous 
                                                
347 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 71; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 883. 
348 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 72. 
349 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 845. 
350 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 73. 
351 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 206. 
352 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 671. 
353 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 845. 
354 Moreover, according to the Interpretive Guide, ‘membership must depend on whether the 
continuous function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively executed by the 
group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the 
conflict’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2141-49); Solis The Law of Armed 
Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 206). 
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combative matter355, their ‘functional membership’ results in their loss of 
civilian ‘protection against direct attack’ for ‘as long as their membership 
lasts’356.  
According to the ICRC Interpretive Guide, ‘membership in an organised 
armed group begins in the moment a civilian starts de facto to assume a 
continuous combat function for the group, and lasts until he or she ceases to 
assume such function’357. Such an assessment requires proof of repeated 
direct participation in hostilities, along with ‘a lasting integration358 into an 
armed group’359, with indications that ‘such conduct constitutes a continuous 
function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed for 
the duration of a particular operation’360. There is no assessment based upon 
the donning of a uniform or the possession of an identification card361, it is 
determine solely by function362. The Israeli High Court of Justice, in their 
assessment of the degree of participation in hostilities on the part of 
Palestinian terrorists, in Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v 
Government of Israel concluded:  
‘a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his 
"home", and in the framework of his role in that organization he commits a 
chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, loses his 
immunity from attack "for such time" as he is committing the chain of acts. 
Indeed, regarding such a civilian, the rest between hostilities is nothing 
other than preparation for the next hostility’363.  
 
iii. Exclusion and cessation of the ‘continuous combat function’ classification 
 
At their core these members of organised armed groups still enjoy primary 
civilian status (i.e. they do not acquire combatant status). As Melzer points 
out, ‘continuous combat function does not, of course, imply de jure entitlement 
                                                
355 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 838. 
356 Idem at 843. 
357 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 72. 
358 Van der Toorn proposed the following ‘objectively verifiable indicia’ of the necessary 
integration: ‘regular physical association with other individuals affiliated with the group; acting 
under orders or the command of senior figures; and any other conduct that demonstrates they 
are seeking to advance the common purpose of the group’ (Van der Toorn ‘“Direct 
Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 28-29). 
359 Idem at 7.  
360 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2141-49. 
361 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 206. Neither 
can it ‘depend on abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone to error, arbitrariness, 
or abuse’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 846). 
362 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 206. 
363 At para 39. 
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to combatant privilege’364. Consequently, it is imperative that only those 
members of the group who actually engage in the continuous combat 
function365 stand to lose their otherwise civilian immunity from attack366. Those 
who, while affiliated367 with an organised armed group, fail to ‘regularly 
perform combat duties’368, cannot be said to perform a continuous combat 
function, and consequently are excluded369 from the loss of protection on 
account of their failure to directly participate in hostilities370. Moreover ‘once a 
member has affirmatively disengaged from a particular group, or has 
permanently changed from its military to its political wing371, he regains his 
civilian immunity against attack’372. As to how this disassociation from the 
group is manifested, the Interpretive Guide states that: ‘disengagement from 
an organised armed group need not be openly declared; it can also be 
expressed through conclusive behaviour, such as a lasting physical distancing 
from the group and reintegration into civilian life, or the permanent resumption 
of an exclusively non-combat function’373. Accordingly, an assessment as to 
whether an individual has disengaged from an organised armed group, ‘must 
therefore be made in good faith and based on a reasonable assessment of 
the prevailing circumstances, presuming entitlement to civilian protection in 
case of doubt’374. 
 
iv. A critique of the continuous combat function 
 
The ICRC’s ‘continuous combat function’ has not been without criticism. In 
particular some academics have raised concerns around the issue that the 
specific treaty language, which the Interpretive Guide was attempting to 
interpret, states that civilians lose immunity from attack ‘for such time’ as they 
participate directly in hostilities375. The ICRC’s continuous combat function 
                                                
364 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 847. 
365 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2141-49. 
366 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 846. 
367 This would include ‘private contractors and civilian employees’, contracted to organised 
armed groups (Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 292). 
368 For example ‘recruiters; trainers; financiers; propagandists; or those who purchase; 
smuggle; store; manufacture; or maintain weapons and other military equipment’ (Jensen 
‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2003-12).  
369 Included in this exempted group are ‘political and administrative personnel, as well as 
other persons not exercising a combat function’ (Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in 
Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 7). 
370 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
704. 
371 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 891. 
372 Ibid. 
373 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 72-73. 
374 Idem at 73. 
375 Philip Alston ‘Study on Targeted Killings’ Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions (28 May 2010) A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 at para 65.  
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interpretation effectively arrives at a conclusion which makes it permissible to 
directly target civilians at all times, provided they are engaged in a continuous 
combat function376. The potential increased risk to civilians posed by the 
creation of the continuous combat function category, has seen critics of the 
concept call for the ‘the other constituent parts of the guidance (i.e. the 
threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus criteria) not [to] be 
diluted’377 so as to adequately protect civilians in times of armed conflict. 
Melzer, and others who defend the proposed continuous combat function 
category, cite principle XI378 in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide as providing the 
necessary counter balance to prevent the continuous combat function 
category posing an increased risk to civilians around whom there might be 
some doubt as to their degree of involvement in hostilities (i.e. as a sporadic 
direct participant or having a continuous combat function). 
Watkin is critical that the continuous combat function approach still 
‘creates a bias against State armed forces’379 in that the regularly constituted 
armed forces can only target those within the organised armed group who 
exhibit continuous combat function, while their own non-combatant members 
can be targeted at all times380. Watkin is skeptical that, at a split second’s 
notice, a soldier can ‘realistically be expected to distinguish between a civilian 
who participates on a “persistent recurring basis”, and a member of an 
organised armed group who performs a “continuous combat function”’381. 
Fenrick concurs. In essence, ‘members of organised armed groups are 
treated more favorably than members of State armed forces, in so far as a 
smaller percentage of them may be lawfully subjected to direct attack’382. 
Furthermore, protected immunity against attack is afforded to persons ‘who 
are an integral part of the combat effectiveness of an organised armed group 
when their regular force counterparts performing exactly the same function 
can be targeted’383. In response to these criticisms, Melzer points out that this 
perceived bias is not a fiction developed by the Interpretive Guide, but is 
‘rooted in existing treaty and customary law’ which prohibits the direct 
                                                
376 Ibid. 
377 Idem at para 69. 
378 ‘In addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific means 
and methods of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may arise under 
other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of force which is 
permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed 
what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing 
circumstances’. 
379 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 837. 
380 Watkin warns that, together with ‘a narrow concept of direct participation’, the pool of 
‘persons accompanying the armed force or closely connected to it that cannot be targeted’ is 
expanding (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 659-660). 
381 Idem at 662; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 855. 
382 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 291. 
383 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 664 and 675; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 837. 
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targeting of civilians until such time as they participate directly in the 
hostilities384. Melzer concedes that, while notionally more of the regular armed 
forces might be exposed to direct targeting than the members of their 
‘irregularly constituted counterparts’, ‘the actual practical effect will have very 
little consequence385, since in organised armed groups many of the so-called 
non-combative roles are performed by the very individuals who engage in the 
continuous combat function’386. Moreover, as Melzer points out ‘almost all 
non-combatant387 members of regular armed forces, with the exception of 
medical and religious personnel… are not only entitled, but also trained, 
armed, and expected to directly participate in hostilities in case of enemy 
contact and, therefore, also assume a continuous combat function’388.  
Another criticism raised by Watkin is that a restrictive interpretation of 
what activities amount to ‘combat function’ is at odds with more broader 
interpretations adopted in ‘case law and other academic writings’389. Watkin 
argues that the criteria for attaining ‘membership in an organised armed 
group’ is couched so restrictively, as to make the potential for an otherwise 
civilian to lose that status and thus be targetable, unlikely390. Watkin prefers to 
apply the continuous loss of civilian immunity from attack ‘not only to fighting 
personnel of organised armed groups, but essentially to any person who 
could be regarded as performing a “combat,” “combat support,” or even 
“combat service support” function for such a group, including unarmed cooks 
and administrative personnel’391. Van der Toorn shares a similar concern, that 
the ‘continuous participation requirement’ ‘imposes a very high threshold and 
would likely exclude a large number of individuals’ who, for all intents and 
purposes, are ‘carrying out substantial and continuing integrated support 
functions for such groups’392, but ‘who fight for the group on a regular but not 
continuous basis’393. Van der Toorn suggests relaxing the strict continuous 
combat function requirement in favour of ‘”regular participation”, or to require 
an individual’s “predominate function” to be direct participation in hostilities for 
the group’394. Watkin also suggests a similar formulation which would state 
that ‘after the first involvement, any subsequent act demonstrating direct 
participation would start to provide the basis to believe that there is the 
                                                
384 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 852. 
385 Idem at 851. 
386 Idem at 852. 
387 For example ‘cooks and administrative personnel’ (Idem at 851). 
388 Idem at 852. 
389 Watkin maintains that the most obvious mistaken exclusions from the ICRC’s 
understanding of ‘combat function’ is ‘the performance of a logistics function’ (like the 
‘transport of weapons and equipment’) (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups 
and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 683). 
390 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 835. 
391 Idem at 913. 
392 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 664. 
393 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 837. 
394 Ibid. 
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beginning of a pattern of conduct that reflects an intention to regularly engage 
in the hostilities”’ 395. So for Watkin, ‘repetitious participation can be 
considered in determining if such persons are in reality continuously engaged 
in hostilities’, and when such repetition has taken place, ‘affirmative 
disengagement would be required in order to establish that such persons are 
no longer direct participants in hostilities’396. 
These criticisms certainly do ‘express understandable concerns over 
the ability of State armed forces to operate effectively against an elusive 
enemy who can hardly be distinguished from the civilian population and 
whose means and methods are often indiscriminate, perfidious, or otherwise 
contrary to IHL’397. That being said, any interpretation which gives rise to 
overly permissive targeting of individuals under IHL’398, will result in an 
‘unacceptable degree of error and arbitrariness’399. In response to this 
critique, Melzer cautions that what Watkin and Van der Toorn refer to as 
‘“combat support” activities would almost invariably constitute an integral part 
of combat operations’400, and consequently would result in the loss of 
immunity from attack. As Melzer explains, 
  
‘in practice, a civilian who regularly and consistently directly participates 
in hostilities in support of a belligerent party will almost always be 
affiliated with an organised armed force or group and, thus, may be 
regarded as a de facto member assuming a continuous combat function 
for that force or group. This includes not only the armed full-time fighter, 
but also private contractors hired to defend military objectives, as well as 
the notorious “farmer by day and fighter by night” who, in parallel to his 
seemingly401 peaceful everyday life, assumes a continuous function 
involving acts such as placing IEDs, mines, or booby-traps, or providing 
tactical intelligence or logistic support as part of specific attacks or 
combat operations’402.  
 
Moreover Melzer argues that to adopt an ‘overextended’ notion of who could 
be targeted in an organised armed group ‘to include all persons 
accompanying or supporting that group (regardless of their function)’ would 
‘completely discard the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” participation 





                                                
395 Idem at 856. 
396 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 692. 
397 Melzer ‘‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 913. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Idem at 848. 
401 Idem at 890. 
402 Idem at 891. 
403 Idem at 837. 
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4.7 Presumptions in assessing direct participation in hostilities 
 
As already mentioned in the chapter discussing civilian status, IHL operates 
on the presumption that in cases of doubt ‘whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian’404. According to the study 
undertaken by the ICRC into the customary international law status of various 
IHL provisions, ‘when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment has 
to be made under the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation 
as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack’405. ‘One 
cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious’406. The 
rationale behind the principle of distinction and this legal presumption is ‘to 
avoid the erroneous or arbitrary targeting of civilians’407. The same rationale 
would make the presumption applicable in instances when an assessment 
needs to be made as to whether an individual has directly participated in 
hostilities. In the words of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide: ‘in case of doubt as 
to whether a specific civilian conduct qualifies as direct participation in 
hostilities, it must be presumed that the general rule of civilian protection 
applies and that this conduct does not’408. Consequently, prior to and during 
any attack all ‘feasible precautions’ should be taken ‘to ensure that the 
intended target of the attack is in fact a legitimate military target’, and should 
there be any doubt as to whether a target is in fact a civilian ‘entitled to civilian 
protection’ the intended attack must be suspended409. In the Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel the 
Israeli High Court of Justice endorses the position that, in examining the grey 
areas which require a case by case analysis, there is a heavy burden of proof 
which requires well verified information before a belligerent can justify the 
direct targeting of a civilian, on the basis that their actions are perceived as 
amounting to direct participation in hostilities410. Moreover the Court points out 
that there is always the obligations upon belligerents to employ less harmful 
means (ie. arrest, investigation and trial) where at all feasible, rather then 
order the direct targeting of the civilian411. 
 
i. Critique of the presumption’s application to assessments of direct 
participation 
 
Schmitt rejects the ICRC’s application of the presumption of civilian status to 
assessments of direct participation, in favour of an approach which would see 
the ‘gray areas… interpreted liberally i.e., in favor of finding direct 
                                                
404 AP I article 50(1); ‘In case of doubt, the person must be presumed to be protected against 
direct attack’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law at 74). 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Idem at 75. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Idem at 74. 
410 At para 40. 
411 Idem at para 41. 
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participation’412. Schmitt argues that once a determination is made that a 
civilian is directly participating in hostilities they may be legally targeted 
without further need to justify any resultant injury or death by considerations of 
proportionality413 or by taking special precautions in attack414. Schmitt defends 
what he concedes may seem like a ‘counter-intuitive’ and ‘harsh’ approach on 
the grounds that it ‘is likely to enhance the protection of the civilian population 
as a whole, because it creates an incentive for civilians to remain as distant 
from the conflict as possible’415. 
Melzer cautions that instructing the armed forces that they are justified 
in directly targeting civilians whose actions are questionable is clearly contrary 
to the ethos of IHL and in violation of many of its fundamental provisions416. 
As Melzer points out, it is not suprising, given the radical approach that 
Schmitt proposed, that there is ‘no support in State practice and 
jurisprudence’417 for his inversion of the presumption of civilian status. I prefer 
a more nuanced conclusion: that the proportionality and special precautions 
test would be easier to satisfy when doubts are raised regarding the degree of 
a civilian’s involvement in hostilities. In other words there is still an obligation 
to assess the proportionate result of the impending attack, as well take special 
precautions during the attack418. The threshold for justifying these actions is 
easier to achieve when civilians are playing an active role in the hostilities. 
This view has been endorsed by the Israeli High Court of Justice in Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel which 
stated that if a civilian’s actions brought them into close proximity to military 
targets (by providing strategic analysis or disseminating propaganda), while 
those actions would not amount to direct participation in hostilities, the State 
would nevertheless not be liable for their injury where such injury ‘falls into the 
framework of collateral or incidental damage’419.  
As Melzer correctly points out, if a civilian’s actions ‘posed a grave 
threat to public security, law and order, without clearly amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities’, then in such instances ‘the regular law enforcement 
mechanisms as well at the legal regime applicable to individual self-defence 
                                                
412 Schmitt ‘”Direct Participation in Hostilities” and 21st Century Armed Conflict’ at 505 and 
509; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 875.  
413 The ‘principle of proportionality prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’ (AP I article 51(5)(b); Michael Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation 
in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees’ (2004) 5:2 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 511 at 541). 
414 There is a further imperative on commanding officers, once they have determined that an 
attack is proportional, to select a military objective ‘which may be expected to cause the least 
danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects’ (Idem at 519; AP I article 57(3)). 
415 Idem at 505; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 875. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Idem at 876. 
418 Hans-Peter Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 211. 
419 Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel (2006) HCJ 
769/02 at para 35. 
 105 
will prevail’420.  
 
4.8 The legal consequences for civilians found participating directly in 
hostilities 
 
It is also worth noting that at all times (even while participating directly in 
hostilities) civilians retain their primary civilian status. Their actions alone do 
not re-classify them as combatants. They are, however, exposed to direct 
attack for so long as they persist with their direct participation in hostilities, 
despite their primary civilian status. While they lose their civilian immunity 
against direct attack, they never lose their inherently civilian status. Once they 
desist from their direct participation or disengage from the group’s continuous 
combat function, they regain their full civilian immunity against direct attack. 
Civilians, by definition, do not enjoy combatant status, with its attendant 
authorisation to participate directly in hostilities, associated POW status and 
immunity from prosecution. Consequently when a civilian is found to be 
participating directly in hostilities without the requisite combatant privileges, 
they are exposed to potential ‘prosecution for violations of domestic and 
international law they may have committed’421, even if during their 
participation they observed the laws of war regarding the means and methods 
of warfare422. What is particularly problematic for civilians taking a direct part 
in hostilities, or acting with a continuous combat function, is that they very 
often ‘capture, injure, or kill an adversary’423 whilst ‘failing to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population’424 and feigning the right to ‘civilian 
protection against direct attack’425. This is considered a serious violation of the 





At present, the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide appears to provide a neutral, 
impartial and balanced interpretation of the longstanding IHL principle against 
civilian direct participation in hostilities. In setting a minimum threshold of 
harm, the Interpretive Guide respects the customary IHL distinction between 
‘direct participation in hostilities, and mere involvement in the general war 
effort’427. In applying the direct causation requirement the Interpretive Guide 
limits ‘broad targeting policies, prone to error, arbitrariness, and abuse’428. 
                                                
420 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 76. 
421 Idem at 83; Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern War’ at 41. 
422 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 329; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 84. 
423 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 




427 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 877. 
428 Idem at 867. 
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The belligerent nexus link distinguishes occasions of legitimate military 
targeting from common criminal activities.  
As for the temporal scope of the loss of civilian immunity from attack, 
the revolving door phenomenon ensures maximum protection for the civilian 
population against ‘erroneous or arbitrary attack’429, in line with the 
fundamental principles of IHL. The concept of a ‘continuous combat function’ 
distinguishes those ‘farmers by day and fighters by night’, who participate 
directly in hostilities from those who merely provide indirect support for a 
belligerent party (and who retain their civilian immunity against attack). This 
concession, for critics like Schmitt who felt that the ‘under-inclusivity’ of the 
guide reflected ‘a troubling ignorance of the realities of 21st century battlefield 
combat’430, allows ‘that organised armed groups belonging to non-State 
belligerents… constitute legitimate military targets according to the same 
principles as regular combatants… for as long as they assume a continuous 
combat function’431 and for the entire duration of their formal or functional 
membership.  
At all times it is evident that the Interpretive Guide adheres to the 
longstanding IHL principle of presumptive civilian status and immunity against 
direct attack in cases of doubt. The Interpretive Guide is also clear that, even 
while participating directly in hostilities, these civilian participants retain their 
primary civilian status, albeit without immunity against direct attack during 
their active and direct participation in hostilities. Their participation in hostilities 
does not render them authorised combatants, which is why they face criminal 
prosecution for their unauthorised participation in hostilities, in some instances 
on serious charges of perfidy. Nevertheless, the cessation of their 
participation in the hostilities restores their full civilian immunity against direct 
targeting. 
While there was criticism directed at aspects of the Interpretive Guide, 
mostly on the grounds that it was under-inclusive, even those critics concede 
that ‘the three constitutive elements reflect factors that undoubtedly must play 
into such an analysis’432, and that the Interpretive Guide is ‘superior to the 
various ad hoc lists because it provides those tasked with applying the norm 
on the battlefield with guidelines against which to gauge an action’433. All in 
all, ‘after careful consideration of the critiques prepared by Watkin, Schmitt, 
Boothby and Parks, nothing indicates that the ICRC’s interpretive guidance is 
substantively inaccurate, unbalanced, or otherwise inappropriate, or that its 
recommendations cannot be realistically translated into operational 
practice’434. More importantly the guide’s cautious interpretation of direct 
                                                
429 Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 757. 
430 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
739. 
431 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 914. 
432 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
739. 
433 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 877. 
434 Idem at 915. 
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participation in hostilities ensures that the fundamental principles of distinction 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE COMBATANT STATUS OF ‘UNDER-AGED’ CHILD SOLDIERS 
RECRUITED BY NON-STATE-ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 





Children have featured in historical accounts of the earliest conflicts as 
‘lookouts, spies’2, ‘drummer boys, messengers, porters, and servants’3. 
However since the mid 20th century, the role of child soldiers has undergone 
significant transformation in the extent of their recruitment4 (both locally and 
across borders5), their increasing youthfulness (some reportedly as young as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.This chapter is based on two articles entitled: ‘Targeting and Prosecuting ‘Under-aged’ 
Child Soldiers in International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the International Humanitarian Law 
Prohibition Against Civilian Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2012) Comparative and 
International Law Quarterly of South Africa (forthcoming) and ‘The Combatant Status of 
‘Under-aged’ Child Soldiers Recruited by Non-State Armed Groups in International Armed 
Conflicts’ submitted for publication to the (2012) African Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (awaiting review). 
2 Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin (1998) Children the Invisible Soldiers Radda Barnen: 
Sweden at 20. 
3 Anna Cataldi and Jimmie Briggs ‘Child Soldiers’ Crimes of War available at 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/child-soldiers (accessed 3 August 2011); David M 
Rosen ‘Who is a Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers’ (2009) 25 Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 81 at 85. 
4 Currently there are approximately 300 000 child soldiers deployed in seventy-five percent of 
all armed conflicts in about fifty countries (Coalition against Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: 
Global Report (2008) available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/global-reports 
(accessed 3 June 2011) at 22). As Brett and McCallin rightly point out - ‘almost by definition 
information on child soldiers is out of date before it is published’ (Brett and McCallin Children 
the Invisible Soldiers at 31). Children have served ‘in government forces, paramilitaries, or in 
opposition forces … in the following States: In Africa: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, DRC, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, and 
Uganda. In the Americas: Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. In Europe: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, United Kingdom/Northern Ireland, Turkey/Kurdistan, and 
the Russian Federation/Chechnya. In the Middle East/Persian Gulf: Israel/occupied 
territories, southern Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq/Kurdistan. In Asia: Afghanistan, Burma, 
Cambodia, India/Kashmir, Indonesia/East Timor, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Papua 
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Solomon Islands and Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
(Nsongurua J Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of 
Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ (2006) 20:1 Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal 57 at 61-62 and 65; Center for Defense Information ‘Defence 
Monitor: The Invisible Soldier’ (1997) XXVI:4 (DC-I.S.S.N. # 0195-6450) available at 
http://www.cdi.org/dm/1997/issue4/ (accessed 1 February 2012)). The Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army alone is reported to have recruited in excess of 20 000 child soldiers, while 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is estimated to have abducted in the region of 26 000 
children (BBC News ‘South Sudan to End Use of Child Soldiers’ (31 August 2010) available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11135426 (accessed 5 August 2011)); Watchlist 
‘Sudan’s Children at a Crossroads’ (2007) available at 
http://watchlist.org/reports/pdf/sudan_07_final.pdf (accessed 31 August 2010) at 23; United 
Nations (U.N.) (2011) Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (A/65/820-
S/2011/250), issued on 23 April 2011. 
5 Armed groups in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are reported to have 
recruited refugee children from Rwanda and Sudan, while the LRA is reported to have 
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eight6 years of age), their degree of military involvement7, and most 
significantly that the vast majority are being recruited by non-State-armed 
groups8. In recent armed conflicts, child soldiers - often drugged into a state 
of irrational fearlessness - have acted as ‘regular soldiers, guerrilla fighters, 
cooks’9, human shields10, porters11, lookouts and spies12, and in the case of 
young girls, have been offered as ‘sex slaves to the armed forces’13. Of 
course the data detailing the extent of their involvement in armed conflict is at 
best an underestimation. As Brett and McCallin point out, child soldiers are 
often invisible because those who employ them often either deny their 
existence, or falsify their ages14. Singer reports that child soldiers featured as 
combatants in sixty-eight percent of recent and ongoing conflicts, and in 
eighty percent of these instances the children are under fifteen years of 
age15. ‘In short, the participation of children in armed conflict is now global in 
scope and massive in number’16. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abducted children from Uganda, Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) 
(Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 17 and 23).  
6 Amnesty International ‘In the Line of Fire: Somalia’s Children Under Attack’ (July 2011), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR52/001/2011/en (accessed 6 August 
2011). In 2002 the Joint Army Commission of the U.N., which was investigating the situation 
in the Congo, reported that ‘children accounted for fifty percent of the three hundred and fifty-
thousand total soldiers being used’ in the Congo, and they estimated that ‘ten percent were 
under twelve years of age, thirty percent were between twelve and fifteen years of age and 
twenty per cent were between sixteen and eighteen years of age’ (Justin Coleman ‘Showing 
its Teeth: The International Criminal Court Takes On Child Conscription in the Congo, But is 
its Bark Worse Than Its Bite?’ (2007-2008) 26 Penn State International Law Review 765). 
7 In the DRC most children, recruited in 2010 into non-State-armed groups, were used in 
military operations (U.N. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council; Coalition 
Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 19). 
8 Singer reports that sixty percent ‘of the non-State armed forces in the world today 
deliberately make use of child soldiers’ (Peter Warren Singer (2005) Children at War 
Pantheon Books: USA at 95). Even the private security industry has made use of child 
soldiers (Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds) (2011) War by Contract: Human 
Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors Oxford University Press: Oxford at 266). 
In figures quoted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is estimated that ‘over eighty-
five percent of the LRA’s forces are made up of children’, bolstering the numbers of 200 core 
members to 14 000 soldiers (Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the 
Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 65; Singer Children at War at 95), 
and a U.N. report released in 1999 maintained that the Taliban were enlisting child warriors 
younger then fourteen years of age in Afghanistan (Anatole Ayissi ‘Protecting Children in 
Armed Conflict: From Commitment to Compliance’ (2002) available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1727.pdf (accessed 28 December 2011) at 10). What 
is not covered by this piece though, is any analysis of non-State-organised armed groups per 
se, and the controversy around how IHL deals with such groups. 
9 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 61. 
10 Feigning protected civilian status to shield military targets from attack. 
11 It is not uncommon for children to be used to transport contraband items through 
checkpoints, where they are less likely to be searched. 
12 Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 22. According to Brett and 
McCallin ‘many of the case studies refer to a special preference for using children as look 
outs, messengers and for intelligence work’ (Brett and McCallin Children the Invisible 
Soldiers at 95). 
13 U.N. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. 
14 Brett and McCallin Children the Invisible Soldiers at 19. 
15 A study conducted in Asia estimated the average age of child soldiers at thirteen years of 
age, while a similar study conducted in Africa concluded that over sixty percent of all child 
soldiers in Africa were under fourteen years of age (Singer Children at War at 28-29). 
16 Singer Children at War at 16. 
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 Just what is meant by the term ‘child soldier’17 has also undergone 
significant legal scrutiny in recent years. While most international treaties and 
customary international law set the minimum age for recruitment into the the 
States armed forces or armed groups, at fifteen years of age18, there has 
been significant international pressure to increase this minimum age to 
eighteen years of age19.  
 Despite redoubled efforts by a myriad of international organisations, 
including the U.N. Security Council20, UNICEF, many regional 
organisations21, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and NGO groupings like ‘the 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers’22, the statistics reveal that under-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The use of the term ‘child soldier’ in this paper is defined according to the Cape Town 
Principles and Best Practices (27-30 April 1997), adopted at the Symposium on the 
Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilisation and 
Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa’ (Cape Town Principles) available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf (accessed 15 December 
2011). The Cape Town Principles define a child soldier as ‘any person under eighteen years 
of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any 
capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying 
such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual 
purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying 
or has carried arms’. This definition is ‘intentionally broadly worded so as to extend its 
application beyond those employed as combatants, to include ‘cooks, porters, messengers, 
and anyone accompanying such groups, including girls recruited for sexual purposes and 
forced marriage’ (UNICEF Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (2003) available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/option_protocol_conflict.pdf (accessed 6 July 2011) at 14). 
This definition applies to all child participants, irrespective of whether ‘the authorities contend 
the child “volunteered” for soldiering’ (Sonja Grover ‘“Child Soldiers” as “Non-Combatants”: 
The Inapplicability of the Refugee Convention Exclusion Clause’ (2008) 12:1 The 
International Journal of Human Rights 53 at 54). 
18 See section 5.2 for a full discussion of each piece of law.  
19 Particularly in cases where conscription is involuntary, and in cases involving recruitment 
by non-State-armed groups. The 1997 Cape Town Principles, which has widespread 
endorsement from the UN, sets the age limit for participation in hostilities at eighteen years, 
and the U.N. Secretary-General has requested that U.N. peacekeepers preferably be twenty-
one years of age, but certainly no younger than eighteen (UNICEF Guide to the Optional 
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict at 14). 
20 The U.N. Security Council have frozen assets and imposed travel bans on the leaders of 
armed groups suspected of recruiting child soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda and the DRC 
(Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 14; U.N. A World Fit for 
Children (2002) available at http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/wffc/ (accessed 7 August 
2011) Part III:B3 at para 22). Moreover, the following Security Council Resolutions: 1261 
(1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 
1998 (2011) all call for countries to criminalise child recruitment, and the national legislation 
and military manuals in numerous countries do indeed reflect this stance (U.N. Office of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict The Six 
Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict (2009) Working paper no. 1 
available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict (accessed 5 August 2011). 
21 1996 Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) Resolution on the Plight of African Children in 
Situation of Armed Conflicts, 1998 European Parliament Resolution on Child Soldiers, 1999 
Declaration by the Nordic Foreign Ministers Against the Use of Child Soldiers, 1999 Berlin 
Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers, 1999 Montevideo Declaration on the Use of 
Children as Soldiers, 1999 Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers, 2000 
Organisation of American States’ Resolution on Children and Armed Conflict, and the 2001 
Amman Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers. 
22 The umbrella organisation was formed in 1998 and comprised Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Save the Children, Jesuit Refugee Service, the Quaker U.N. Office - 
Geneva, and International Federation Terre des Hommes (Singer Children at War at 142). 
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aged and forcible ‘recruitment’ remains widespread23, especially when it 
comes to non-State-armed groups24. Of the fifty-six armed groups who 
engage in the unlawful recruitment of child soldiers, sixteen appear on the 
U.N. Secretary-General’s watch-list for being in persistent violation of 
international law for more then five years25.  
 While the project of pursuing and prosecuting the warlords who persist 
in recruiting under-aged child soldiers is important26, I have chosen instead to 
focus this piece on the issue of how one assigns international humanitarian 
law (IHL) status to these under-aged child soldiers in international armed 
conflicts. As Moodrick-Even Khen correctly points out, ‘most efforts are aimed 
at reducing the number of children recruited into armed forces and 
criminalising their recruiters, whereas relatively less attention has been 
directed at reconsidering the legal status of children participating directly in 
hostilities and the rules for their targeting’27.‘This lacunae in IHL is especially 
relevant …for the incorporation of new irregular actors, such as children, into 
the battlefield’28. 
 From the earliest IHL treaties there are references made to the special 
protection and respect afforded children, because of their youthfulness29. The 
majority of these child-focused protections build on the assumption that 
children were to be automatically assigned civilian status, and as such they 
were restricted from participating in hostilities30. Without any authorisation to 
participate in hostilities, children were immune from attack and were to be 
respected and protected. As is the case with any civilian, children ‘who are 
taking no part in the hostilities and whose weakness makes them incapable 
of contributing to the war potential of their country… appear to be particularly 
deserving of protection’31. However, IHL also states that the moment a civilian 
participates directly in hostilities, they lose their civilian immunity from direct 
targeting, and can be prosecuted for their unauthorised participation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The use of child soldiers has been of particular concern in Africa, but large numbers of 
children are ‘being deployed as soldiers throughout the world, including Europe, Asia, the 
Americas and the Middle East’ (Jay Williams ‘The International Campaign to Prohibit Child 
Soldiers: a Critical Evaluation’ (2011) 15:7 The International Journal of Human Rights 1072). 
24 Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 17. 
25 Watchlist ‘Next Steps to Protect Children in Armed Conflict: Briefing Note to the U.N. 
Security Council’ (June 2011) available at http://www.watchlist.org (accessed 6 August 2011) 
at 12; U.N. Report of the Secretary-General ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ (26 April 2012) 
A/66/782–S/2012/261 available at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/619998/publicationFile/169346/120612_VN_Bericht_Kinder_
Konflikte.pdf (accessed 25 September 2012). 
26 For more on this aspect of child soldiering, see Shannon Bosch and Juanita Easthorpe 
‘Africa’s Toy Soldiers, Non-State Armed Groups and ‘Voluntary’ Recruitment: Anything but 
Child’s Play’ (2012) 21:2 African Security Review (forthcoming). 
27 Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen ‘Children as Direct Participants in Hostilities’ in William C Banks 
(ed) (2011) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare Columbia 
Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at 2867-74 (ebook version). 
28 Moodrick-Even Khen ‘Children as Direct Participants in Hostilities’ at 2874-2881. 
29 Kurt Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 216. 
30 Hans-Peter Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 210; 
Noëlle Quénivet and Shilan Shah-Davis (2010) ‘Confronting the Challenges of International 
Law and Armed Conflict in the 21st Century’ (Chapter 1) in Noëlle Quénivet and Shilan Shah-
Davis (eds) International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century TMC Asser 
Instituut, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Netherlands at 16. 
31 Howard Mann ‘International Law and the Child Soldier’ (1987) 36 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 32 at 35. 
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hostilities32. Given the serious legal implications which flow from one’s IHL 
status in international armed conflicts, including whether one is afforded 
prisoner of war (POW) status and immunity from prosecution for participating 
in hostilities, it is high time that the question of the child soldier’s IHL status is 
explained. In particular, I wish to consider the case of the under-aged child 
soldier (i.e. under fifteen years of age), who is recruited into a non-State-
armed group33, and who participates directly in an international34 armed 
conflict. At this juncture it is useful to note that while the under-aged 
recruitment of child soldiers is prohibited under IHL, and the actions of these 
unlawfully recruited child soldiers might constitute direct participation in 
hostilities, those actions themselves are neither ‘neither prohibited nor 
privileged’35 according to the ICRC Interpretive Guide. What is crucial 
however, is understanding that these actions which amount to direct 
participation in hostilities do compromise the immunity from direct targeting, 
which is otherwise enjoyed by civilians in situations of armed conflict. 
In 1994, when Goodwin-Gill and Cohn published their study on the role 
of children in armed conflict, they concluded that at the time, there were no 
international armed conflicts in which AP I was ‘applied to the benefit of 
children’36. Eighteen years later, the growing involvement of children in armed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 211. 
33 I have chosen to focus this piece on those child soldiers recruited into non-State-armed 
groups, because these instances are more statistically significant, and the legal regime 
applicable under IHL to non-State-armed groups is more complicated than that applicable to 
the recruitment of child soldiers into the State’s armed forces. 
34 IHL is divided into a body of rules that applies to international conflicts, and another vastly 
different legal regime that applies to internal armed conflicts. I have chosen to restrict my 
focus here to international armed conflicts, because it is within the legal regime specifically 
applicable to international armed conflicts where one finds the legal allocation of combatant 
and POW status, a status that under both customary IHL and conventional IHL ‘is strictly 
limited to international armed conflicts’ (Robert Goldman and Brain Tittemore ‘Unprivileged 
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2002) ASIL Task Force Paper available at 
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012) at 1). Common 
article 2, found in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, defines what constitutes an 
‘international armed conflict’ as, ‘all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the State of 
war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial 
or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance’ (1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I) of August 12 (1950) 
75 U.N. Treaty Series 31; 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II) of August 12 
(1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 85; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GC III) of August 12 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135; 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) of August 
12 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287). The 1977 Protocol additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty Series 3, article 1(4), includes within the 
parameters of an international armed conflict, ‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self determination’. 
35 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 83. 
36 ‘There are no recent conflicts in which AP I has been applied to the benefit of child soldiers 
generally, because one or both of the parties to the conflict has not ratified it or made the 
necessary declaration’. Such was the case in the war between Iran and Iraq, and that 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Guy Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn (1994) Child Soldiers: The 
Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute Geneva 
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conflicts, including international armed conflicts (as Iraq37 and Afghanistan 
can attest), suggest that the issue of child soldiers is likely to become more 
prevalent.  
 I will begin by setting out the existing international legal framework 
(found in IHL, international and regional human rights law, international 
criminal law and customary international law) - which dictates when 
‘children’38 may lawfully be recruited by non-State-armed groups. I will then 
turn to explore the IHL framework for assigning combatant status to under-
aged child soldiers recruited by non-State-armed groups. In exploring this 
topic, I will discuss when the activities of children may compromise their 
otherwise protected civilian status, and expose them as legitimate military 
targets. I will explore the question of how one assigns combatant and 
prisoner of war status when these under-aged child soldiers are recruited into 
non-State groups (considering their age, and the possibility that their 
recruitment may be involuntary). Lastly, I end off by discussing the possibility 
of prosecuting under aged-child soldiers where they are suspected of 
committing war crimes during international armed conflicts. 
 
 
5.2 The international law response to the issue of recruiting under-aged 
child soldiers: IHL, international and regional human rights law, 
international criminal law, and evolving customary international law 
 
i. International humanitarian law 
 
In almost every traditional culture there is reference to the belief that children 
should be excluded from warfare39. While historically there were compelling 
and pragmatic reasons for excluding children from the theatre of warfare, 
based largely around the belief that ‘adult strength and training were needed 
to use pre-modern weapons’40, this is no longer the case in modern armed 
conflicts41. 
While the very early IHL treaties42 expressed the view that ‘children 
should be especially protected against warfare’43, one had to read into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Clarendon Press: Oxford at 63 and 66). Iraqi soldiers have confirmed that ‘the Iranian child 
soldiers against whom they fought were the most difficult because “they had not fear”, and an 
army without fear is the most dangerous army in the world’ (Geraldine Van Beuren ‘The 
International Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts’ (1994) 43 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 809 at 813). 
37 U.S. Special Forces also faced Somali child soldiers in 1993 in Mogadishu, as did NATO 
forces in Kosovo in 1999 (Singer Children at War at 163). 
38 The use of the term ‘child soldier’ in this work is defined according to the Cape Town 
Principles (see footnote 17). 
39 Singer Children at War at 9. 
40 Idem at 10. 
41 Idem at 14. 
42 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (ICRC) available at http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm; Maria Dutli ‘Captured Child Combatants’ (1990) 278 
International Review of the Red Cross 421 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmea.htm (accessed 15 December 
2011). 
43 Denise Plattner ‘Protection of Children in International Humanitarian Law’ 
(1984) 240 International Review of the Red Cross 140 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmat.htm (accessed 15 December 
2011). 
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1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War’s (GC IV)44 prohibition against ‘compulsory labor for those under 
eighteen’ for any prohibition against ‘compulsory enlistment of child 
soldiers’45. Only in 1977, the additional protocols (AP I46 and AP II47) to the 
four Geneva Conventions (GC), stated for the first time in an international 
treaty, that the recruitment of child soldiers under fifteen years of age was 
contrary to IHL48. Even today one will not find any IHL provision stating 
outright that ‘a child may never become a combatant’49. 
In so far as international armed conflicts are concerned, API now 
dictates that ‘States should take all feasible measures50 to ensure that 
children under fifteen years of age should not take a direct part in 
hostilities’51. In line with this directive, AP I prohibits ‘all States party to the 
protocol from conscripting children under the age of fifteen into the armed 
forces’52. The ICRC’s commentary on the drafting of the two AP’s, reveals 
that arriving at agreement on the fifteen-year age limit was not without 
lengthy debate53. The initial proposal had been for an eighteen-year age limit, 
but that proposal was rejected because a number of influential States still had 
domestic legislation in place that permitted the ‘recruitment of children under 
eighteen years of age, into their armed forces’54 (a reality that continues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC 
IV) of August 12 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287. 
45 CG IV article 51; Claire Breen ‘“When Is a Child Not a Child?” Child Soldiers in 
International Law’ (2007) January-March Human Rights Review at 77. 
46 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty 
Series 1391. At present there are 171 States party to AP I. 
47 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (AP II) (1979) 1125 U.N. 
Treaty Series 609. At present there are 166 States party to AP I. 
48 ICRC Children Protected Under IHL (29 October 2010) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/children/overview-protected-
children.htm (accessed 7 August 2011). Whilst GC III makes reference to women POW’s, ‘no 
mention at all is made of child POWs’ (Françoise J Hampson ‘Legal Protection Afforded to 
Children Under International Humanitarian Law’ (1996) Report for the Study on the Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children by University of Essex) available at 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000578.html (accessed 1 February 2012)). 
49 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute at 61. While GC IV makes no mention of ‘child soldiers’ per se, it 
does ‘afford lesser protection to children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen’ (Rosen 
‘Who is a child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers’ at 88). 
50 At the ICRC’s diplomatic conference tasked with drafting AP I, the initial proposal was for 
States party to take ‘all necessary measures’ - a more mandatory demand which failed to 
achieve State support (Breen ‘“When Is a Child Not a Child?” Child Soldiers in International 
Law’ at 77). 
51 According to the ICRC’s Commentary on AP I, the prohibition found in article 77(1-3) also 
precludes children under fifteen years of age from voluntarily signing up to gather 
information, transmit orders, deliver ammunition and food, or participate in acts of sabotage 
(Breen ‘“When Is a Child Not a Child?” Child Soldiers in International Law’ at 78). 
52 As Udombana points out - ‘voluntary enrolment was not explicitly mentioned... an omission 
that probably was deliberate’. If one scrutinises the writings of the Rapporteur for the Working 
Group of Committee III, we find that this was as a result of the belief that ‘it would not be 
realistic to completely prohibit voluntary participation of children under fifteen, especially in 
occupied territories and in wars of national liberation’ (Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! 
International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 76).  
53 Breen ‘“When Is a Child Not a Child?” Child Soldiers in International Law’at 78. 
54 Ibid. Having said that, the ‘majority of States fix eighteen as the age for compulsory military 
service, and that many States which permit voluntary enlistment at a lower age, nevertheless 
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today). Consequently, the fifteen year minimum was proposed as a 
compromise55, with a clause tacked on to article 77(2) which stipulates that in 
the case of recruitment, States party to the protocol should give preference to 
the oldest when they recruit children between fifteen and eighteen years of 
age56. Initially the ICRC had also proposed that AP I be worded to restrict 
even ‘indirect participation in hostilities, such as the transmission of 
information, transport of arms and provision of supplies’57. However, this 
proposal was rejected given the perception that such a requirement would be 
unrealistic in the existing climate which characterised the wars of national 
liberation58.  
 It is interesting to note that when the wording of AP II was debated, in 
respect of non-international armed conflicts, States opted for a much more 
rigorous clause in article 4(3)(c) which reads: ‘children ... shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups, nor allowed to take part in hostilities 
… regardless of whether the participation is of a direct or indirect nature’59. 
The resultant effect was to impose an absolute ban on the involvement of any 
children, under fifteen years of age, in situations of internal conflicts. The 
intended effect of this clause was to deny rebel groups the perceived 
advantage that they had by being able to recruit child soldiers60. In line with 
this thinking, ‘the U.N. Secretary-General demanded that non-State actors 
involved in conflict not use children below the age of eighteen in hostilities’, 
and he backed this demand with the promise of ‘targeted sanctions if they did 
not comply’61. 
 This legal distinction (between the children recruited into non-State-
armed groups and those recruited into the State’s armed forces) is 
problematic for child soldiers recruited into non-State-armed groups fighting 
in armed conflicts of an international character. While AP II contains an 
outright ban on non-State-armed groups recruiting children less than fifteen 
years of age, this treaty is not applicable in conflicts of an international 
character. Having said that, AP I does permit non-State actors, ‘involved in 
“internationalised” conflict within the terms of article 1(4)’, the right to 
unilaterally ‘declare their adherence to GC’s and API’, which Goodwin-Gill 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
limit the assignment of such recruits to inactive duty’ (Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: Child 
Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant 
Institute at 62). 
55 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 76.  
56 Breen ‘“When Is a Child Not a Child?” Child Soldiers in International Law’ at 78. The ICRC 
has continued to seek to raise the minimum age from fifteen to eighteen years, for children to 
participate directly in hostilities. In 1991, the ICRC requested that the Henry Dunant Institute 
‘undertake a study ... on the recruitment and participation of children as soldiers in armed 
conflicts, and on measures to reduce and eventually eliminate such recruitment and 
participation.’ The result of the study was the book Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in 
Armed Conflict by Ilene Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! 
International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 91 and 
92). 
57 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute at 61. 
58 Idem at 62. 
59 According to Goodwin-Gill ‘voluntary or indirect participation of those under fifteen is 
equally ruled out’ (Idem at 64). 
60 Rosen ‘Who is a child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers’ at 92; Ipsen (1995) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 217. 
61 Liesbeth Zegveld (2002) The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International 
Law Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 63. 
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and Cohn argue makes many of AP I’s provisions (including article 77 on 
recruitment) binding on ‘all parties to the conflict, as opposed only to 
States’62. 
 
ii. International and regional human rights law 
 
As early as 1924, the international community - through the League of 
Nations - stressed ‘the need for special care and protection’ for children, 
when they endorsed the first Declaration on the Rights of the Child63. This 
was followed in 1948 by the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights64, 
the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 195965, and then the U.N. 
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergencies and 
Armed conflict in 197466. However it was not until 1989, when the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)67 became one of the most 
widely ratified international human rights treaties, that the rights of children 
were really given effect. A year later, in 1990, the World Summit for Children 
adopted the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development 
of Children, which added impetus to the speed with which the UNCRC 
received the necessary ratifications for it to enter into force. The speed with 
which the UNCRC attained the required ratifications, prompted international 
lawyers to suggest that ‘the UNCRC became international customary law 
almost at the time of [its] entry into force’68 - a remarkable first for 
international law. The UNCRC achieved other notable firsts in the field of 
human rights law: ‘unlike many other human rights treaties, the UNCRC has 
no general derogation clause allowing States to suspend certain rights in 
times of emergency’69. Moreover, the treaty applies to all children under the 
jurisdiction of a signatory State, and is not restricted to those children who are 
nationals of the signatory State. 
 The UNCRC defines ‘a child’ as ‘every human being below the age of 
eighteen years’70, and extends special protections to ‘children’ in a myriad of 
circumstances. However, if we examine article 38, the sole provision dealing 
with the effects of conflict on children, there is a notable departure from the 
eighteen-year age limit that applies to all the other provisions in the UNCRC. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute at 123. 
63 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (adopted by the League of Nations on 
26 September 1924) available at http://www.un-documents.net/gdrc1924.htm (accessed 15 
December 2011). The Declaration had been proposed the year before, by an NGO called 
Save the Children International Union (Ayissi ‘Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: From 
Commitment to Compliance’ at 6; Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed 
Conflict - A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute at 55).  
64 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) (adopted 10 December 1948) available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed 21 February 2012). 
65 General Assembly Resolution 1386(XIV) (adopted 20 November 1959) available at 
http://www.unicef.org/lac/spbarbados/Legal/global/General/declaration_child1959.pdf 
(accessed 21 February 2012). 
66 General Assembly Resolution 3318 (XXIX) (adopted 14 December 1974) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/protectionwomen.htm (accessed 15 December 2011). 
67 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (1989) 1577 U.N. Treaty Series 
at 3. At present there are 193 States that are party to the UNCRC. 
68 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 58.  
69 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute 124. 
70 ‘Unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’ (article 1). 
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Sadly, article 38 failed the world’s children in perhaps their most notable time 
of need. As the Swiss delegation pointed out to the Working Group on the 
UNCRC Protocol, ‘there is no reason for lowering the limit … precisely in a 
sphere in which the rights of the child are exposed to grave danger’71. 
Despite thirteen years of child rights’ activism since the Additional Protocols 
were adopted, the UNCRC could not garner support for a straight-eighteen 
ban on the recruitment of child soldiers, and instead settled for restating the 
legal position, as it had been reflected in the AP I in 1977. Child rights’ 
activists argued that the failure to adopt the eighteen years age limit, together 
with a total ban on any level of participation in hostilities by a child, seemed to 
undermine the ground that had been gained in the progressive wording of AP 
II (which ‘provides a more absolute and comprehensive prohibition for non-
international armed conflicts’)72. 
 Two years after the UNCRC entered into force, the UNCRC 
Committee began discussions on the topic of ‘children in armed conflict’, with 
a view to ameliorating the unsatisfactory protection provided by the ‘pre-
existing fifteen-years-of-age standard for recruitment’73. These discussions 
led to the appointment in 1994 of Ms Graça Machel, who was tasked with 
conducting a study into the impact of armed conflict on children. The Machel 
report74 endorsed the position that ‘war violated every right of a child’75, and 
not surprisingly ‘recommended eighteen years as the minimum age for 
recruitment into armed forces or groups, and for participation in hostilities’76. 
 Drawing on the findings of the Machel report, the UNCRC Committee 
drafted the Optional Protocol to the UNCRC on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (OP-AC)77, and opened it for ratification in 2000. The main 
thrust of the Protocol was to increase ‘the minimum age for compulsory 
recruitment and participation in hostilities of children, from fifteen to eighteen 
years of age, and to explicitly include non-State actors under its coverage’78. 
Although the negotiations on the OP-AC failed to establish a ‘straight-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 97. 
72 Daniel Helle ‘Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2000) 839 International Review of the Red Cross at 3. 
73 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 92. 
74 UNICEF Impact of Armed Conflict in Children (‘the Machel Report’) (1996) available at 
http://www.unicef.org/graca/ (accessed 1 December 2011).  
75 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 92. Another recommendation flowing from the Machel 
Report was that a ‘representative of the Secretary-General’ should be appointed to Report on 
the implementation of the Report. A Ugandan, Olara Otunnu, was the first appointment to this 
position (Ayissi ‘Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: From Commitment to Compliance’ at 
7). 
76 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 93. 
77 2000 Optional Protocol to the UNCRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
(2000) 2173 U.N. Treaty Series 222 (Doc.A/RES/54/263). OP-AC currently has 142 States 
party to it (including many African States where child soldier recruitment is rife), and it 
entered into force on 12 February 2002. It is interesting to note that in 2002 the U.S. was 
pressurised to ratify its signature two years prior to the OP-AC, despite the fact that they had 
not yet ratified their signature of the UNCRC, or either of the two 1977 AP’s (Matthew 
Happold ‘Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?’ (2008) 29 University of La Verne Law 
Review 56). Interestingly, Afghanistan acceded to the Optional Protocol on September 24, 
2003.  
78 Singer Children at War at 143. 
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eighteen’ ban across the board, it did impose considerably more stringent 
demands in cases of recruitment by non-State-armed groups. Echoing the 
sentiments of AP II, OP-AC imposed the straight-eighteen ban even in cases 
of voluntary recruitment79, and dictated that States party to the Protocol were 
to criminalise the recruitment of children less then eighteen years of age by 
non-State-armed groups, by way of the States’ domestic legislation80. Sadly, 
the same was not demanded of States with regard to recruitment into the 
States’ armed forces. Under OP-AC, States are obliged to refrain from 
compulsory recruitment (or conscription) of under-eighteens into their armed 
forces81, and to undertake to ‘raise the minimum age for voluntary recruitment 
into their armed forces from fifteen to eighteen’82. However, as the treaty 
stands at the moment, States party to OP-AC are legally still permitted to 
recruit those between sixteen and eighteen years of age, provided the 
safeguarding requirements set out in OP-AC are met. OP-AC exhorts States 
to take ‘all feasible measures to ensure that under-eighteens who volunteer in 
the States’ armed forces do not take a direct part in hostilities’83. However, 
OP-AC opted not to adopt the language found in AP II article 4(3)(c), ‘which 
prohibits any participation in hostilities’84(even indirect participation).  
 While the UNCRC had been paralysed by the resistance of some 
States to the adoption of a straight-eighteen ban, the African Union (AU) took 
the lead when in 1999 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACRWC)85 came into force - ten years after it was opened for 
ratification. The ACRWC is notable for being the first international law treaty 
that imposes a more stringent straight-eighteen ban on child recruitment and 
direct participation in hostilities, across the board86. Unfortunately, though, it 
is only binding on the thirty-seven AU member States who have ratified the 
ACRWC, which means that before the straight-eighteen ban can be applied 
to non-State-armed groups, these signatory States will have to pass domestic 
legislation to that effect.  
 This gradual move towards an eighteen-year minimum for the voluntary 
recruitment of individuals into the armed forces, is in line with the legal age of 
majority adopted by most States, where eighteen is considered the legal age 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Article 4(1). 
80 Article 4(2); Coleman ‘Showing its Teeth: The International Criminal Court Takes On Child 
Conscription in the Congo, But is its Bark Worse Than its Bite?’ at 775. 
81 Article 2. 
82 Article 3(1). Of the 142 States party to the OP-AC, two thirds of States party ‘have 
committed themselves to setting a minimum voluntary recruitment age at eighteen or higher’. 
OP-AC demands that States obtain informed consent from legal guardians, fully reveal the 
duties involved in military service, and only permit voluntary sign-up once proof of age is 
provided (article 3(3). Despite these safeguards, the ‘risk of inadvertent under-age 
recruitment of children, because of low birth registration rates’, is a very real problem, 
particularly in warn-torn African States (Coalition Against Child Soldiers ‘Facts and Figures 
on Child Soldiers’ (2009) available at http://www.childsoldiersglobalReport.org/content/facts-
and-figures-child-soldiers (accessed 12 August 2011) at 22). 
83 Article 1. 
84 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 94. 
85 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted by the O.A.U. on the 
11 July 1990) CAB/LEG/24.9/49 available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38c18.html (accessed 12 August 2011). The 
ACRWC currently has thirty-seven African States party (see 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/96Welfare_of_the_Child.pdf (accessed 12 August 
2011)). 
86 Article 22(2). 
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for voting and full legal responsibility87. ‘Of the 185 States surveyed, only 
seven are quoted as having a lower age for compulsory recruitment, and only 
six had a lower voting age’88. In fact many States expressed dissatisfaction 
with the low fifteen-year minimum set out in the UNCRC and OP-AC for 
voluntary recruitment89. There is indeed something ‘logically untenable and 
peculiarly intolerable that the age of recruitment into the army should be less 
than the age of criminal responsibility or the voting age’90. It is not clear why 
we would hold to the view that an unassisted sixteen-year-old child cannot 
conclude a legal contract (for lack of legal capacity), yet afford them the 
capacity to volunteer themselves for use in situations of armed conflict.  
 
iii. International criminal law 
 
Against this international treaty law background, it was appropriate that when 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established, pursuant to the Rome 
Statue in 200291, that ‘conscripting or enlisting92 children under fifteen years 
into any armed forces, or using them to participate actively in hostilities (in 
both international and internal conflicts) was listed as a prosecutable war 
crime93’. With the domestic legislation of many nation States still permitting 
the armed forces to recruit children over fifteen years of age94, it is 
understandable why the drafters of the Rome Statute could not garner 
support for a straight-eighteen ban. However, as the travaux préparatoires of 
the Rome Statute reveal, this compromise was ameliorated by a very ‘broad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Some States go so far as to set the age of majority between 19 and 21 years, and only 4 
States (Brasil, Cuba, Iran and Nicaragua) have dropped the legal age of majority to 16 years 
(Udombana ‘War is not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 97 and 98). 
88 Brett and McCallin Children the Invisible Soldiers at 168. 
89 Austria, Germany, Colombia, Spain, Uruguay and Germany stated that they felt that the 
‘age-limit of fifteen years was incompatible with the best interests of the child’. Moreover, in 
1999 (at the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent) ‘Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Guinea, Iceland, Mexico, Mozambique, Norway, South Africa, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay pledged support to raise the age-limit for participation in 
hostilities to eighteen years’ (Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (2005) 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge at 96). 
90 Udombana ‘War is not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 97 and 98. 
91 U.N. doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993) 36. At present there are 139 States signatory, and 119 
States who have ratified the Rome Statute.  
92 The words ‘conscripting or enlisting’ were substituted for the initial proposal, which read 
merely ‘recruiting’, so that it would be possible to prosecute someone who did ‘not provide for 
safeguards and inquire the age of the child, even though the child’s age appears close to the 
protected minimum age’. Consequently, under this new wording ‘evidence of the accused’s 
willful blindness of the child’s age should be sufficient to establish liability under the ICC 
Statute’ (Udombana ‘War is not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of 
Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 86). 
93 Articles 8.b.xxvi and 8.e.vii. Out of the proposed options put to the participants at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference, which drafted the Rome Statute, this variation was adopted to 
‘appease the United States, which had argued that the criminalisation of children’s 
involvement in armed conflicts did not reflect customary international law, and that it was a 
human rights, rather than a criminal law, provision’ (Udombana ‘War is not Child’s Play! 
International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 86). 
94 The United Kingdom, Australia, India and Canada all permit sixteen year-old children to 
voluntarily join the military, with China accepting applicants from fifteen years of age 
(UNICEF ‘Database On Age of Child’ (2011) (on file with author)).  
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interpretation’ of what acts would amount to ‘direct participation of children in 
hostilities’95. Using children in ‘active participation in military activities linked 
to combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage, and the use of children as 
decoys, couriers, or at military checkpoints’, all satisfy the definitional 
requirements for the crime. Similarly, ‘the use of children in direct support 
functions such as carrying supplies to the front line or activities at the front 
line itself’96, all satisfy the definitional criteria for direct participation in 
hostilities. The ICC has already issued arrest warrants against five senior 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) members, and ‘three members97 of Ituri-based 
armed groups in the DRC’, on charges relating to the recruitment of child 
soldiers98. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, was the first accused to face prosecution 
at the hands of the ICC for recruiting as many as 30 000 boys and girls under 
the age of fifteen, to fight with his militia99. Lubanga even went so far as 
establishing ‘a special “Kadogo Unit”… which was comprised principally of 
children under the age of fifteen’100. Lubanga’s defence was that these child 
soldiers ‘volunteered to join the UPC’101, although the testimonies of many of 
the child soldiers spoke of large-scale forcible abductions102. On the 14th 
March 2012, the court found Lubanga Dyilo guilty of enlisting, conscripting 
and using ‘children under the age of fifteen … to participate actively in 
hostilities between 1 September 2002 and 13 August 2003’103... ‘as soldiers 
and as bodyguards for senior officials including the accused’104. His sentence 
is still to be determined, but he could face a life prison term105. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 UNICEF Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict at 
14. 
96 ‘It would not cover activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities, such as food deliveries to an 
airbase, or the use of domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation’ (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 487; Coalition Against Child 
Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 375).  
97 Germain Katanga was transferred to the ICC in October 2007.  
98 Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 110. However, it must be 
noted that the Trial Chamber did in its judgment find that the ‘armed conflict between the 
UPC/FPLC and other armed groups between September 2002 and 13 August 2003, was 
non-international in nature’ (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC Public judgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the statute (14 March 2012) No. ICC-01/04-01/06 2/593 at 567). 
99 Evidence presented before the court reveals that some of Lubanga’s child soldiers were as 
young as nine (Child Soldier Relief ‘Lubanga Trial: Week 13 and 14 in Review’ (2009) 
available at http://childsoldierrelief.org/2009/05/10/lubanga-trial-week-13-in-review and 
http://childsoldierrelief.org/2009/05/18/lubanga-trial-week-14-in-review/ (accessed 12 August 
2011)).  
100 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubango Dyilo ICC Summary of the judgment pursuant to article 74 
of the statute (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06-2843 1/17 SL T at para 31. 
101 Wairagala Wakabi ‘Lubanga Trial Highlights Plight of Child Soldiers’ Commentary trial 
reports (October 2010) available at http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/10/05/lubanga-trial-
highlights-plight-of-child-soldiers (accessed 14 August 2011). 
102 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC Decisions on the confirmation of charges 
(29 January 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06 at para 251. The decision of the court turns on their 
response to allegations made by the defence team that child witnesses were coached, or 
paid incentives by the office of the prosecution, to give false evidence against Lubanga 
(Wairagala Wakabi ‘Lubanga Witness Claims his Son Lied to the ICC’  
(1 February 2010) available at http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/02/01/lubanga-witness-
claimshis-son-lied-to-the-icc/ (accessed 26 April 2010).  
103 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubango Dyilo ICC Summary of the judgment pursuant to article 74 
of the Statute’ at para 35. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Kate Davey and Sarah Pierce (Coalition Against the Use of Child Soldiers) ‘Too Young to 
Fight: A Review of the Laws that Protect Child Soldiers and Children in Armed Conflict’ 
available at http://childsoldierrelief.org/child-soldiers-csr-reports-on-a-global-crisis (accessed 
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 While the ICC ‘now stands as the primary international legal forum’ for 
the prosecution of those recruiting child soldiers, it will not be the first 
international tribunal to hand down a conviction under international law for 
recruiting child soldiers. Here the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)106, 
established in 2002, has already achieved a world first. In 2007 the SCSL 
handed down a forty-five year prison term and two fifty year terms, to ‘three 
members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council107, and one member of 
the government-backed Civilian Defence Forces’, on a variety of charges, 
including the recruiting and use of child soldiers under the age of fifteen 
years108. In another world first, the decision of the SCSL to prosecute Charles 
Taylor marks ‘the first time a former head of State has been brought to trial 
for the crime of recruiting children’109. On the 26th April 2012, the SCSL’s 
Trial Chamber II handed down a guilty verdict on several counts, including 
the aiding and abetting in ‘conscripting or enlisting of children under the age 
of fifteen years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities, another serious violation of IHL pursuant to article 4(c) 
of the Statute’110.  
 While international criminal law is casting an ever-tightening noose 
around all those who recruit child soldiers, sadly international criminal law has 
been unable to set the minimum age for prosecuting such recruitment higher 
then the pre-existing fifteen-year minimum found in IHL and international 
human rights treaty law. 
 
iv. Evolving customary international law 
 
The measures aimed at protecting children in situations of armed conflict, in 
IHL, international human rights laws, and international criminal law, have also 
been endorsed in soft law111, international refugee law112, and international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 August 2011). 
106 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-sl.org (accessed 
19 December 2011) at article 4. 
107 The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, 
SCSL Trial Chamber II sentencing judgment (19 July 2007) available at http://www.sc-
sl.orgldocuments/SCSL-04-16-T-624.pdf (accessed 22 October 2012) at 36. 
108 U.N. A World Fit for Children at 7; Steven Freeland ‘Mere Children or Weapons of War - 
Child Soldiers and International Law’ (2008) 29 University of La Verne Law Review 19. Under 
article 4 of the statute of the SCSL ‘the abduction and forced recruitment of children under 
the age of fifteen years into the armed forces’ is a serious violation of IHL, punishable before 
the court. There was doubt expressed whether this customary law prohibition was 
‘recognised as a war crime entailing individual criminal responsibility’, as is the case under 
the statute of the ICC (Zegveld The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in 
International Law at 103). 
109 Coalition against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 32. Prosecutor of the 
Special Court v Charles Ghankay Taylor Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T. For reasons of security, 
Charles Taylor is facing prosecution at the ICC, but the trial is being conducted under the 
SCSL’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
110 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL Trial Chamber II summary judgment (26 April 
2011) SCSL-03-1-T at page 44 and paras 37-45.  
111 The international concern around the plight of children in conflict situations led to the 
drafting of the non-binding 2007 Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful 
Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups, available at 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/pariscommitments/ParisCommitments_EN.pd
f (accessed 12 August 2011), and the 2007 Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children 
Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, available at 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf 
(accessed 12 August 2011). Both documents exhort States to adopt a ‘straight-eighteen’ ban 
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labour law113. It is apparent that the prohibition against the recruitment of 
children less than fifteen years of age reflects a recognised principle of 
customary international law, applicable to any recruiters (be they State or 
non-State actors), in instances of both conscription and voluntary recruitment. 
However, while the aspiration towards raising the age for recruitment from 
fifteen to eighteen years of age expressed in the ACRWC and OP-AC are 
laudable, both these treaties suffer from the same fundamental flaw: non-
State-armed groups cannot legally ratify these treaties. International treaty 
law, ‘is a body of rules operates primarily between States ... and has only 
indirect effect on non-State actors’114. Without their ratification, these human 
rights law-based obligations do not bind non-government agencies without 
further domestic legislation on the part of States where these non-State-
armed groups are operating115. Consequently, the effectiveness of any 
attempt to increase the age for recruitment from fifteen to eighteen years of 
age is heavily reliant on a State’s ability to legislate and enforce a more 
stringent legal framework.  
 Fortunately, once an IHL principle can be said to have achieved 
customary international law status, those customary provisions can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on recruitment into the armed force, as well as initiatives aimed at demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration of child soldiers. Since 1994, thirty-four formal demobilisation 
processes have been carried out, twenty-two of them in Africa. They cost an average of 
US$1 565 per child (Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 151). 
112 The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee’s Policy on Refugee Children and the 
Guidelines on Refugee Children (Geneva, August 1988) define recruitment of children from 
refugee camps as ‘not only forced recruitment but also voluntary participation in armed 
attacks. Equally, support functions, such as carrying arms and ammunition and acting as 
scouts for military patrols is as unacceptable as more direct functions, such as active combat 
duty’ (at para 26(e)). This policy was updated in 1993 with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugee’s Policy on Refugee Children (6 August 1993) EC/SCP/82 available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f9e6a534.html (accessed 18 December 2011). 
113 The cause has also been championed by the International Labour Organisation, which 
adopted Convention 182 in 1999. Convention 182 concludes that ‘forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children (under eighteen years of age) for use in armed conflict is among the 
worst forms of child labour, and calls for programs of action to eliminate child soldiering’ 
(1999 ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C182 (accessed 12 August 2011) at article 3(a)). Also the 1973 ILO 
Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age ‘establishes eighteen years as the minimum age for 
admission to employment or work which by its nature ... is likely to jeopardise the health, 
safety or morals of young persons’ (Brett and McCallin Children the Invisible Soldiers at 167). 
114 Barbara Fontana ‘Child Soldiers and International Law’ (1997) 6:3 African Security 
Review, available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/6no3/fontana.html (accessed 26 
December 2011). When a State ratifies a treaty, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1980) 115 U.N. Treaty Series at 331 (which entered into force on 27 January 1980), 
and the principle of pacta sunt servanda demand that States act in good faith and ensure that 
they promulgate the necessary domestic legislation, in accordance with their treaty 
obligations, so that the treaty can be incorporated into their domestic law. This is the 
‘traditional approach to the implementation of international human rights instruments in many 
States’, and is necessary in all instances where the ‘treaties are not self-executing’ 
(Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 98; Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in 
Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute at 56).  
115 According to Goodwin-Gill, non-State entities may become bound by the provisions in for 
example AP I ‘if it is recognised as enjoying a sufficient measure of “personality” and had 
made a valid unilateral declaration of intent to respect the rules of IHL’. Beside two Sudanese 
groups, most of these non-State-armed groups have not attempted to make any declaration 
of acceptance of the UNCRC (Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed 
Conflict - A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute at 65). 
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enforced against ‘all parties to a conflict, including non-State actors’116. As the 
Marten’s clause states in AP I: 
 
‘in cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatant remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience’117. 
 
In 2005 the ICRC published a study on the IHL principles which could be said 
to have achieved customary international law status. The study confirmed 
that the principle that children ‘must not be recruited into armed forces or 
armed groups’118, and must not be allowed to participate in hostilities119 had 
crystalised into a norm of customary international law. Notably, both the ICC 
and the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL have stated that ‘the recruitment and 
use of children under fifteen years in armed conflict is also a war crime under 
customary international law, at least since 1996. Consequently the prohibition 
is universally binding upon all nations and persons’120. However, the same 
cannot be said of aspirations to raise the recruitment age from fifteen to 
eighteen years of age at present. In essence this means that non-State-
armed groups will not be legally liable for recruiting children over fifteen years 
of age, unless the jurisdictional State has the requisite legislation in place121 
to prosecute the recruitment of children under eighteen years of age, and 
possesses the judicial clout to enforce their international treaty obligations. 
Since non-State-armed groups are the main culprits when it comes to 
recruiting child soldiers, it is worrying that only twenty States have domestic 
legislation in place to criminalise the recruitment of child soldiers122. Since 
there is this disconnection between what States sign up to, and what they 
actually enforce or criminalise, the plight of child soldiers is heavily dependent 
on the application of customary international law. As already noted, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 ‘A treaty rule may bind non-parties if it becomes a part of international custom’). 
Unfortunately, at present the OP-AC has not attained customary law status, although it might 
attain such status in the future (Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and 
the Prohibition of Children’s Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 103-4).  
117 AP I article 1(2); Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A 
Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute at 56.  
118 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 136. 
119 Idem at rule 137. 
120 Prosecutor v Norman SCSL Decision on preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction 
(child recruitment) (31 May 2004) SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) at paras 44-45; U.N. A World Fit 
for Children at 7; David Rosen ‘Social Change and the Legal Construction of Child Soldier 
Recruitment in the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2010) December 1:2 The Institute for the 
African Child (Ohio University ‘Childhood in Africa’) at 50. 
121 Unless the State adopts the monist approach to international law, in which further 
domestic law is not required for international treaty obligations to be applicable to individuals 
in the State’s jurisdiction. 
122 Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Canada; Colombia; Congo; Georgia; 
Germany; Ireland; Jordan; Malawi; Malaysia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Philippines; Spain; Ukraine and United Kingdom. See also the draft legislation of Argentina; 
Burundi and Trinidad and Tobago (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at 484). Notably absent are the African States, which the persistent 
violators make their hunting ground for prospective child soldiers (Rosen ‘Who is a child? 
The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers’ at 98). 
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customary obligation binds non-State actors even without domestic 
legislation, ‘in both international and non-international armed conflicts’123. 
 While this is a significant achievement in the project of protecting the 
rights of children in situations of armed conflict, it is still worrying that children 
as young as eight are still found to be participating in hostilities. 
Unfortunately, the reality of armed conflict, lawlessness and potentially failed 
States all work together to undermine the effectiveness of any obligations to 
prevent children under fifteen years of age from participating directly in 
hostilities. Not surprisingly, with the exception of two cases in the DRC, 
almost no one has been ‘prosecuted by national courts for recruiting and 
using children’124. This speaks to the gap which exists between a customary 
IHL obligation to prevent use of child soldiers, and the judicial and political will 
necessary to act on those undertakings. 
 When all is said and done, the reality remains that non-State-armed 
groups will continue to recruit children to fight in armed conflicts, and these 
child soldiers are going to pose difficult questions for those opposing these 
non-State groups. One of the fundamental problems for those engaged in 
international armed conflict against child soldiers who are fighting on behalf of 
non-State-armed groups, is assessing their combatant status and the 
resultant implications which that determination of status has for targeting 
decisions, POW privileges and the possible prosecution of these child 
soldiers once they are detained or rendered hors de combat. 
 
5.3 The combatant status of under-aged child soldiers recruited into 
non-State-armed groups in international armed conflicts 
 
i. An introduction to combatant status under IHL 
 
At the heart of IHL, is the notion that every individual in the theatre of 
international armed conflict must be categorised as either a combatant or a 
civilian, and serious legal consequences flow from this determination125. ‘As a 
matter of customary international law (applicable to all parties to an 
international armed conflict)’126 combatant status is extended to all members 
of the armed forces127 (irrespective of whether they are members of a regular 
or irregular armed force) who: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 The ICC, in the Lubanga trial, has stated that this customary international law prohibition 
against the recruitment of child soldiers applied ‘equally to international and non-international 
conflicts, and to State and non-State armed groups’ (Wakabi ‘Lubanga Trial Highlights Plight 
of Child Soldiers’). 
124 Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 32. 
125 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65. 
126 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 3 and 
rule 4. 
127 As per the functional based definition set out in API article 43(1) which replaced the 
membership based regime which existed under GCIII (Daphne Richemond-Barak (2011) 
‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity’ in William C Banks 
(ed) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (Columbia Studies 
in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) at 2502-9; 2509-17 and 2495-2502). No longer do 
irregulars have to prove that they wore a uniform; carried their arms openly; or that they 
enjoyed political recognition (Nils Melzer (2009) Targeted Killing in International Law Oxford 
University Press: Oxford at 307; Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: 
An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 87; Goldman and Tittemore 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
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a) ‘fight in an international armed conflict; 
b) on behalf of a party to a conflict’128; 
c) who subordinate themselves to its command129 and  
d) behave in accordance with the laws of war130 
 
While the new customary law understanding of one’s primary combatant 
status does away with the visibility requirement (previously contained in GCIII 
article 4A(2))131, combatants are nevertheless still obliged to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population, or risk the forfeiture of their 
secondary POW status upon capture132. Those who enjoy combatant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 17-18; Mirko Sossai ‘Status of Private 
Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of International Armed Conflict’ in 
Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzotti (eds) War By Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law and Private contractors (2011) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 199 – 
200). 
128 The relationship of belonging may ‘be officially declared, but may also be expressed 
through tacit agreement or conclusive behaviour that makes clear for which party the group is 
fighting’ (Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 18). 
129 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 4. 
130 What is key is that the irregulars must ‘conduct hostilities on behalf and with the 
agreement of that party’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under IHL (May 2009) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609 
(accessed 7 August 2011) (Interpretive Guide) at 23; Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged 
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 18). As Rogers points out ‘it is a matter of [a 
measure of] organisation and discipline, which goes to the root of the definition of armed 
forces’ (Anthony PV Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3 at 14-15; Fritz Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld Constraints 
on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (2010 4th ed) 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 87; Sossai ‘Status of Private Military and Security 
Company Personnel in the Law of International Armed Conflict’ at 200; Richemond-Barak 
‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity’ at 2502-9; 
Christopher Greenwood (1991) ‘Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols’ in 
Astrid JM Delissen and Gerard J Tanja (Eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: 
Challenges Ahead T.M.C Asser Instituut: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers at 107). Some 
academics maintain that a combatant cannot lose their primary combatant status even if their 
actions violated IHL (Garth Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary Safety”: The 
Guantanamo Bay Internees and Combatant Status’ (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 
829 at 844; George Aldrich ‘New Life for the Laws of War’ (1981) 75 American Journal of 
International Law at 773; Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 20), although they do concede that they will likely face court martial 
and punishment. While others like Rogers argue that consistent violation of IHL, that goes 
unpunished ‘is strong evidence that the group does not qualify as ‘armed forces’, since it fails 
to meet the criterion of an internal disciplinary system’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the 
Law of War’ at 16). 
131 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 15 and rule 
106. 
132 Idem at rule 106; Knut Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck 
(ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford 
at 93. ‘In the whole of API, article 48 (parties shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants) ‘may be its most cardinal provision’ (Kalshoven and Zegveld 
Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 86).  
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status133 are then authorised to participate directly in hostilities134. Until they 
surrender, are captured, or are rendered hors de combat135, this authorisation 
makes it permissible for the opposing force to treat combatants as legitimate 
military objectives, and target them for attack136. Once captured, their primary 
combatant status translates into secondary POW privilege137, and affords 
them immunity from prosecution for their participation in hostilities, provided 
they have observed the laws of war during hostilities138.  
Every person, who is not obviously a traditional combatant or a 
member of the levée en masse’, and who falls into enemy hands, is 
presumed to have protected civilian status, until their status can be accurately 
determined by a competent tribunal139. Amongst this ‘civilian’ category we 
find ordinary civilians and those non-combative ‘persons accompanying the 
armed forces’ (like civilian contractors)140. Civilian status comes with the 
benefit of immunity from attack, and the right to be shielded against the 
effects of the conflict. These perks are of course solely dependent on the 
civilian not compromising his protected status by playing any part in the 
hostilities. Civilians who do participate in hostilities, without the necessary 
authorisation, are sometimes referred to as ‘unlawful or unprivileged’ 
combatants141, but in fact there is no such legal category. The consequences 
for being found participating directly in hostilities without the requisite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 In this category we find not only the ‘traditional combatant’, but also the ‘levée en masse’, 
which is the term given to ‘the inhabitants of a country which ... spontaneously take up arms 
to resist the invading troops without having time to form themselves into an armed force. 
Such persons are considered combatants if they carry arms openly and respect the laws and 
customs of war’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
at 18). 
134 There is an exception to this general rule that combatants are authorised to participate in 
hostilities: ‘civilians accompanying the armed forces without actually being members thereof, 
and members of crews of the merchant navy and of civil aircraft, are not entitled to take a 
direct part in hostilities. In the event of such participation as unprivileged belligerents they 
must expect to be prosecuted in the same manner as all other civilians who are prohibited 
from taking a direct part in hostilities’. They are the only categories of civilians who upon 
capture acquire POW status (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 105 and 
107). 
135 Which means disabled or injured. 
136 Steven Oeter (1995) ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook 
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press: Oxford at 155. As Solis 
correctly points out ‘a combatant remains a combatant when he/she is not actually fighting’ 
and ‘a lawful combatant enjoys the combatant’s privilege, but also is a continuing lawful 
target’ (Gary Solis (2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 
Cambridge University Press: New York at 188). 
137 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the 
Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 (HR) article 3(2), GC III article 4A(1-3), AP I article 
44(1). 
138 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 93, Goldman and Tittemore 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 2. Members of the regular armed 
forces who fail to observe the laws of war do not on account of that fact lose their combatant 
status, or their ‘right to be treated as a POW’. It may, however, be grounds for a military court 
martial to prosecute and punish them for this omission (Claude Pilloud, Yves Sandoz and 
Bruno Zimmermann (1987) ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Geneva at 511, GC III 
articles 4, 5 and 85. 
139 AP I article 45(1). 
140 GC III article 4A(4), AP I article 50(1), Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 
65. 
141 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 68. 
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authorisation are dire. Not only does one temporarily lose the immunity from 
attack normally afforded to civilians, but unauthorised participants also 
become legitimate military targets for attack, for so long as they persist in 
their participation in hostilities142. Once captured, unauthorised participants 
are not treated as POWs (which is a privilege extended only to lawful 
combatants) - instead they may face criminal prosecution under the State’s 
domestic legislation, solely on the basis that they participated in the hostilities 
without the requisite authorisation143. 
 IHL has for some time already acknowledged the presence of children 
in the theatre of war. However, most of the provisions dealing with child 
soldiers have dealt exclusively with children who are ‘enrolled in the armed 
forces’ or who take ‘part in a mass uprising of the population (levée en 
masse)’144. And in these instances, it is argued that these child soldiers ‘do in 
fact have combatant status and are ipso facto entitled to prisoner-of-war 
status if captured’145. I turn now to explore the combatant status of the 
vulnerable under-aged child soldiers who are participating in international 
armed conflicts on behalf of non-State-armed groups, who may or may not 
fulfill the criteria of an ‘armed force’ as defined in AP I article 43(1).  
 
ii. Under-aged child soldiers ‘recruited’ into non-State-armed groups - 
‘civilians’ participating directly in hostilities 
 
IHL has always regarded ‘children’ as a subset of the group of those afforded 
civilian status in international armed conflicts, and protected against the 
effects of warfare by GC IV146 and AP I147. More especially, children have 
enjoyed preferential treatment in situations of armed conflict owing to their 
special developmental needs148. In the words of AP I: 
 
‘children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected 
against any form of indecent assault. The parties to the conflict shall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Grover ‘”Child Soldiers” as “Non-Combatants”: The Inapplicability of the Refugee 
Convention Exclusion Clause’ at 56. 
143 Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 2. 
144 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute at 63; Dutli ‘Captured Child Combatants’. 
145 Ibid. Since the injunction contained in AP I article 77(2) (against recruiting children under 
fifteen years of age) is aimed at the State and not the child, ‘children under fifteen years of 
age who, are recruited or are enrolled as volunteers in the armed forces, also have 
combatant status and will if captured have POW’ status since there is no minimum age 
requirement for POW status (Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 4). 
146 GC IV ‘contains numerous provisions benefiting or protecting children both as civilians 
and in their own right’ (Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - 
A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant Institute at 121). 
147 AP I articles 77 and 78. 
148 These include: ‘free passage of assistance intended for children under fifteen (GC IV 
article 23); requiring the occupying power to facilitate the good functioning of institutions for 
the care of children in occupied territory (GC IV article 50(1)); provision of food supplements 
to interned children (GC IV article 81(3)); moreover there are several provisions dealing with 
the protection of the family unit which afford special protections to children (AP I articles 
77(4) and 74), holding detained children in special facilities (AP I article 77(4)), and lastly the 
prohibition against imposing the death penalty for infringements committed by children (AP I 
article 77(5)).  
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provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of 
their age or for any other reason’149. 
 
Having said that, these special privileges extended to children are conditional 
upon their preserving their primarily civilian status. The full enjoyment of 
these privileges is necessarily restricted, the moment the child elects to 
compromise ‘their civilian status by participating directly in hostilities’150. The 
consequence of a decision to participate in hostilities can result in the loss of 
their ‘inviolability as non-combatants’, and can make them a legitimate 
military target151. Given the dire consequences which flow from this 
compromise of their civilian status, some have argued that children ‘must be 
considered as non-combatants in that they, unlike adult soldiers, have no 
unqualified right under international law to directly participate in armed 
conflict’152. Grover, for example, argues that when children153 (under eighteen 
years of age) participate directly in hostilities they must be treated as 
protected civilians and non-combatants, even where they are voluntarily 
recruited154. Grover bases her argument on several assertions: firstly, IHL 
‘deems their [children’s] participation in hostilities as abnormal’, and IHL 
prohibits their recruitment and participation in hostilities, which Grover argues 
necessarily denies them ‘an unqualified right to participate in hostilities’155. 
Secondly, Grover cites the ‘presumption of civilian status, which prevails in 
cases of doubt’156, as the authority for her position that ‘children … taking a 
direct part in hostilities … also retain their civilian status’157. Thirdly, Grover 
argues that since there is no minimum age requirement for POW status158, 
the fact that IHL affords ‘special civilian protections to child soldiers under 
eighteen as opposed to just those protections associated with ordinary 
prisoner of war status, reflects recognition of the child soldier as a “non-
combatant” or “protected civilian”’159.  
 I believe that Grover has over stated the point on each of these 
assertions, particularly when one appreciates that she starts from the position 
that her claim of civilian immunity on the basis of youthfulness applies to all 
children under eighteen years of age. In respect of her first assertion, it is 
simply not true that the recruitment of children aged fifteen to eighteen always 
constitutes a breach of international law (unless a particular State has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Article 77 opening paragraph. 
150 Breen ‘“When Is a Child Not a Child?” Child Soldiers in International Law’ at 73. 
151 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 12. 
A legitimate military target is defined in the 1968 Declaration of St Petersberg as any 
‘individuals whose death or disablement results in that weakening of the armed forces of the 
enemy, which is the only legitimate aim in war’ (1970) 1 (Eng Supplement) American Journal 
of International Law 95. 
152 ‘The general unqualified right of adult combatants to participate directly in combat is set 
out in AP I article 43’ (Grover ‘”Child Soldiers”’ as ‘”Non-Combatants”’: The Inapplicability of 
the Refugee Convention Exclusion Clause’ at 56). 
153 Idem at 54. 
154 Idem at 56. 
155 Ibid. 
156 AP I article 50(1). 
157 Grover ‘”Child Soldiers”’ as ‘”Non-Combatants”’: The Inapplicability of the Refugee 
Convention Exclusion Clause’at 56. 
158 Which means that, in effect, even the youngest child soldier could technically be granted 
POW status. 
159 Grover ‘”Child Soldiers”’ as ‘”Non-Combatants”’: The Inapplicability of the Refugee 
Convention Exclusion Clause’at 56. 
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adopted the straight-eighteen ban). The current legal position is that, for the 
most part, children over fifteen who are voluntarily recruited, would enjoy the 
right to participate in hostilities as a combatant (and whether this is also true 
of those recruited into non-State groups would depend on the State’s 
domestic legislation160). As for her second assertion, that of presumptive 
civilian status, Grover misses the point that this legal presumption only 
operates until a competent tribunal can assess the individual’s claim to 
combatant and POW status. It is entirely possible that a child soldier might 
appear before such a tribunal and be granted combatant and POW status. 
Lastly, the argument that children under eighteen years of age always qualify 
for special privileges over and above those afforded regular POWs, just 
speaks to an understanding that their developmental needs might be more 
demanding then that of their adult colleagues. It does not necessarily mean 
that they cannot be classed with combatants. In fact AP I article 77 states ‘… 
if in exceptional cases, … children who have not attained the age of fifteen 
years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse 
party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by 
this article, whether or not they are prisoners of war’ - which seems to 
suggest that they might acquire POW status (a status which is necessarily 
reserved for those who enjoy primary combatant status). Ipsen notes that 
‘children protected under article 77 can only be POW if they have previously 
attained the primary status of combatants by being unlawfully recruited into 
the armed forces of one of the parties to the conflict. This is particularly 
significant because the combatant status protects the child against being 
prosecuted upon capture for its direct participation in hostilities’161. 
 It is certainly correct that the blame for the recruitment of children less 
than fifteen years of age lies at the recruiter’s door. However, if ‘child soldiers 
under fifteen [are] arrested, detained or interned by an adverse party due to 
their soldiering activities, [they] are entitled to receive the special protections 
afforded child civilians under IHL’162, although this does not necessarily mean 
that whilst participating in hostilities they are entitled to complete, protected 
civilian status. 
 Mulira, on the other hand, proposes a viewpoint, which I think 
expresses more accurately the subtle nuances which permeate IHL on this 
topic. Mulira argues that, ‘although the Protocols prohibit the recruitment and 
participation of children less than fifteen years of age in armed conflicts, 
those who do decide to participate are recognised as combatants and lose 
the protections afforded civilians under IHL’163. She then goes on to clarify 
that once captured these child soldiers do enjoy the special treatment 
afforded to children164. 
 The differing viewpoints found in a variety of legal opinions reveal that 
there is indeed a need to clarify the issue of the IHL status of under-aged 
child soldiers, especially when they are recruited to fight for non-State-armed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 So for example, for those States who had signed up to OP-AC, and who had legislated to 
enforce the straight-eighteen ban stipulated against non-State-armed groups, in these 
instances it would be a domestic offence to recruit children under eighteen years of age into 
non-State-armed groups. 
161 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 73. 
162 AP I article 77. 
163 Dorcas B Mulira ‘International Legal Standards Governing the Use of Child Soldiers’ 
(2007) Paper 88 LLM Theses and Essays, available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/88 at 29 (accessed 12 August 2011). 
164 AP I article 77 (3). 
	   131	  
groups. Any discussion must take into consideration the myriad of factors 
which impact upon the assessment - including their age, the voluntariness of 
their recruitment and with whom they are associated (State armed forces or 
non-State-armed groups), and what activities they are involved in performing. 
What I want to explore here is the effect that ‘direct participation in hostilities 
may have on the otherwise civilian status of children (under fifteen years of 
age) in situations of international armed conflict, where they are recruited into 
non-State-armed groups. More specifically, I want answers to the question of 
whether under-aged child soldiers acquire combatant status, and whether 
they can be prosecuted for their direct participation in international armed 
conflicts on the side of non-State-armed groups.  
 An investigation of this sort must start with an analysis of what actions 
amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities’. It is only when child soldiers 
engage in these ‘specific hostile acts’165 that they compromise their otherwise 
presumptive civilian status, with its consequent ‘protection against direct 
attack’166. Their direct participation in hostilities ‘does not however result in 
the loss of their primary civilian status’167. However, as a consequence of 
their actions, they do become ‘a legitimate target, though only for as long168 
as they take part in hostilities’169. 
 Although the phrase ‘direct participation in hostilities’ can be found in 
many IHL treaties, up until 2009 there was no clear guidance on exactly what 
actions might amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities’170. To this end the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Determining what activities amount to direct participation in hostilities is not dependant on 
ones ‘status, function, or affiliation’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 10). Moreover the scope of what constitutes ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’ does not change whether it is carried out by civilians, or members 
of the armed forces ‘on a spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganised basis, or as part of a 
continuous function assumed for an organised armed force or group belonging to a party to 
the conflict’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
IHL at 10). 
166 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL 70. 
This is based on the ‘fundamental principle of the laws of war that those who do not 
participate in the hostilities shall not be attacked’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation 
in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 715). According to the ICRC’s study into the 
customary international law status of IHL, no ‘official contrary practice was found’, and on the 
whole, the principle that civilians lose their immunity from prosecution when they participate 
in hostilities is seem as a ‘valuable reaffirmation of an existing rule of customary international 
law’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23). 
167 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 70. 
168 The ICRC’s Commentary on AP I article 51(3) ‘allows that this would include preparation 
for combat and the return from combat’, but then adds ‘once he ceases to participate, the 
civilian regains his right to the protection under this section … and he may no longer be 
attacked’ (Eric Talbot Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C Banks (ed) New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (2011) at 2003-2012). 
169 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1995-2003; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 70. Since the ‘loss is temporary’, 
Melzer suggests that it is ‘better described as a “suspension” of protection’ (Melzer Targeted 
Killing in International Law at 347). 
170 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 12 
and 41. The most commonly held opinion is that direct participation in hostilities refers to 
‘combat-related activities that would normally be undertaken only by members of the armed 
forces’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19). Moreover the ICRC’s study into 
customary international law confirms that ‘a precise definition of the term “direct participation 
in hostilities” does not exist’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at 22). 
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ICRC undertook a study and consequently published an Interpretive Guide171 
to assist in determining when actions amount to direct participation in 
hostilities172. The guide makes it explicit that it only speaks to the ‘notion of 
direct participation in hostilities in so far as it impacts on decisions regarding 
targeting and military attacks’. It does not propose to deal with issue of 
‘detention173 or combatant immunity’174. It is in this vein that I have relied 
upon the guide to assist in determining when the actions of a child soldier 
might expose them to direct targeting. 
 
Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in hostilities on the 
part of civilians175 
 
‘According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, in order to qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet three cumulative 
criteria176: 
 
‘1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to 
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation), and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Which while not legally binding, it was hoped that it may be accepted ‘as a secondary 
source of international law … analogous to writings of the “most highly qualified publicists”’ 
(ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 10; 
Damien van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of 
the ICRC Guidance’ (2009) available at http://works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 
(accessed 23 October 2012) at 22). 
172 The Interpretive Guide was not without its critics. For more on this issue see Michael 
Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ (2010) 
42 International Law and Politics 697; Bill Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time 
Dimensions to Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 741; 
Kenneth Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 641; 
Nils Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 831. 
173 ‘[I]ts conclusions are not intended to serve as a basis for interpreting IHL regulating the 
status, rights and protections of persons outside the conduct of hostilities, such as those 
deprived of their liberty.’ (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 670).  
174 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the forum’ 
(2010) 42 International Law and Politics 637 at 638.  
175 It is important to remember that this rule is only intended to be applicable to those who 
qualify as civilians, and it is the means of determining when their actions result in the loss of 
their otherwise protected civilian immunity. As Boothby explains ‘until the civilian in question 
again engages in a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, the use of force against 
him or her must comply with the standards of law enforcement or individual self-defence’ 
(Boothby ‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in Hostilities’ 
at 755; Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ 
at 704).  
176 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 46. 
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3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus)’177. 
 
The first criterion, the ‘threshold of harm’ determination, would be satisfied if 
the actions of child soldiers were ‘reasonably expected to result in the 
infliction of harm’178 of a specifically military nature179, or180 harm of a 
protected person or object181. In short, if a child soldier was found committing 
‘acts of violence against human and material enemy forces,’ or causing 
‘physical or functional damage to military objects, operations or capacity’182, 
this would satisfy the threshold of harm requirement for a finding of ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’183. Moreover, any action on the part of child soldiers 
which sabotages military capacity, or restricts military ‘deployments, logistics 
and communications’184, would also satisfy the threshold of harm criteria. 
Similarly, exercising any form of control over ‘military personnel, objects and 
territory, to the detriment of the adversary’, also reaches the required level of 
harm185.  
 Even when no military harm results, the actions of child soldiers might 
still constitute direct participation in hostilities when child soldiers attack186, 
and inflict ‘death, injury or destruction upon protected persons or objects’187 
(like ‘civilians and civilian objects’188). In both instances (military harm or harm 
of protected persons), all that is required is the ‘objective likelihood189 that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Idem at 47. 
178 The degree of harm includes ‘not only the infliction of death, injury, or destruction on 
military personnel and objects, but essentially any consequence adversely affecting the 
military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict’ (Ibid). 
179 The term ‘military harm should be interpreted as encompassing not only the infliction of 
death, injury, or destruction on military personnel and objects, but essentially any 
consequence adversely affecting the military operations or military capacity of a party to the 
conflict’ (Ibid). 
180 From a cursory examination of the criteria it is apparent that test is framed in the 
alternative ‘that is, the harm contemplated may either adversely affect the enemy or harm 
protected persons or objects’ (Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements’ at 713). 
181 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 47. 
182 Idem at 48. 
183 Idem at 47. 
184 Idem at 48. 
185 Ibid. 
186 The Interpretive Guide relies on AP I article 49’s definition of ‘attack’ which ‘does not 
specify the target, but the belligerent nexus of an attack, so that even acts of violence 
directed specifically against civilians or civilian objects may amount to direct participation in 
hostilities’ (Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements’ at 723). Legal precedence for this position can be found in the jurisprudence 
emerging from the ICTY, where it was concluded that ‘sniping attacks against civilians and 
bombardment of civilian villages or urban residential areas’ constitutes an ‘attack’ in the IHL 
sense (Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ 
at 723). 
187 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 47. 
188 Idem at 49; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A 
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 862. 
189 As was discussed at the expert meetings - ‘wherever a civilian had a subjective “intent” to 
cause harm that was objectively identifiable, there would also be an objective “likelihood” that 
he or she would cause such harm’ (Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: 
The Constitutive Elements’ at 724). All that is required is ‘harm which may reasonably be 
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act will result in such harm’, not necessarily the actual ‘materialisation of 
harm’190. 
 At the drafting of the Interpretive Guide, experts were able to agree on 
a myriad of activities which they felt satisfied either the military harm 
requirement, or the requirement of harm in the form of death or destruction 
directed at protected persons191. If we look at the activities which child 
soldiers are reportedly carrying out: scouting; spying; acting as couriers and 
porters; transporting detonators; cooking; participating in sabotage activities; 
clearing and laying landmines; acting as decoys or human shields; being 
assistants at military checkpoints and providing logistical support192 - some of 
these activities feature in the list of ‘specific hostile acts’. Certainly, 
participating in sabotage activities; relaying tactical targeting information; 
laying or clearing the oppositions’ landmines; and acting as human shields, 
would certainly rise to the threshold of harm required of the first criterion. 
Furthermore, often times child soldiers are used to ‘restrict military 
deployments’ on account of the IHL principle of distinction. According to the 
ICRC ‘where civilians voluntarily and deliberately position themselves to 
create a physical obstacle to military operations of a party to the conflict, they 
could directly cross the threshold of harm required for a qualification as direct 
participation’193. In a survey conducted into the activities carried out by child 
soldiers, it was revealed that ninety-one percent of these child soldiers had 
seen active combat194. This alone, however, is not sufficient to arrive at a 
determination of direct participation in hostilities - the action must be linked to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expected to result from an act in the prevailing circumstances’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 47). 
190 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 47. 
Schmitt concedes that this is a sensible requirement since it would be ‘absurd to suggest that 
a civilian shooting at a combatant, but missing, would not be directly participating because no 
harm resulted’ (Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements’ at 724). 
191 ‘Acts of violence against human and material enemy forces’; causing ‘physical or 
functional damage to military objects, operations or capacity’; ‘sabotaging military capacity 
and operations’; ‘restricting or disturbing’ military ‘deployments, logistics and 
communications’; exercising any form of control or denying the military use of ‘military 
personnel, objects and territory to the detriment of the adversary’; ‘sabotage or other 
unarmed activities qualify, if they restrict or disturb logistics or communications of an 
opposing party to the conflict’; ‘clearing mines placed by the opposition’, ‘guarding captured 
military personnel to prevent them being forcibly liberated’; ‘wiretapping the adversary’s high 
command or transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack’; ‘violent acts specifically 
directed against civilians or civilian objects, such as sniper attacks or the bombardment of 
civilian residential areas, satisfy this requirement’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 47- 49). Schmitt adds electronic interference, 
exploitation or attacks on ‘military computer networks’ to the ICRC’s list (Schmitt 
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 715). While 
Melzer adds ‘building defensive positions at a military base certain to be attacked’, and 
‘repairing a battle-damaged runway at a forward airfield so it can be used to launch aircraft’ 
(Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 859). 
192 UNICEF Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
at 3; Coalition Against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers: Global Report at 22; U.N. Report of the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council. 
193 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 56. 
194 Singer Children at War at 77. 
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the resulting harm or benefit so as to satisfy the direct causation requirement, 
and lastly there needs to be a belligerent nexus’195. 
 The second leg of the test for direct participation in hostilities (that of 
direct causation) was formulated in order to exclude ‘general war effort’196 
and activities aimed at sustaining war197, which would otherwise amount to 
direct participation in hostilities, were it not for the direct causation 
requirement of the test198. While these activities are indispensable to the war 
effort, which in effect does harm the adversary, the concern raised at the 
drafting of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, was that these functions are 
frequently carried out by the protected civilian population.  
 In order to prevent any of these supportive functions amounting to 
direct participation in hostilities, the direct causation test requires ‘a 
sufficiently close causal relation between the act and the resulting harm’, for it 
to amount to direct participation in hostilities199. In other words: the ‘harm 
(which already satisfies the threshold enquiry) must be brought about in one 
causal step’200. Clearly excluded from the definition of ‘acts, which amount to 
direct participation in hostilities’ - are activities that only indirectly cause harm, 
and mere ‘geographic or temporal proximity’201 on their own are insufficient 
without this direct causation202. Having said that, the drafters of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 50. 
196 This includes all activities ‘objectively contributing to the military defeat of the adversary’. 
For example ‘design, production and shipment of weapons and military equipment, 
construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure 
outside the context of concrete military operations’ (Idem at 53). 
197 As the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide points out - ‘both the general war effort and war-
sustaining activities may ultimately result in harm reaching the threshold required for a 
qualification as direct participation in hostilities, in fact … some of these activities may even 
be indispensable to harming the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to 
the armed forces and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of 
hostilities, which is designed to cause the required harm, the general war effort and war 
sustaining activities also include activities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to 
cause such harm’ (Idem at 52). War sustaining activities reach beyond general war effort to 
include ‘political, economic or media activities supporting the general war effort’, like for 
example ‘political propaganda, financial transactions, production of agricultural or non-military 
industrial goods’, providing ‘finances, food and shelter to the armed forces and producing 
weapons and ammunition’ (Ibid). 
198 During the expert meetings, emphasis was placed on the ‘idea that direct participation in 
hostilities is neither synonymous with "involvement in" or "contribution to" hostilities, nor with 
"preparing" or "enabling" someone else to directly participate in hostilities, but essentially 
means that an individual is personally "taking part in the ongoing exercise of harming the 
enemy" and personally carrying out hostile acts which are "part of" the hostilities’ (Idem at 52 
and 53).  
199 Ibid.  
200 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 866. The act must not only be causally linked to the harm, but it must also 
cause the harm directly. For example ‘the assembly and storing of an improvised explosive 
device (IED) in a workshop, or the purchase or smuggling of its components, may be 
connected with the resulting harm through an uninterrupted causal chain of events, but, 
unlike the planting and detonation of that device, do not cause that harm directly’ (Idem at 54 
and 55). 
201 Ibid. 
202 Watkin cites the following activities as not satisfying the direct causation test: ‘civilians 
driving military transport vehicles’; ‘participating in activities in support of the war or military 
effort’; ‘selling goods to one of the parties to the conflict’; ‘expressing sympathy for the cause 
of one of the parties to the conflict’; ‘accompanying and supplying food to one of the parties 
to the conflict’; ‘gathering and transmitting military information’; ‘transporting arms and 
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Interpretive Guide wanted to include under the banner of ‘direct participation’ 
- those acts, which are part of a tactical operation, and aimed at causing 
harm. The ICRC’s Interpretive Guide recognises that in the case of collective 
operations, the resulting harm does not have to be directly caused (i.e.in one 
causal step) by each contributing person individually, but only by the 
collective operation as a whole203. In these instances the direct causation 
criteria would still be fulfilled, and the civilian would lose their immunity from 
attack, where their individual ‘act constitutes an integral part of a concrete 
and coordinated tactical (or collective) operation that directly causes such 
harm’204.  
 In short, child soldiers will fall foul of the second leg of the test for direct 
participation in hostilities, if their actions (either alone or part of a coordinated 
military operation) may ‘reasonably be expected to directly - in one causal 
step - cause harm that reaches the required threshold’205. According to the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, there are a number of activities which will satisfy 
the direct causation aspect of the three-pronged analysis of direct 
participation in hostilities206. Certainly participating in sabotage activities, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
munitions’ and ‘providing supplies’ (Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and 
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ 707). To this list Schmitt adds: 
‘selling food or medicine to an unlawful combatant’; providing ‘logistical, general support, 
including monetary aid’; ‘distributing propaganda supporting those unlawful combatants’; 
‘working in canteens’ and ‘working in factories producing munitions’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing 
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 708 and 710). 
203 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865-6; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under IHL at 55. 
204 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 55; 
Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 102. 
205 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 58. 
206 The ICRC’s Interpretive Guide cites the following as instances which satisfy the direct 
causation requirement: ‘a coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such harm’; ‘the 
identification and marking of targets’; ‘the analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to 
attacking forces’ and the ‘instruction and assistance given to troops for the execution of a 
specific military operation’ (Idem at 55). Melzer and Ricou-Heaton add to that list ‘gathering 
tactical intelligence on the battlefield’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 867; John Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at 
War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ (2005) 57 Air 
Force Law Review 155 at 177-8). Watkin includes ‘bearing, using or taking up arms’; ‘taking 
part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or operations’; ‘armed fighting or combat’; 
‘participating in attacks against enemy personnel, property or equipment’; transmitting 
military information for immediate use’; ‘transporting weapons in proximity to combat 
operations’; ‘serving as guards, intelligence agents, lookouts, or observers on behalf of 
military force’, and ‘civilians manning an antiaircraft gun engaging in sabotage of military 
installations’(Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ 707). Ricou-Heaton adds 'performing mission-
essential work at a military base’ and ‘providing logistical support’ to the list (Ricou Heaton 
‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 
177-8). While Schmitt cites ‘a person who collects intelligence on the army’; ‘a person who 
transports unlawful combatants to or from the place where the hostilities are taking place’; ‘a 
person who operates weapons which unlawful combatants use, or supervises their operation, 
or provides service to them, be the distance from the battlefield as it may’; ‘delivering 
ammunition to combatants’; ‘a person who gathers military intelligence in enemy-controlled 
territory’; ‘conducting attacks’; ‘capturing combatants or their equipment’ and ‘sabotaging 
lines of communication (Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements’ at 708). 
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laying landmines, spying which results in gathering and relaying tactical 
information to attacking forces207, actual combat activities, transporting arms 
to the frontlines, and guarding functions - would rise to the fall into this 
category. In particular the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide warns that civilians 
(which includes children) must be cautious that they do not divulge tactical 
information regarding combatants, or be used as lookouts. Certainly child 
soldiers used to scout information or act as spies would be seen to be 
satisfying the direct causation test. 
 The third, and final leg of the test for direct participation, termed the 
‘belligerent nexus test’, requires that ‘an act must be specifically designed to 
directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the 
conflict and to the detriment of another’208. In other words, ‘in order to amount 
to direct participation in hostilities, an act must not only be objectively likely to 
inflict harm that meets the first two criteria, but it must also be specifically 
designed to do so in support of a party to an armed conflict and to the 
detriment of another’209. 
This nexus is sometimes very difficult to assess, because during 
armed conflicts gangsters can often engage in criminal activities, which are 
‘merely facilitated by the armed conflict’, while not ‘designed to support one 
party to the conflict by directly causing the required threshold of harm to 
another party’210. As Rogers points out, in ‘the case of children throwing 
petrol bombs or stones at enemy military patrols’, members of the patrol will 
have to assess carefully whether it is just ‘criminal activity’ or whether the 
children have forfeited their ‘civilian immunity’ – thus entitling the military to 
‘use necessary force in self-defence’211. 
 As recruits of non-State-armed groups, these child soldiers will most 
often be inflicting harm in support of the non-State-armed group which 
recruited them, to the detriment of the opposing force (be it a State force for 
another non-State group)212. It is important that the harmful action is ‘in some 
way connected to the armed conflict’213, or as Melzer puts it, they are an 
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‘integral part of armed confrontations’214. However, the guidelines do go on to 
state that if child soldiers are found causing harm in:  
‘(a) individual self-defence or defence of others,  
(b) in exercising power or authority over persons or territory,  
(c) as part of civil unrest against such authority, or  
(d) during inter-civilian violence,  
these acts lack the belligerent nexus required for a qualification as direct 
participation in hostilities’215, and must be dealt with by means of the regular 
law-enforcement mechanisms216. 
 Also of importance to questions involving the participation of children in 
hostilities, is the understanding that ‘the belligerent nexus is generally not 
influenced by factors such as personal distress or preferences, or by the 
mental ability or willingness of persons to assume responsibility for their 
conduct’217. Consequently, according to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, ‘even 
children below the lawful recruitment age may lose protection against direct 
attack’218. Having said that, part of the belligerent nexus requirement is an 
appreciation that ‘when civilians are totally unaware of the role they are 
playing in the conduct of hostilities’219, or ‘when they are completely deprived 
of their physical freedom of action’220, the individual ‘remain[s] protected 
against direct attack despite the belligerent nexus of the military operation in 
which they are being instrumentalised’221. This is because they cannot be 
said to be acting (in a meaningful and voluntary sense of the word). Schmitt 
supports the conclusion that, in the case of children (as a vulnerable group in 
situations in armed conflict), there needs to be an exception to the 
voluntariness assessment, on the basis that ‘children are legally incapable of 
forming the intent necessary to "directly participate" in hostilities’222. Schmitt 
agrees with the Interpretive Guide that an activity does not amount  to direct 
participation in hostilities on the basis of the actor’s subjective intent. In his 
own words, ‘the question is not whether the participants wanted to harm the 
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enemy, but instead whether their actions were of a nature to do so,’ 
wherefore even ‘civilians impressed into fighting or children under the age of 
fifteen can be treated as direct participants even though their participation is, 
as a matter of fact or law, involuntary’223. 
 
The temporal scope of the loss of civilian immunity on the part of child 
soldiers: the ‘for such time as’ or the ‘continuous combat function’ test 
 
Once it has been determined that a civilian is carrying out a specific hostile 
act which amounts to direct participation in hostilities, the next level of enquiry 
must address when the loss of civilian immunity starts and ends224. The 
notion that direct participation has a temporal limitation has a longstanding 
history225 in IHL, and the ICRC’s study into the customary international law 
status of the phrase ‘and for such time as’, concluded that it was widely 
recognised as constituting customary international law.226 
 While the ‘for such time’ criterion might reflect customary international 
law, its practical implementation has not been without controversy. For the 
most part the controversy lies in that fact that when such a civilian is no 
longer engaged in direct participation (and consequently no longer poses a 
threat to the opposition), ‘they regain their full civilian immunity from direct 
attack’227. This gives rise to the so called ‘revolving door’ of civilian 
protection228. According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, the scope of the ‘for 
such time’ window will also include ‘measures preparatory to the execution of 
a specific act’ … ‘as well as the deployment to and the return from the 
location of its execution’229. This was done in order to take into account ‘the 
collective nature and complexity of contemporary military operations’, where 
some activities only result in the cause of harm ‘in conjunction with other 
acts’230.  
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guide justifies the revolving door position as 
being necessary in order to protect the civilian population from erroneous or 
arbitrary attack’231, at times when they do not constitute ‘a military threat’232. 
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That said, it is worth noting that even when they regain full civilian immunity 
from attack, these civilians may nevertheless still face ‘prosecution for 
violations of domestic and international law they may have committed’233. 
 There is, however, always the potential for the ‘revolving door of 
protection’ to be abused by non-State actors234, giving these ‘farmers by day 
and fighters by night’ … a significant operational advantage’235 and 
‘endangering innocent civilians’236. In response to this concern, the 
Interpretive Guide mandates that the temporary nature of the suspension of a 
civilian’s immunity from attack is only afforded civilians who participate in 
hostilities in a ‘spontaneous, unorganised or sporadic basis’237. As soon as a 
civilian is found to be participating in hostilities in a more permanent and 
organised manner, they are treated as a member of an organised armed 
group. At the ICRC’s expert meeting it was generally agreed that ‘the 
distinction between civilians and members of organised armed groups was 
defensible’238. Accordingly, ‘members of organised armed groups belonging 
to a non-State party to an armed conflict’, are not afforded the same 
protection as the spontaneous and unorganised acts of participation by 
civilians239. While this category of participant also loses immunity from direct 
attack, as is the case with a civilian, they however lose their immunity ‘for as 
long as they assume their continuous combat function240, and for the duration 
of their membership of the group’241. ‘In other words, the “revolving door” of 
protection operates based on membership’242, and the individual only 
becomes a protected civilian once their membership in the group has ceased. 
 This functional membership ‘requires a lasting integration243 into the 
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armed group’244, and ‘includes those who have repeatedly, directly 
participated in hostilities, in support of an organised armed group, in 
circumstances indicating that such conduct constitutes a continuous function, 
rather then a spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed for the 
duration of a particular operation’245. Those, who while affiliated with an 
organised armed group, fail to undertake a continuous combat function, are 
excluded246 from the loss of protection, on account of their failure to directly 
participate in hostilities. These ‘members of an organised armed group who 
do not regularly perform combat duties continue to enjoy full civilian 
protection from attack unless they directly participate’247 in the hostilities. 
Targeting is limited to ‘only those serving in a continuous combat function’248. 
 According to the Interpretive Guide, ‘once a member has affirmatively 
disengaged from a particular group, or has permanently changed from its 
military to its political wing249, he can no longer be regarded as assuming a 
continuous combat function and must be considered a civilian protected 
against attack, unless and for such time as he directly participates in 
hostilities’250. As to how this disassociation from the group needs to be 
manifested, the Interpretive Guide states that ‘disengagement from an 
organised armed group need not be openly declared; it can also be 
expressed through conclusive behaviour, such as a lasting physical 
distancing from the group and reintegration into civilian life, or the permanent 
resumption of an exclusively non-combat function’251. Accordingly, an 
assessment as to whether an individual has disengaged from an organised 
armed group ‘must therefore be made in good faith, and based on a 
reasonable assessment of the prevailing circumstances, presuming 
entitlement to civilian protection in case of doubt’252. 
 The ICRC’s approach to those who adopt a continuous combat function 
has not been without criticism. In particular it raised concern because the 
specific treaty language which the guide was attempting to interpret, stated 
that ‘civilians lose immunity from attack ‘for such time’ as they participate 
directly in hostilities’253. The ICRC’s interpretation effectively arrives at a 
conclusion which makes it permissible to directly target civilians at all times, 
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provided they are ‘engaged in a continuous combat function’254. The potential 
increased risk to civilians, posed by the creation of the continuous combat 
function category, has seen critics of the concept call for the ‘the other 
constituent parts of the guidance (threshold of harm, causation and 
belligerent nexus) not [to] be diluted’ so as to adequately protect civilians in 
times of armed conflict255. Melzer and others who defend the proposed 
continuous combat function category, cite principle XI256 in the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide as providing the necessary counter balance to prevent the 
continuous combat function category posing an increased risk to civilians 
around whom their might be some doubt as to their degree of involvement in 
hostilities. 
 In short we can conclude from looking at the ICRC’s guidelines that the 
concept of ‘direct participation’ extends beyond active participation in combat 
and military activities, and includes many of the direct support functions which 
child soldiers traditionally carry out257. Taking cognisance of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide on what amounts to direct participation in hostilities, it is 
apparent that many child soldiers will find themselves in breach of the 
restrictions against specific hostile acts, which amount to civilian participation 
in hostilities. Moreover, since these child soldiers are recruited into fulltime 
membership of organised armed groups, it is very possible that their 
performance of these specific, prohibited hostile acts, will amount to evidence 
of a continuous combat function. As a consequence of these two factors 
these child soldiers will likely ‘lose their entitlement to protection against 
direct attack’258, which would normally apply to civilians. Consequently those 
who perform ‘a continuous combat function’ will remain lawful targets ‘even 
when they put down their weapons and walk home for lunch with their 
family’259, and their ‘loss of protection against direct attack endures for the 
duration of their membership while they ‘assume their continuous combat 
function’260. 
It is interesting to note that the drafters of the Rome Statute, in a bid to 
increase the courts’ prospects of prosecuting those found recruiting child 
soldiers (under fifteen years of age), adopted a much broader interpretation 
of ‘what acts would amount to direct participation of children in hostilities’261. 
According to the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute, when children 
partake in ‘active participation in military activities linked to combat such as 
scouting, spying, sabotage, and the use of children as decoys, couriers, or at 
military checkpoints’, as well as the ‘use of children in “direct” support 
functions such as carrying supplies to the front line or activities at the front 
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line itself’262, this will be sufficient to justify prosecuting their recruiters under 
articles 8(b)(xxvi) and 8(e)(vii). Clearly the purpose of this extended 
interpretation was to make it easier to prosecute their recruiters, and this 
interpretation should not be used to deny children less then fifteen years of 
age their civilian immunity from attack. A similarly ‘liberal’ interpretation was 
adopted by the SCSL in Prosecutor v Brima (Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council)263, which concluded that ‘any labour or support that gives effect to or 
helps maintain operations in a conflict constitutes active participation. Hence 
‘carrying loads for the fighting faction, finding or acquiring … ammunition or 
equipment, acting as decoys, carrying messages, making trails or finding 
routes, manning checkpoints or acting as human shields are examples of 
active participation as much as fighting and combat’264. The trial chamber in 
the Lubanga case even went so far as to state that the ‘offence of using 
children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in hostilities…includes 
a wide range of activities, from those children on the front line (who 
participate directly) through to the boys or girls who are involved in a myriad 
of roles that support the combatants’265. Moreover the chamber concluded 
that ‘the decisive factor…in deciding if an “indirect” role is to be treated as 
active participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child 
to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target’266. 
Consequently this means that ‘although absent from the immediate scene of 
the hostilities, the individual was nonetheless actively involved in them’ if his 
support exposed him to consequent risk267. 
 I would argue that in order to determine the loss of civilian status for 
under-aged child soldiers, it would be in the best interests of the child and in 
keeping with IHL to apply the more conservative interpretation proposed by 
the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, rather then the more far-reaching definition set 
out in the Rome statute. Regardless, I would argue that it is justifiable to 
conclude that under-aged child soldiers/civilians, carrying out activities which 
satisfy the three-pronged test for direct participation in hostilities, will lose 
their civilian immunity from attack. The ICRC’s guidelines make it explicit that 
no special allowances are made for children, ‘even children below the lawful 
recruitment age may lose protection against direct attack’268 when they 
participate in hostilities. This one statement by the ICRC, in its Interpretive 
Guide published in 2009, puts pay to the argument that Grover proposed in 
2008 - that child soldiers would always maintain their civilian inviolability in 
situations of armed conflict. 
 This viewpoint, that children be treated as any other participants in 
IHL, applies irrespective of whether the particular child soldier is obviously 
under fifteen years of age, and therefore in terms of IHL below the lawful 
recruitment age and restricted from participating in hostilities. Moreover, there 
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doesn’t appear to be any relaxation of the principle to account for the fact that 
some of these child soldiers may have been conscripted against their will. 
Obviously, evidence of under-aged or forcible conscription will aggravate a 
case for prosecuting their recruiters, and will be a compelling consideration in 
their defence or mitigation of sentence if these child soldiers are captured and 
prosecuted for war crimes, or unauthorised participation in hostilities.  
 Opposition forces faced with under-aged child ‘soldiers’ are going to 
have to conduct an on-the-spot analysis to ascertain whether the child’s 
specific activities amount to direct participation in hostilities, thereby 
compromising their presumptive civilian status and making them potential and 
legitimate military targets. Sadly, in conflicts where under-aged child soldiers 
are utilised, the net effect is to increase the ‘risk for other children in the 
conflict zone’ who are viewed with suspicion, and subjected to interrogation 
and harassment269. 
 All of this discussion emanates from the premise that a child is most 
naturally categorised under IHL as a civilian, because IHL, international 
customary law, and treaty law, discourage their participation in hostilities. 
Having said that, customary and IHL only prohibit the recruitment of those 
children under fifteen years of age, and many States have not adopted the 
straight-eighteen ban. What this means is that it is legally plausible for a child 
(between fifteen and eighteen years of age) to be part of an armed group and 
consequently entitled to combatant and POW status.  
 This leads me to the next portion of this analysis: what is the 
combatant status of under-aged child soldiers who are recruited to participate 
directly in hostilities as members of non-State-armed groups? Can a child 
soldier (under fifteen years of age) be clothed with combatant and POW 
status and does the manner of their recruitment (be it voluntary or 
involuntary) impact upon the determination of their IHL status? 
 
5.4 Under-aged child soldiers recruited to participate directly in 
hostilities in non-State-armed groups - assessing combatant and 
POW status 
 
‘Recruiting or using children under the age of fifteen as soldiers is 
incontrovertibly prohibited under IHL– treaty and custom’270, and this 
prohibition is applicable to non-State-armed groups. Consequently, a child 
soldier who is under fifteen years of age would necessarily have been 
unlawfully recruited according to existing customary IHL. Despite pressure 
from human rights activists to adopt a straight-eighteen ban in cases of 
recruitment by non-State groups, the adoption by the international 
community, of a universal age limit of eighteen, has still not been attained271. 
Consequently, it is highly debatable whether any straight-eighteen ban, 
applicable to non-State-armed groups in international armed conflicts, can be 
said to have achieved customary status. As a consequence of this, the child 
soldier over fifteen years of age might plausibly have been lawfully recruited 
(provided the straight-eighteen ban was not legally applicable in the particular 
case as a result of the jurisdictional State’s domestic legislation272), and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Singer Children at War at 103. 
270 U.N. ‘The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict’ at 7. 
271 ICRC Children Protected Under IHL. 
272 At most, all that can be expected is that those thirty-seven AU States who are party to the 
ACRWC (article 22(2)) and those States party to OP-AC article 4(2), legislate to make it 
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consequently entitled to combatant status. The real issue is whether it is at all 
possible for child soldiers under fifteen years of age to also acquire this 
status? 
 The issue of the ‘combatant/civilian’ status of the under-aged child 
soldiers recruited into a non-State-armed groups and involved in an 
international armed conflict, is a complex legal question. The treatment of 
these child soldiers upon capture is dependent upon their individual claims to 
combatant or civilian status. If they can be classified as members of the 
‘armed forces’ as defined in AP I article 43(1), they acquire combatant and 
POW status upon capture, and immunity from prosecution for ‘participating in 
hostilities’, provided they comply with the laws and customs of war. Civilians, 
on the other hand, who participate directly in hostilities, do so without 
authorisation and consequently face criminal prosecution for their actions. 
Since the legal implications of being found to be a lawful combatant and a 
protected POW are so important, it is imperative that IHL provide guidance to 
those who are engaging in hostilities against under-aged child soldiers - an 
issue which has been fudged for too long. Since armed forces ‘now face real 
and serious threats from [child] opponents whom they generally would prefer 
not to harm’, ‘being unwilling or unable to operate in child soldier zones is a 
recipe for strategic inaction’273, even though fighting children has a 
demoralising effect on troop morale274. 
 We know from the discussion above that children under fifteen years 
of age who participate directly in hostilities, lose their civilian immunity from 
attack. ‘To conscript or recruit soldiers, of whatever age, is necessarily to 
change their status; to convert them from civilians … to fighters who can be 
personally attacked on that account alone’275. Which begs the question - is it 
possible for these under-aged soldiers, who are recruited into non-State-
armed groups, to acquire full combatant status with the attendant privileges?  
 It is important to note that ‘no one is born a combatant ... without being 
a civilian first’276. However, once a civilian becomes a ‘member of the armed 
forces of a belligerent party’277 (other than medical personnel and chaplains), 
they are presumed to acquire primary combatant status and secondary POW 
privileges upon capture278. Moreover, this combatant status is granted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unlawful at a domestic level for non-State-armed groups to recruit children under eighteen 
years of age.  
273 Singer Children at War at 164 and 166. 
274 Idem at 170. 
275 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute at 70. 
276 Shlomy Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant 
Belong?’ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 378 at 390. 
277 Irrespective of whether they are ‘regular or irregular, including paramilitary units 
incorporated de facto in the armed forces’ (Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 11).  
278 GC III article 4A (1) and (3), Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 11. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that that in an armed conflict, only a 
recognised subject of international law can clothe their armed forces with authorised 
combatant status. This status is not given to the individual, but is granted as a result of his or 
her affiliation to a party to the conflict which is a subject of international law (Ipsen (1995) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 66-67). ‘Private citizens and independent armed 
groups have always been excluded from entitlement to the combatant privilege and POW 
status’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 197); 
‘there is no room for hostilities in an international armed conflict being conducted by 
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irrespective of the ‘specified task assigned to an individual within the military 
apparatus’279, their ‘function, or contribution or lack thereof with respect to the 
war effort’280. The rule that combatant status derives from ones mere 
membership in the armed forces, rather then ones function281, is widely 
acknowledged without any State practice to the contrary282.  
 As a general rule combatants cannot forfeit their combatant status and 
POW privilege, even if they are found in breach of IHL283. There is however 
one exception to this rule - POW status can be forfeited in instances where 
the combatant is found in breach of the minimum obligations of distinction 
expressed in AP I article 44(3) (2nd sentence). If however, they fail to observe 
this minimum requirement for distinction284, they will then forfeit their POW 
status, and may be liable for prosecution285 for breach of the principle of 
distinction286. A classic example of an instance where POW status is forfeited 
is when a combatant is captured while spying287. 
 As a general rule, a recognised State’s armed forces have always 
been clothed with combatant status and given the authorisation to participate 
directly in hostilities288. There has never been any minimum age limit required 
for the awarding of POW status289. Consequently, IHL has always recognised 
that any children, irrespective of their age, who ‘enrolled in the armed forces’ 
or who take ‘part in a mass uprising of the population (levée en masse), do in 
fact have combatant status and are ipso facto entitled to prisoner-of-war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
individuals on their own initiative’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict at 43). 
279 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 33. 
280 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1535-1544. 
281 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1595-1604. 
282 Dale Stephens and Angeline Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed 
Conflict’ (2006) 9 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 25 at 30. 
283 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95. 
284 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 15. The 
requirement of visibility is now ‘relevant with respect to a combatant’s entitlement to POW 
status’ (AP I article 44, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law at 15 and rule 106). 
285 If commanders do not try their soldiers for failing to distinguish themselves they will be 
found to be violation of AP I articles 86 and 87, with liability flowing up the chain of command 
(Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 20). The ‘requirement of 
an internal disciplinary system supplements the provisions concerning command 
responsibility and is a corollary to the obligation to issue instructions which comply with IHL’ 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 16).  
286 Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 22.  
287 ‘Spies are persons who clandestinely, or under false pretences, gather information in the 
territory controlled by the adversary. Even if they are members of the armed forces, they do 
not have the right to POW status. Persons who fall into the hands of the adversary while 
engaged in espionage shall be liable to punishment’ (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 110; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law at 16 and rule 106-108; Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 10). 
288 As an exception to this general rule, there are a number of groups of service personnel 
(like medical and religious personnel), within the ranks of the armed forces who are denied 
authorisation (by national legislation) to ‘use a weapon or a weapons system’ and are 
consequently called non-combatants (HR article 3, GC I articles 24, 26 and 27, AP I article 
43(2)).  
289 Dutli ‘Captured Child Combatants’. 
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status if captured’290. If this is the position for the child soldiers recruited into 
the States armed forces or participating in the levée en masse, what do we 
make of the case of the under aged child soldier recruited into a non-State-
armed group, who participates directly in an international armed conflict? 
 Non-State-armed groups have traditionally been singled out for more 
demanding treatment under IHL in so far as awarding them combatant status 
is concerned. While it was assumed that the ‘regular armed forces would as a 
matter of course’ do all that was necessary to merit their being clothed with 
combatant and POW status291, the same was not true of non-State-armed 
groups. GC III article 4A(2) set out six criteria292 required of these non-State-
armed groups in order to afford them combatant and POW status293. 
The requirements are: 
 
1. Belong to an organised group294; 
2. Belong to a party to the conflict295; 
3. ‘Be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates’296; 
4. ‘The group must ensure that its members have a fixed, distinctive sign 
recognisable at a distance’297; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Goodwin-Gill Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict - A Study on Behalf of 
the Henry Dunant Institute at 63; Dutli Captured Child Combatants. 
291 While IHL (more particularly GC III article 4A (1) and (3)) presumes that members of the 
regular armed forces will always observe the requirements of a uniform, organised hierarchy 
and compliance with the laws of war, the same assumption is not made of irregular armed 
forces (Jean Pictet (1960) ICRC Commentary on GC III ICRC: Geneva at 63; Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 15). 
292 If the members generally (i.e.as a collective) ‘meet all 6 conditions all the of the time then 
individual members who fail to observe any of the 4-6 will not lose their privileged combatant 
or POW status upon capture’ (Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 14). 
293 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 15. 
294 This requirement is normally characterised ‘by discipline, hierarchy, responsibility and 
honour’ (Pictet ICRC Commentary on GC III at 58), and can be ‘filled by the most 
rudimentary elements of military organisation’ (Thomas Mallison and Sally Mallison ‘The 
Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (1977) 9 Case Western Journal of International Law 39 at 50). 
295 Put another way, they must fight ‘on behalf of a State party that is engaged in an 
international armed conflict’ as per GC common article 2, as there is still a ‘customary law 
proscription against individuals or groups engaging in “private warfare” against a State party 
involved in an armed conflict’ (Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 12). ‘Tacit authorization, for example by delivery of weapons to the irregulars, or a de 
facto relationship between the resistance organisation and the State is sufficient’ (Goldman 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 12). 
296 ‘The leader’s qualifications or authority to lead are not prescribed, all that is required is 
that the leader must discipline his members who violate IHL, and as a leader he or she must 
bear ultimate responsibility for the actions taken on his or her orders’ (Goldman ‘Unprivileged 
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 12). 
297 Members of irregular armed groups need not wear traditional military dress, ‘a helmet, 
headdress, cap, coat, shirt, badge, armlet, brassard or a coloured sign worn on the chest’, 
will suffice, provided it is worn constantly, in all circumstances and is ‘visible during daylight 
and detectable at a distance by the naked eye’ (Idem at 13; U.S. Department of the Army 
‘Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare’ available at 
www.aschq.army.mil/gc/files/fm27-10.pdf (accessed 26 December 2012) at 27 para 64(b); 
Pictet ICRC Commentary on GC III at 60).  
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5. ‘The group must ensure that its members carry their arms openly; and  
6. The group must ensure that its members conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws of war’298. 
 
These stringent requirements which were demanded of irregular armed 
forces under the Geneva Conventions, have been the cause for much 
controversy, and underlie suggestions that IHL is enforcing a double 
standard299. Irregulars have argued that the requirements are impossibly 
demanding, impossible to prove without endangering the group’s identity and 
location300, with some even suggesting that compliance would be suicidal301. 
It was this ‘realisation of the inadequacy of these provisions to provide 
privileged combatant status for those who fight regular military forces in 
colonial wars, occupied territory and in struggles for self determination, which 
gave rise to strong initiatives to relax or abolish the 1949 Convention 
standards for “freedom fighters” under the 1977 Additional Protocols’302. 
 The 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference on IHL Applicable in Armed 
Conflict, set about drafting the APs, with the aim of creating ‘a single and 
non-discriminatory set of rules applicable to all combatants regular and 
irregular alike’303. The task demanded a solution to ensure that guerilla forces 
were able to attain ‘privileged combatant status without exposing the forces 
fighting them to the danger inherent in the use of civilian disguise in order to 
achieve surprise’304. 
 The essence of the compromise is reflected in AP I articles 43-47 
(entitled ‘combatant and POW status’), which set aside the distinction 
between regular forces and other armed groups. AP I now contains a 
‘presumption that anyone who participates in hostilities is entitled to POW 
status upon capture and the right to have their POW status adjudicated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Where these non-State-armed groups are found directing attacks at the civilian 
population, ‘causing disproportionate civilian casualties, or otherwise causing unnecessary 
suffering and destruction’, they would lose their right to claim combatant status (Goldman 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 14). This last requirement raises and 
interesting conundrum. Non-State-armed groups who forcibly abduct children under fifteen 
years of age from civilian communities, to be trained as child soldiers, would be violating IHL 
and would consequently compromise any claim that the armed group would have to 
combatant status. The same could be said of those groups who enlist children under the age 
of fifteen, even if they maintain that the children joined voluntarily. Moreover, if the straight-
eighteen ban ever crystallises into customary IHL, and is applicable in international armed 
conflicts, then it is plausible that the very act of enlisting child soldiers would compromise the 
entire group’s claim to combatant status, including the child’s right to claim combatant status.  
299 For example: irregular forces have to show individual compliance with the laws of war in 
order to get POW status, but regular soldiers can breach the laws of war without losing 
combatant and POW status (although they can be tried in a court martial for these breaches) 
(Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 14-15). 
300 Idem at 14-16. 
301 Since most irregular fighters are part time combatants, the requirement that they wear a 
fixed distinctive emblem all of the time, even when not engaged in conflict, would ‘be 
suicidal’, yet that is what IHL demands of them (Idem at 15). 
302 Waldemar Solf ‘Response to Douglas J Feith's Law in the Service of Terror - The Strange 
Case of the Additional Protocol’ (1986-1987) 20 Akron Law Review 261 at 272. 
303 George Aldrich ‘Guerrilla Combatants and Prisoner of War Status’ (1982) 31 American 
University Law Review 871 at 874. 
304 Solf ‘Response to Douglas J Feith's Law in the Service of Terror - The Strange Case of 
the Additional Protocol’ at 273. 
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before a judicial tribunal’305. The new definition of ‘armed forces’ puts all 
members of armed groups on an equal footing306, and all those armed forces 
(be they State forces or non-State forces) ‘fulfilling the conditions in article 43 
of AP I are armed forces’307, and entitled to combatant status. No longer are 
non-State-armed groups required to prove that their armed group enjoys 
political recognition. Moreover, any failure to observe the laws and customs 
of war308 will not result in denial of their combatant and POW309 status, as 
was the case under the GCs. 
 The most notable effect of the new relaxed rule is that under the 
previous treaty regime, ‘failure to distinguish oneself from the civilian 
population’310 (through the use of a fixed distinctive emblem), resulted in the 
forfeiture of ones combatant and POW status upon capture, and led to 
possible criminal prosecution for unauthorised participation in hostilities311. 
However, under the new relaxed rule, irregular combatants are required as a 
minimum, to distinguish themselves during and in preparation312for an 
attack313. Although AP I does not set out explicitly how this is to be achieved, 
an ‘authoritative commentary on the protocols suggests that ‘presumably a 
distinctive sign, which need not be fixed, or carrying arms openly would 
satisfy the requirement’314. This relaxed expression of the principle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 AP I articles 45(1) and (2) and 43(2); Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 18. 
306 AP I article 43(1). 
307 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 16. 
308 Instead, each individual may be held criminally responsible for their violations of the laws 
of war (AP I article 44(2)). The effect of this provision is to prevent the detaining power from 
denying the member of a non-State-armed group their POW status upon capture, on the 
grounds that the non-State-armed group failed to observe a provision of the laws and 
customs of war (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
at 16). 
309 AP I article 43 and 44 (reaffirm GC III article 85) ‘”POWs prosecuted under the laws of the 
Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the 
benefits of the present Convention”, that is to say that they retain their status’. 
310 Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 20. 
311 Ibid. 
312 The meaning of ‘military operations preparatory to an attack’, should be ‘broadly 
construed’ to include ‘logistical activities preparatory to an attack’, since these ‘are more 
likely to be conducted in a civilian environment and consequently involving a greater 
obligation for combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians’ (Idem at 21; Michael 
Bothe, Karl Partsch and Waldemar Solf (1982) New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: 
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague at 252. 
313 AP I article 44(3). 
314 Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 19, Bothe New Rules for 
Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 at 253. The second sentence of article 44(3) sets out the 
situations in which POW status can be forfeited ‘recognising, however that there are 
situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such 
situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military 
deployment preceding the launch of an attack in which he is to participate in 
acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as 
perfidious within the meaning of article 37 (1)(c)’. ‘This second sentence suggests that the 
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distinction acknowledges the complications inherent in ‘part time 
combatancy’315, and relieves irregular combatants of the previous obligation 
to distinguish themselves at all times, even whilst ‘pursuing their civilian 
vocation or participating in a military operation not preparatory to an 
attack316’. Having said that, even while pursuing their ‘civilian vocations’, the 
members of these non-State-armed groups ‘remain combatants and may 
lawfully be attacked prior to capture’317. However, if captured whilst engaged 
in their civilian vocation, they must nevertheless be accorded POW status’318.  
 It was the relaxation of the principle of distinction for irregular 
combatants (as expressed in articles 43 and 44 of AP I) which motivated the 
United States, amongst other States, to refuse to ratify AP I. At present there 
are 170 States that have ratified the protocol, but notably absent are the 
United States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey319. This is the legal dilemma 
which faced the U.S’s ‘military prosecutors who arraigned Omar Ahmed 
Khadr’ at Guantanamo Bay, for crimes he allegedly committed as an al 
Qaeda affiliate in Afghanistan in 2002, when he was just fifteen years of 
age’320.  
 As already mentioned, international law can, by way of crystalisation 
into custom, make treaty obligations binding upon non-signatory States once 
there is sufficient State practice and opinion juris to confirm that a treaty law 
principle has crystalised into customary international law. According to the 
ICRC’s study conducted into the customary international law status of many 
of the IHL provisions found in the IHL treaties, the relaxed provisions 
contained in AP I, which determine combatant status, ‘can be said to have 
achieved customary international law status’321. Interestingly, the State 
practice relied upon to reach such a conclusion, included States like the U.S. 
who were not party to AP I. This analysis now confirms that the relaxed 
requirements for combatant status enjoy customary status and are ‘applicable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
open carrying of arms is the minimum requirement’ (Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and 
the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 19). 
315 Idem at 20. 
316 This, for example, would include the following permissible military operations: ‘gathering 
intelligence without deception, recruiting, training, general administration, law enforcement, 
aid to underground political authorities, collection of contributions and dissemination of 
propaganda’ (Bothe New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 
1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 at 252). 
317 Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and 
Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 21. 
318 Idem at 20; AP I article 44(5). 
319 Consequently in terms of the strict application of international treaty law obligations, in 
international armed conflicts involving non-State-armed forces and the nation States who 
have not ratified API, the stringent requirements contained in GC III article 4A(2) remain the 
prevailing law used to determine combatant and POW status of irregular forces (Goldman 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 23). 
320 ‘Since the government alleges that Khadr was taken to al Qaeda guest houses at age 10, 
sent to military training at age fifteen, and sent into battle shortly thereafter, any proceedings 
against him must take into account his lack of independence, relative culpability and 
vulnerability to outside influence as a child. In late 2003, the United States released three 
children (ages thirteen-fifteen) detained at Guantanamo to UNICEF to enable them to receive 
rehabilitation and reintegration assistance in Afghanistan’. Sadly Khadr was not among the 
three (Human Rights Watch ‘The Omar Khadr Case: A Teenager Imprisoned at 
Guantanamo: II Culpability of Children’ (2007) available at 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/us0607web[1].pdf (accessed 21 February 2012)). 
321 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 15. 
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in both international and non-international armed conflicts’322, irrespective of 
whether States are party to AP I. Consequently, it is safe to conclude that in 
all international armed conflicts where non-State actors are involved, the 
definition of ‘armed forces’ as set out in AP I article 43, would apply and 
would be the means of determining combatant status. When non-State actors 
are captured, the provisions in AP I articles 44-47 would then be used to 
assess their POW status. In short then, the main focus in assessing the right 
to claim POW status, is the individual ‘combatants’ failure or otherwise to 
distinguish himself from the civilian population when engaging in an attack. 
 What then are we to make of under-aged child soldiers who are 
recruited323 into non-State-armed groups and who may participate directly in 
international armed conflicts. Firstly a distinction needs to be made between 
those recruited in ‘armed force’ as defined in AP I and those recruited into a 
group which is not an ‘armed forces’324 as defined in AP I article 43(1). In the 
latter case, their lack of membership in an armed force will deny them 
combatant status, and since they are participating in hostilities they then 
forfeit their civilian immunity from attack and are classified as a ‘civilian 
participating directly in hostilities’. The phrase ‘unlawful combatant is a short 
hand expression useful for describing those civilians who take up arms 
without being authorised to do so by international law. It has an exclusively 
descriptive character ... and does not corroborate the existence of a third 
category of persons’325 As Solis opines, ‘unlawful combatants/unprivileged 
belligerents are not a third battlefield category but a subcategory of 
civilian’326. 
 During such time as they persist in their unauthorised participation in 
hostilities, these child soldiers may be legitimately targeted and ‘killing them 
within the context of combat is not murder’327. As Rogers explains, despite 
the fact that the ‘recruitment of children might be a breach of the law of war, 
the rules on combatant status apply equally to adults and children’ … it is 
only upon capture that special rules for their treatment apply to children’328. 
If they fall into enemy hands they can be prosecuted and do not enjoy normal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Idem at 14. 
323 I have excluded from this piece a discussion of children whose activities, within the non-
State-armed group, do not reach the threshold required to be labeled ‘direct participation in 
the hostilities’ (such as cooks). Where children are recruited to cook or act as porters, those 
activities will not satisfy the three-pronged test for direct participation in hostilities. (David 
Crane and Daniel Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ in William C Banks (ed) New Battlefields 
Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (2011) at 1595-1604). ‘All members of 
the regular armed forces were unconditionally and automatically presumed to enjoy full 
combatant and POW privilege without more’ (GC III article 4A (1) and (3); Goldman 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 11), ‘irrespective of their role, function, 
or contribution or lack thereof with respect to the war effort’ (Crane ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 
1535-44). As Jensen points out - ‘once an individual joins a nation’s armed forces, even as a 
cook or court reporter, he or she immediately becomes targetable by the enemy ... it is 
membership that makes the difference.’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2197-
2204 and 2477-2485). 
324 ‘Private citizens and independent armed groups have always been excluded from 
entitlement to the combatant privilege and POW status’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law in War at 197). 
325 Idem at 208. 
326 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 207. 
327 Michael W Brough ‘Combatant, Noncombatant, Criminal: The Importance of Distinction’ 
(2004) 11 Ethical Perspectives 176 at 178. 
328 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 17. 
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POW privileges329. They still benefit from the special benefits extended to all 
children to participate in hostilities as listed in AP I article 77(3): 
 
‘if, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions in paragraph 2, children 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in 
hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse Party, they shall 
continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by this article, 
whether or not they are prisoners of war330’. 
 
In essence what this means is that if detained, they will be entitled to be held 
in ‘separate quarters’ from adult detainees331, and they shall not be subjected 
to the death penalty in respect of any offence committed before they turned 
eighteen332. AP I article 77(3) flowed from the ICRC’s investigation into all the 
IHL principles which grant children special protections, but nowhere did the 
ICRC observe State practice revoking those special protections in the event 
that children are found taking part in hostilities333. 
 What then of children recruited (albeit unlawfully) into an armed force 
within the AP I article 43(1) meaning. Before one is clothed with combatant 
status, the armed force that one belongs to, and you as an individual, need to 
fulfill the IHL requirements set out in GC III 4A or AP I article 44(3). Since 
there is no minimum-age limit required for awarding POW status, I would 
argue that the same will be true of awarding combatant status. I think it would 
be wholly consistent with the ethos of IHL to award full POW status to any 
combatant who could fulfill the IHL requirements for combatant status, no 
matter how young they might be or how unlawful their recruitment. Ipsen 
supports this conclusion and notes that ‘children protected under article 77 
can only be POW if they have previously attained the primary status of 
combatants by being unlawfully recruited into the armed forces of one of the 
parties to the conflict’334. So in principle there is no obstacle to awarding them 
combatant status, even though their recruiters will be found to be in violation 
of IHL, and can face prosecution for involving under-aged children in 
hostilities.  
 Now the question which begs asking is whether (as unlawful recruits) 
under-aged children have to meet (at a minimum) the more relaxed criteria 
under AP I article 44(3) in order to enjoy combatant and POW status, or does 
the unlawfulness of their recruitment exempt them from this requirement? 
What becomes of under-aged child soldiers who are recruited into a non-
State-armed group and who individually fail to observe the minimum 
requirements of distinction? Despite the relaxation of the requirements for 
combatant status since GC III, it is a very big ask for a child soldier to 
appreciate what is expected of them by AP I, and to comply with those 
expectations. Certainly, for a child under fifteen years of age it is probably an 
impossible ask. The particular difficulty facing under-aged combatants is that 
their very youthfulness contradicts any attempts that they might be making to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 207. 
330 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 74; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
Customary International Humanitarian Law at 487. There is no lower age-limit for claiming 
POW status. 
331 AP I article 77(4). 
332 AP I article 77(5); Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 87. 
333 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 487. 
334 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 73. 
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distinguish themselves from civilians. It is as if their age speaks louder then 
their distinctive emblem (whatever that might be in the given circumstance) or 
the weapon that they carry. The crux of the problem is that children are often 
sought out by non-State-armed groups because their size and youthfulness 
makes them inconspicuous and easy to feign protected civilian status. When 
one considers that in many instances their recruitment is forcible, you have to 
question whether these unwilling child soldiers should legally be held 
responsible for their conduct. 
 Not only does a civilian lose their protection against the effects of 
hostilities when they elect to participate directly in hostilities, but they can in 
fact be legitimately targeted (without concerns for issues of proportionality335) 
for the duration of their participation in the hostilities. However, as Melzer 
points out ‘continuous combat function does not, of course, imply de jure 
entitlement to combatant privilege’ with its attendant immunity from 
prosecution336. Even once they are again classified as civilians they can 
nevertheless still face ‘prosecution for violations of domestic and international 
law they may have committed’337 - in particular for their unauthorised 
participation in hostilities338. What is particularly problematic for civilians 
taking a direct part in hostilities or acting with a continuous combat function, 
is that they are very often found in the theatre of war acting so as to ‘capture, 
injure, or kill an adversary and in doing so they fail to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population in order to lead the adversary to believe that they 
are entitled to civilian protection against direct attack’. This alone is 
considered a serious violation of the IHL prohibition against perfidy339. 
Moreover, even if they had at all times respected the laws of war340, their 
direct participation in hostilities is what exposes them to prosecution. 
 If individuals are determined to participate in hostilities, it really is in their 
best long-term interests to satisfy the requirements for authorised 
combatancy. Admittedly, being a combatant will make them a legitimate 
military target, but they will also enjoy POW immunity from prosecution, plus 
they will still enjoy the child-focused protections set out in AP I article 77. 
Assigning them civilian status at all times (as Grover suggests) is not going to 
afford them the best protection in the event of their capture. If they cannot 
fulfill the legal requirements for combatant status, and yet continue to 
participate directly in hostilities without authorisation, they can also be legally 
targeted for so long as they continue to participate in hostilities, but also will 
face criminal prosecution for their unauthorised actions. As Ipsen notes - 
‘children protected under article 77 can only be POW if they have previously 
attained the primary status of combatants by being unlawfully recruited into 
the armed forces of one of the parties to the conflict. This is particularly 
significant because the combatant status protects the child against being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Schmitt Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 
703. 
336 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 847. 
337 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 83; 
Adam Roberts ‘The Civilian in Modern Warfare’ (2009) 12 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 13 at 41. 
338 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 12. 
339 Idem at 85. 
340 Idem at 84. 
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prosecuted upon capture for its direct participation in hostilities’341. Does this 
suggest that unlawful recruitment guarantees combatant status which can 
never be forfeited (even by feigning civilian status or spying)? It seems 
unlikely that such an important point would not be expressly stated in API 
article 77 if that was what the drafters had intended.  
 While article 77(3) ensures certain safeguards for all children, it is 
apparent that the leniency afforded under-aged child soldiers does not 
guarantee them complete immunity from all prosecution. The fact that they 
need protection from the death penalty (whether or not they have POW 
status) suggests that they are not exempt from prosecution and its 
consequences. This conclusion would support the argument that they can be 
prosecuted for violations of the laws of war, and what more fundamental 
violation is there but to feign civilian status and fail to observe the principle of 
distinction. I would argue, that like any adult combatant, they too can forfeit 
their POW privileges if they fail to observe the minimum requirement of 
distinction (carrying their arms openly). While this failure will render them 
liable of prosecution, the safeguards in article 77 of separate facilities for 
children and exemption from the death penalty, will be observed. 
 The real impact of this assessment (whether the result is one of 
combatant or civilian status), is felt at the moment that these child soldiers 
are captured. If they are afforded combatant status by virtue of their unlawful 
recruitment and observance of the principle of distinction, they will avoid 
prosecution for their participation in hostilities. If they are deemed to be 
unlawful combatants by virtue of their failure to observe the principle of 
distinction, they would likely face criminal prosecution upon capture. 
Ironically, many of these child soldiers would have committed the majority of 
their crimes at a time when they would probably not have had full criminal 
responsibility under the domestic legislation of their respective States. Sadly 
it is only upon facing prosecution that the real age of many of these young 
recruits will be accurately ascertained. It is to this aspect of prosecution which 
I now turn my focus. Perhaps here we can ameliorate the affect of this 
conundrum. 
 
5.5 Prosecuting under-aged child soldiers recruited into non-State-
armed groups 
 
In terms of IHL, civilians who participate in hostilities without authorisation, or 
combatants who are found in breach of the laws of war, can face criminal 
prosecution. However, given that the recruitment of children under fifteen 
years of age is unlawful, under both treaty and customary IHL, the drafters of 
the AP I, through article 77(3), attempted to soften the application of this 
normal IHL consequence for unauthorised participation in hostilities - in 
instances where children under fifteen years of age are recruited to 
participate in hostilities and are captured. At the very least they might be 
spared the death penalty for their crimes. 
 Dutli argues that the rationale for this special allowance made for 
children under fifteen years of age stems from the fact that ‘a child combatant 
under age fifteen, who is captured cannot be sentenced for having borne 
arms’ since the breach of AP I article 77(2) lies at the door of the recruiting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 73. 
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party, not on the shoulders of the under-aged child’342. As Grover argues, it 
would be unjust to prosecute children under fifteen years of age for their 
participation in hostilities, given that IHL prohibits the recruitment of under 
fifteen’s, and as civilians the State is obliged to protect these children against 
involvement in the conflict343. 
 Neither the CRC nor the OP-AC (the two international treaties dealing 
specifically with the rights of children in conflict situations) contain ‘a universal 
minimum age of criminal culpability for committing conflict-related 
international crimes’ 344. Neither does either of these treaties contain 
directives on when child soldiers should be ‘prosecuted for having committed 
conflict-related international crimes, or having been part of any armed groups 
that did so’345. For the most part States set the minimum age for full criminal 
responsibility at eighteen years of age in their domestic legislation346. In light 
of this virtually universal position, Grover argues that children involved in 
armed conflicts under eighteen years of age, should enjoy blanket immunity 
from criminal prosecution. Grover argues that this same principle of 
guiltlessness should apply to child soldiers who were ‘compulsorily recruited 
or recruited by non-State armed forces (as both are also breaches of 
international law)’347. Certainly, any practice that favours the non-prosecution 
of child soldiers under fifteen years of age endorses the IHL aim of shielding 
children from the horrors of war. I am not wholly convinced that a similar ban 
on prosecution applies in cases of child soldiers aged between fifteen and 
eighteen years of age. Certainly, AP I article 77(3) limits the special leniency 
afforded children found participating directly in hostilities, to those under 
fifteen years of age348.  
 In examining recent judicial practice we find that neither the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), nor the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), prosecuted any one under 
eighteen years of age, despite the fact that there was no provision precluding 
the prosecution of under eighteens in their statutes. The statute of the SCSL 
allowed for the prosecution of child soldiers over fifteen years of age. 
However the Prosecutor for the SCSL ‘announced that child soldiers would 
not be prosecuted, as they were not legally liable for acts committed during 
the conflict’349. Instead, these types of cases were referred to the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), because it was felt that a 
rehabilitative focus was more in tune with the prevailing international legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Dutli ‘Captured Child Combatants’. 
343 Grover ‘”Child Soldiers”’ as ‘”Non-Combatants”’: The Inapplicability of the Refugee 
Convention Exclusion Clause’ at 57. 
344 Grover ‘”Child Soldiers”’ as ‘”Non-Combatants”’: The Inapplicability of the Refugee 
Convention Exclusion Clause’ at 55. 
345 Ibid. 
346 UNICEF Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. 
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349 David Crane ‘Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Experience’ 
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norm350. This ‘rehabilitative’ focus is favoured in the Paris principles which 
maintain that ‘children accused of crimes under international law, allegedly 
committed while they were associated with armed forces or armed groups, 
should be considered primarily as victims of offences against international 
law, not only as perpetrators’351.‘They must be treated in accordance with 
international juvenile justice standards and norms, and within a framework of 
restorative justice and social reintegration’352. The ICC, for their part, has 
specifically limited its jurisdictional reach to those over eighteen years of age, 
as ‘those who are universally accepted as not being children under 
international law’353. 
The existing jurisprudence from the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ICC, 
suggests ‘that children under age eighteen can expect to avoid criminal 
responsibility before international tribunals for grave violations of IHL’354. 
Moreover, ‘no international criminal tribunal established under the laws of 
war, from Nuremberg forward, has prosecuted a former child soldier for 
violating the laws of war’355. Moodrick-Even Khen argues that this fact is 
‘owing to the belief that the factors which influence a child’s participation in 
hostilities mitigate the requisite mens rea necessary for criminal culpability’356. 
 Despite this historic leniency shown towards children under eighteen 
years of age caught up in conflict situations, there is no explicit IHL provision 
which would legally ‘exclude penal proceedings in respect of serious 
breaches of IHL committed by children’357. Unfortunately this leniency has 
also made child soldiers the ideal type of combatant - their age allows them 
to feign protected civilian status, and they have little incentive to observe the 
laws of war if they are unlikely to face prosecution. Brett and McCallin argue 
that the ‘greater suggestability of children, and the degree to which they can 
be normalised into violence, means that child soldiers are more likely to 
commit atrocities then adults’358. Those fighting child soldiers can expect little 
respect for IHL from these children. Instead they should expect ‘false 
surrenders, hiding among civilians, and POW executions’359. Singer reports 
that child soldiers often fail to observe the legal protections afforded hors de 
combat, and they have been known to target humanitarian workers and 
journalists360. In fact Amnesty International argues that where child soldiers 
have been voluntarily recruited, and satisfy the State’s domestic law for 
criminal culpability, they should in fact face criminal prosecution for their 
actions361. 
 While it may be compelling to make a case for the non-prosecution of 
child soldiers under eighteen years of age (regardless of whether the 
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recruitment was voluntary or forcible), until the straight-eighteen ban can be 
said to have achieved customary status, the voluntary recruitment of over 
fifteen’s is technically not unlawful: an argument that has been used by those 
facing prosecution before the ICC for child recruitment362. Without an element 
of force at the time of recruitment, there might very well be a legitimate case 
to be made for prosecuting children over fifteen years of age who participate 
in hostilities without authorisation, or who are found to be in breach of the 
laws of war. I would argue that any special practice of not actively 
prosecuting363 children under fifteen years of age under IHL364, must logically 
be extended to children under eighteen years of age where they are forcibly 
recruited, even in instances where the straight-eighteen ban is not legally 
applicable. This conclusion is supported by the jurisprudence from the ICTY, 
ICTR, SCSL and ICC. Unfortunately those over fifteen years of age, who 
voluntarily sign up to participate in hostilities, should be aware that there is no 
international legal prohibition against their prosecution. 
 While child rights advocates may disagree on whether to prosecute or 
not, there is generally agreement that in the event of such prosecutions, child 
soldiers ‘should always be evaluated according to their age, and as a general 
rule educational measures, rather than penalties, will be decided 
on’365. ‘There is no doubt that if children involved in military operations are 
captured, they must receive the special treatment and protections366 
appropriate to their age, meaning that such children should be treated with 
pity rather than detestation’367. Even if children take part in hostilities and fall 
foul of the IHL requirements for combatant status368, API article 75 sets out 
the basic minimum humanitarian guarantees and fair judicial procedures 
which they are entitled to upon capture369 - for the protection of all persons 
including children. Despite these guarantees, in a number of countries 
(Burundi, DRC and Myanmar) child soldiers, some as young as nine years of 
age, have been arbitrarily detained, tortured and sentenced to death for 
participating in hostilities370. 
 The one thing that both sides of the debate can agree upon, however, 
is that international criminal law must be seen to be prosecuting those, like 
Lubanga, Ntaganda, Kony, Katanga and Chui - found recruiting child 
soldiers371. Mercifully both the ICC372 and the SCSL have insisted that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 It was the submission of the Special Representative before the ICC in the Lubanga trial, 
that the psychological voluntariness of these actions were questionable (Wakabi ‘Lubanga 
Trial Highlights Plight of Child Soldiers’).  
363 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 73. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Crimes of War ‘Child Soldiers’; Dutli ‘Captured Child Combatants’. 
366 IHL specifically precludes the ‘imposition of the death penalty on anyone under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the offences’ (GC IV article 68, AP I article 77(5); Crimes of War ‘Child 
Soldiers’). 
367 Udombana ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflicts’ at 76 and 77. 
368 ‘Even if child soldiers, as members of irregular forces which fall foul of the GC III 
requirements, and are deemed unlawful belligerents’ (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 68). 
369 AP I article 75; GC III articles 99-108; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 
68). 
370 Coalition against Child Soldiers Child Soldiers Global Report at 18. 
371 Cynthia Chamberlain (2010) ‘Children and the International Criminal Court’ in Noëlle 
Quénivet and Shilan Shah-Davis (eds) International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in 
the 21st Century TMC Asser Press: Netherlands at 246-7. 
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children under fifteen are unable to consent out of the international law 
protection afforded them against recruitment373. In light of the circumstances 
in which child soldiers are frequently ‘enlisted’ into non-State-armed groups, 
to ‘accept consent as a defense would be to negate the whole policy behind 
such prohibitions’374. If a child lies about their age, or claims to truly volunteer 
- does this negate the unlawfulness of their recruitment and thereby make 
them vulnerable to prosecution? 
In the words of Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, ‘leaders of armed 
groups could not hide behind the excuse of a child having joined their groups 
voluntarily’375.‘Failure to refuse the voluntary enlistment of children to the 
armed force is thus a war crime’376. Sadly, those child soldiers over fifteen 
years of age are still legally able to consent to recruitment, and without 
domestic legislation to the contrary (pursuant to the ACRWC or OP-AC), their 
participation is strictly speaking not prohibited.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
Existing IHL reveals that while a child (defined as anyone under the age of 
eighteen years of age) can become a combatant, the recruitment of child 
soldiers under fifteen years of age is strictly prohibited in all armed conflicts. 
At an international criminal law level, the Rome Statue dictates that 
‘conscripting or enlisting children under fifteen years into any armed forces, or 
using them to participate actively in hostilities’ (in both international and 
internal conflicts) are prosecutable war crimes377. At present, customary 
international law prohibits recruitment of children under fifteen years of age, 
and this customary obligation binds non-State actors even without domestic 
legislation, in both international and non-international armed conflicts. For the 
most part, non-State-armed groups may recruit children as young as fifteen 
years of age to participate in hostilities, and this fact immediately raises 
issues around how they are to be classified in terms of IHL.  
 While IHL might ‘prohibit the recruitment and participation of children 
less than fifteen-years old in armed conflict, those who do decide to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 ‘The manner in which a child was recruited, and whether it involved compulsion or was 
“voluntary”, are circumstances which may be taken into consideration by the Chamber at the 
sentencing or reparations phase, as appropriate. However, the consent of a child to his or 
her recruitment does not provide an accused with a valid defence’ (Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo ICC Public judgment pursuant to article 74 of the statute at 617). 
373 This position echoes the dicta of the Appeal chamber of the SCSL, which concluded that 
‘where a child under the age of fifteen years is allowed to voluntarily join an armed force or 
group, his or her consent is not a valid defence to those facing prosecution for unlawful 
enlistment’ (Prosecutor v Fofana ICC Judgment (28 May 2008) SCSL-04-14-A at para 140; 
Rosen ‘Who is a child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers’ at 110). For those facing 
prosecution before the ICC under the Rome statute, ‘the line between lawful recruitment and 
unlawful recruitment is drawn based solely on age’…‘all “voluntary” acts or statements or 
other indications or interpretations of consent by children under the legal age for recruitment 
are legally irrelevant’ (Coomaraswamy, Amicus Curiae Submission in Lubanga Trial, at para 
10). 
374 Ibid. 
375 Wakabi ‘Lubanga Trial Highlights Plight of Child Soldiers’. Coomaraswamy made a 
submission before the ICC as amicus curiae in the Lubanga trial. 
376 Yoram Dinstein (2010) The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict (2nd Ed) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 158. 
377 Articles 8.b.xxvi and 8.e.vii.  
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participate are recognised as combatants and lose the protections afforded 
civilians under IHL’378, although once captured these child soldiers do enjoy 
the special treatment afforded to children379. 
 Where these child soldiers are recruited into a non-State-armed group 
which does not satisfy the IHL requirements for an ‘armed group’, they are 
classified as civilians, albeit participating in hostilities. In applying the ICRC’s 
guidelines on what activities amount to ‘direct participation’, it is apparent that 
the criteria extend beyond active participation in combat and military 
activities, and includes many of the direct support functions380 which child 
soldiers traditionally carry out. Children who carry out these restricted 
functions lose their civilian immunity from attack, and may become liable for 
‘criminal prosecution for their unauthorised participation in hostilities, even 
children below the lawful recruitment age’381, and even if their recruitment 
was involuntary. They may be legitimate military targets for so long as they 
participate directly in hostilities. Furthermore, as members of armed groups, 
their civilian immunity from attack is suspended for so long as they engage in 
the continuous combat function, and until they disassociate themselves from 
the group. 
On the other hand, children recruited into an ‘armed force’ as defined in IHL, 
are granted presumptive POW status upon capture and the right to have their 
POW status adjudicated on before a judicial tribunal382. However, while IHL 
does afford special protections to children involved in conflict situations, it 
does still require these young combatants to meet, at a minimum, the more 
relaxed criteria under AP I in order to ensure the they do not forfeit their POW 
status for failing to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. 
 Certainly, the prohibition against prosecuting child soldiers under fifteen 
years of age would reflect the ethos of shielding children from the horrors of 
war, which underpins much of IHL. While there is a pattern of historic 
leniency shown towards children under eighteen caught up in conflict 
situations, in so far as their prosecution is concerned, the special protections 
extended to children in armed conflicts do not ‘exclude penal proceedings in 
respect of serious breaches of IHL committed by children’383. In fact, Amnesty 
International’s argues that where child soldiers have been voluntarily 
recruited and satisfy the State’s domestic law for criminal culpability, they 
should face criminal prosecution for their unlawful actions384. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Mulira ‘International Legal Standards Governing the Use of Child Soldiers’ at 29. 
379 AP I article 77 (3). 
380 UNICEF Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
at 14. 
381 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 50. 
382 AP I article 45(1) and (2) and 43(2); Goldman ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 18. 
383 Crimes of War ‘Child Soldiers’; Dutli ‘Captured Child Combatants’.  
384 Grover ‘”Child Soldiers”’ as ‘”Non-Combatants”’: The Inapplicability of the Refugee 
Convention Exclusion Clause’ at 54. 












THE COMBATANT STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF 
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When the Cold War ended in the 1990s, ‘more than six2 million soldiers’ were 
demobilised, and many military and security functions were simultaneously 
outsourced3 at unprecedented4 levels to a new player in international 
                                                
1 This chapter is based on two articles, one published under the title ‘Private Security 
Contractors and International Humanitarian Law - A skirmish for recognition in international 
armed conflicts’ (2007) 16(4) African Security Review 34-52 available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com, and revised with permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis 
Ltd); and the other entitled ‘Private military and security contractors: Violating the prohibition 
against civilian direct participation in hostilities, in international armed conflicts’, which is 
undergoing peer review with the Journal for Juridical Science. This later article reflects 
subsequent developments in the concept of combatant status under customary IHL, and 
incorporates the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 
which was published in 2009. 
2 Peter Warren Singer (2006) ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some 
Implications of the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ in Victoria 
Wheeler and Adele Harmer (eds) Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in 
Military-Humanitarian Relations, HPG Report 22 at 2. 
3 This chapter does not address the controversy around whether States should be permitted 
to outsource ‘activities which are inherently governmental and military in nature’. For more on 
this issue see Mirko Sossai (2011) ‘Status of Private Military and Security Company 
Personnel in the Law of International Armed Conflict’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino 
Ronzotti (eds) War By Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors 
Oxford University Press: Oxford at 198. As Gillard points out ‘international humanitarian law 
does not address the lawfulness or legitimacy of PMCs/PSCs or of States' outsourcing to 
them certain activities. Rather, its aim is to regulate the activities of these actors if they are 
operating in situations of armed conflict’ (Emanuela-Chiara Gillard ‘Private Military/Security 
Companies: The Status of their Staff and their Obligations under International Humanitarian 
Law and the Responsibilities of States in Relation to their Operations’ (2005) Third Expert 
Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Geneva at 1). Neither does it 
address the issue of State responsibility for the actions of these contracted PMSCs (for more 
on this topic see Shannon Bosch ‘Private Security Contractors and State Responsibility’ 
(2009) 41(3) Comparative and Internatioal Law quarterly of South Africa 353-382). Neither will 
I address the issue around regulating the industry, save to make mention of the specific 
provisions in the Montreux Document and Code of Conduct which pertain to IHL status and 
direct participation in hostilities (for more on this see ‘The Montreux Document on Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of 
Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’ (Montreux Document) 
available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf (accessed 14 June 2012), and 
‘International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ available at 
http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names
.pdf (accessed 7 July 2012)).  
4 In 1991 the ratio of military personnel to contractors was 50:1; by 2003 the ratio was less 
than 10:1 (Peter Warren Singer (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military 
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humanitarian law (IHL): the private military and security contractor (PMSC) 5. 
Subsequent, general military downsizing has presented private security 
companies with a vast pool of ex-military personnel6, and a burgeoning 
market for their services. Not suprisingly, names like DynCorp International 
LLC, Triple Canopy Inc, EOD Technologies Inc, Aegis Defence Services 
Limited, ArmorGroup International plc, and Blackwater Security, feature 
prominently in the international armed conflicts which followed (notably in Iraq 
and Afghanistan)7. Today there are an estimated8 3109 registered private 
military and security companies, operational in ‘over fifty countries’10 ‘from 
Albania to Zambia’11, with ‘access to an international, mobile, and largely 
anonymous pool of labor’12. In 2010, the industry itself was estimated to be 
worth between 200 and 300 billion U.S. dollars annually13.  
                                                                                                                                      
Industry Cornell University Press: New York at 277). At the end of the Iraqi conflict, 
contractors working for the U.S. government and military outnumbered U.S. troops in Iraq 
(Amnesty International ‘Private Military Contractors: Questions and Answers’, available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/pmc/HousePartyToolKit.pdf (accessed 19 July 2012); 
Ellen L Frye ‘Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” can 
Tame the “Dogs of War”’ (2005) May Fordham Law Review 2607 at 2610). Moreover, ‘there 
are an estimated 10,000 security contractors in Afghanistan, including local nationals, third-
party nationals, and Afghan security companies’ (Erica Gaston ‘Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise 
of the Modern Private Security Industry and its Implications for International Humanitarian 
Law Enforcement’ (2008) 49(1) Harvard International Law Journal 221 at 223). 
5 Won Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2010) 38(3) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 361 at 364; Singer 
‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military 
Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 3. 
6 Blackwater (founded by a U.S. Navy SEAL) is staffed by ‘former military, intelligence, and 
law enforcement personnel’; Triple Canopy Inc (founded by a member of the U.S. Special 
Forces’ Delta Force) is ‘comprised of former operators from tier-one special operations units’; 
aand Aegis Defence Services Limited was founded by a retired British lieutenant-colonel 
(Jennifer K Elsea, Moshe Schwartz and Kennon H. Nakamura ‘Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’ (2008) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf (accessed 10 July 2012) at 8-10). 
7 Renée De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ (2009) 40 Security 
Dialogue available at http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/40/2/169 (accessed 10 July 2012) at 
175; Elsea et al ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other 
Issues’ at 9-11. 
8 ‘There is no exhaustive list of companies operating in the international private security 
sector, and a notorious lack of verifiable data on the magnitude of the industry’ (Caroline 
Holmqvist ‘The Private Security Industry, States and Lack of an International Response’ 
Prepared for the Seminar on Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups convened by the 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) at Harvard University, in 
cooperation with the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva) and the Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study (Harvard University, Cambridge) (9-10 March 2007) at 7). 
9 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 175. 
10 Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the 
Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 3. 
11 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
364. 
12 Holmqvist ‘The Private Security Industry, States and Lack of an International Response’ at 
7; De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 175. 
13 Holmqvist ‘The Private Security Industry, States and Lack of an International Response’ at 
7; Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the 
Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 3; Paul Keilthy (2004) ‘Private 
Security Firms in War Zones Worry NGOs’ available at 
http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/private-security-firms-war-zones-worry-ngos (accessed 
25 September 2012). 
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 This boom in the private security industry has been met with mixed 
responses. While the early PMSCs like Sandline International and Executive 
Outcomes openly advertised their combative activities, ‘today’s PMSC 
downplay a willingness to provide direct combat support’14. Some tout 
themselves as the world’s future peacekeeper15. While others brand PMSCs 
as ‘mercenaries’. In line with the two international anti-mercenary treaties16, 
some States have even introduced measures to ban or regulate the activities 
of PMSCs17. The official U.N. position, expressed through the U.N. Working 
Group on the Use of Mercenaries, is that ‘many private military and security 
companies are operating in a “grey zone” which is not defined at all, or at the 
least not clearly defined by international legal norms’18.  
 Whatever individual States conclude regarding the legality of PMSCs, 
one thing is clear: PMSCs ‘are becoming more mainstream and acceptable’19. 
In Iraq, even the Chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Paul Bremmer) 
and visiting dignitaries, were seldom without a Blackwater Security escort20, 
and in the Green Zone in Baghdad, it was not uncommon for Blackwater 
personnel to be involved in ‘prolonged gun battles … defending the U.S. 
                                                
14 Aril McDonald ‘Private Military Contractors’ (no date) Transnational and Non-State Armed 
Groups Project available at http://www.tagsproject.org (accessed 14 July 2012) at 2. 
15 Damian Lilly ‘The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities in Peace Keeping 
Evolution or Extinction?’ (2000) 3 UNIDAR available at http://www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-
periodique.php?ref_periodique=1020-7287-2000-3-en (accessed 19 July 2012); Lindsey 
Cameron ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status Under International Humanitarian Law 
and its Impact on their Regulation’ (2006) 88:863 International Review of the Red Cross 573. 
16 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (1989) 2163 U.N. Treaty Series 75 (A/RES/44/34) (‘U.N. Mercenary 
Convention’) which entered into force on 20 October 2001 - by July 2012 only 32 States had 
become party to the convention (Katherine Fallah ‘Corporate Actors: The Legal Status of 
Mercenaries in Armed Conflict’ (2006) 88:863 International Review of the Red Cross 599 at 
603). 1977 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (XXXIX) Annex II Rev. 3 
OAU CM/817 (‘O.A.U. Mercenaries Convention’) available at http://www.africa-
union.org/official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention_on_Merc
enaries.pdf (accessed 14 July 2012). 
17 The U.S. and South Africa are amongst the biggest producers of PMSCs, ‘so it is 
perhaps not surprising that they have come the furthest in regulating the industry’ (Holmqvist 
‘The Private Security Industry, States and Lack of an International Response’ at 50). To this 
end, South Africa has passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 
and proposed the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in 
the Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (for more on this see Shannon Bosch and 
Marelie Maritz ‘South African Private Security Contractors Active in armed Conflicts: 
Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work’ (2011) 14:7 Potchefstroom Electronic Review 
71. 
18 Marina Mancini, Faustin Z Ntoubandi and Thilo Marauhm (2011) ‘Old Concepts and New 
Challenges: Are Private Contractors the Mercenaries of the Twenty-first Century?’ in 
Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzotti (eds) War By Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors Oxford University Press: Oxford at 340. 
19 Christopher H Lytton ‘Blood for Hire: How the War in Iraq has Reinvented the World’s 
Second Oldest Profession’ (2006) Summer Oregon Review of International Law at 307. ‘The 
United Nations (U.N.) is beginning to realise this fact and in its most recent guidance they 
have begun addressing “other security actors” in recent U.N. guidelines’ (Colonel Cliff D 
Crofford, Jr ‘Private Security Contractors on the Battlefield’ (15 March 2006) USAWC 
Strategy Research Project available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil320.pdf (accessed 10 July 2012) at 
8). 
20 Frye ‘Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” can 
Tame the “Dogs of War”’ at 2611.  
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government headquarters’21. In 2004, graphic images of the bodies of a 
former Army Ranger and a former Navy SEAL, now Blackwater Security 
Contractors, being ‘mutilated, burned, dragged through the streets, and hung 
from a bridge over the Euphrates River’ - made news headlines around the 
world22.  
It is not only actual States who are making greater use of PMSCs - 
‘private corporations, international and regional inter-governmental 
organisations, as well as non-governmental organisations’23 are also 
increasingly needing to employ PMSCs, in order to operate in situations of 
armed conflict24. These private contractors have reportedly provided anything 
from direct frontline military assistance, to security, advice and training, 
logistical support, maintenance, interrogation, guarding and intelligence 
services25.  
 While some texts draw a distinction between ‘private military 
companies (which may replace or back-up an army or armed group)26, and 
private security companies (which provide services to protect businesses and 
property from criminal activity)’27, I have adopted the blanket term ‘private 
military and/or security contractors’ (PMSCs) to refer to individual contractors 
who provide either military services28 or security services29. I have chosen to 
                                                
21 Elsea et al ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other 
Issues’ at 11; Frye ‘Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining 
“Mercenary” can Tame the “Dogs of War”’ at 2611. 
22 Frye ‘Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” can 
Tame the “Dogs of War”’ at 2607. These Blackwater personnel were ambushed ‘while 
escorting trucks carrying supplies for a private company that provided food services to U.S. 
military dining facilities in Iraq’ (Elsea et al ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, 
Legal Status, and Other Issues’ at 11). 
23 That said, in order to secure their funding, they often prefer ‘to work with low-profile security 
providers like Olive, Hart, Armorgoup-DSL’ (Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military 
Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ 
at 3). 
24 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard ‘Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and 
International Humanitarian Law’ 2006 88:863 International Review of the Red Cross 525 at 
525.  
25 EOD Technologies Inc, claims to provide ‘munitions response, security services, and 
critical mission support. Its security services include armed security, guard force, reaction 
force training, surveillance and surveillance detection, counter IED response services, and 
security consulting’ (Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 364). ArmorGroup International plc provides ‘protective security; [a] risk 
management consultancy; security training; development, humanitarian, and construction 
support; weapons reduction and mine action services … to more than 5,000 security 
professionals, government officials, and corporate executives and their families worldwide’ 
(Elsea et al ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’ 
at 11). DynCorp International LLC provided ‘police training and related services in Iraq’ (Idem 
at 9). Singer Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry at 91-92; De 
Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 175; Holmqvist ‘The Private 
Security Industry, States and Lack of an International Response’ at 5. 
26 ‘These offer direct, tactical military assistance, including serving in combat roles’ (Singer 
‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military 
Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 3). 
27 Rikke Ishøy (2008) Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law 
(revised edition) Danish Red Cross: København at 106-107.  
28 As defined in the Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), 
as ‘specialised services related to military actions, including strategic planning, intelligence, 
investigation, land, sea or air reconnaissance, flight operations of any type, manned or 
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use this approach, because, as the Montreaux Document acknowledges30: 
the reality on the ground is that the line between purely security functions 
often blurs into functions with a military flavour, and so it seems to be 
pragmatic to deal with all permutations of the ‘beast’. Consequently, 
throughout this chapter I will refer to PMSCs, with the caveat that under this 
umbrella-term, will be individuals performing any range of tasks from active 
combat, military support31, training32 and non-lethal support33, through to 
passive defence, and the ‘protection and defense of civilians and their 
property’34.  
IHL treaties35 (drafted ‘prior to and during the Cold War’36), and human 
rights treaties, currently make no specific reference to PMSCs by this 
appellation37. At present, the legal response to PMSCs is focused upon 
enforcing some legal accountability for their actions, and ‘little effort seems to 
have been made to assess their general status under IHL’38. In 2008, a joint 
iniative between the Swiss government and the ICRC gave rise to a code of 
good  practices for the private security industry called the Montreux 
Document. The Montreux document contained a list of twenty-seven 
obligations, requiring States to ensure that private security companies comply 
                                                                                                                                      
unmanned, satellite surveillance, any kind of knowledge transfer with military applications, 
material and technical support to armed forces and other related activities’ (Human Rights 
Council ‘Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination’ 
(2010) A/HRC/15/25 (‘Draft PMSC Convention’). 
29 As defined in the Draft PMSC Convention, as: ‘armed guarding or protection of buildings, 
installations, property and people, any kind of knowledge transfer with security and policing 
applications, development and implementation of informational security measures and other 
related activities’. 
30 Montreux Document at 37. 
31 Which includes the provision of ‘logistics, intelligence and maintenance services’, as 
performed by Halliburton and its KBR subsidiary (Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private 
Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian 
Community’ at 3). 
32 ‘Retired senior and non-commissioned officers’ are often contracted ‘to provide military 
advice and training’, as was the practice of Washington-based Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI) (Ibid). 
33 Who ‘provide logistical support such as de-mining, laundry and food services’ (Douglas 
Brooks ‘Protecting People: The PMC Potential: Comments and Suggestions for the U.K. 
Green Paper on Regulating Private Military Services’ (2002) available at 
http://www.ipoaonline.org (accessed 17 September 2010) at 2-3). 
34 Zoe Salzman ‘Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation’ (2008) 
40 International Law and Politics 853 at 857. 
35 IHL is unusual in that it applies ‘to all individuals who find themselves in a territory in which 
there is an armed conflict (international or non-international), whether they are State or non-
State actors’, and consequently is binding on PMSCs (Lindsey Cameron ‘International 
Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military Companies’ (2007) available at 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Non-State/Cameron.pdf (accessed 20 
August 2010) at 2).  
36 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
364. 
37 Montreux Document at 37.  
38 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
365. 
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with international law39. The document then goes on to propose a list of 
seventy-three ‘good practices’, intended to assist States in ensuring that 
private security companies are both responsible under, and respect IHL and 
human rights law. At the same time that the Swiss initiative was drafting the 
Montreux document, there were also a variety of national and regional 
associations being formed, with the aim of self regulating the private security 
industry of their members. These associations include the British Association 
of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), the Pan African Security Association 
(PASA), the International Peace Operations (IPOA), and the Private Security 
Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI). One year later in 2009 the UN Working 
Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination40  
proposed a Draft Convention on Regulation Oversight and Monitoring of 
Private Military and Security Companies41. The draft convention proposes a 
regulatory framework which addresses a variety of issues including:  
• regulating the relationship between States and private security 
companies42;  
• State responsibility43; 
• international humanitarian law and human rights law obligations44; 
• limitations upon States against outsourcing inherent government 
functions or prohibited activities to PMSCs45. 
The Draft Convention aims to establish mechanisms through its ‘Oversight 
Committee’46  and through its complaint procedures47, to monitor48 and 
enforce the provisions at both a domestic49  and international level.  
With PMSCs fast outnumbering traditional armed forces on the ground 
in international armed conflicts50, and with the prospect that PMSCs are likely 
to be a permanent feature in ‘humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peace-
enforcement operations’51, there is an urgent and pragmatic need for IHL to 
                                                
39 These include legislating, investigating, prosecuting and enforcing IHL obligations, 
including provision for the payment of reparations in instances where private security 
companies violate IHL. 
40 Published under HRC Res 2005/2.  
41 (13 July 2009) available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/A.HRC.15.25.pdf (accessed 20 May 
2013). 
42 Idem article 6. 
43 Idem article 4. 
44 Idem article 7. 
45 Idem articles 8-11. 
46 Idem article 33. 
47 Idem article 34 and 37. 
48 Idem article 35. 
49 Idem article 4(5). 
50 This chapter focuses solely on international armed conflicts, as defined by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, common article 2 and Additional Protocol I, because the legal regime 
that applies to international armed conflicts differs vastly from that which regulates non-
international armed conflicts (Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of 
Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors’ (2008) 98(3) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 711 at 728), and the issue ‘combatant status …exists only in 
international armed conflicts’ (De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ 
at 173; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (2005) Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 11). 
51 Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the 
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address the issue of ‘where the modern PMSCs fit into existing international 
law’52. Without an ‘international convention which governs the activities of 
PMSCs specifically, the ‘status of today’s private military contractors is 
ambiguous at best’53. That said, ‘in situations of armed conflict certain well-
established rules and principles do… regulate both the activities of PMSC 
staff, and the responsibilities of the States that hire them’54 under IHL. 
Beyond the prospect of tribunals being flooded with cases involving the IHL 
status of PMSCs, lie other motivations for this analysis: first, opposition forces 
need clarity as to whether PMSCs may be legitimately targeted in the theatre 
of armed conflict; secondly, PMSCs need to know whether they are permitted 
to participate directly in hostilities (and exactly what activities amount to direct 
participation in hostilities), and lastly, PMSCs must appreciate the 
consequences which might follow from their actions if they do participate 
directly in hostilities55. In short, it is crucial to assess their specific primary 
status as combatants or civilians’56, and to ascertain what actions amount to 
direct participation in hostilities. At this juncture it is useful to note that while 
some PMSCs might fulfil the definitional criteria for Mercenarism, and 
consequently be found to be in violation of IHL57, their direct participation in 
hostilities alone is ‘neither prohibited nor privileged’58 according to the ICRC 
Interpretive Guide. What is crucial however, is understanding that these 
actions which amount to direct participation in hostilities do compromise the 
immunity from direct targeting, which is otherwise enjoyed by civilians in 
situations of armed conflict. 
 I turn now to address these two issues in turn: the primary status of 
PMSCs under IHL, and how the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
affects them in the roles they have assumed in international armed conflicts. 
 
6.2 The importance of primary status under IHL and its legal 
consequences 
 
At the heart of IHL is the notion that ‘armed hostilities should as far as 
possible be between organised armed forces, not entire societies’59. To this 
end, IHL attempts to maintain a ‘firebreak distinguishing legitimate military 
targets, from civilian objects and people not involved in armed hostilities’60, in 
order to ‘insulate civilians from the prospect of attack in war’61. For this 
                                                                                                                                      
Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 3. 
52 Lytton ‘Blood for Hire: How the War in Iraq has Reinvented the World’s Second Oldest 
Profession’ at 307. 
53 Ibid; Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian 
Law’ at 364; De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 170. 
54 Montreux Document at 37. 
55 Cameron ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status Under International Humanitarian Law 
and its Impact on their Regulation’ 582. 
56 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 175. 
57 And potentially face prosecution at the hands of States party to the U.N. Mercenaries 
Convention or the O.A.U. Mercenaries Convention, or under a State’s municipal law. 
58 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under IHL at 83. 
59 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
363. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Yoram Dinstein (2004) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 35. 
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firebreak to be effective, every individual in the theatre of war must have a 
recognised primary status as either a combatant or a civilian62. The 
determination of one’s primary status informs not only the protections which 
individuals are afforded in the theatre of war, but also the legal consequences 
that flow from their actions63, and the international legal obligations imposed 
upon their captors64.  
 It is important to note that ‘no one is born a combatant … without being 
a civilian first’65. However, once a civilian becomes a ‘member of the armed 
forces of a belligerent party’66 (as defined by IHL67), they acquire primary 
combatant status68, and are expected to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population69. Every one else who is found in the theatre of war, and 
who do not fit within the definition of a combatant70, are then by default 
classified as civilians71.  
 With ‘combatant’ privilege comes the exclusive authorisation to lawfully 
participate directly in hostilities72. This authorisation does not vest in 
combatants individually, ‘but results from the affiliation of the individual 
combatant to an organ (i.e. the armed forces) of a party to the conflict, which 
is itself a subject of international law’73. Since combatants are acting as 
                                                
62 Kurt Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1st ed) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 65; Kidane 
‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 363; De 
Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 172; Moreover, there is no 
intermediate ‘quasi-combatant’ category under IHL (Donald Rothwell ‘Legal Opinion on the 
Status of Non-combatants and Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law and 
Australian Law’ (2004) available at 
http://www.aspi.org.au/pdf/ASPIlegalopinion_contractors.pdf (accessed 17 July 2012). 
63 A civilian who participates directly in hostilities might face criminal prosecution for their 
unauthorised actions; while combatants are not prosecuted for participating in hostilities, 
provided they observe the rules of war.  
64 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65. 
65 Shlomy Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where does the Unlawful Combatant 
Belong?’ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 378 at 390. 
66 ‘... whether regular or irregular, including paramilitary units incorporated de facto in the 
armed forces’ (Robert Goldman and Brian Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’  (2002) December ASIL Task Force Paper available at 
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012) at 11).  
67 Medical personnel and chaplains enjoy unique status under IHL (GC III article 33). 
68 GC III articles 4A (1) and (3); Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 11.  
69 AP I article 44(3); Gary Solis (2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War. Cambridge University Press: New York at 209-210. 
70 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 173. 
71 AP I article 50(1). That said, some academics like Watkin propose more than just the two 
categories of participant. Watkin lists: ‘lawful combatants (API article 43); otherwise lawful 
combatants (API article 44(4)); members of organised armed groups who are not lawful 
combatants; civilians who take a direct part in hostilities; and uninvolved civilians’ (Kenneth 
Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 641 at 665-667). 
72 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 173. 
73 It is worth mentioning at this juncture, that in an armed conflict, only a recognised subject of 
international law can clothe their armed forces with authorised combatant status (Ipsen 
(1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 66-67). ‘Private citizens and independent armed 
groups have always been excluded from entitlement to the combatant privilege and POW 
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‘representatives of a sovereign’74, they are exempt from criminal liability for 
their ‘authorised acts’75 of hostility, and cannot be punished for their mere 
participation in the hostilities76. Without their primary combatant status, such 
participation in hostilities would render them liable for criminal prosecution 
upon capture77.  
While combatants are authorised to participate directly in hostilities, 
this authorisation is subject to the expectation that they adhere to the laws of 
war, and individuals can be prosecuted for their failure to do so78. While a 
failure to observe the laws of war does not result in the loss of their primary 
‘combatant status’79, they shall nevertheless ‘be called to account in 
accordance with the … military penal law of their party to the conflict’80. The 
obligation to punish violations of IHL committed by individual combatants is 
viewed very seriously81. 
 As a further incentive for individual combatants to abide by the laws of 
war82, combatant privilege brings with it secondary prisoners of war (POW) 
status, in the event of a combatant falling into enemy hands. This secondary 
POW privilege, flows from the rationale that a detained combatant’s ‘ability to 
fight is limited’83, which consequently neutralises their ‘military threat to the 
enemy’84. Their detention renders them hors de combat, for the duration of 
                                                                                                                                      
status’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 197). 
‘There is no room for hostilities in an international armed conflict being conducted by 
individuals on their own initiative’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict at 43). 
74 Eric Talbot Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C Banks (ed) New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare at 2020-28. 
75 Idem at 1897-1906 and 1906-14. 
76 Michael Brough ‘Combatant, Noncombatant, Criminal: The Importance of Distinction’ 
(2004) 11:2-3 Ethical Perspectives 176 at 177; Zachary ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: 
Where Does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ at 380; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged 
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 4; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ 
at 93. 
77 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 172; Brough ‘Combatant, 
Noncombatant, Criminal: The Importance of Distinction’ at 177. 
78 Combatants who breach the laws of war may be subjected to disciplinary proceedings or 
military prosecutions (AP I articles 85 and 86; GC III articles 82-88; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants 
and Non-combatants’ at 81; Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 363). 
79A breach of the laws of war does not, however, result in the forfeiture of their secondary 
POW status, unless they also breach the fundamental obligation of distinction (Claude 
Pilloud, Yves Sandoz and Bruno Zimmermann (1987) ICRC Commentary on Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Geneva at 511; Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95).  
80 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 82. 
81 Idem at 95; AP I articles 85 and 86. 
82 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 173. 
83 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65-6; The Regulations respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Hague Convention IV of 18 October 1907 
(Hague Regulations ‘HR’) 1910 U.K.Treaty Series 9 article 3(2), GC III articles 4A(1-3) and 
(6); AP I articles 43 and 44(1); Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War at 197. 
84 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 197.  
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the conflict’85. At the cessation of hostilities those lawful combatants (held as 
POWs) are repatriated ‘to their own country, free to continue life unimpeded 
by their lawful hostile acts’86. 
 While combatant status brings with it certain privileges, it also carries 
with it the risk associated with identifying oneself openly as a member of the 
armed forces87. As such, they remain a ‘continuing lawful target’88 for the 
opposing forces, at all times and at all locations89, whether in or ‘out of 
uniform’90… ‘even when they are not on active duty’91. This status quo 
continues as long as they retain membership of the armed force, and until 
they either retire from the military92, or ‘gain immunity from attack by 
becoming hors de combat’93.  
 All those who do not enjoy combatant status, and who are consequently 
classified as civilians, are expected94 not to partake in hostilities. Civilians are 
protected against the effects of hostilities, cannot be targeted, and are to be 
respected. In order to enjoy this protection, they must ensure that their actions 
do not compromise their civilian status95. The moment a civilian elects to 
participate in the hostilities, he/she loses not only their immunity against 
targeting, but if captured can face criminal prosecution for their actions (even 
for actions which do not amount to a war crime were they to be committed by 
a combatant, like for example ‘killing an enemy soldier’)96. 
 While IHL operates primarily on these ‘two stark classifications – 
combatant and civilian – it must fit a range of actors within them’97. 
Consequently we find within IHL a few anomalous categories of individuals, 
which challenge the stark combatant/civilian distinction. The first is the group 
labelled ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’. Although these non-
combative service personnel accompany the armed forces, and for that are 
granted POW status upon capture, they are not authorised to participate 
                                                
85 Nathaniel Berman ‘Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction 
of War’ (2004) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1 at 5; Zachary ‘Between the 
Geneva Conventions: Where Does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ at 380. 
86 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1906-14. 
87 Idem at 2020-28. 
88 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 188. 
89 Which includes those ‘on a front line or a mile or a hundred miles behind enemy lines’ 
(Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 34). 
‘Whether eating, washing, watching television, or even sleeping, a lawful combatant is 
targetable by an opposing force at any time, regardless of his actions’ (Jensen ‘Direct 
Participation in Hostilities’ at 2020-28). 
90 Yoram Dinstein (2007) ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ in 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Volker Epping (eds.) International Humanitarian Law Facing 
New Challenges Springer: Germany at 150-151. 
91 Dinstein ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ at 150-151; Solis 
The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 188. 
92 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law (‘Interpretive Guide’) (2009) ICRC: Geneva at 23. 
93 ‘Only combatants can become hors de combat through surrender or incapacitation’ - it does 
not cover civilians (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict at 34; Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2197-2204). 
94 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 173. 
95 Ibid; GC IV article 3. 
96 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
363. 
97 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 173. 
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directly in hostilities, and consequently enjoy primary civilian status98 . As a 
result of their essentially civilian status, ‘they cannot be targeted deliberately, 
although if they are co-located within legitimate military targets, attacks 
against those locations are nonetheless legitimate’99. As a further 
consequence of their civilian status, they are restricted from participating 
directly in hostilities, and by taking up arms they effectively forfeit their POW 
privilege upon capture, and can face criminal prosecution100. Another 
anomalous category is that of the ‘levée en masse’101. These are civilians who 
acquire the secondary protections afforded combatants (against prosecution), 
when they are forced to take up arms spontaneously in the face of an 
occupation.  
Clearly, IHL is accustomed to a somewhat muddled response to the 
ambiguous scenarios encountered in the theatre of war. Moreover, ‘as the 
privatisation of military-related activities becomes ever more commonplace, 
the formerly strict differentiation between “soldier” and “civilian” appears 
simplistic and difficult to implement’102. PMSCs are just one of many recent 
challenges which are facing international humanitarian lawyers. Nevertheless, 
IHL does operate ‘on the basis of the fundamental principle of distinction 
between combatants and civilians’103, and that in cases of doubt an individual 
is ‘presumed to have protected status until such time as their status is 
determined by a competent tribunal’104. So, as much as the stark delimitation 
between the two categories does not meet the current reality of international 
armed conflict, it remains ‘crucial as it determines the rights and privileges 
afforded individuals by law, and the legal consequences deriving from the 
conduct of those persons’105. 
 
6.3 PMSCs as ‘combatants’ 
 
The term ‘combatant’ does not have a codified definition106 in IHL. However, it 
is widely believed that the ‘enumerated categories of those entitled to POW 
                                                
98 GC III article 4A(4); AP I article 50(1); Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 
65. 
99 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 173. 
100 Ibid. 
101 This essentially civilian group are afforded primary combatant status if: 
‘they have spontaneously taken up arms against invading troops; without having had time 
to form themselves into armed units; and they carry their arms openly and respect the 
laws and customs of war in their military operations’(GC III article 4(6); AP I article 43(1)). 
This primary combatant status ensures that if captured, these individuals will be afforded 
secondary POW status.  
102 David M Crane and Daniel Reisner (2011) ‘Jousting at Windmills’ in William C Banks (ed) 
New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (Columbia Studies in 
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) at 1566-72 (ebook). 
103 Sossai ‘Status of Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of 
International Armed Conflict’ at 197. 
104 GC III article 5; AP I article 45(1). 
105 Sossai ‘Status of Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of 
International Armed Conflict’ at 197. 
106 David Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 
699 at 701; Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1888-97. ‘As James Spaight stated in 
1911: the delegates to the 1907 Conference had “almost shirked their task - a task of great 
difficulty, it must be admitted” in attempting to define combatant status’ (Kenneth Watkin 
‘Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over 
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status’107, set out in GC III article 4108, define the meaning of the term 
combatant 109, since it is implied that all those individuals who qualify for POW 
status a priori enjoy combatant privilege110. GC III shifted the focus from the 
activity-based understanding of combatant status which had existed under the 
Hague law, to a membership-based understanding, wherein ‘all members of 
the armed forces are combatants, regardless of what their function within the 
armed forces might be’111. Put another way, ‘membership in an identifiable 
and organised armed force’ is what determines whether one qualifies for 
combatant status112. 
                                                                                                                                      
Legitimacy’ Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University 
Occasional Paper Series (Winter 2005) 2 at 3-4). Some academics argue that ‘there is no 
consensus definition of the term combatant in international law’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation 
in Hostilities’ at 1888-97).  
107 Daphne Richemond-Barak (2011) ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of 
Distinction and Reciprocity’ in William C Banks (ed) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical 
Debates on Asymmetric Warfare (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) at 
2372-79; Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ at 701. 
108 Article 4(A): 
‘Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one 
of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:  
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organised resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in 
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such 
militias or volunteer corps, including such organised resistance movements, fulfil the 
following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an 
authority not recognised by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, 
such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply 
contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
armed forces, provided that they have received authorisation, from the armed forces 
which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card 
similar to the annexed model. 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant 
marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by 
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law. 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to 
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect 
the laws and customs of war.’ (1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GC III) of August 12 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135). 
109 Albeit in a rather inconvenient place, in a convention dealing with the rights of POWs 
(Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity’ 
at 2477-85 and 2372-79; Whippman ‘Redefining Combatants’ at 701). 
110 This customary law position is codified in GC II article 87 (Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged 
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 4). 
111 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and 
Reciprocity’ at 2477-85; Crane and Reisner ‘Jousting at Windmills’ at 1595-1604. 
112 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and 
Reciprocity’ at 2386-94; Toni Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ (2004) 86 
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i. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict  
 
Regular armed forces 
 
In IHL there is a rebuttable presumption113 that all members of a State’s 
regular armed forces automatically enjoy full primary combatant privilege114. 
While it appears as if there are no conditions115 attached to this presumption, 
the U.K. Privy Council116 maintained that States must ensure that their forces 
observe the conditions expressed in GC III article 4A(2), ‘notwithstanding the 
fact that it is not stated expressis verbis in the GC’s or the HR’s’117.  
 When one looks at the criteria set out in GC III article 4A(2), it is 
obvious that ‘these conditions were fashioned on the operations of regular 
armed forces’, who traditionally have been organised ‘subject to hierarchical 
discipline’118, and normally have belonged to a belligerent party, such that the 
‘issue of allegiance scarcely arises’119. Moreover there is a ‘proud tradition of 
wearing uniforms120, carrying their arms openly’121, and being ‘trained to 
respect the law of international armed conflict’122. 
                                                                                                                                      
International Review of the Red Cross 93 at 115; Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 86. 
113 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 43. 
114 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 10 and 11. The one 
exception to this presumption arises when members of the regular armed forces are caught 
spying while out of uniform. In these cases, they lose their primary combatant status as a 
result of their perfidious actions (Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 115).  
115 Although Pfanner notes that based on the ‘ordinary reading of GCIII article 4A(1), and the 
travaux preparatoires it is clear that the regular armed forces (including members of militia 
and volunteer corps forming part of them) do not have to formally fulfil the four criteria to 
qualify as POW’ (Idem at 114-115). 
116 In Bin Haji Mohamed Ali and Another v Public Prosecutor, Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (U.K.) (29 July 1968) [1969] 1 A.C. 430. 
117 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 42; 
Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 11. 
118 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 47. 
119 Ibid. 
120 One of those unspoken requirements, is that members of the regular armed forces 
observe the principle of distinction, which they have traditionally done by wearing uniforms 
(Jean Pictet (1960) ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention III ICRC: Geneva at 63; 
Pfanner ‘Military Uniforms and the Law of War’ at 94 and 103-104). The only personnel who 
were exempted from this requirement were those individuals (like war correspondents, civilian 
contractors, civilian members of military aircraft crews, merchant marine and civil aircraft 
crews) who by their vocation were not authorised to participate in hostilities directly. In fact, 
the expectation that the State’s armed force would be ‘uniformed was so unquestioningly 
assumed that no effort was made in any of the IHL treaties to define what constitutes a 
uniform’ (Michael Cowling and Shannon Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay - 
International Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ (2009) 42:1 Comparative and 
International Law Quarterly of South Africa at 1). Academics agree that the term ‘uniform’ is 
used very loosely to apply to any myriad of ‘distinguishing symbols’ and even to camouflage 
dress, which is considered a ‘lawful ruse of war’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under 
the Law of International Armed Conflict at 44). This clearly calls into question the requirement 
that the ‘uniform’ is recognisable at a distance (Yves C Sandoz, Christopher Swinarski and 
Bruno Zimmerman (eds) (1987) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ICRC/ Martinus Nijhoff: Geneva/Dordrecht at 
566). ‘Special forces often wear non-standard uniforms, a phenomenon which is 
unobjectionable, provided that the combatants retain some distinctive feature telling them 
apart from civilians’ … is worth remembering that the principle of distinction is not concerned 
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Irregular armed forces123 
 
As war evolved, and other voluntary militia groups began to participate more 
regularly in the theatre of war (often without clothing their members in 
traditional military uniform), IHL responded124 by setting out more stringent 
criteria125 which these irregulars had to fulfil before they could enjoy 
combatant status126. The conditions initially set out in GC III article 4A(2), can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
a) belonging to an organised group127; 
b) ‘belonging to a party to the conflict’128;  
                                                                                                                                      
so much with whether ‘combatants can be seen, but whether (if observed) they are likely to 
be mixed up with civilians’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict at 43 and 44). As Watkins explains: ‘camouflage and disguise as an ordinary 
civilian going about his normal pacific activities are different’ (Watkin ‘Warriors Without 
Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy’ at 29-30). 
121 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 47. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Also referred to as ‘members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps’ (GC 
III article 4A(2)). 
124 Amongst the changes made to the Hague law, GC III sought to ‘explicitly recognise 
independent irregular militias, volunteer corps’ and now also organised resistance 
movements, on condition that they could prove that they belonged to a party to the conflict 
(Anthony PV Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3 at 14; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 9). 
125 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 11. 
126 Idem at 7. A status which their colleagues in the State’s armed forces seemed to enjoy 
automatically (Idem at 9 and 11; Cherif Bassiouni ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of 
Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors’ at 750-751). 
127 According to most legal commentators, this requirement can be ‘filled by the most 
rudimentary elements of military organisation’ (Thomas Mallison and Sally Mallison ‘The 
Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (1977) 9 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 39 at 50; Pictet ICRC 
Commentary on Geneva Convention III at 58).  
128 In other words they must fight on behalf of a State party that is engaged in an international 
armed conflict. According to the commentary, any form of tacit authorisation, control or ‘a de 
facto relationship between the group and a party to an international armed conflict’ is 
sufficient to satisfy this requirement (Prosecutor v Tadić ICTY Appeals Chamber (1999) 38 
International Legal Materials 1518 at 1537). According to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals chamber in Tadić, ‘a relationship of dependence 
and allegiance of these irregulars vis-à-vis that party to the conflict will satisfy this 
requirement’ (Ibid). This ‘implicitly refers to ‘a test of control ... by co-ordinating or helping in 
the general planning of [the associated group’s] military activity’ (Dale Stephens and Angeline 
Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ (2006) 9 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 25 at 32; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 12). Richemond-Barak maintains that the ‘belonging’ requirement set 
out in article 4A(2), did not require either ‘formal incorporation into the State’s armed forces 
nor the authorisation of all the armed group’s activities by the State’ (Richemond-Barak ‘Non-
State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity’ at 2534-41). In short, it 
was included as a requirement to ensure that the ‘customary law proscription against 
individuals or groups engaging in private warfare against a State party involved in an armed 
conflict’ would be observed (Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
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c) the ‘group must be commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates’129; 
d) the ‘group must ensure that its members have a fixed, distinctive sign 
recognisable at a distance’130;  
e) the group’s members ‘must carry their arms openly’131; 
f) ‘the group must ensure that its members conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws of war’132. 
 
It is necessary to verify that the armed group as a whole is organised, 
has a responsible commander, and belongs to a belligerent party. Should that 
be the case, all members of the armed group will benefit from combatant 
status. Thereafter the last three conditions (d-f) are applicable to the group’s 
individual members, and must be met ‘continuously and not intermittently’133. 
Authorities generally agree that all six conditions134 are applicable to the 
irregular group as a collective135. Consequently, if the group is in the habit of 
                                                                                                                                      
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 12).  
129 The exact qualifications which the leader needs, or ‘how he obtained his authority is not 
specified’ - in essence all that is required is that ‘the leader must be responsible for the action 
taken on his orders’ and he must discipline ‘his members to ensure compliance with the laws 
of war’ (Goldman and Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: 
Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 12). 
130 Much like the confusion surrounding the definition of the term uniform, there is little by way 
of guidance in either treaty law or soft law as to what ‘constitutes a distinctive sign’ (Idem at 
12-13). Goldman suggests that provided ‘the dress or sign worn be such that it is visible 
during daylight and detectable at a distance by the naked eye’, that this would satisfy the 
requirement (Ibid). From various legal opinions, it is probably safe to conclude that the 
following items are believed sufficient to constitute a distinctive sign recognisable at a 
distance: a helmet, headdress, cap, scarf, coat, shirt, badge, ‘armlet or brassard permanently 
affixed to their clothing, or an emblem or coloured sign worn on the chest, provided it is worn 
constantly, in all circumstances’. While Dinstein notes that ‘it is not clear whether visibility is 
determined solely by the naked eye or if it also includes observation by means of binoculars 
and even infra-red equipment’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict at 53; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 12-13; Pictet ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention III at 60; U.S. 
Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10 ‘The Law of Land Warfare’ at 27 para 64(b)). 
131 Which is intended to ensure that the opposition are not unfairly taken by surprise by 
irregulars who approach with pistols concealed beneath their clothing (Goldman et al 
‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 13). 
132 Idem at 14. For example: ‘not directly attacking civilians; causing disproportionate civilian 
casualties, or otherwise causing unnecessary suffering and destruction’ (Ibid). Immediately 
we can appreciate that those engaging in terrorist acts, aimed at spreading fear amongst the 
civilian population, would fall foul of this criteria, and would not be classified as combatants in 
terms of GC III. 
133Idem 14 -15; Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay - International 
Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 25. 
134 Yoram Dinstein maintains that the ‘requirements of a lawful combatant’ can be reduced to 
seven general-cumulative-conditions: (i) subordination to a responsible command, (ii) a fixed 
distinctive emblem, (iii) carrying arms openly, (iv) conduct in accordance with jus in bello, … 
(v) organisation, (vi) belonging to a party to the conflict, … [and] (vii) lack of duty of allegiance 
to the Detaining Power’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1914-21). 
135 While the actions of a few ‘bad apples’ in a group will not strip the entire group of its 
combatant status (provided most of the group observe IHL), it will certainly expose those 
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flouting any or all of the six requirements, ‘the groups general pattern of 
behaviour will be extrapolated’ to each individual member, denying them 
privileged combatant status, and classifying them ‘as civilians participating 
unlawfully in hostilities’136. Similarly, if the group ‘generally meet all six 
conditions, all of the time then an individual member who fails to observe any 
of the last three criteria (d-f) will not lose his privileged combatant …status 
upon capture’137, but he will be liable for judicial prosecution for his non-
compliance. 
 Over time, the requirements of article 4A(2) have proved ‘extremely 
difficult if not, in fact, impossible for irregulars to comply with, without 
jeopardising their military operations’138. In 1977 AP I139 addressed the issue 
of ‘fashioning new rules’140 to ‘create a single and non-discriminatory set of 
rules, applicable to all combatants regular and irregular alike, … and to 
provide presumptions and procedures to prevent abuse of the exceptions’141. 
In AP I article 43(1), we find a new definition of ‘armed forces’ (applicable 
to regular and irregular voluntary corps, militia and other organised groups142), 
and these are described as: 
  
                                                                                                                                      
rogue combatants to ‘individual judicial or administrative prosecution’ for their violations of IHL 
(Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 50; 
Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at Guantanamo Bay - International Humanitarian Law 
Detained Incommunicado’ at 25; Evan Wallach ‘Afghanistan, Quirin, and Uchiyama: Does the 
Sauce Suit the Gander?’ (2003) November Army Lawyer at 5; Arfan Khan ‘International and 
Human Rights Aspects of the Treatment of Detainees’ (2005) 69:2 The Journal of Criminal 
Law 168 at 178; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: 
Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 14). In 
instances where ‘there is no conclusive evidence on the groups compliance, each individual 
will be judged on his own compliance’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict at 50). 
136 William J Fenrick ‘Combatant and POW Status’ (1998) ICRC Seminar on IHL (Lecture 
delivered at New York University Law School); Cowling and Bosch ‘Combatant Status at 
Guantanamo Bay - International Humanitarian Law Detained Incommunicado’ at 25. 
137 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 14; Dinstein The 
Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 50. 
138 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 14-16. This fact was 
recognised in AP I articles 1(4) and 44(3) which reads as follows: ‘recognising, however, that 
there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed 
combatant cannot so distinguish himself’ (Waldemar Solf ‘A Response to Douglas J Feith’s 
Law in the Service of Terror - The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol’ (1986) 20 Akron 
Law Review 261 at 272). 
139 AP I was drafted to deal with international armed conflicts, while AP II was limited in scope 
to non-international armed conflicts. Since this chapter is focused on the combatant status of 
non-State groups in situations of international armed conflict, I shall restrict the following 
discussions to the developments which arose in respect of AP I only. 
140 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 16. 
141 George Aldrich ‘Guerilla Combatants and Prisoner of War Status’ (1982) 31 American 
University Law Review 87 at 874.  
142 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 17-18; Sossai 
‘Status of Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of International Armed 
Conflict’ at 199-200. 
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‘... all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates, 
even if that party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognised by the adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to 
an international disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict’. 
 
This functional-based143 definition ‘of “armed forces” widens the scope of 
actors brought within combatant status’144, replacing the membership-based 
regime under GC III145, and substituting the six onerous ‘rules for combatant 
status’ set out in GC III, with only two conditions: 
 
a) ‘responsible command under a party to the conflict146; and  
b) behaviour in accordance with the laws of war’147. 
 
What is key, is that the irregulars ‘conduct hostilities on behalf and with the 
agreement of that party’148. As Rogers points out, ‘it is a matter of [a measure 
of] organisation and discipline, which goes to the root of the definition of 
armed forces’149. No longer do irregulars have to prove use of a uniform150 
and that they carried their arms openly151, or that they enjoyed political 
recognition152. AP I article 43(2) then goes on to state that ‘all members of the 
armed forces (other than the medical personnel and chaplains) are 
combatants having the right to directly participate in hostilities’ - effectively 
clothing all these newly-defined ‘armed forces’ with combatant status. 
                                                
143 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and 
Reciprocity’ at 2509-17. 
144 Idem at 2495-2502. 
145 Idem at 2502-9. 
146 The relationship of belonging may ‘be officially declared, but may also be expressed 
through tacit agreement or conclusive behaviour that makes clear for which party the group is 
fighting’ (Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their 
Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 18). 
147 Richemond-Barak ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and 
Reciprocity’ at 2502-9. 
148 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 23; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 18. 
149 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 14-15; Fritz Kalshoven and Liesbeth 
Zegveld (2011) Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law (4th ed) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 87; Sossai ‘Status of 
Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of International Armed Conflict’ 
at 200. 
150 According to Melzer ‘visibility is no longer a collective defining element of the armed 
forces, but an individual obligation, the respect of which may be relevant for a member’s 
entitlement to POW status or combatant privilege, but not for his unit’s legal qualification as 
an armed force of a party to the conflict’ (Nils Melzer (2009) Targeted Killings in International 
Law Oxford University Press: Oxford at 307). 
151 Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 87. 
152 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 18. 
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 Another innovation for irregular forces, brought about by the regime 
under AP I, is that once an individual is clothed with combatant status, they 
cannot lose that status - even by actions prior to their capture which might 
have violated IHL153. This is a remarkable change from the consequences 
which used to pertain under GC III, where irregular forces were at risk of 
losing their POW status for their failure to observe IHL154. Now, any failure to 
observe the rules of war (even if it is found that an individual has committed 
war crimes155), will be an offence for which they can be court-martialled and 
face punishment, but they shall now nevertheless continue to be treated as 
combatants156.  
 While the new customary law definition of the armed forces does away 
with the visibility requirement previously contained in GC III article 4A(2)157, 
the AP I regime does take the obligation to observe the principle of 
distinction158 very seriously. Since ‘combatant privilege’159 makes one a 
legitimate military target, combatants are duty bound to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population160. The new regime in AP I dictates 
that ‘the failure to distinguish oneself from the civilian population…warrants 
forfeiture of POW status’161. Moreover, other IHL provisions effectively 
                                                
153 Garth Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” Versus “Temporary Safety”: The Guantanamo Bay 
Internees and Combatant Status’ (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 829 at 844. ‘While all 
combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant 
or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a POW, except as provided 
in paragraphs 3 and 4’ (AP I article 44(2)). 
154 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 93; Christopher Greenwood (1991) 
‘Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols’ in Astrid JM Delissen and Gerard J 
Tanja (eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead TMC Asser 
Instituut/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Netherlands at 107. 
155 Colonel Draper states bluntly that ‘members of the armed forces who persistently violate 
the laws of war do not lose their POW status upon capture’ (Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged 
Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 10).  
156 ‘Any guerrilla who fails to distinguish himself during such military operations ... can be 
punished only by applicable disciplinary or penal sanctions, not by forfeiture of his status as a 
lawful combatant or … as a POW.’ George Aldrich ‘New Life for the Laws of War’ (1981) 75 
American Journal of International Law at 773; Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and 
the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ at 20. 
157 The ‘requirement of visibility’ is not a prerequisite for one’s entitlement to POW status’ 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 15-16). 
158 In the whole of API, article 48 (‘parties shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants) ‘may be its most cardinal provision’ (Kalshoven and Zegveld 
Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 86). 
159 HR article 3; AP I article 43(2). It is worth noting that failure to observe the laws of war will 
not render the combatant an unlawful combatant. It will, however, expose him or her to 
military prosecution provided he or she meets the other requirements for combatant status 
(GC III article 82ff; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 68). There have 
already been cases of PMSCs attempting to claim immunity, by virtue of combatant status, 
from civil claims brought against them for their hostile actions (Ibrahim v Titan, civil action no. 
04-1248 (JR), and Saleh v Titan case no. 04CV1143 R (NLS). It must be noted that these 
privileges may be forfeited as a result of the actions of the particular individuals, for example 
engaging in spying (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65-66). 
160 AP I article 44(3). 
161 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 16 and rules 
106-108; Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 93; AP I articles 44(3) and (4). 
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transfer the liability to observe the principle of distinction up the chain of 
command, by making commanders, who elect not to court-martial their 
soldiers for failing to distinguish themselves, personally liable for violating 
articles 86 and 87 of AP I162. In fact, Rogers argues that consistent violation of 
IHL that goes unpunished ‘is strong evidence that the group does not qualify 
as an “armed forces”, since it fails to meet the criterion of an internal 
disciplinary system’163. In effect, what Rogers proposes is that ill-disciplined 
forces might not enjoy full combatant status164.  
 Admittedly, the additional protocols did not receive the widespread 
ratification that the GCs did, and some of their provisions have proved 
controversial and sometimes devisive165. Before the AP I definition of a 
combatant can be said to have replaced the GC III article 4A(2) criteria, it 
needs to be shown that AP I articles 43 and 44 have attained customary 
international law status. In Henckaerts and Doswald Beck’s publication on the 
customary international law status of various IHL principles, we read in rule 3 
that: State practice endorses the conclusion that as a matter of customary 
international law ‘all members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are 
combatants, except medical and religious personnel’166. The study then goes 
on in rule 4, to state that it is accepted as customary international law that ‘the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organised armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the 
conduct of its subordinates’167. Henckaerts goes on to say that the definitions 
contained in AP I articles 43 and 44 are replicated in ‘numerous military 
manuals’168, ‘official statements and reported practice’, even by States that 
were not, or are still not ‘party to Additional Protocol I’169. Consequently, it can 
be concluded that as a matter of customary international law (applicable to all 
parties to an international armed conflict), combatant status is extended to all 
persons (irrespective of whether they are members of a regular or irregular 
armed force), who: 
 
a) fight in an international armed conflict; 
b) ‘on behalf of a party to a conflict’; and  
                                                
162 Goldman et al ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 20. 
163 This raises some concerns for PMSCs who are affiliated to the State’s armed forces, since 
‘the obligation to search out and prosecute individuals suspected of breaching IHL rests with 
States’, and yet these obligations are so rarely enforced in the case of these PMSC that 
PMSC ‘executives and employees do not even consider the possibility of a prosecution under 
international law in their planning’ (Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: 
Some Implications of the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 24). 
164 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 16. 
165 The definitions set out in AP I articles 43 and 33 are ‘disputed by a number of nations, 
including the U.S.’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1888-97; Richemond-Barak 
‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity’ at 2517-25). 
166 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 11. 
167 Idem at 11, and rule 4. 
168 See, for example, the military manuals of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Cameroon, 
Canada, Colombia, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Kenya, South Korea, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Togo, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 12). 
169 See, for example, the practices of France, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, the United Kingdom 
and the United States (Ibid). 
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c) who subordinate themselves to its command170. 
 
ii. Non-combatant members of the armed forces  
 
As with most rules there is an exception to the general rule that all members 
of the armed forces (be they regular or irregular) are authorised to participate 
in hostilities. There are, within the membership ranks of the armed forces, 
‘service personnel’171, including quartermasters, ‘cooks, court reporters, 
judges, government officials and blue-collar workers’172. These service 
personnel are denied authorisation (by national legislation173) to ‘use a 
weapon or a weapons system’174, they do not engage in combat 
operations175, and are consequently dubbed ‘non-combatants’176.  
 Their status as members of the armed forces - albeit non-combatant 
members - guarantees their secondary status as POWs upon capture. 
Although they are not authorised to participate directly in hostilities, save for 
defending themselves177, they are nevertheless not classified as civilians.178 
As members of the armed forces, non-combatants are not protected by a 
prohibition against attack (as is the case with civilians) - they are susceptible 
to attack without special considerations or collateral damage calculations179, 
as they remain fundamentally a ‘military objective’180 and subject to the 
‘dangers arising from military operations’181. 
 
Hors de combat 
 
Within this broader sub-category of ‘non-combatants’, are ‘those who, but for 
their injuries would be classified as ordinary combatants (the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked)’182. When an ordinary combatant ‘become hors de combat 
                                                
170 Idem at 16. 
171 Dale Stephens and Angeline Lewis ‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed 
Conflict’ (2006) 9 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 25 at 30. 
172 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ 99; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
Customary International Humanitarian Law at 13. 
173 This national legislation ‘has no impact on the international law position affording 
combatant status to all members of the armed forces’ (Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 99). 
174 AP I article 43(2); Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 81. 
175‘The only exception - as affirmed in AP I article 43(2) - are medical and religious personnel’ 
(Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 33). 
176 HR article 3. 
177 GC I article 22(1); GC II article 35(1); AP I article 13(2)(a). ‘Non-combatants, too, have the 
right to defend themselves or others against any attacks … the attack activates the latent 
combatant status irrespective of whether the attack was in contravention of the laws of war’ 
(Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 103-104). 
178 AP I article 50(1) precludes this by its restrictive definition of a civilian (Ipsen (2005) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 84). 
179 Idem at 85. 
180 AP I article 51(1); Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 84. A military 
objective is defined as ‘those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose partial destruction, capture or 
neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.’ 
(AP I article 52(2)). 
181 Ipsen (2008) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 99. 
182 The protections afforded these non-combatants are explored comprehensively in GC I and 
GC II. 
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… he does not become a civilian; but he is entitled to special protections and 





Religious and medical personnel 
 
Medical and religious personnel enjoy a unique primary status under IHL184. 
They are a unique category of non-combatant member of the armed forces, 
because while they are undoubtedly still ‘members of the armed forces’185, 
they are ‘expressly prohibited from participating directly in hostilities and enjoy 
special protection as a result of this limitation’186. They are issued with special 
armbands187 to ‘mark the wearers as non-combatants and not lawful 
targets’188. Moreover, were they to fall into enemy hands, they would not hold 
POW status strictu sensu. ‘Although they are POWs to all outward 
appearances, their status is “retained personnel”, or retainees’189.  
 
Persons accompanying the armed forces 
 
GC III article 4A(4) includes under the umbrella of those enjoying POW, 
‘persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members of 
the armed forces’. This is an interesting category to find in a discussion on 
combatant status, since these persons accompanying the armed forces lack 
the membership-link to the armed forces, necessary to clothe them with 
combatant status. They are, however, clothed with POW status in the event 
that they fall into enemy hands. So, while it is possible to argue that all POWs 
must necessarily have enjoyed primary combatant status when one is 
speaking of regular and irregular armed forces, this does not apply in the case 
of ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’. These persons (like civilian 
contractors), are ‘not members of the armed forces’190, and because of their 
                                                
183 Dinstein ‘The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law’ at 148. 
184 GC I articles 24-27 afford protected status to medical and auxiliary personnel who collect 
and care for the wounded, and who administer medical units. During armed conflict, they are 
to be respected and protected and can never form part of the military objective, as do other 
non-combatants. Any attack upon these specially protected personnel is unlawful. While they 
may not participate directly in hostilities, medical personnel, in particular, are nevertheless 
entitled to use small arms to defend themselves and the injured in their care (AP I 
article13(2)(a)). Upon capture they are granted the same legal protections afforded POWs 
(although they are not technically POWs (GC I articles 28 and 30; GC II articles 36 and 37; 
GC III article 33; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 85-92). 
185 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 13. 
186 GC I articles 24, 26 and 27; Dinstein ‘The System of Status Groups in International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 147. 
187 The armband bears a red cross on a white background. 
188 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 192. 
189 However, ‘if a physician or a chaplain refuses to employ his professional abilities … he will 
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non-combative roles, enjoy primary civilian status191. I will discuss this 
category further under the heading of ‘civilians’.  
 
Levée en masse, merchant mariners and civil aviators 
 
For the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning that POW status is also 
extended to ‘members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of 
the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the conflict, 
who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions 
of international law’192, and the ‘inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on 
the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading 
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, 
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war’. I 
will not explore these two categories any further here, since they are not 
relevant to PMSC which are the focus of this chapter. 
 
PMSC – can they enjoy combatant status in international armed conflicts in 
terms of customary193 IHL? 
 
There are potentially two ways in which PMSC might enjoy combatant status 
during an international armed conflict. The first is if they are ‘employees 
working for the State and are integrated into their armed forces’194. The 
second is if they are ‘member of an organised armed group under a command 
responsible’ to a party to the conflict195. Both of these means of attaining 
combatant status require that PMSC to fulfil certain criteria: 
 
a) they need to be acting on behalf of a party to a conflict; 
b) the organised group needs to subordinate themselves to the party’s 
command196; and  
c) they need to behave in accordance with the laws of war197. 
 
 
a) Acting on behalf of, or belonging to a party to a conflict198 
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193 Prior to the crystallisation of the AP I article 43 definition of a combatant, these PMSCs 
would have had to satisfy the stringent requirements set out in GC III article 4A(2), in order to 
enjoy combatant status. However, ‘in general, PMSCs do not meet all the criteria required for 
non-State armed groups or militias, to merit combatant status’ (De Nevers ‘Private Security 
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This ‘belonging’ requirement formed part of the stringent GC III article 4A(2) 
criteria, and has a long-standing history in IHL. The rationale behind this 
requirement was to ensure that the ‘customary law proscription against 
individuals or groups engaging in private warfare against a State party 
involved in an armed conflict’199 would be observed. 
 The clearest way in which this requirement can be met, is if the State 
formally incorporated PMSCs into their armed forces. International law does 
not stipulate who qualifies for incorporation200, or how States go about 
incorporating individuals into their armed forces; this is a matter purely within 
a State’s internal law (usually by way of an act of parliament)201. Thereafter, 
once a State’s internal laws have endorsed the incorporation of individuals 
into the armed forces, all that IHL requires of States is that the opposition 
forces are notified of their incorporation202. In theory then, there is no legal bar 
to States incorporating PMSCs into their traditional armed forces203. Some 
argue that formal incorporation is the only way ‘to put the private contractors 
within the military chain of command and control’ required of AP I article 
43(3)204.  
Some academics, like Richemond-Barak, argue that this belonging 
requirement does not require either ‘formal incorporation into the State’s 
forces nor the authorisation of all the armed group’s activities by the State’205. 
To adhere to such a ‘highly formalistic, membership based’ notion of 
combatant status, would exclude ‘a number of non-State entities from the 
definition’206. He argues that short of formal incorporation, there are other 
means of satisfying the belonging requirement207. In cases where the 
‘relationship of belonging’ is not ‘officially declared’, it will have to be ‘judged 
on the facts’208, ‘expressed through tacit agreement or conclusive behaviour 
that makes clear for which party the group is fighting’209. As is evidenced by 
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academic debate, the exact degree of relationship required to reach a 
conclusion that the group acts ‘on behalf of’, or ‘belongs to a party to an 
international armed conflict’, has been controversial. 
 Early commentary on the belonging requirement (as expressed in GC 
III article 4A(2)), concludes that ‘any form of tacit authorisation, control or a de 
facto relationship between the group and a party to an international armed 
conflict is sufficient’ to satisfy this requirement210. On the other hand ‘mere 
fighting in support of a party is not sufficient’ to meet the belonging 
requirement211. There needs to be some ‘de facto link’ between the group and 
a party to the conflict212.  
 Gillard suggests that the following factors might indicate affiliation to 
the armed forces of a State: 
 
‘whether they have complied with national procedures for enlistment or 
conscription, where they exist;  
whether they are employees of the department of defense;  
whether they are subject to military discipline and justice;  
whether they form part of and are subject to the military chain of 
command and control; 
whether they form part of the military hierarchy;  
whether they have been issued with the identity cards envisaged by the 
Third Geneva Convention or other forms of identification similar to 
those of ‘ordinary’ members of the armed forces; and  
whether they wear uniforms’213.  
 
Some have argued that, for reasons of pragmatism, when PMSCs are 
contracted to work for a State alongside their armed forces, one can conclude 
that the contract establishes the necessary incorporation, and that they are 
‘legally indistinguishable from a national army’214. Others argue that if PMSC 
‘have been entitled by a State to participate directly in hostilities on its behalf, 
they should be included within the members of the armed forces’215 and 
‘considered combatants’216. This view is endorsed by the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (hereafter ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide), which states that: 
 
‘contractors and employees who, to all intents and purposes, have 
been incorporated into the armed forces of a party to the conflict, 
whether through formal procedures under national law or de facto by 
being given a “continuous combat function”… such personnel would 
become members of an organised armed force, or group or unit under 
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a command responsible to a party to the conflict and, for the purposes 
of the principle of distinction, would no longer qualify as civilians’217. 
 
There is academic support for the conclusion that ‘when a State hires PMSCs 
for ‘coercive services, the existence of the factual link required for 
“membership in the armed forces: within the API article 4(1) meaning” is 
possible’218.  
Those who oppose the notion that PMSCs can ‘belong to a party to the 
conflict’, without formal incorporation in to the State’s armed forces219, raise 
several issues. Firstly, they argue that while ‘participating in hostilities “on 
behalf of” one party and against another’ (as set out in the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guide) might amount to direct participation in hostilities, it does not 
necessarily satisfy the belonging requirement necessary for affording 
combatant status to that party’220. They argue that the belonging requirement 
is more stringent, and that one can be found to be participating directly in 
hostilities (on behalf of a party to the conflict), without enjoying the necessary 
‘belonging’ to enjoy combatant status. They also point out that, although 
PMSCs ‘share some characteristics with militias’, and often perform military 
type functions or tasks traditionally performed by members of the armed 
forces (even non-combatant functions) , that alone is not sufficient to satisfy 
the ‘belonging requirement’221, and ‘is also not a key element for determining 
whether they "form part" of the armed forces’222. Even when they ‘have been 
hired to provide assistance to a State's armed forces’, that alone is not 
relevant per se’223 to a determination of their combatant status. ‘Simply being 
under contract to the government is insufficient to merit combatant status’224.  
 In fact, ‘many contractors are hired on the basis of individual short-term 
contracts ... suggesting ‘that allegiance to a State is not what guides 
employees’ actions’225. State practice does indeed seem to support this 
viewpoint. We see from State practice that commercial contracts, on their 
own, are not considered by States to be sufficient to incorporate PMSCs into 
the armed forces, despite the fact that State responsibility may be invoked as 
a result of the contract alone226.  
It is noteworthy that most States making use of PMSCs deliberately 
refuse to officially incorporate them into their armed forces, citing a variety of 
reasons. Sometimes the State’s domestic law precludes or limits the number 
of combatants they can enlist. In order to circumvent the State’s ‘national laws 
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that would prevent them from sending their own armed forces’227, they hire 
PMSCs from States that are not party to the conflict. Other times, as Gillard 
points out, States outsource activities ‘traditionally carried out by the armed 
forces to PMSCs, in order to reduce numbers of the armed forces and related 
costs’228. Whatever the motivation might be, the benefit gained from 
outsourcing these functions would be lost if the relationship between the State 
and these PMSCs was interpreted as incorporating these individuals into the 
State’s armed forces. States are at pains to ensure that the outsourcing is not 
interpreted as incorporation.  
 That said, it is not impossible for a State to incorporate PMSCs into their 
own armed forces. However, it seems very unlikely ‘that instances in which 
PMSC staff are incorporated into the armed forces, to the extent necessary 
for them to be considered … forming part thereof, for the purposes of a 
determination of status under IHL’229. In particular, there will be legal 
difficulties where PMSC are ‘sub-contracted by private firms who have 
government contracts’230, and ‘not directly for the government whose combat 
they may be supporting’231. In these cases, the direct contractual link is once 
removed, obscuring the required de facto link232. Certainly, where PMSCs are 
hired (even to engage in combat-related activities) by ‘NGOs, companies or 
government ministeries or departments other then a ministery of defence’, 
they will not satisfy the belonging requirement, and will be ‘considered to fall 
into the category of civilians under IHL’233. 
 That said, the belonging requirement is only one of the criterion 
necessary for PMSCs to achieve combatant status. Before they can be said to 
enjoy combatant status, it still needs to be shown that: ‘the contract defines 
precisely the [combative] tasks to be performed by the company; the State 
authorities assure adequate oversight and co-ordination of the activities, and 
the PMSCs employees are subject to criminal jurisdiction’234. Without each 
criterion being met, these PMSCs remain classified as civilians, albeit 
participating directly in hostilities. 
 
b) Subordinating themselves to the Party’s command 
 
In essence, this criterion requires that the ‘group must be commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates’235, who takes his orders from the 
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party to the conflict, and has ‘to answer to the party for its actions’236. The 
rationale behind this IHL requirement, is that combatants follow orders, and 
that legitimate orders can only come from the party to a conflict who 
authorised the individuals to fight on its behalf. Commanders issuing orders 
are held responsible for their subordinates’ actions, and are expected to 
discipline their subordinates when they disobey orders. Traditionally, this is 
the model used by the military, which operates based on hierarchy and rank. 
That said, ‘command responsibility does not necessitate “command by a 
military officer”’237, and there is nothing in IHL which stipulates ‘the leaders 
qualification, or how he obtained his authority’238. 
 Technically it is not impossible for an organised group of PMSCs to 
mimic these practises by being ‘hierarchically organised and providing some 
sort of supervision analogous to command’239. According to Mallison and 
Mallison, being an organised group requires only ‘the most rudimentary 
elements of military organisation’240. A form of hierarchy in the organisation 
will assist in satisfying the ‘command responsibility’ requirement241. In fact, 
some academics argue that it is highly likely that PMSCs will be able to satisfy 
the ‘command responsibility’ requirement, given that so many are ex-military 
personnel and naturally operate subject to a military command ‘supervisory 
structure’242. This is endorsed in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, which claims 
that ‘such personnel … [are] under a command responsible to a party to the 
conflict’243. However, the ICRC does caution that ‘the “command responsible” 
criterion requires more than the mere “express or tacit” authorisation of the 
State party to the conflict’244 - the chain of command must link back to the 
party to the conflict. What is key, is that PMSCs must ‘conduct hostilities on 
behalf of, and with the agreement of that party’245. It is not sufficient that they 
fight alongside the State’s force, and for the same goal. They need to be 
under the State party to the conflict’s command. Not only does the contractor 
have ‘to report to the hiring State, but the latter has to establish a supervision 
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mechanism’246. Moreover, as Sossai points out, the ‘conclusion of the contract 
between the State and the private firm would not be sufficient to meet the 
condition’ of command responsibility247. ‘The “command responsible” 
condition requires a certain degree of oversight by the party to the conflict’248. 
Having said that, there is ‘a trend towards the exercise of military jurisdiction 
over the employees of private firms’249 - which would satisfy the ‘command 
responsibility’ requirement. 
 While it might be possible for PMSCs to satisfy the ‘command 
responsibility’ criterion, evidence on the ground in the recent conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, reveal that PMSCs ‘work on the basis of a “leader” or “agent 
in charge”, who directs the other “operators” who work with him or her on a 
particular mission’250. However, it is not always evident whether the leader 
has authority ‘over others on his or her team’251. Some academics question 
whether the quasi-military appearance adopted by PMSCs really ensures the 
‘stable, fixed hierarchy within the relevant companies’, needed to satisfy the 
command responsibility criterion252. De Nevers suggests that the rate at which 
the industry has grown, has sometimes been at the cost of traditional military 
discipline, ‘particularly as more companies hire contractors of different 
backgrounds and nationalities’253. The ‘incident in the Nisoor Square on the 
16 September 2007’, and the incident where Blackwater employees, while 
‘running an armed convoy through Baghdad, killed seventeen civilians’254, 
suggest that command responsibility can, and does break down. ‘It was even 
reported that in some cases contractors were actually supervising government 
personnel, instead of the other way around’255. Some argue that PMSCs are 
freed up to mobilise with speed, precisely because they ‘work outside the 
chain of command and on a mandate basis only’256. Certainly, where PMSCs 
are hired by ‘third parties’257, the ‘government and military do not have 
command over these contractors’258. In the end, while it is possible that 
PMSCs satisfy the command responsibility criterion necessary for combatant 
status, that assessment needs to be made on the specific facts in each case. 
 
c) Behaving ‘in accordance with the laws of war’259 
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The group must ‘ensure that its members conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws of war’260 - in short observe the principles of 
distinction, proportionality and military necessity. In fact, Rogers argues that 
consistent violation of IHL, that goes unpunished, ‘is strong evidence that the 
group does not qualify as an ‘armed force’, since it fails to meet the criterion of 
an internal disciplinary system’261.  
 
Concluding remarks on the combatant status of PMSC 
 
The crystallisation into customary IHL of the API definition for combatant 
status, means that PMSCs no longer have to show that they enjoy political 
recognition262 before they can be afforded combatant status, nor do they have 
to make use of a uniform263 or fixed distinctive emblem264. In fact, as evidence 
from Iraq and Afghanistan confirms, PMSCs are not routinely confused with 
civilians because they ‘have a uniform “look” that makes them distinguishable 
from civilians’265, although ‘they have sometime been confused by the civilian 
population with members of the regular armed forces’266. PMSCs on the 
whole carry ‘their weapons openly, as required by IHL’267, which is crucial in 
order to avoid being in breach of the IHL prohibition against perfidy. 
 The drafters of the Montreaux Document concluded that PMSCs were 
‘protected as civilians under IHL’, unless they were formally incorporated into 
the State’s armed forces, or unless they fulfilled the customary IHL criteria for 
combatant status268. As we have seen, it is rarely the case that PMSCs are 
formally incorporated or ‘deputised as parts of a State’s armed forces’269. 
Whether they manage to satisfy the belonging and command responsibility 
requirements, while still observing the laws of war, will have to be assessed 
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based on the facts of each case. In some instances ‘both the companies 
themselves and their employees’ will fall foul of these requirements, 
effectively denying them combatant status under IHL270. 
 While ‘a few scholars have argued that private military companies could 
be considered combatants under IHL’271, the ‘majority of commentators share 
the view that a private company, considered as a distinct group, could rarely 
match … the standards’272 demanded by the definition of combatants273. ‘The 
Geneva conventions generally regard them as civilians because they do not 
meet the formal requirements of combatant status’274. While PMSCs may be 
‘involved in almost every aspect of military activity’275, ‘they are not part of the 
military; they are not bound to a chain of command, nor have they sworn any 
oath of office’276. In the end, ‘there is a widely held consensus that PMSCs are 
civilians and cannot be considered combatants under IHL’277.  
 
6.4 PMSCs as ‘civilians’ 
 
According to the ICRC’s commentary, ‘nobody in enemy hands can be 
outside of the law’278: if they are not combatants there exists a presumption 
that where there is ‘doubt a person shall be considered to be a civilian’279, 
whether or not their actions amount to direct participation in hostilities. IHL 
defines a civilian as any person who is not a combatant280. Unlike 
combatants, civilians are not obliged to identify themselves as civilians281.  
 With the exception of the ‘levée en masse’, civilians are not authorised 
to participate directly in hostilities. Civilians who take an active part in 
hostilities open themselves up to attack from the opposition acting in self-
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defence, during and ‘for such time as they continue to actively participate in 
hostilities282. Furthermore, they are unable to claim the protections 
traditionally afforded civilians under IHL283. Exactly when the actions of a 
civilian might be said to amount to direct participation in hostilities has been 
the source of some academic debate, which I shall deal with below. 
 Provided they do not take part in the hostilities, civilians are to be 
respected284, shielded from the effects of hostilities and direct targeting285, 
and may not be ‘taken prisoner without sufficient reason’286. The obligation to 
respect and protect civilians, demands not only that armed forces refrain from 
acts which would cause harm to civilians, but also that they are required to 
take steps to ensure the safety of civilians287. Consequently, even attacks on 
military objects must first be assessed to establish that the loss caused to 
civilian life is not excessive in relation to the ‘concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated’288 from the attack. Incidental harm caused to civilians 
and civilian objects, is only lawful when it is an ‘unavoidable and proportionate 
side effect of lawful attacks on military objective289. In every attack, 
precautions must be taken to ensure that civilian losses are kept to a 
minimum, that civilians are warned of imminent attacks, and where feasible, 
civilians must be removed from the vicinity of the military objective290.  
 
i. ‘Persons accompanying the armed forces’ 
 
This sub-category of civilian (sometimes also referred to as civilian 
contractors), who ‘accompany the armed forces’291, provide the necessary 
specialised expertise which the armed forces might be lacking. Traditionally, 
IHL listed them as: ‘civilian members of aircraft crew, war correspondents, 
supply contractors, or members of labor units’, and those providing ‘services 
for the welfare of the armed forces’292. This list is not exhaustive293, and 
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‘civilian contractors can be hired to perform almost any service a State 
requires’…, including to ‘train, feed, equip, and house an army’294. What is 
evident from the listed activities295, is that the drafters of IHL treaties never 
intended that these individuals would ‘carry out activities that amount to taking 
a direct part in hostilities’296. In fact, ‘the majority of functions carried out by 
persons who accompany the armed forces, are generally considered as 
‘indirect’ participation, as they only provide ‘general support’. It has been 
‘unanimously accepted’297 that these activities do not compromise their 
protection against direct attacks. It also seems unlikely that activities which 
‘materially and directly cause harm to the opposing party’ would ever be 
‘officially entrusted to these persons accompanying the armed forces, as 
combat operations are inherently governmental functions and cannot involve 
private sector performance’298. As Bartolini maintains, seldom are these 
contractors ‘de facto, … given a “continuous combat function” by the State 
armed forces’299. In fact, many ‘States expressly prohibit persons who 
accompany the armed forces from carrying out certain activities which are 
commonly considered as direct participation in hostilities’300. 
  While these civilian contractors may not participate directly in 
hostilities, they are in the ‘business of providing support for weapons and 
infrastructure’, often ‘maintaining the effectiveness of a piece of hardware’ 
which might be used to win a military advantage over the opposition301. Even 
though the assistance they render to the armed forces is critical, they do not 
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fulfil the definitional requirements of a combatant, they are not enlisted into 
the armed forces302, they do not wear a uniform, and are not permitted to 
engage in hostilities in any direct way303. They are consequently clothed with 
primary civilian status304, and are not themselves military targets for direct 
targeting. That said, some academics have argued that IHL needs to be 
developed ‘to make it permissible to target those accompanying civilians who 
provide direct and essential support to military combat operations’305, given 
the ‘the vital role accompanying civilians play in the military capacity of 
States'306.  
 As IHL stands at the moment, these ‘persons accompanying the armed 
forces’ retain their civilian status. That said, this group of civilians are unique 
in that they enjoy ‘a number of combatant-like privileges’307. The most 
important privilege which they enjoy in the event that they fall into enemy 
hands, is POW308 status,309 which is traditionally reserved only for the State’s 
authorised combatants310. POW status brings with it distinct advantages - not 
only does a POW enjoy ‘several protections while in captivity’, but they must 
be ‘repatriated to their country as soon as hostilities cease’311. Another 
combatant-like privilege afforded these ‘civilians accompanying the armed 
forces’, is that they can be armed with ‘light weapons for their own protection 
or for the protection of other civilians’312. Using these light arms in self-
defence will not compromise their entitlement to POW status, or expose them 
to criminal prosecution, ‘provided that their conduct does not rise to the level 
of war crimes’313.  
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313 Ibid. 
 194 
 Since POW status is not usually enjoyed by civilians, only the ‘the 
armed forces, through a specific authorisation’ are empowered under IHL to 
designate certain individuals as ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’314.  
This special ‘authorisation to undertake their civilian activities’315, is recorded 
on an identity card which confirms their function316. The privileges of POW 
status cannot be afforded to ‘contractors providing support to other branches 
of the State administration … during an armed conflict’317. In order to enjoy 
these benefits, ‘civilians must have a real link with (i.e. provide a service to) 
the armed forces, not merely the State’318. Contractors working for other 
branches of the State administration, or indeed for other ‘international or non-
governmental organisations, and private entities’, which accounts for a ‘large 
part of the situations involving contractors’, also cannot claim POW status319.  
 While there need not be ‘a formal and direct contractual link between 
the individual [contractor] and the armed forces’ 320, all that is needed is ‘a 
contract between the armed forces and the commercial entity that undertakes 
to supply resources or perform services’321. Because these civilian contractors 
are not enrolled in the armed forces, there are ‘limited options for dealing with 
their misconduct’322. Military ‘commanders do not have direct control over 
contractors or their employees’ … ‘only contractors manage, supervise, and 
give directions to their employees’323, and the military has ‘limited supervisory 
control’324. While misconduct might go unpunished325, there are serious 
consequences applied in cases where ‘persons accompanying the armed 
forces’ are found to be performing combat related functions beyond their 
‘civilian duties’326, or otherwise using their ‘civilian status to cause harm to the 
enemy’327. If it is ever discovered that these civilian contractors have been 
participating directly in hostilities328, they ‘not only … lose their protection as 
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civilians329 [and become a legitimate military target for so long as they persist 
in these combat-related activities330], but they would also lose POW status331 
and may be prosecuted for war crimes’332. Moreover, while they themselves 
retain their civilian status, the critical assistance that contractors render to the 
armed forces, and their ‘proximity to military objectives’333, exposes them to 
an increased risk of collateral injury334 than is the case for other civilians.  
 
ii. PMSCs as civilians or ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’ 
 
Given the type of support activities often performed by PMSCs, there could be 
a case made for concluding that they should be classified as civilian 
contractors who accompany the armed forces. While they are often ‘not part 
of a standing army, private military contractors are a far cry from ordinary 
civilians’335. They are, in fact, providing similar services to those who 
traditionally accompany the armed forces, including: ‘preparing food and 
building bases to deliver armaments and fuel, planning combat operations 
alongside ordinary troops, gathering intelligence, providing personal security 
for senior military and civilian officials, and training soldiers in the use of 
military hardware’336.  
 Certainly there is no prohibition under IHL to classify PMSCs with 
‘persons accompanying the armed forces’, and affording them the benefit of 
POW status should they be captured. In fact, the U.S. generally views ‘PSCs 
contracting with the military’ … ‘as civilians accompanying the force’337. 
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Admittedly this view is taken in order to deny PMSCs the right to claim 
incorporation into the armed forces (by way of contract)338. There might then 
be room to argue that where States have contracted PMSCs to assist the 
armed forces, it is sufficient to infer protected status as civilian contractors, 
even if the contract itself is insufficient to actively incorporate them into the 
armed forces. However, as the Montreaux Document points out, they are 
expected to ‘fulfil the requirements of article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva 
Convention’339. While the ‘support functions’ carried out by PMSCs 
‘doubtlessly do fall within article 4(4)’, it is also worth noting that ‘it is unlikely 
that all PMC/PSC staff, hired by States, would fall within this category’340, 
especially where their activities bring them closer to the ‘heart of military 
operations’341. In the end it will require individual ‘case-by-case’ analysis of 
the ‘nature of the activities carried out’342. 
 Probably the greatest hurdle to overcome when arguing that PMSCs be 
classed with ‘persons accompanying the armed forces’, is that States do not 
normally issue PMSCs with identification cards reflecting this status. Before 
PMSCs can claim POW status, they will need to overcome the treaty 
requirement that they carry identification as ‘persons accompanying the 
armed forces’343. It is, however, true that when the convention drafters 
included the provision regarding the identity card for those accompanying the 
armed forces, it was agreed that ‘possession of one was a supplementary 
safeguard for the person concerned, but not an indispensable prerequisite for 
being granted POW status’344. When PMSCs can overcome this technical 
requirement, they might be classified as ‘persons accompanying the armed 
forces’ and enjoy the associated POW status345. Having said that, it is clear 
that this argument cannot be made where PMSCs are hired by other State 
departments346 (other then the department of defence347), or sub-
contracted348 by non-State actors without any affiliation to the armed forces349. 
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 Gillard concludes that ‘it seems safe to conclude that the majority of 
PMCs/PSCs staff hired by States can be considered "ordinary" civilians’350. As 
the Montreux Document states, ‘this is probably the case for the large majority 
of PMSC personnel. As such, they benefit from the protection afforded to 
civilians in situations of armed conflict’351. As civilians, PMSCs ‘may not be the 
object of an attack, unless and for such time as they directly participate in 
hostilities’352, and during this window they ‘constitute legitimate targets’353. At 
no time do they lose their civilian status, but they do ‘lose their protection from 
attack for the duration of their participation’. Moreover, if they were entitled to 
POW status by virtue of being classified as ‘persons accompanying the armed 
forces’, ‘they may lose their POW status’ if they are found to be participating 
directly in hostilities.354 Without the benefit of POW status, if PMSC fall into 
enemy hands after having participated directly in hostilties, they can ‘be tried 
under the national law of the State that is holding them’355. They do, however, 
remain subject to the the protections under GC IV, API artcle 75 ‘and the 
customary law rules applicable in international conflicts’356. 
 
6.5  Are PMSCs, today’s mercenaries in a new guise?357 
 
As PMSCs became a more common feature in recent international armed 
conflicts, the ‘first immediate response’… [was] to label them mercenaries … 
tainted with illegality and illegitimacy’358. While Enrique Bernales-Ballesteros 
was the Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism, the official position of the 
Special Rapporteur’s office was that PMSCs were mercenaries359, ‘a finding 
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that most of the international community chose to reject’360. In ‘2006 the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted a resolution prohibiting ‘private companies 
offering international military consultancy and security services’, from 
‘intervening in conflicts or being used against governments’361. Thereafter, in 
2007, the U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, reported to the 
U.N. General Assembly, that PMSCs ‘represent the new modalities of 
mercenarism’362. Although to be fair - these PMSCs ‘have more in common 
with the mercenary of the pre- rather than post- Wesphalian period’363. 
 Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that the two anti-mercenary 
conventions, both received generally ‘low levels of ratification’364 and lax 
implementation by States365. Meanwhile, PMSCs continued to operate in over 
fifty States, often on government contracts366. In addition, the ‘heavy reliance 
on PMSCs by the USA and the U.K. has led observers to argue that it simply 
is too late to seek to ban PMSCs: the goal instead should be to sort out 
accountability issues’367. PMSCs, for their part, have always maintained that 
‘they are not mercenaries, and that existing international law condemning 
mercenaries cannot be applied to them’368. Furthermore, endeavours by the 
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to dialogue with those in 
the private security industry, in order to promote their compliance with IHL, 
lends credibility to the position that PMSCs are not as a general rule 
mercenaries369. The prevailing legal opinion is that ‘treating private 
contractors as mercenaries is not productive’370, neither is it supported under 
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customary international law for want of State practice371 and ‘opinio juris’372. 
 State practice reveals that ‘outside of the community of African States 
that championed it, the mercenary ban has never received the type of 
widespread support that would make enforcement likely’373. Not suprisingly, 
‘prosecutions for the crime of mercenarism … are rare’374, and even in the 
instances of ‘some quite well-known trials of mercenaries’375, States have 
often resorted to charging these ‘mercenaries’ with other ‘violations of national 
law’ (like arms possession), rather then for mercenarism per se376. 
 It is, however, not impossible for an individual PMSC to satisfy the 
definitional requirements for mercenary status. Having said that, it must be 
noted that at present there are no ‘provisions, in treaty or customary IHL, 
which explicitly prohibit mercenarism’377 under IHL. Moreover, nowhere in any 
treaty is there a provision making it an offence for a State to make use of 
mercenaries, and most treaty provisions (like AP I article 47) target only 
individual mercenaries378. The IHL provisions dealing with mercenarism are 
considered ‘one of the weaker provisions’379 in IHL. Instead of criminalising 
the behaviour of mercenaries, IHL approaches the issue of mercenarism by 
restricting the status to be granted to these individuals, if captured380. In 
effect, AP I article 47 treats mercenaries like other civilians who participate 
directly in hostilities without authorisation381. Consequently, if captured, they 
are not entitled382 to claim combatant and POW status under IHL, because 
they are ‘not members of the armed forces’383. Moreover, they are not 
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immune from prosecution, and ‘can be tried under national law for the mere 
fact of having participated in hostilities’384. As with any civilians who are 
captured after having participated in hostilities, GC IV will apply in the case of 
captured mercenaries, and ‘lays down minimum standards to regulate their 
deprivation of liberty, as well as minimum judicial guarantees to be respected 
in any criminal proceedings’385. Should a captured mercenary fall outside of 
the scope of GC IV, they are, nevertheless, still entitled to claim a ‘proper trial’ 
and the minimum fundamental guarantees enshrined in AP I article 75386. 
Consequently, an individual who fulfills the IHL definition of a mercenary will 
not face criminal prosecution for ‘mercenarism’387 per se, neither will they face 
potential prosecution under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court388. At most, they might face prosecution under the domestic laws of a 
detaining State that is party to either of the two anti-mercenary treaties389. 
However, having said that, it is acknowledged by most jurists that the ‘legal 
standards within these instruments are difficult to meet’390.  
 
i. Defining a mercenary under IHL 
 
The term mercenary is defined in AP I article 47(2), as any person who (in the 
context of an international armed conflict): 
 
‘(a)  is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict391; 
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(b)  does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c)  is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the 
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the 
armed forces of that Party392; 
(d)  is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e)  is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f)  has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces’. 
 
Given that all six criteria have to be fulfilled cumulatively, the threshold is 
difficult to attain and, PMSCs fail to fulfill many of the six criteria required by 
the IHL definition of a ‘mercenary’. Consequently, the term ‘mercenary’ is 
rarely used in its legally accurate sense, and the definition is widely regarded 
as being unworkable393 and ‘easy to evade’394. 
  
Are PMSCs ‘specially recruited’? 
 
There is some academic debate about whether PMSCs can be said to be 
‘specially recruited’. Most PMSCs work on a freelance basis, with their names 
on several databases395. Where they do work ‘on long-term contracts’396, 
moving from one conflict zone to another, they cannot be said to have been 
‘specially recruited’397. However, where they are ‘awarded a particular 
contract398 that might be sufficient to conclude that they were “specially 
recruited”’399. 
 
Do PMSCs take a direct part in international hostilities? 
 
                                                
392 ‘According to the ICRC’s commentary, this requirement was introduced to distinguish the 
mercenary from the noble volunteer (Ibid). 
393 Cameron ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military 
Companies’ at 6; Cameron ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status Under International 
Humanitarian Law and its Impact on their Regulation’ at 578; Foreign Commonwealth Office 
‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ (Green paper) (2002) available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf4/fco_pdf_privatemilitarycompanies (accessed 28 
February 2011) at para 6. 
394 Clapham ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ at 98. 
395 Salzman ‘Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation’ at 882. 
396 Ibid.  
397 Walker and Whyte ‘Contracting Out War?: Private Military Companies, Law and 
Regulation in the United Kingdom’ at 679-680. 
398 Like, for example, where Executive Outcomes (EO) was hired in 1993 by the Angolan 
Government ‘to regain control of the territory’, or where EO was hired in 1995 by Sierra Leone 
‘to retrain its troops and to help them defeat the rebels of the RUF’ (Mancini et al ‘Old 
Concepts and New Challenges: Are Private Contractors the Mercenaries of the Twenty-first 
Century?’ at 331). It would be entirely possible to interpret these cases as fulfilling the 
‘specially recruited’ criterion.  
399 Salzman ‘Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation’ at 882; 
Mancini et al ‘Old Concepts and New Challenges: Are Private Contractors the Mercenaries of 
the Twenty-first Century?’ at 331. 
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Many PMSCs are not recruited to fight, but are contracted to provide support 
services400, advisory services401, training, logistical support, security402, or to 
act as bodyguards403. Provided PMSCs are providing ‘non-combat services’ 
or miltary advice, they are not considered to be ‘taking a direct part in the 
hostilities', and will not fall foul of AP I article 47(2)(b)404. This position is 
endorsed by the ICRC in their commentary on AP I, where it is stated that: 
military advice, training, and technical maintenance of weapons are not 
‘mercenary activities’, and do not in and of themselves amount to direct 
participation in hostilities405. PMSCs are ‘quick to deny that they provide 
tactical military services, claiming to provide purely defensive and protective 
services’406. PMSCs also ‘tend not to openly advertise their more combat-like 
services’407. Some academics argue that ‘so long as private contractors are 
not contracted specifically to engage in combat, and do so only in self-
defense, they fall outside of the definition of article 47’408.  
 The reality on the ground reveals that, although private contractors may 
have initially fulfilled purely support roles, they have today ‘spread across the 
full spectrum of government activities’409, effectively blurring the line ‘between 
combat and non-combat services’410. So, for example, in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the U.S. and U.K. governments hired a variety of PMSCs (Blackwater, 
Dynacorp International, Military Professional Resources Inc, Triple Canopy, 
EOD Technology, Aegis, ArmorGroup, Control Risks and Erinys411) to provide 
‘services including static security of sites, escourt security, convoy security 
and personal security details of high ranking individuals’412. While they might 
have initially been recruited as ‘security guards’, they often became ‘private 
soldiers militarily armed’413… ‘often receiving ad hoc military training before 
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being dispatched to Iraq or Afghanistan’414.  
So ‘while it may be true that certain private contractors do not meet the 
direct participation requirement, an increasing number do’415. As was the case 
in Iraq, many PMSCs were hired to carry out tasks in ‘combat-like situations’ 
(‘from maintaining complex weapons such as the B-2 bomber, to performing 
interrogations, to selecting targets and flying surveillance missions’416), which 
clearly satisfy the ‘direct participation requirement’417. Sometimes PMSCs 
were even ‘permitted to join coalition forces in combat operations, for the 
purposes of self-defense and for the defense of people specified in their 
contract'418.  
 Admittedly it will sometimes be difficult to establish when security 
contractors cross the line over to ‘direct combat activity’419. So, for example, 
while ‘armed security contractors cannot be considered as recruited to fight in 
an armed conflict if they are hired to protect military objectives against 
common criminals’420, it is also true that ‘there is no distinction based on the 
offensive or defensive nature of the participation in combat’421. Legally, only 
those PMSCs specifically recruited to actively participate in hostilities422 
directly, will satisfy these criteria. As for the rest, they would retain their 
civilian status423.  
 
Are PMSCs motivated by the desire for private gain, substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions? 
 
It is generally uncontested that PMSCs are ‘private agents, principally 
motivated by profit’424 and that they ‘are paid substantially more than their 
counterparts in the national armed forces’425. To illustrate the extent of their 
remuneration, Blackwater staff (of U.S. nationality) undertaking a protective 
security detail, cost the U.S. government ‘six-nine times more then an 
equivalent U.S. soldier’426. When one considers that PMSCs take up risky 
assignments in countries far from their homes, ‘the desire for private gain 
appears to be the primary motivator’427. Similarly, there is no consensus on 
whether being hired by private security companies behind a ‘corporate veil’, 
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protects the individual PMSCs from questions regarding ‘their monetary 
motivations’428. That said, legal scholars are generally in agreement that the 
legal proof of their motivation would be extremely difficult to satisfy429. After 
all, many ‘members of the State’s own armed forces are motivated to enlist for 
monetary gain’, while many PMSCs might well have ‘non-monetary 
motivations’430 based on ‘moral or political ideals’431. As Gaston points out, 
‘even if they are not actually motivated by a sense of patriotic duty, it may be 
difficult to prove otherwise’432. As the Diplock Report concluded, 'any 
definition of mercenaries which required proof positive of motivation would ... 
either be unworkable or ... haphazard'433. 
 
Are PMSCs ‘not nationals of a Party to the conflict or residents of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict’? 
 
In an arbitrary manner, any PMSCs emanating from States party to the 
conflict, would automatically be exempt from mercenary status under this 
criterion434, while fellow employees of the same private security company 
would fall foul of this requirement due to their citizenship or residence alone. 
So, for example, in the ‘specific context of Iraq or Afghanistan, security 
contractors who are citizens of either the United States or coalition 
partners’435, or ‘Iraqi or Afghan nationals hired by these countries’436, would be 
exempt from AP I article 47, while PMSCs ‘emanating from Honduras, Peru, 
Chile and other third world countries’437 would have fulfilled the nationality 
requirement of the test for mercenarism’438. Sometimes PMSCs have avoided 
this provision by being immediately granted nationality or citizenship by the 
host State (‘as in the case of the Executive Outcomes and Sandline helicopter 
pilots in Sierra Leone’)439. 
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Are PMSCs not ‘member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict’? 
 
As was discussed in length above, States are reluctant to officially incorporate 
PMSCs into their armed forces. However, there is evidence of host States 
clothing PMSCs with a special designation which links them to the armed 
forces. So, for example, PMSCs employed by Sandline in Papua New 
Guinea, ‘were designated as Special Constables'440, which then exempted 
them from AP I article 47. 
 
Are PMSCs ‘sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty 
as a member of its armed forces’? 
 
While States are reluctant to officially incorporate PMSCs into their armed 
forces, some jurists have argued that the contract of employment is sufficient 
to conclude that they are contractors of their employing State441, which will 
ensure that they are not classified as mercenaries. 
 In July 2010, the U.N. Working Group on the use of mercenaries 
submitted a ‘draft of a possible convention on PMSC’ to the Human Rights 
Council442. The draft ‘establishes an outright ban on the direct participation of 
contractors in hostilities’443, and required States party ‘to take such legislative, 
administrative and other measures as may be necessary to prohibit and make 
illegal the direct participation of PSMC’s and their personnel in hostilities, 
terrorist acts and military actions in violation of international law’444.  
 What we can surmise from this recent development, is not that PMSCs 
are necessarily mercenaries, but that their direct participation in hostilities 
does violate IHL – which has always been the legal position, irrespective of 
whether one views them as mercenaries or not. The U.N. working group 
conceded that ‘although their activities have characteristics in common with 
mercenaries, save in exceptional cases, they do not fit the technical definition 
provided in the U.N. anti-mercenary convention’445, and ‘many activities 
performed by PMSCs cannot be considered as mercenary activities under the 
existing international treaties’446.  
 In conclusion then, it seems that, in theory, it is possible for a PMSC (in 
the context of an international armed conflict) to fulfill all the complicated 
requirements of the IHL definition of a mercenary447, although it would be a 
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rare occurrence448. For the most part, PMSCs are ‘not contracted to fight in 
military operations’, ‘many are nationals of one of the parties to the conflict’, 
and proving motivation of private gain has eluded most prosecutors449. In 
most cases, the term mercenary is not useful in determining the status of 
PMSCs under IHL450, and ‘is largely inapplicable to the relatively new 
phenomenon of PMSCs’451.  
 
6.6  Conclusions on the primary status of PMSCs 
 
In short then, most legal scholars agree that there is no legal obstacle to 
PMSCs being afforded primary combatant status and secondary POW status 
upon capture452. PMSCs will enjoy the privileges associated with combatant 
status when they are ‘formally incorporated into the States armed forces’453, 
or ‘they fulfil the customary IHL criteria for combatant status’454. However, 
most commentators agree that the attainment of either of these conditions is 
likely to be rare455. As for the allegation that PMSCs might be classified as 
mercenaries, in theory it is possible for a PMSC (in the context of an 
international armed conflict) to fulfill all the requirements of the IHL definition 
of a mercenary456, although it would be a rare occurrence457.  
 If PMSCs do not fulfil the criteria for combatant status, ‘they are 
protected as civilians’458, ‘to whom the normal rules of civilian status apply’459. 
In order to ensure their civilian immunity is not compromised, PMSCs must 
take care not to ‘dress like members of the armed forces’… or to ‘engage in 
combat-related activities’460. Since most PMSCs are employed ‘to provide 
support functions461… they are considered to be civilians’462. As the 
Montreaux Document concludes: ‘the status of PMSC personnel depends on 
their exact employment and functions’463.  
As civilians, PMSCs are not permitted to participate directly in 
hostilities, but are still by law permitted to carry ‘light, personal weapons for 
their own self-defence or the defence of those they are protecting’464. Whether 
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they compromise their civilian status, will depend on ‘the activities they are 
undertaking at the time, as well as how they use force’465. If they do exceed 
these limitations, they ‘may only be attacked if, and so long as, they take part 
directly in hostilities’466. If PMSCs are captured after being found to be 
participating in hostilities, ‘they run the risk, … of being accused of perfidy, [or] 
unprivileged belligerency’467, and can ‘be prosecuted for mere involvement in 
hostilities’468, without any benefit of POW status469. 
 There might then be room to argue that where States have contracted 
PMSCs to assist the armed forces, it is sufficient to infer protected status, as 
‘persons accompanying the armed forces’, even if the contract itself is 
insufficient to actively incorporate them into the armed forces. In such cases, 
PMSCs will need to be in possession of a card identifying them as ‘civilians 
accompanying the armed forces’470. The benefit for PMSCs of this special 
category, is that these individuals are granted POW status upon capture471. 
 In conclusion, it is misleading to say that PMSCs are without status 
under IHL472. As Gillard explains ‘IHL contains criteria for determining this 
status as well as clear consequent rights and obligations’473. Moreover, under 
IHL, every individual in the theatre of an international armed conflict has a 
primary status as either a combatant or a civilian474. What is true, however, is 
that ‘there is no single simple answer applicable to all’475 PMSCs. Much will 
turn on ‘the nature of their relationship with the State that hires them’, the 
‘nature of the activities that they carry out’476, the ‘given time and place477, and 
the circumstances surrounding the performance of their functions’478. As 
Kidane points out, ‘not all activities of private military contractors can easily be 
classified as legal or illegal’479. Moreover, ‘most of the private military 
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contractors perform legitimate activities most of the time’480. ‘Until State and 
international laws catch up to the advent of PMSCs’ their legal ‘status will 
have to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis’481. Even the U.N. working 
group concedes that its most recent draft treaty on PMSCs does not aim to 
ban outright their use; rather it aims at setting standards and ‘regulating the 
activities of PMSCs and their personnel’482. 
 
6.7 PMSCs and the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
 
From the analysis so far, it seems that most PMSCs will fall into the IHL 
classification of civilians (possibly enjoying privileges as contractors 
accompanying the armed forces). Civilian status brings with it immunity 
against attack on account of the ‘fundamental principle of the law of war that 
those who do not participate in the hostilities shall not be attacked483.’ 
Consequently, ‘civilians are protected persons, for so long as they do not act 
to compromise their protected status by engaging in ‘combat related 
activities’484, ‘normally … undertaken only by members of the armed 
forces’485. When a civilian engages in these combat-related activities (or to put 
it another way, ‘participates directly in hostilities’), that action ‘suspends their 
(civilian) protection against the dangers arising from military operations’486, 
exposes them to legitimate targeting487, and potential criminal prosecution for 
their unauthorised participation in hostilities488. As the ICRC’s commentary on 
AP I article 51(3) explains: ‘only some specific actions will result in the civilian 
losing their immunity, and … their loss of protection is limited to the length of 
time489 during which they persist in their direct participation’490. The corollary 
                                                                                                                                      
at 412. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Crofford ‘Private Security Contractors on the Battlefield’ at 8. 
482 Montreux Document at 36. 
483 Michael Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 697 at 715. 
484 Idem at 714. 
485 Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19. Rogers cites the following examples: 
‘attacks with roadside bombs on military patrols, sabotage of military communications 
installations, electronic interference with weapons systems or capturing members of the 
armed forces’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19). These activities must be 
distinguished from ‘support activities, such as provision of supplies and services … which do 
not amount to taking a direct part in hostilities’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ 
at 19). 
486 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
487 ‘The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to an overriding condition, namely, on 
their abstaining from all hostile acts … thus a civilian who takes part in an armed combat, 
either individually or as part of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target, though only for 
as long as he takes part in hostilities’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1995-
2003). The targeting decision in such instances does not have to take into account the 
principle of proportionality (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements’ at 703). 
488 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
489 ‘Once he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to the protection under this 
section …and he may no longer be attacked’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 
2003-12). 
490 Idem at 2003-12 and 1995-2003. 
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of this principle, is that ‘combatants’ (as understood by IHL), by virtue of their 
IHL status alone, are authorised to participate directly in hostilities,491 and do 
so without the threat of possible prosecution for their hostile actions. 
 The restrictions upon civilian direct participation in hostilities can be 
traced back to Geneva law, and is codified in the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949492. It is reiterated again in AP I article 51(3)493. This principle can also be 
said to have achieved customary international law status, as was confirmed 
by the ICRC’s study into the customary international law status of IHL. The 
study concluded that no ‘official contrary practice was found’494, and on the 
whole the principle that civilians lose their immunity from prosecution when 
they participate in hostilities, is seen as a valuable reaffirmation of an existing 
rule of customary international law’495. 
 While the principle is often cited, neither treaty law nor customary 
international law, can offer a definitive ‘definition of what activities amount to 
prohibited direct participation in hostilities’496. What is often stated, is that an 
‘assessment of direct participation has to be made on a case-by-case 
basis’497, interpreting ‘the notion of direct participation in hostilities … in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its constituent 
terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose of IHL’498. 
 Simply put, the notion of direct participation in hostilities is generally 
understood to apply to ‘acts which, by their nature or purpose may cause 
actual harm to enemy personnel and matériel’499.These are distinguished from 
acts which merely support the war effort500, like supplying ‘food and shelter to 
combatants or generally “sympathising” with them’501.This problem, which 
                                                
491 Subject to the limitations imposed upon them by international law regarding methods and 
means of warfare. Failure to observe these limitations will expose combatants to prosecution 
before a military tribunal (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65-66 and 68; 
HR article 3; AP I article 43(2)). It must be noted that these privileges may be forfeited as a 
result of the actions of particular individuals, for example by engaging in spying. 
492 GC common article 3(1): ‘Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' 
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth 
or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned 
persons’; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
493 ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities’. 
494 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23. 
495 Ibid.  
496 Idem at 22; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law at 12 and 41. 
497 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 22. 
498 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41. 
499 ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law’ ICRC expert 
meetings, (2 June 2003; 25-26 October 2004; 23-25 October 2005) (the Hague and Geneva) 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/direct-participation-
article-020709.htm (accessed 14 July 2012) at 1. 
500 Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211 and 233. 
501 Gillard ‘Private Military/Security Companies: The Status of their Staff and their Obligations 
Under International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibilities of States in Relation to their 
Operations’ at 5. ‘Support and logistical activities’ carried out by civilians like ‘catering, 
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Gillard expresses so succinctly, is that ‘a considerable grey zone exists 
between these two ends of the spectrum’502 - which has led to the existing 
controversy. The ICRC in their commentary to AP I, summarises the 
controversy as follows ‘undoubtedly there is room here for some margin of 
judgment: to restrict this concept to combat and to active military operations 
would be too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort would be too 
broad, as in modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort 
to some extent, albeit indirectly’503. The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, when faced with this issue in the Tadić case, commented 
that ‘it is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active 
part in hostilities and those who are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine 
the relevant facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in each individual’s 
circumstances, that person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant 
time’504. 
 While it might seem straight forward to instruct civilian PMSCs to desist 
from any actions which might amount to direct participation in hostilities, the 
issue is complicated by the fact that the notion of exactly what amounts to 
direct participation in hostilities has eluded IHL academics and international 
courts alike. There is widespread agreement, that when PMSCs ‘engage in 
combat activities’ (like the accounts of ‘Executive Outcomes and Sandline 
International contracting to fight wars for the governments of Sierra Leone and 
Angola in the 1990’s’)505, that these activities amount to direct participation in 
hostilities. While these sorts of activities have received ‘widespread 
condemnation’, PMSCs have reinvented themselves, ‘rejecting … an explicit 
combat role’, to the extent that ‘some scholars argue that a norm against 
offensive missions is emerging’506. ‘British industry officials argue … that 
British companies are ‘purely defensive’, while U.S. industry representatives, 
in discussing offensive actions, insist that ‘none of the companies do it’507, and 
others argue that it still happens, but that PMSCs do not advertise these 
services openly, and ‘have simply learned to avoid public view’508. 
  The PMSC ‘industry boom’ seems to test the debate around which 
activities amount to direct participation in hostilities, in new ways. It poses new 
challenges, like: whether preparation for military operations oversteps the 
mark509; whether defensive510 (as opposed to offensive) operations amount to 
                                                                                                                                      
construction and maintenance of bases’ do not constitute direct participation in hostilities, 
provided these civilians do no more then act in self defence (Cameron ‘Private Military 
Companies: Their Status Under International Humanitarian Law and its Impact on their 
Regulation’ at 588-589). 
502 Gillard ‘Private Military/Security Companies: The Status of their Staff and their Obligations 
Under International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibilities of States in Relation to their 
Operations’ at 5.  
503 Pilloud et al ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocol of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Convention of 12 August 1949 at 516. 
504 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić ICTY (7 May 1997) IT -94 -1-A available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (accessed 17 July 2012) at 
para 616. 




509 Gasser proposes that direct participation involves not only ‘direct personal involvement but 
also preparation for a military operation, and intention to take part therein’, provided the 
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direct participation; whether the ‘use of force in self defence’ amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities; whether the close proximity of PMSCs to the theatre 
of combat makes their activities more likely to be interpreted as direct 
participation in hostilities511; and lastly, whether the location of PMSCs far 
from the actual theatre of hostilities necessarily exempts them from being 
found participating directly in hostilities512. 
 
i. The ICRC’s ‘Interpretive Guide’ 
 
In an attempt to provide guidance for States interpreting the concept of ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’, the ICRC convened a panel of experts to debate 
the issue, and in 2009 the ICRC produced the Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities. While the guide is not legally 
binding, the ICRC hoped that their recommendations would have ‘substantial 
persuasive effect’513 ‘for States, non-State actors, practitioners, and 
academics alike’514. Some argue that the guidance ‘may even be viewed as a 
secondary source of international law… analogous to writings of the “most 
highly qualified publicists”’515. 
 It is worth stating at the outset, that the Interpretive Guide makes it 
explicit that the document only speaks to the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities, in so far as it impacts on decisions regarding ‘targeting and military 
attacks’. It does not propose to deal with the issue of ‘detention or combatant 
immunity’516. Moreover, the concept of direct participation in hostilties is only 
                                                                                                                                      
activities ‘represent a direct threat to the enemy’ (Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ 
at 232; ICRC ‘Commentary to AP I’ (1977) 16 International Legal Materials 1391 at 1679. 
510 ‘IHL does not distinguish between offensive and defensive operations’, providing defence 
for ‘military objectives amounts to direct participation in hostilities’ (Sossai ‘Status of Private 
Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of International Armed Conflict’ at 208). 
511 ‘The first principle is that the closer an activity occurs to the physical location of fighting, 
the more likely it will be considered combat’, since ‘activity near the battlefield can usually be 
more closely linked to the infliction of harm on an enemy’ (Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-
examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 179-180).  
512 Technological developments which would allow individuals located far from the front-lines 
to direct a weapon to strike a target remotely by computer, must be taken into account. 
Cameron argues that these activities would amount to direct participation in hostilities 
(Lindsey Cameron ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military 
Companies’ (Februry 2007) Plenary Lecture given at Conference on Non-State Actors as 
Standard Setters: The Erosion of the Public-Private Divide, available at 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Non-State/Cameron.pdf (accessed 27 
May 2012) at 9). 
513 William Fenrick  ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2009) 12 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law 287 at 300. 
514 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 10. 
515 Damien Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical 
Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ (2009) available at 
http://works.bepress.com/damien_van_der_toorn/1 (accessed 14 July 2012) at 22.  
516 Robert Goodman and Derek Jinks  ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the 
Forum’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 637-640 at 638. ‘Its conclusions are not 
intended to serve as a basis for interpreting IHL regulating the status, rights and protections 
of persons outside the conduct of hostilities, such as those deprived of their liberty’ (Watkin 
‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
Interpretive Guide’ at 670). 
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intended to be applicable to those who qualify as civilians, as it is the means 
of determining when their actions result in the loss of their otherwise protected 
civilian immunity517. The guide approaches the issues as a series of steps: 
 
step 1: does the ‘specific hostile act’518 fall within the ambit of those 
restricted acts which amount to direct participation in hostilities519; and  
step 2: what is the temporal scope of the loss of immunity on account of 
their direct participation in hostilities. 
 
Despite being critical of elements of the guide, most commentators concede 
that ‘the Interpretive Guidance is superior to the various ad hoc lists’, because 
it provides ‘those tasked with applying the norm on the battlefield’ with 
‘guidelines against which to gauge an action’520. 
 
ii. Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in hostilities 
 
‘According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, in order to qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet three cumulative 
criteria’521: 
 
‘1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack (‘threshold of harm’), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely 
to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (‘direct causation’), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (‘belligerent nexus’)’522. 
 
The threshold523 of harm 
                                                
517 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 
704. Since the ‘loss is temporary’ Melzer suggests that it is ‘better described as a 
“suspension” of protection’ (Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 347); Boothby 
‘“And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 755-
756. 
518 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 45. 
519 ‘The notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by 
individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 46). 
520 Melzer N ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 831 at 877. 
521 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 46. Determining which activities amount to direct 
participation in hostilities is not dependant on ones ‘status, function, or affiliation’ (Idem at 10). 
522 Idem at 47. 
523 The Interpretive Guidance stipulates that it is not the ‘quantum of harm caused the enemy’ 
which determines whether it reaches the necessary threshold of harm criteria’ … it is ‘the 
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The first criterion, which is referred to as the ‘threshold of harm’ determination, 
requires that harm: 
 
a) ‘of a specifically military nature’524, or525  
b) harm (‘by inflicting death, injury or destruction’526) of a protected 
person or object527,  
must be reasonably expected to result from a civilian’s actions 
before the civilian can be said to be participating directly in 
hostilities528. 
 
All that is required is the ‘objective likelihood529 that the act will result in such 
harm’, not necessarily the actual ‘materialisation of harm’530. 
 
a) Military harm 
 
The term ‘military harm should be interpreted as encompassing not only the 
infliction of death, injury, or destruction on military personnel and objects, but 
essentially any consequence adversely affecting the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to the conflict’531. This does not apply to ‘civilian 
objects (even if they may sometimes contribute to one belligerent’s success in 
the conflict)’532. 
                                                                                                                                      
performance of a specified act, not that the act reaches a “particular threshold”’ (Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 716). 
524 The act ‘must either harm the enemy’s military operations or capacity’ (Melzer ‘Keeping 
the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 862). 
525 From a cursory examination of the criterion, it is apparent that the test is framed in the 
alternative ‘that is, the harm contemplated may either adversely affect the enemy or harm 
protected persons or objects’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constituent Elements’ at 713). 
526 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
527 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 862. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Defined as ‘harm which may reasonably be expected to result from an act in the prevailing 
circumstances’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law at 47). As was discussed at the Expert discussions, 
‘wherever a civilian had a subjective “intent” to cause harm that was objectively identifiable, 
there would also be an objective “likelihood” that he or she would cause such harm’ (Schmitt 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 724). 
530 The ‘causal relationship between the physical conduct and the harm suffered’ is addressed 
under the second leg of the test (the direct causation test) (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 33). 
Schmitt concedes that this is a sensible requirement, as it would be ‘absurd to suggest that a 
civilian shooting at a combatant, but missing, would not be directly participating because no 
harm resulted’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 724). 
531 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
532 So, for example, ‘political, economic and psychological contributions might play a role in a 
military victory but alone they are not considered military objects’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing 
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 717). 
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b) Attacks against protected persons 
 
When no military harm results, the actions of civilians might still constitute 
direct participation in hostilities, when their actions amount to attacks533 
specifically ‘directed against civilians and civilian objects’534. ‘In the absence 
of such military harm, however, a specific act must be likely to cause at least 
death, injury, or destruction’535. It is important that the harmful action is ‘in 
some way connected to the armed conflict’536, or as Melzer puts it, it is an 
‘integral part of armed confrontations’537. ‘Consequently, the direct infliction of 
harm on protected persons and objects, qualifies as direct participation in 
hostilities, unless: 1) it falls short of the required threshold of death, injury or 
destruction, or 2) it lacks belligerent nexus’538. 
 A large proportion of the tasks performed by PMSCs involve guarding or 
security services for objects and personnel. When assessing the actions of 
PMSCs who claim to be acting defensively as a security guard, two factors 
will have to considered in deciding whether their ‘defensive use of force 
amounts to direct participation in hostilities’539. Firstly, who or what sites are 
                                                
533 The Interpretive Guidance relies on the AP I article 49 definition of ‘attack’, which ‘does not 
specify the target, but the belligerent nexus of an attack, so that even acts of violence 
directed specifically against civilians or civilian objects may amount to direct participation in 
hostilities’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 723). Legal precedence for this position can be found in the jurisprudence 
emerging from the ICTY, where it was concluded that ‘sniping attacks against civilians and 
bombardment of civilian villages or urban residential areas’ constitutes an ‘attack’ in the IHL 
sense (Ibid). 
534 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 49. It is worth noting that these attacks would also 
constitute ‘grave violations of IHL or even war crimes’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between 
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 861). 
535 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 49). ‘As distinct from other forms of harm, such as 
deportation’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 723). ‘Political, diplomatic, economic, or administrative measures, which may 
well be harmful to the civilian population, but which are not part of the hostilities’ (Melzer 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 862). For example, ‘building of fences or road blocks, the interruption of 
electricity, water, or food supplies, and the manipulation of computer networks not directly 
resulting in death, injury, or destruction. While all of these activities may adversely affect 
public security, health, and commerce, they would not, in the absence of military harm, qualify 
as direct participation in hostilities’ (Ibid). 
536 For example, a ‘prison guard may kill a prisoner for purely private reasons’, without his 
actions amounting to direct participation in hostilities, but were he to engage in ‘a practice of 
killing prisoners of a particular ethnic group during an ethnic conflict [that] would meet the 
standard’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 723). 
537 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 861. 
538 Ibid. 
539 It is worth noting that ‘IHL makes no distinction between offensive and defensive uses of 
force: it focuses on whether the actor has the right to use force’ (Cameron ‘International 
Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military Companies’).  
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they guarding (i.e. the status of the sites under IHL), and secondly who are 
they using force against540. These two factors determine whether PMSCs ‘can 
lawfully use force, even defensively, without endangering their status and 
protections under IHL’541. If they are guarding military personnel542, or military 
objectives543, they are affecting military operations and can be considered to 
be participating directly in hostilities. While they, themselves, are not 
technically legitimate military targets, if they defend military objectives they 
become legitimate targets for attack544. If, on the other hand, they are 
guarding civilians545 or civilian objects, they will not be considered to be 
participating in hostilities546, provided they ‘only use force in self-defence’547, 
or in defence of those civilians they are protecting548. So, for example, 
‘Blackwater employees protecting U.S. State Department officials in Iraq, will 
not be found to be participating directly in hostilities when using force to 
protect their clients, since these diplomats cannot lawfully be attacked’549. 
What then of dual use sites (i.e. ‘pipelines, radio towers, and electricity 
stations’550), which ‘could be seen to help a war effort owing to their role in 
supporting the State and its armed forces’?551 In light of the presumption in 
favour of protected status for dual-use sites, these dual-use sites should be 
afforded civilian status until the status of the installation can be deemed to be 
definitely military in nature. Only once the installation is classified as a military 
objective, can those PMSCs guarding it be targeted for participating directly in 
hostilities. As regards the issue of who they are guarding the particular site or 
persons against, if they are using force in defence against criminal 
elements552, rather then parties to the conflict, their actions do not have the 
necessary belligerent nexus to amount to direct participation in hostilities553.  
                                                
540 De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 180. 
541 Ibid; Elsea et al ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other 
Issues’ at 17. 
542 ‘Military leaders are legitimate military targets’ and ‘because military officers are legitimate 
military targets, PSC employees risk coming under attack when protecting them’ (De Nevers 
‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 180). 
543 When PMSCs ‘use of force … to defend these [military] sites’, their actions amount to 
‘direct participation in hostilities’ (Gillard ‘Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security 
Companies and International Humanitarian Law’ at 540).  
544 The presence of PMSCs at military targets not only puts them at increased ‘risk of harm’, 
but ‘if they use force in defense of this target they become legitimate targets of attack 
themselves’ (De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ at 180). 
545 Civilians enjoy complete immunity from attack, as do diplomats, ‘neither are legitimate 
targets’ (Ibid).  
546 Ibid. 
547 Using ‘indiscriminate force’ will result in PMSCs being charged with ‘war crimes, or 
criminal acts, or both’ (Idem at 181). 
548 Since attacks which target civilians are illegal under IHL, any such attacks are considered 
‘criminal acts’, and as a result PMSCs ‘may lawfully defend themselves and those they are 
protecting’…’without being viewed as taking a direct part in hostilities’ (Idem at 180). 
549 Idem at 181. 
550 Idem at 186 
551 Ibid. 
552 ‘Naturally the security provided must be against thieves and marauders, rather then enemy 
combatants’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict at 58). 
553 As de Nevers explains, ‘attacks by non-State actors, insurgents, and criminals’ are not a 
part of hostilities, ‘because these are not lawful combatants’ (De Nevers ‘Private Security 
Companies and the Laws of War’ at 180). 
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 Guarding duties aside, the following activities satisfy the threshold of 
harm test: 
 
• ‘acts of violence against human and material enemy forces’554;  
• causing ‘physical or functional damage to military objects, operations 
or capacity’555; 
• violent acts specifically directed against civilians or civilian objects 
(such as sniper attacks or the bombardment of [a] civilian residential 
area’)556; 
• sabotaging military capacity and operations557;  
• electronic interference, exploitation, or attacks on ‘military computer 
networks’558; 
• ‘wiretapping the adversary’s high command or transmitting tactical 
targeting information for an attack’559; 
• restricting or disturbing military ‘deployments’560;  
• exercising any form of control or denying the military use of ‘military 
personnel, objects and territory to the detriment of the adversary561; 
• providing ‘logistics and communications’562 assistance; 
• clearing mines placed by the opposition;  
• ‘repairing a battle-damaged runway at a forward airfield, so it can be 
used to launch aircraft’563;  
• ‘guarding captured military personnel to prevent them being forcibly 
liberated’564; 
• ‘building defensive positions at a military base certain to be 
attacked’565; 
• ‘voluntarily and deliberately positioning themselves to create a 
physical obstacle to military operations of a party to the conflict’566; 
                                                
554 For example, ‘killing and wounding of military personnel’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 48). 
555 Idem at 47-48. 
556 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 203; ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 49. 
557 ‘Sabotage or other unarmed activities qualify, if they restrict or disturb logistics or 
communications of an opposing party to the conflict’ (Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law in War at 203). 
558 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
715. 
559 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 48. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Ibid.  
563 ‘Because it constitutes a measure preparatory to specific combat operations likely to 
directly inflict harm on the enemy’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity 
and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 859). 
564 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 48.  
565 ‘Because it is likely to directly and adversely affect the enemy’s impending attack’ (Melzer 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 859). 
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• disclosing any tactical targeting information; and 
• training military personnel ‘for the execution of a predetermined 
hostile act’567. 
 
If those activities, performed by PMSCs, satisfy the threshold of harm 
requirement, then the following activities performed by PMSCs, will not 
amount to a specific hostile act, for which they can expect to lose civilian 
immunity from targeting: 
  
• ‘building fences or roadblocks’568;  
• interrupting electricity, water, or food supplies’569;  
• appropriating ‘cars and fuel’570;  
• manipulating ‘computer networks’571;  
• arresting or deporting ‘persons [who] may have a serious impact on 
public security, health, and commerce’572; 
• refusing ‘to engage in actions that would positively affect one of the 
parties’ (e.g. refusing to provide information)573; 
• rescuing ‘enemy aircrew members’574; 
• ‘development and production of improvised explosive devices’ 
(IEDs);575 and 
• providing ‘generalised training to military personnel’576. 
 
Jensen577, Schmitt578 and Heaton579, are all critical of the threshold of harm 
requirement for - what they term - its ‘under-inclusiveness’, and its failure to 
include within its ambit ‘those who directly support those who cause actual 
harm’580. They would have preferred an interpretation which ‘would also 
                                                                                                                                      
566 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 56. 
567 Idem at 53.  





573 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
719. 
574 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 860. 
575 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 860. 
576 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 53.  
577 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2221-28. 
578 Melzer argues that ‘Schmitt fails not only to support his argument as a matter of law, but 
also to demonstrate that the Interpretive Guidance’s wide concept of military harm is “under-
inclusive” as a matter of practice’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity 
and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ 859). 
579 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 37. 
580 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2221-28. 
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include those who gather intelligence or act as observers and supply 
information to fighters, those who solicit others to participate in hostilities, and 
those who train them on military tactics’581. They argue that the final hostile 
act of the combatant is heavily reliant on the ‘support personnel’, which makes 
the combative actions possible582. In response to these critiques, Melzer 
warns that any proposal to lower the required threshold of harm, in order to 
‘extend loss of protection to a potentially wide range of support activities’, will 
result in ‘undermining the generally recognised distinction between direct 
participation in hostilities and mere involvement in the general war effort’583. 
 
The direct causation requirement 
 
The second requirement of the three criteria for a finding of ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’, is termed the ‘direct causation’ test. The purpose of 
this part of the test is to ensure that ‘general war effort’584 and activities aimed 
at sustaining war 585 (although indispensable to the war effort, and which in 
effect do harm the adversary), would not satisfy the threshold criteria and 
amount to direct participation in hostilities586. Consequently, and in order to 
avoid depriving much of the civilian population of their protected status, there 
must be ‘a sufficiently close causal relation between the act and the resulting 
harm’, for it to amount to direct participation in hostilities587.  
 According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, ‘direct causation should be 
understood as meaning that the harm in question must be brought about in 
one causal step’588. Where a specific act by an individual does not, ‘on its own 
                                                
581 Ibid. 
582 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 37. 
583 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 877. 
584 This includes all activities ‘objectively contributing to the military defeat of the adversary’, 
for example ‘design, production and shipment of weapons and military equipment, 
construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure 
outside the context of concrete military operations’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 53). 
585 This would additionally include ‘political, economic or media activities supporting the 
general war effort’, for example ‘political propaganda, financial transactions, production of 
agricultural or non-military industrial goods’… providing ‘finances, food and shelter to the 
armed forces and producing weapons and ammunition’ (Idem at 52-53).  
586 As the ICRC Interpretive Guide points out: ‘both the general war effort and war-sustaining 
activities may ultimately result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as 
direct participation in hostilities, in fact … some of these activities may even be indispensable 
to harming the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to the armed forces 
and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of hostilities, which is 
designed to cause the required harm, the general war effort and war sustaining activities also 
include activities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to cause such harm’ (Idem at 
52). 
587 Ibid. 
588 The act must not only be causally linked to the harm, but it must also cause the harm 
directly. For example, ‘the assembly and storing of an improvised explosive device (IED) in a 
workshop, or the purchase or smuggling of its components, may be connected with the 
resulting harm through an uninterrupted causal chain of events, but, unlike the planting and 
detonation of that device, do not cause that harm directly’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 54 and 
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directly cause the required threshold of harm, their actions might still amount 
to direct participation where the individuals are part of a collective 
operation’589. As Sossai explains, ‘this means that the notion of direct 
participation of hostilities’, comprises also those activities which cause harm 
‘only in conjunction with other acts’590. In these instances, the requirement of 
direct causation would still have to be fulfilled, and the civilian would lose their 
immunity from attack, where their individual ‘act constitutes an integral part of 
a concrete and coordinated tactical (or collective) operation that directly 
causes such harm’591.  
 In light of this requirement of causation, the following activities have 
been said to satisfy the direct causation enquiry: 
  
• ‘a coordinated tactical operation that directly causes harm’ (of the 
required threshold)592; 
• ‘taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or 
operations’593; 
•  ‘bearing, using or taking up arms’ in combat594; 
• ‘conducting attacks’595 or ‘participating in attacks against enemy 
personnel, property or equipment’596;  
• operating ‘weapons which unlawful combatants use’ (i.e. ‘manning an 
anti-aircraft gun’)597, or supervising the ‘operation of weaponry’598; 
• ‘sabotaging military installations599 and lines of communication’600; 
                                                                                                                                      
55). In short, where an ‘individual’s conduct … merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a 
party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, it is excluded 
from the concept of direct participation in hostilities’ (Idem at 53); Melzer ‘Keeping the 
Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 866. 
589 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 865. 
590 Sossai ‘Status of Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of 
International Armed Conflict’ at 206. 
591 Examples of such acts would include, inter alia: ‘the identification and marking of targets, 
the analysis and transmission of tactical intelligence to attacking forces, and the instruction 
and assistance given to troops for the execution of a specific military operation’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 55); Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An 
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 102. 
592 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
593 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
596 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
599 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
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• capturing combatants or their equipment601;  
• the gathering602 (in enemy- controlled territory)603 of military 
intelligence604; 
• analysis or transmission of ‘tactical intelligence’ or military 
information605 to attacking forces’606, ‘for their immediate use’607; 
• ‘acting as lookouts, or observers on behalf of military forces’608; 
• identifying and ‘marking of targets’609; 
• ‘instruction and assistance given to troops for the execution of a 
specific military operation’610; 
• ‘providing logistical support’611 like transporting weapons in proximity 
to combat operations612; 
• ‘transporting unlawful combatants to or from the place where the 
hostilities are taking place’613, and ‘delivering ammunition to 
combatants’614;  
• 'performing mission-essential work at a military base’615; and  
• serving as guards for military objects or personnel616. 
 
The following activities, often performed by PMSCs, will not satisfy the direct 
causation test: 
                                                                                                                                      
600 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
601 Ibid. 
602 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 867; Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 177-8. 
603 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
604 ‘The rule that participation in activities closely associated with the direct infliction of 
violence is more likely to be labelled combat explains why activities such as gathering 
intelligence for targeting purposes and servicing a weapons system may be considered direct 
participation in hostilities’ (Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of 
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces’ at 180). 
605 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
606 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
607 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
608 Ibid. 
609 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 177-8. 
612 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
613 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 177-8. 
616 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
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• ‘driving military transport vehicles’617 and ‘transporting arms and 
munitions’618 in a combat zone 619;  
• ‘participating in activities in support of the war or military effort’620 (i.e. 
working in military vehicle maintenance depots’621 or munitions 
‘factories’622, ‘providing supplies or services’623 or working in 
canteens624); 
• providing logistical and general support625 (for example ‘accompanying 
and supplying food626 or selling goods627 and medicine628 to one of the 
parties to the conflict’629); 
• aiding combatants by providing ‘general strategic analysis’630; 
• recruiting and general631 training of personnel632, including the 
‘recruitment of suicide bombers’633; 
• ‘design, production and shipment of weapons’634, including the 
purchase, assembly, storage or smuggling of materials in order to build 
suicide vests’635 or improvised explosive device(s)636; 
                                                
617 Idem at 706.  
618 Idem at 707. 
619 At the ICRC’s expert meeting ‘everyone agreed that the truck itself represented a military 
objective, disagreement surrounded the driver’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 710). 
620 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
621 Idem at 706. 
622 Ibid; Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ 
at 710. 
623 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707; Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 728. 
624 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
710. 
625 Idem at 708. 
626 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 181. 
627 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
628 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
629 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
630 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
708. 
631 ‘General training of recruits undeniably contributes to a party’s military prowess; effective 
recruit training will often be the difference between eventual victory and defeat on the 
battlefield. Nevertheless, the causal link between the training and subsequent combat action 
is attenuated’ (Idem at 728). However, ‘training for a particular type of mission’… where the 
training may ‘reasonably be regarded as a preparatory measure integral to a predetermined 
hostile act or operation’ may qualify as direct participation in hostilities (Melzer ‘Keeping the 
Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 867). 
632 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 204. 
633 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865; Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
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• advising on the ‘correct maintenance of the weapons’637; 
• ‘voluntary human shielding’ 638; 
• ‘contributing funds to a cause’639 or partaking in ‘economic 
sanctions640; 
• ‘expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties to the 
conflict’641; 
• distributing propaganda supporting unlawful combatants642; and 
• ‘failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the parties to the 
conflict’643. 
 
Schmitt is critical of the guide’s interpretation of direct causation, which 
excludes from the parameters of ‘direct participation’, a range of ‘capacity-
building activities’644 which may not result ‘in direct and immediate harm to the 
enemy’645, despite the fact that they may have a marked effect on the 
belligerent’s capacity to win646. Melzer warns that Schmitt’s approach is 
‘extremely permissive’, and if we were to adopt Schmitt’s approach 
‘essentially any act connected with the resulting harm through a causal link 
would automatically qualify as “direct” participation in hostilities’, no matter 
how far removed it may be from the final harm caused’647. To adopt Schmitt’s 
                                                                                                                                      
634 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 293. 
635 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
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Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 865; Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 727). 
645 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
736. 
646 Idem at 725. 
647 According the Melzer, if we were to apply Schmitt’s proposal, then ‘not only the planting or 
detonation of an improvised explosive device, but also its assembly and storage, as well as 
the purchase or smuggling of its components, would make legitimate military targets of all 
those involved, no matter how far their action is removed from the actual causation of harm’ 
(Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
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‘extreme relaxation of the requirement of direct causation would invite 
excessively broad targeting policies, prone to error, arbitrariness, and 
abuse’648. Melzer maintains that there is no indication that ‘general opinio juris 
of States would condone the targeting of all persons who, at some point, have 
causally contributed to a hostile act, no matter how far removed from the 
potential materialisation of harm’649. 
 
The belligerent nexus requirement 
 
The third and final leg of the test for direct participation in hostilities, is the 
belligerent nexus requirement. In short, this leg of the test requires that ‘an act 
must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm, 
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another’650.  
So, for example, the following activities will satisfy the belligerent nexus 
requirement: 
 
• preparatory collection of tactical intelligence651; 
• transporting of personnel652; 
• transporting and positioning of weapons and equipment 653; and  
• loading explosives in a suicide vehicle654.  
  
On the other hand, ‘armed violence which is not designed to harm a party to 
an armed conflict, or which is not designed to do so in support of another 
party655, cannot amount to any form of “participation” in hostilities taking place 
between these parties’656.  
 
So, for example, if civilians are found causing harm in: 
 
‘(a) individual self-defence or defence of others,  
(b) in exercising power or authority over persons or territory,  
(c) as part of civil unrest against such authority, or  
(d) during inter-civilian violence. 
These acts lack the belligerent nexus required for a qualification as 
                                                                                                                                      
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 867). 
648 Ibid. 
649 Idem at 868. 
650 Idem at 872; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law at 64; and Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the 
Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law at 102. 




655 For example, ‘looting or civil unrest that merely takes advantage of the instability incident 
to conflict’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 735). 
656 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 873. 
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direct participation in hostilities’657. 
 
On this basis, ‘the hiding or smuggling of weapons658 and the financial or 
political support of armed individuals’659, will not satisfy the belligerent nexus 
requirement. 
 Schmitt is in favour of formulating the belligerent nexus test in the 
alternative, to read ‘in support of a party to the conflict or to the detriment of 
another’660. Melzer cautions against a ‘disjunctive reading of the two 
elements’, for the reasons that it can give rise to situations where it would be 
permissible to respond with military force against criminal elements who had 
no connection to the armed conflict 661. Melzer argues that, if ‘either element 
is missing’ (support of a party to the conflict and the intention to act to the 
detriment of another party), the ‘violence in question becomes independent of 
the armed struggle taking place between the parties to a conflict’662.  
 
Conclusions regarding PMSCs and the specific hostile acts 
 
If we examine the activities that PMSCs have reportedly been carrying out, we 
can conclude that some of these activities amount to hostile acts which fulfill 
the threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus test. Where 
PMSCs - at the so-called tip of Singer’s spear663 - have been ‘hired for the 
explicit purpose of engaging in combat operations’664 (a practice which the 
ICRC has documented665), or providing ‘operational support in combat’666 
(sometimes even operating weapons’ systems667), their actions, which target 
                                                
657 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
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enemy personnel, ‘military objects, operations or capacity’668, clearly satisfy 
the initial threshold of harm requirement. So, for example, when Russian, 
Latvian and Ukrainian PMSCs were hired during the Eritrea and Ethiopia War 
(1998-2000) to fly the Sukhoi-27 fighters and the MiG-29 interceptors, which 
Ethiopia and Eritrea had purchased, these individuals were clearly 
participating directly in hostilities669. These sorts of incidence of hiring PMSC 
is not limited only to advanced fighter jet pilots, actually it is remarkably 
commonplace for PMSC to be hired to fly helicopters670, purely because the 
skills required are so rare. While most PMSCs are reticent to advertise their 
combat services, some like Lockheed Martin and MPRI list their ‘products to 
include the provision of ‘combat capability’671. Blackwater, which boasts 
having the ‘largest private training center in the United States’, maintains that 
at its centre PMSC are trained in ‘urban combat’ ... and ‘boarding hostile’ 
vessels,672 all activities which reach the initial threshold of harm requirement.  
When PMSCs engage in these sorts of ‘coordinated, tactical, hostile 
operations’673; which involve attacking ‘enemy personnel, property or 
equipment’674, these acts clearly also satisfy the direct causation leg of the 
test for direct participation in hostilities. For this reason, the ‘policy directives 
issued by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, prohibited PMSCs working for the 
Department of State and the Agency for International Development from 
engaging in “offensive combat operations”’675. Similarly, when PMSCs are 
hired to operate676 weapons, ‘supervise the operation of weaponry’677 and 
maintain weapons, as has been the case in recent international armed 
conflicts, this satisfies the direct causation leg of the test for direct 
participation in hostilities - particularly when these activities are carried out in 
close proximity to the theatre of hostilities678. So, for example, when PMSCs 
‘flew on targeting and surveillance aircraft, and operated Global Hawk and 
Predator UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq’679, not only did their actions rise to the 
required threshold of harm, but they also satisfied the direct causation leg of 
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the test. Similarly, when PMSCs ‘maintained and loaded weapons on many of 
the most sophisticated U.S. weapons systems’ during the Iraqi war, including 
the loading of hellfire missiles and laser-guided smart bombs on unmanned 
aerial vehicles or drones’680, their actions met both the threshold of harm and 
the direct causation test for direct participation in hostilities. 
 With most PMSCs being ex-military (often with ‘special op’s’ credentials), 
it is not surprising that they are ‘involved in covert operations’681 aimed at 
sabotaging the military installations682, capacity, operations, logistics and lines 
of communication683 of the opposition. These activities not only reach the 
required threshold of harm, but they also satisfy the direct causation 
requirement needed to amount to direct participation in hostilities.  
 PMSCs have also rather infamously been employed to capture684 and 
guard the opposition’s ‘military personnel, to prevent them being forcibly 
liberated’685. The scandal which ensued when it was discovered how PMSCs 
were carrying out their duties at Abu Ghraib detention centre, cast them in a 
bad light and prompted academics to question whether these duties should 
ever have been abdicated by the State to private entities. It is generally 
agreed that certain inherently State functions686 simply cannot be outsourced 
to PMSCs, including ‘the role of commander over a POW camp’687 or 
responsible officer over ‘a place of internment’688, as was the case in Abu 
Ghraib689. To this end, article 9 of the proposed treaty on PMSCs, states that 
‘each State Party shall define and limit the scope of activities of PMSCs, and 
specifically prohibit the outsourcing to PMSCs of functions which are defined 
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as inherently State functions’690. Probably, and most notably, this will put an 
end to PMSCs interrogating detainees691. In fact, in the aftermath of the ‘Abu 
Ghraib prison torture scandal the U.S., in its National Defense Authorisation 
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, concluded that interrogation … is an inherently 
governmental function and it cannot be transferred to private sector 
contractors’692. Those issues aside, it is clear from the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guide, that these activities satisfy the threshold of harm requirement, and the 
direct causations test, and might implicate PMSCs in activities which amount 
to direct participation in hostilities.  
 Another activity which PMSCs are often involved in, which satisfies the 
threshold of harm requirement and the direct causation test, is their assisting 
a party to the conflict with ‘tactical targeting information for an attack’693. Their 
ex-military backgrounds along with their presence in ‘enemy-controlled 
territory’694, place PMSCs in an advantageous position to gather695 military 
intelligence696. Sometimes PMSCs gather their intelligence through 
interrogating detainees697, ‘performing analysis698, maintaining and supporting 
intelligence computer and electronic systems, or providing intelligence in the 
form of aerial reconnaissance and satellite imagery’699. So, for example, 
PMSCs were often contracted by the U.S. government to gather ‘intelligence 
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useful for U.S. operations in Iraq’… to ‘analyse intelligence data’ and most 
importantly to transmit ‘targeting co-ordinates to unmanned aerial vehicles or 
other manned or unmanned platforms that fire weapons’700. Similarly, ‘Air 
Scan, a Florida-based company, has provided aerial intelligence-gathering 
services in Angola, the Balkans, Colombia, and Sudan’701. Provided one can 
‘demonstrate a direct causal link between the intelligence information, and the 
harm affecting the adversary’702, the inteligence gathering activities are 
deemed to satisfy the belligerent nexus test703 and will amount to direct 
participation in hostilities704. Probably the easiest way to illustrate the causal 
link, is to show that the intelligence was passed on to attacking forces705 ‘for 
their immediate use’, to assist parties in identifying and marking706 military 
targets. Under these circumstances, when PMSCs gather intelligence, their 
actions qualify as ‘direct participation’707.  
PMSCs are also often hired to provide military training because of their 
ex-military backgrounds. While generalised ‘advise and military training aimed 
at improving the capacities of the regular armed forces’, does not rise to the 
required threshold of harm, since it does ‘not necessarily produce the 
immediate direct impact on military operations’708, the Interpretive Guide does 
prohibit training709 of military personnel710 where their training is intended ‘for 
the execution of a predetermined hostile act’711. So, for example, when MPRI 
‘reportedly helped prepare Croatia's armed forces to plan a successful 
offensive in 1995 against the Serbs in Krajina’712, this would rise to the 
threshold of harm and fulfil the direct causation test. Likewise, when 
‘contractors from Vinnell Corporation, were teaching the Saudi National Guard 
how to use heavy weapons systems, and accompanied the Guard into battle 
against Iraqi forces in the battle of Khafji’713, during the first Gulf War, these 
activities rose to the required threshold of harm needed to amount to direct 
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participation in hostilities. 
 While these instances of PMSC involvement in hostilities often make 
news headlines, the reality remains that ‘only very few PMSCs engage in 
active combat’714. PMSCs are also hired to build and man roadblocks715, to 
arrest persons who threaten public security716, to undertake rescue 
operations717 in respect of ‘enemy aircrew members’718 or civilians719 - all 
being activities which are not considered to be direct participation in hostilities. 
Likewise, when PMSCs provide unarmed security services like military advice 
and training720 to military personnel in situations of armed conflict, these 
activities do not rise to the required threshold of harm. So, for example, the 
security training721 provided to the Iraqi security forces722 by MPRI723 and 
DynCorp International724, was not considered to be direct participation in 
hostilities. Provided PMSCs ensure that the training725 of military personnel726 
is ‘generalised’727 (i.e. not for a specific military operation), or that they are 
only providing ‘general strategic analysis’728 and ‘strategic advisory 
services’729, they do not run the risk of being found in violation of the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities.  
 Another area which the ICRC730 note is often contracted out to PMSCs, 
is the provision of ‘logistical support’731. In Iraq alone, it is estimated that 
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‘twenty to thirty percent of the essential military support services in Iraq are 
provided by contractors’732. Since logistical support is imperative to the 
military capacity to defeat the opposition, it does, according to the Interpretive 
Guide, satisfy the direct causation element of the test for direct participation in 
hostilities. That said, the Interpretive Guide exempts the ‘driving of military 
transport vehicles’733 and the ‘transporting of arms and munitions’734 in a 
combat zone735 from activities which amount to direct participation in 
hostilities - because these activities fail to meet the direct causation leg of the 
test (although they clearly satisfy the belligerent nexus test736). So, for 
example, when MPRI737, Halliburton or Kellogg, Brown & Root were reported 
to have provided transport for troops738, while other PMSCs are reported to 
have transported weapons and ammunition, these activities would not amount 
to direct participation in hostilities. 
 By far the predominant service provided by PMSCs739 in conflict 
situations, is that of private armed guards. So, for example, in Iraq it was not 
uncommon for PMSCs to be hired to guard ‘U.S., British, or NATO military 
bases740 , embassies741, checkpoints742, convoys moving equipment and 
supplies’743 and even the armed forces744. PMSCs have provided security for 
a variety of premises745, and ‘close protection of persons’746. The ‘British firm 
Aegis had three contracts to perform these functions in Iraq, while 23000 
PMSCs were performing these functions for the U.S. Department of Defence 
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in Iraq and Afghanistan’747. PMSCs have also been hired to provide guarding 
capacity in respect of civilian buildings, government buildings748, ‘construction, 
consulting and engineering’ corporations (particularly those undertaking 
reconstruction work in conflict zones749), large mining corporations750, high-
ranking751 personnel , ‘U.S. defence lawyers gathering evidence for detainee 
cases’752, diplomats, and relief workers. PMSCs are often at pains to explain 
that they are not using force in an offensive manner when they act as guards, 
and consequently they argue that their actions cannot constitute direct 
participation in hostilities. However, the legal reality remains that IHL ‘does not 
draw a distinction between offensive or defensive operations’753, and 
‘engaging in defensive combat [might] also constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities’754.  
As already discussed above, the nature of the site which is being 
guarded, impacts upon decisions about whether civilian PMSCs, stationed at 
these sites, can be legally targeted, and whether collateral damage 
calculations are applicable. While the Interpretive Guide supports the 
conclusion that some guarding activities do satisfy the direct causation 
requirement of the test for direct participation in hostilities755, some academics 
maintain that guarding does not amount to direct participation in hostilities756. 
In short, I would argue that when PMSCs are guarding purely civilian sites, 
and even when they are guarding military sites against criminal elements, 
their actions do not amount to direct participation in hostilities757. On the other 
hand, as was the case in Iraq, when PMSCs are ‘retained to protect military 
installations, such as barracks and military hardware … these are military 
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objectives and defending them amounts to taking direct part in hostilities’758. 
However, as the Iraqi conflict can attest, it was not uncommon for PMSCs 
acting as armed guards to ‘become involved in exchanges of fire’ where it was 
almost impossible to differentiate engaging with combatants (which amounts 
to direct participation), from deterring ‘criminal attacks’759(which does not 
technically amount to direct participation). So, for example, in Najaf (Iraq) on 4 
April 2004, ‘Blackwater’s contractors tasked with the protection of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority Headquarters’760 ‘took up positions on a rooftop 
alongside U.S. Army and Spanish forces 761’, and ‘repulsed an attack by 
hundreds of Shiite militia members’ during a battle which lasted for more then 
three hours762.  
 It is worth restating that ‘armed violence which is not designed to harm 
a party to an armed conflict, or which is not designed to do so in support of 
another party763, cannot amount to any form of “participation” in hostilities’764. 
On this basis, PMSCs who cause harm in ‘individual self-defence or defence 
of others’, or ‘in exercising power or authority over persons or territory’, lack 
the belligerent nexus required for a qualification as direct participation in 
hostilities’765. To this end, the U.K. government stated in its Green Paper, that 
‘private military companies be expressly prohibited from direct participation in 
armed conflict operations, and that firearms should only be carried - and if 
necessary, used - by company employees for purposes of training or self 
defence’766 Likewise, the U.S. Department of Defence’s instruction of 3 
October 2005, stated that ‘contractor personnel may be authorised to be 
armed for individual self-defence’767. 
 Another category of activities traditionally carried out by PMSCs768, 
which does not satisfy the direct causation requirement of the test, are those 
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activities which ‘support of the war or military effort’769. This category includes: 
building military bases770, ‘working in military vehicle maintenance depots or 
munitions factories’771, and ‘providing supplies or services’772 (like catering773, 
selling goods774 and medicine775 to one of the parties to the conflict776). While 
PMSCs providing these services will not be deemed to be participating 
directly in hostilities, they are neverthelss in ‘dangerously close proximity to 
combat’777. 
 Another major source of support, often provided by PMSCs, includes 
advising on the ‘correct maintenance of the weapons’ systems778, as was the 
practice of firms like Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown & Root779. Often the 
maintenance of sophisticated military systems requires skills that military 
members simply do not possess780. Moreover, this maintenance often takes 
place ‘in close proximity to the battlefield’781. According to the Interpretive 
Guide, this type of maintenance activity does not satisfy the direct causation 
requirement of the test for direct participation in hostilities. 
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 In conclusion then, ‘many activities undertaken by PMSC can, 
depending on the circumstances’782, be ‘covered by the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities as specified in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance’783. 
For most PMSCs who are not incorporated into the armed forces, engaging in 
these specific hostile acts would amount to unauthorised direct participation in 
hostlities under IHL. As civilians, their direct participation in hostilities exposes 
them to direct targeting, and potential criminal prosecution upon capture. 
Moreover, where these PMSCs are fortunate enough to be able to show 
identification as a ‘person accompanying the armed forces’, they would ‘lose 
their POW status’, were they to be found to be participating directly in 
hostilities784. Sadly, despite this legal position, PMSCs ‘are increasingly 
performing duties once reserved for military personnel and becoming 
increasingly intertwined with, and essential for, combat operations’785. In the 
words of the Coalition Provisional Authority official in Iraq, ‘the military role 
and the civilian-contractor role are exactly the same’786.  
 
iii. The temporal scope of the loss of protection ‘for such time as’ civilians 
take a direct part in hostilities 
 
Once an individual is classified as a civilian, their direct participation in 
hostilities does not result in the loss of their primary civilian status787, but it 
does temporarily suspend their civilian ‘protection against direct attack’788 and 
exposes them to prosecution789, for so long as the civilian engages in direct 
participation in hostilities790. When such a civilian is no longer engaged in 
these specific hostile acts, (and consequently no longer poses a threat to the 
opposition), ‘they regain their full civilian immunity791 from direct attack’ - 
giving rise to what is called the ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection792. 
 Uncontroversially, the ‘execution phase of a specific act’ which satisfies 
the three-pronged test for direct participation in hostilities, will fall within the 
‘for such time’ window, and result in a temporary loss of civilian immunity from 
attack793. According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, the scope of the ‘for 
such time’ window will ‘also include measures preparatory to the execution of 
a specific act’… ‘as well as the deployment to and the return from the location 
                                                
782 Tougas ‘Some Comments and Observations on the Montreux Document’ at 338. 
783 Mancini et al ‘Old Concepts and New Challenges: Are Private Contractors the Mercenaries 
of the Twenty-first Century?’ at 334. 
784 McDonald ‘Private Military Contractors’ at 3. 
785 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 179. 
786 Ibid. 
787 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 70. 
788 Ibid. 
789 Idem at 83. 
790 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 70; Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 329. 
791 ‘Even the fact that a civilian has repeatedly taken a direct part in hostilities, either 
voluntarily or under pressure, does not allow a reliable prediction as to future conduct’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 71). 
792 Idem at 70. 
793 Idem at 65. 
 235 
of its execution’, as they ‘constitute an integral part of that act’794. What the 
Interpretive Guide does stipulate, however, is that these preparatory 
measures must be linked to ‘specific hostile acts’795 of direct participation, 
before they amount to direct participation in hostilities796.  
 Where the specific hostile act requires ‘prior geographic deployment’ by 
the belligerent party, that preparatory deployment ‘already constitutes an 
integral part of the act in question’, and results in the loss of civilian 
immunity797. For an activity to amount to a deployment which will compromise 
civilian immunity, ‘the deploying individual’…must ‘undertake a physical 
displacement’ with the aim of carrying out the specific act798. Similarly, if the 
military withdrawal ‘from the execution of a hostile act remains an integral799 
part of the preceding operation’, it constitutes a part of the ‘for such time’ 
window800, and civilian immunity is only restored ‘once the individual in 
question has physically separated from the operation. Such physical 
separation might be evidenced by laying down, storing or hiding the weapons 
or other equipment used, and resuming activities distinct from that 
operation’801. 
 The ICRC’s Interpretive Guide cites the following as examples of acts, 
which, if carried out as preparation for the undertaking of a specific hostile 
act802, amount to direct participation in hostilities: ‘equipping, instructing, and 
transporting personnel; gathering intelligence; preparing, transporting and 
positioning weapons and equipment’803.  
 PMSCs have on occasion provided training, and transported personnel 
‘for the execution of a predetermined hostile act’804, although this is not the 
norm805. More common, is the practice of PMSCs being hired to gather806 
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military intelligence807, sometimes through interrogating detainees808, which is 
then used to assist parties in identifying and marking809 military targets. Either 
of these preparatory acts will form an ‘integral part of the hostile act’810 which 
amounts to direct participation in hostilities. 
 These preparations for a specific hostile act, are to be distinguished 
from preparatory activities which merely establish ‘the general capacity to 
carry out hostile acts’, or exhibit a generalised ‘campaign of unspecified 
operations’811. Examples of such general preparations (which do not amount 
to direct participation in hostilities)812 include ‘the purchase, smuggling, 
production, hiding of weapons813; recruitment and training of personnel; and 
financial, political, and administrative support to armed actors’814. 
 As mentioned above, it is not the norm for PMSCs to train personnel 
with a specific hostile act in mind; it is more common for PMSCs to provide 
‘generalised’815(i.e. not for a specific military operation) training816, which does 
not rise to the required threshold of harm, and is not considered integral to the 
hostile act which might result after training. Likewise, the activities frequently 
carried out by PMSCs which ‘support the war or military effort’817, are not 
considered an integral part of the preparations, so as to amount to direct 
participation in hostilities. 
 Probably the most common academic818 critique levelled at the 
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‘revolving door’ phenomenon819, is that it gives rise to an ‘uneven legal playing 
field on the battleground’820. In effect, it is argued that the ‘revolving door’ 
permits attacks to be levelled at regular combatants (be they cooks or infantry 
men) at all times, whilst affording civilians who are participating in hostilities 
the advantage of a ‘shield’, behind which to ‘repeatedly claim the protection 
associated with that status’821, and yet launch ‘spontaneous, unorganised or 
sporadic’822 attacks from these protected positions823. However, the 
Interpretive Guide justifies the revolving door position as being necessary 
(rather than a ‘malfunction’), in order to protect the ‘civilian population from 
erroneous or arbitrary attacks’824 at times when they do not constitute a 
military target.  
 This temporary suspension of a civilian’s immunity from attack is only 
afforded  ‘civilians who participate in hostilities in a spontaneous, unorganised 
or sporadic basis825’. The revolving door of protection is not extended to 
‘members of organised armed groups belonging to a non-State party to an 
armed conflict’. While this category of participant also lose immunity from 
direct attack, as is the case with any civilian, they however ‘cease to enjoy 
their civilian protections ‘for as long as they assume their continuous combat 
function’826, and for the duration of their membership of the group827. On those 
occasions when PMSCs are found participating in hostilities, either directly or 
in the preparation for such activities, it is possible that they may be seen as 
adopting a continuous combat function. 
 
iv. Continuous combat function 
 
The need for a special legal regime applicable to ‘organised armed groups’, 
arose because it was felt that the revolving door concept (applicable to 
civilians who participate intermittently in hostilities), could not legitimately be 
applied to ‘members of organised armed groups belonging to a non-State 
party’828. It was felt that the ‘for such time’ formulation applicable to civilians, 
was only intended to apply to those spontaneous and unorganised acts of 
participation by civilians, and if it were to be applied to ‘organised armed 
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groups’ it would give these ‘farmers by day and fighters by night’ … ‘a 
significant operational advantage’829 over the regular armed forces, who as a 
result of their combatant status ‘can be attacked on a continuous basis’830. 
Rogers agrees that ‘there is certainly a case for arguing that a person who 
becomes a member of a guerrilla group or armed faction, that is involved in 
attacks against enemy armed forces, forfeits his protected status for so long 
as he participates in the activities of the group’831. At the ICRC’s expert 
meeting, it was generally agreed that ‘the distinction between civilians and 
members of organised armed groups was defensible’832. 
Rather then restrict their protection from attack ‘for such time as they 
participate directly in hostilities’, as is the case with civilians, this group of 
participants lose their civilian protection ‘for as long as they remain members’ 
of the organised group, ‘by virtue of their continuous combat function’833. In 
other words, ‘the “revolving door” of protection starts to operate based on 
membership’834 and the door revolves again, rendering the individual once 
again a protected civilian, only once their membership in the group has 
ceased. In the words of Melzer, their ‘functional membership’ is ‘based on a 
de facto exercise of a continuous combat function’835, and their loss of civilian 
‘protection against direct attack’, lasts for ‘as long as their membership 
lasts’836, and ‘until he or she ceases to assume such function’837. 
 According to the Interpretive Guide, ‘once a member has affirmatively 
disengaged from a particular group, or has permanently changed from its 
military to its political wing838, he can no longer be regarded as assuming a 
continuous combat function, and must be considered a civilian protected 
against attack unless and for such time as he directly participates in 
hostilities’839. As to how this disassociation from the group needs to be 
manifested, the Interpretive Guide states that ‘disengagement from an 
organised armed group need not be openly declared; it can also be expressed 
through conclusive behaviour, such as a lasting physical distancing from the 
group and reintegration into civilian life or the permanent resumption of an 
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exclusively non-combat function’840. Accordingly, an assessment as to 
whether an individual has disengaged from an organised armed group, ‘must 
therefore be made in good faith and based on a reasonable assessment of 
the prevailing circumstances, presuming entitlement to civilian protection in 
cases of doubt’841. 
 Since the loss of civilian protection which results for those who assume 
a continuous combat function is more serious, in that it lasts for the duration of 
their integration842 into, or membership of, the group, it is necessary that only 
those group members who actually engage in the continuous combat function 
lose civilian immunity from attack843. The ‘functional membership’ focus of the 
provision allows for the fact that not all of the members of such organised 
armed groups can be targeted; it is limited to ‘only those serving in a 
continuous combat function’844. Those, who while affiliated with an organised 
armed group, fail to undertake a continuous combat function, are excluded845 
from the loss of protection, on account of their failure to ‘directly participate in 
hostilities’. These ‘members of an organised armed group who do not 
regularly perform combat duties continue to enjoy full civilian protection from 
attack unless they directly participate in hostilities’846. Similarly, ‘private 
contractors and civilian employees’, contracted to such organised armed 
groups, ‘were entitled to protection from direct attack unless and for such time 
as they engaged in direct participation in hostilities’847. Melzer warns that to 
                                                
840 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 72. 
841 Idem at 73. 
842 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 7.  
843 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 846. 
844 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2141-49. Van der Toorn proposed the 
following ‘objectively verifiable indicia’ of the necessary integration: ‘regular physical 
association with other individuals affiliated with the group, acting under orders or the 
command of senior figures, and any other conduct that demonstrates they are seeking to 
advance the common purpose of the group’ (Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in 
Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 28-29). 
845 Included in this exempted group are ‘political and administrative personnel, as well as 
other persons not exercising a combat function’ (Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in 
Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 7). 
846 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
704. 
847 Watkin is sceptical that at a split second’s notice, a soldier can ‘realistically be expected to 
distinguish between a civilian who participates on a “persistent recurring basis” and a member 
of an organised armed group who performs a “continuous combat function”’ (Watkin 
‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
Interpretive Guide’ at 662; Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 855). Watkin prefers to apply the continuous loss of 
civilian immunity from attack ‘not only to fighting personnel of organised armed groups, but 
essentially to any person who could be regarded as performing a “combat,” “combat support”, 
or even “combat service support” function for such a group, including unarmed cooks and 
administrative personnel’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 913). Van der Toorn shares a similar concern that the 
‘continuous participation requirement’… ‘imposes a very high threshold and would likely 
exclude a large number of individuals’, who for all intents and purposes are ‘carrying out 
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adopt an ‘overextended’ notion of who could be targeted in an organised 
armed group, so as ‘to include all persons accompanying or supporting that 
group (i.e. regardless of their function)’, would ‘completely discard the 
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” participation in hostilities inherent in 
treaty and customary law’848. Consequently, the loss of civilian protection 
against attack would not apply to ‘recruiters, trainers, financiers, 
propagandists, or those who purchase, smuggle, store, manufacture, or 
maintain weapons and other military equipment’849.  
 The net effect of the continuous combat function for non-State actors, 
is that those who are affiliated850 with organised armed groups (like child 
soldiers and some PMSCs), and who engage in combative functions in a 
continuous manner, will ‘lose their entitlement to protection against direct 
attack’851 which would normally apply to civilians. Moreover, as Melzer points 
out, the ‘continuous combat function does not, of course, imply de jure 
entitlement to combatant privilege’, with its attendant immunity from 
prosecution852. Even once PMSCs leave the organised armed group, and are 
once again classified as civilians, they can nevertheless still face ‘prosecution 
for violations of domestic and international law’ which they may have 
committed853.  
 What is particularly problematic for civilians taking a direct part in 
hostilities, or acting with a continuous combat function, is that they very often 
act so as to ‘capture, injure, or kill an adversary and in doing so they fail to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population in order to lead the 
adversary to believe that they are entitled to civilian protection against direct 
attack’. This alone is considered a serious violation of the IHL prohibition 
against perfidy854. Moreover, even if they had, at all times, respected the laws 
of war855, their direct participation in hostilities is what exposes them to 
prosecution. 
PMSCs who do engage in specific hostile acts which satisfy the direct 
causation and belligerent nexus test, are likely to be viewed as assuming a 
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continuous combat function. However, that said, only those members of a 
private military group who actually assume these combat functions, will be 
labelled as such, based on their function. PMSCs are unlikely to fall into this 
category unless they train armed forces for specific hostile acts, accompany 
their trainees into battle and engage enemy combatants, or gather military 
intelligence for targeting purposes, on a continuous basis. As Sossai explains, 
‘this approach seems to strike the right balance: if contractors are employed 
fulfil a function which implies taking a direct part in hostilities on a regular and 
continuous basis, then that individual would lose protection against direct 
attack for so long as that function was being fulfilled’856. 
 
6.8  Conclusion  
 
In short then, most legal scholars agree that there is no legal obstacle to 
PMSCs being afforded primary combatant status and secondary POW status 
upon capture857, when they are either ‘formally incorporated into the States 
armed forces’858, or ‘they fulfil the customary IHL criteria for combatant 
status’859. However, most commentators agree that the attainment of either of 
these conditions is likely to be rare860. It is more common that they will remain 
protected as civilians861. There might then be room to argue that where States 
have contracted PMSCs to assist the armed forces, that they are effectively 
‘civilians accompanying the armed forces’. If they are in possession of an 
identity card, they are then entitled to be afforded POW status upon 
capture862. Either way, as ordinary civilians or ‘persons accompanying the 
armed forces’, PMSCs must take care not to ‘dress like members of the 
armed forces’ or ‘participate directly in hostilities’863. As civilians, they would 
by law still be permitted to carry ‘light, personal weapons for their own self-
defence or the defence of those they are protecting’864. As for the allegation 
that PMSCs might be classified as mercenaries, in theory it is possible for a 
PMSC (in the context of an international armed conflict) to fulfill all the 
requirements of the legal definition of a mercenary in terms of IHL865, although 
it would be a rare occurrence866. In the end, it is misleading to say that 
PMSCs are without status under IHL867. What is true, however, is that ‘there is 
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no single simple answer applicable to all’868.  
If PMSCs are for the most part considered civilians, they will face 
prosecution upon capture if they participate directly in hostilities. Usually the 
activities that PMSCs carry out are not considered hostile acts, which fulfill the 
threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus tests. That said, 
where PMSCs have been ‘hired for the explicit purpose of engaging in combat 
operations’869, sabotaging military capacity, operating weapons systems in the 
theatre of hostilities, guarding captured military personnel, gathering military 
intelligence for identifying military targets, and conducting training for 
predetermined hostile acts - their actions clearly satisfy the threshold of harm 
requirement. Since a large part of the role performed by PMSCs is the 
provision of guarding services, it must be noted that sometimes even 
defensive guarding can violate the notion of direct participation in hostilities. 
Much turns on the nature of the site being guarded, the IHL status of 
individuals being protected, and the nature of the attack (i.e. whether it is 
linked to the belligerencies or merely a criminal act). In short, when PMSCs 
are guarding purely civilian sites or personnel, they are not participating 
directly in hostilities. So, PMSCs located at purely civilian sites or otherwise 
protected sites like schools, churches and hospitals, could never constitute a 
direct and immediate military threat to the belligerent party. Likewise, PMSCs 
employed as guards for reconstruction companies would be entitled to use 
force in self defence, and to ‘protect the facilities they are guarding, as long as 
they did so in a defensive manner and employed no more force than was 
strictly necessary’870. Moreover, PMSCs are still permitted under IHL to cause 
harm in ‘individual self-defence or defence of others’, or ‘in exercising power 
or authority over persons or territory’, without their actions amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities871. However, when they are guarding military sites, 
their actions may amount to direct participation in hostilities, unless they are 
only guarding the military sites against criminal elements. Some authors adopt 
the uncompromising position that ‘PSCs who, through their presence at a 
legitimate military target, aid the war effort and can be said to be participating 
directly in hostilities … effectively revoke their civilian protected status and 
exempt military commanders from considering his welfare further when 
calculating the collateral damage likely to result from an attack’872. On the 
other hand, others maintain that even when PMSCs are located at purely 
military objectives, commanding officers still bear an obligation to factor their 
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presence into their calculations of collateral damage873. The latter view is 
reminiscent of the approach taken towards workers in munitions factories. 
While the workers may not personally be targeted (because they retain their 
civilian immunity from attack), the military objectives in which they work 
remain open to attack, ‘subject to the attacking party’s obligations under IHL 
to assess the potential harm to civilians against the direct and concrete 
military advantage of any given attack, and to refrain from an attack if civilian 
harm would appear excessive’874.  
Perhaps it is more useful to ask what a tribunal might have to say 
about PMSCs. It is intuitively right that a tribunal investigating an alleged war 
crime for an attack on a military objective guarded by PMSCs, should demand 
less by way of justification of commanding officers than would ordinarily be 
expected when other civilians are involved. PMSCs are inherently a different 
category of civilian than those envisaged in the conventions. They are clearly 
not wholly innocent civilians going about their daily routine, and caught in the 
crossfire. They have, after all, deliberately chosen to place themselves in the 
line of fire in an attempt to have an impact on the outcome of hostilities. As 
was the case with workers in munitions factories, they do not become quasi-
combatants (personally subject to attack) by their presence in a military 
objective, but the installation remains a permissible military objective875. Even 
a large group876 of PMSCs would not change the status of single-use military 
objective. However, the point is worth stressing: a commander is always 
expected to be aware of the principle of proportionality in his justification for 
an attack, and should thus exercise greater caution if a site is inhabited 
predominantly by PMSCs.  
 I suspect the greatest area for concern lies at neither end of the 
spectrum (that being civilian sites and purely military objectives) - but rather 
concerns the instances when PMSCs carry out guarding duties at dual-use 
installations like communications networks, power sources, oil refineries, 
transportation infrastructure (ports and airports) and the like, which serve both 
the civilian population and the armed forces. It seems intuitively right that 
PMSCs located at dual-use sites be afforded greater protection than those 
located at single-use military installations. Article 52 of AP I states, ‘in case of 
doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, 
such as a place of worship, a house, or other dwelling or a school, is being 
used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed 
not to be so used.’ There is a clear presumption in favour of protected status 
for sites that may eventually be used for military gain. However, there is also 
no distinction in IHL drawn between defensive and offensive guarding. AP I is 
clear that an ‘attack means any act of violence … whether in offense or 
defence’877. Where does that leave the PMSC guarding (defensively) a dual-
                                                
873 Human Rights Watch ‘Backgrounder: International Humanitarian Law Issues in a Potential 
War in Iraq’ Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper 20 (20 February 2003)  available at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm (accessed 27 May 2012). 
874 Ibid. 
875 Stefan Oeter (1995) ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Fleck D (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press: Oxford) at 163. 
876 Oeter argues that the presence of civilian workers in a munitions factory, does not change 
the status of the factory as a legitimate military target, ‘even if there are hundreds or 
thousands of them’ (Ibid). 
877 Article 49(1). 
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use site? I would argue that the presumption of protected status (in respect of 
the site) would transfer to the PMSCs guarding the site, ensuring their civilian 
status is respected until the status of the installation can be deemed to be 
definitely military in nature. Once a site is determined to be a military 
objective, even the act of defending these sites will constitute direct 
participation in hostilities878. However, it remains the case that once a site has 
become military in nature, PMSCs would be able to guard these sites against 
individuals acting for ‘general criminal reasons’879. 
To conclude then, some ‘activities undertaken by PMSC can, depending 
on the circumstances’880 amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities as 
specified in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance’881. While it is rare that PMSCs 
will be found participating in hostilities - either directly or in preparation for 
such activities - it is likely that when they do so on a sporadic basis, they will 
temporarily lose their civilian immunity ‘for such time as’ their behaviour 
continues. When PMSCs engage in specific hostile acts which satisfy the 
direct causation and belligerent nexus tests, and they do so on a continuous 
basis, they will forfeit their civilian immunity until they abandon their 
membership of the group, or adopt a non-combative function. If PMSCs do 
participate directly, they may become legitimate targets for the opposition882, 
as do any civilians who participate in hostilities without State authorisation. 
Once they are rendered ‘hors de combat’, they are once again clothed with 
their civilian immunity from attack (unless they are found to satisfy the 
definitional criteria of ‘mercenary’)883. Should they fall into enemy hands after 
such participation, they will still be treated humanely as civilians, held to 
account for their unauthorised actions884, and afforded the ‘regular and fair 
judicial guarantees’ extended to civilians885. They will not enjoy POW status, 
unless they possess an identity card as a ‘civilian accompanying the armed 
forces’.  
 In the end, it is imperative for the international community to 
understand just how PMSCs fit into the existing IHL structure. We need to 
understand how PMSCs are classified, and what implications flow from that 
classification. Without this understanding, we are left wondering whether 
PMSCs should be labelled as ‘soldiers [or] murderers’, are they found ‘doing 
one’s duty [or] committing a war crime’; … ‘coming home in honor or coming 
home in shame’886.  
 
 
                                                
878 Gillard ‘Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 540.  
879 Cameron ‘Private Military Companies: Their Status Under International Humanitarian Law 
and its Impact on their Regulation’ at 589. 
880 Tougas ‘Some Comments and Observations on the Montreux Document’ at 338. 
881 Mancini et al ‘Old Concepts and New Challenges: Are Private Contractors the Mercenaries 
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882 Dworkin ‘Security Contractors in Iraq: Armed Guards or Private Soldiers’ at 2. 
883 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 233. 
884 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ 
at 400-401. 
885 GC IV article 5(3); AP I article 75; Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211; 
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ASSESSING THE COMBATANT STATUS OF VOLUNTARY HUMAN 
SHIELDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 1 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In 1999 the world witnessed ‘Serbian civilians taking up positions on the 
bridges of Belgrade to prevent them from being bombed during the NATO 
campaign to protect Kosovo’2. In January of 2003, at the inception of the 
military invention in Iraq3, a group of voluntary human shields (VHSs) in a visit 
to Tony Blair, at number ten Downing Street, indicated to the British 
government precisely which civilian Iraqi sites they intended to shield, so that 
attacks on these sites would ‘be made in the full knowledge that U.K. and 
U.S. citizens could be killed’4. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, 
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned Iraq 
that using ‘civilians and foreign pacifists’5 as ‘human shields for strategic 
sites’6 would ‘be considered a war crime’7. When an estimated ‘100-250 
                                                
1 This chapter is based upon two articles, one entitled ‘Voluntary Human Shields: Status-less 
in the Crosshairs?’ (2007) Comparative and International Law Quarterly of South Africa 322 
and the second entitled ‘Targeting Decisions Involving Voluntary Human Shields in 
International Armed Conflicts, in Light of the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, which 
is awaiting peer review with Comparative and International Law Quarterly of South Africa. 
These articles are updated and revised with permission of the publishers.  
2 Stéphanie Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: 
Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90:872 International Review of the 
Red Cross 883 at 884. 
3 Jefferson D Reynolds 'Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy 
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground' (2005) 
56 Air Force Law Review 1 at 1; Richard Cleroux and Roland Watson 'Canadian Women 
Enlist in "Army" of Volunteer Human Shields' (9 December 2002) The Times (London U.K.) at 
4; Rewi Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the 
International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 313 at 314. 
4 The Guardian ‘Human Shield Protestors Visit No 10’ (22 January 2003) available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/jan/22/foreignpolicy.uk2 (accessed 31 October 
2012). 
5 Paolo Fusco ‘Legal Status of Human Shields’ Corso in Diritto Umanitario Internazionale 
Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa e dalla Croce Rossa Polacca Varsavia, 
Pubblicazioni Centro Studi per la Pace (2003) available at www.studiperlapace.it (accessed 
15 May 2012) at 7. The first Gulf War witnessed ‘for the first time in history, a party in a 
conflict explicitly adopting a policy of using unlawful means for preventing attacks from 
parties which are sensitive to humanitarian issues, communicating this policy to the mass 
media and using it as a form of propaganda’ (Fusco ‘Legal Status of Human Shields’ at 7). 
During Operation Dessert Storm, foreigners who were captured to serve as human shields 
were labelled ‘special guests’ by Saddam Hussein (Michael N Schmitt ‘Human Shields in 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2008-2009) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 292 
at 295).  
6 Fusco ‘Legal Status of Human Shields’ at 7. These strategic sites included ‘military targets 
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peace activists from some thirty-two countries’8 realised that they would be 
used, not to protect civilian property, but to shield military objectives, they 
chose to leave Iraq9. In the same year, Palestinian civilians positioned 
themselves around Yasser Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah, with the 
intended goal of forestalling ‘a threatened attack by Israeli forces’10. In 
November 2006, after an appeal broadcast on Hamas radio, Palestinian 
women entered a mosque in Beit Hanoun, where ‘Israeli security forces had 
trapped militants’, ‘clothed some of the militants in female attire, and acted as 
shields for them as they escaped’11. These are just some of the anecdotes 
describing the actions of VHSs in international armed conflicts12. 
General Myers is absolutely correct in asserting that the taking of 
hostages, or forcible use of protected persons to shield objects from attack, is 
prohibited under treaty-based international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
customary IHL. However, the dilemma confronting military commanders in 
recent international armed conflicts, revolves around assessing the status of 
human shields that, without any duress from parties to the conflict, chose 
voluntarily to position themselves, in order to shield particular objects from 
attack. Unfortunately, individuals who voluntarily position themselves as 
human shields, do not fit neatly within any of the existing categories of 
‘protected persons’13 recognised by contemporary IHL14. As a consequence, 
the ‘issue of an attacker's obligations when facing human shields is highly 
complex and controversial’, and to date is a ‘subject unaddressed in lex 
scripta15. The lacunae in IHL regarding the status of VHSs, is to some extent 
                                                                                                                                      
such as oil refineries and power stations’ (Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to cannons or wearing 
targets on their T-shirts: Human shields in international humanitarian law’ at 885). 
7 BBC ‘U.S. Cautions Iraq on Westerners as Human Shields’ (16 January 2003) available at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2663625.stm (accessed 31 October 2012). 
8 Scott Peterson ‘Human Shields in Tug-of War’ (17 March 2003) Christian Science Monitor 
at 1. 
9 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields 
in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
10 Idem at 884. 
11 BBC News ‘Gaza Women Killed in Mosque Siege’ (3 November 2006) available at 
http://news.bbc (accessed ?); Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 
315.  
12 There are competing views as to how to classify the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians. One view, endorsed by Antionio Cassese and the Israeli Supreme Court in the 
Targeted Killings case HCJ 769/02 (11 December 2005) is that ‘the entire conflict, including 
during December 2008 - January 2009 in the Gaza Strip, is an international armed conflict’ 
(Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Projects available at http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_state=113 (accessed 21 May 
2013). 
13 These categories include amongst others: combatants (including the traditional armed 
forces; levée en masse; special forces and the exceptions: spies and mercenaries); non-
combatants (including the wounded; sick or shipwrecked; medical and religious personnel); 
persons accompanying the armed forces (including civilian contractors); and unlawful 
belligerents and civilians. 
14 Save to say that where there is doubt as to whether an individual qualifies for protected 
status under IHL, they shall be ‘presumed to have protected status until such time as their 
status is determined by a competent tribunal.’ (GC III article 5 and AP I article 45(1)). 
15 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 295; Josiane Haas (2005) 
'Voluntary Human Shields: Status and Protection Under International Humanitarian Law' in 
Roberta Arnold and Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand (eds) International Humanitarian Law and the 
21st Century's Conflicts: Changes and Challenges (Editions interuniversitaires suisses: 
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dependent on the controversy surrounding how we are to interpret the 
customary international notion of direct participation of civilians in hostilities. 
To date, the question of whether VHSs can be said to be participating directly 
in hostilities is highly contested, and has sparked much debate at the series 
of expert meetings16 called by the International Committee for the Red Cross 
(ICRC), to draft a guide on how to interpret the IHL notion direct participation 
of civilians in hostilities17. 
In this chapter I seek to explore the question of the combatant status 
of VHSs in international armed conflicts. I begin by outlining the distinction 
between VHSs and those coerced to act as human shields, and then 
examine how IHL currently treats each type of human shield. I then explain 
the notion that every person in the theatre of conflict has a designated status 
under IHL, and explore the existing categories of protected persons under 
IHL. In doing so, I hope to argue for a particular status, or permutation 
thereof, which might assist military advisors and tribunals in assessing the 
cases involving VHSs, and then attempt to answer the questions as to what 
status VHSs should enjoy under IHL. 
I then turn my attention to the issue of whether the act of shielding 
sites from attack amounts to direct participation in hostilities. I begin by 
explaining the concept of direct participation in hostilities and apply this 
analysis to the factual scenario of VHSs, Iooking briefly at the question of 
whether the nature of the shielded site affects a conclusion regarding the 
VHSs level of participation in hostilities. I explore the legal consequences 
which result from a conclusion that VHSs are participating in hostilities, and 
the consequences which result from a conclusion that they are not direct 
participants. Lastly, using the conclusions reached regarding the status of 
VHSs, I will outline the duties and legal obligations which rest upon those 
who capture or detain VHSs. 
 
7.2 Distinguishing voluntary human shields from the IHL concept of 
‘human shields’  
 
The earliest codifications of IHL always maintained the position that it was 
strictly prohibited for belligerent parties to intentionally co-locate ‘military 
objectives and civilians or persons hors de combat, with the specific intent of 
trying to prevent the targeting of those military objectives'18. Moreover, as AP 
I article 50(3) confirms, even when civilians are found ‘comingled with 
combatants’, this fact ‘does not deprive the population of its civilian 
                                                                                                                                      
Lausanne) 191 at 192. 
16 Co-organised by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the TMC 
Asser Institute. 
17 ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law’ ICRC Expert 
Meetings 2 June 2003 (the Hague); 25-26 October 2004 (the Hague); 23-25 October 2005 
(Geneva) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2009/direct-
participation-ihl-feature-020609.htm (accessed 18 May 2012) - culminating in the ICRC 
(2009) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law ICRC: Geneva.  
18 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 315; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume 1: Rules 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 340. 
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character’19. When civilians are used against their will to shield a military 
object, they ‘remain protected civilians, and any likely harm to them must be 
factored into the requisite proportionality analysis when determining whether 
the attack may be executed’, in accordance with AP I article 51(8)20. 
Moreover, their involuntary acts do ‘not render them direct participants in 
hostilities’21, ‘despite the belligerent nexus of the military operation in which 
they are being instrumentalised’22.Today this prohibition against the use of 
human shields has achieved customary international law status.  
 This intentional use or coercion of civilians to provide a deterrent shield 
for a particular military objective, must be distinguished from the recent 
emergence of the VHS, which has characterised some international armed 
conflicts. As Fusco explains, the contemporary term VHS refers to ‘the 
practice, which usually involves several peace activists, travelling to conflict 
areas with the aim to shield facilities (mostly civilian) of States under attack’23. 
It is the exercise of free will which distinguishes VHSs from ‘hostages used as 
human shields’24. However, the definition of what actions amount to shielding, 
what objects can be shielded, and when it can be said to be consensual25 or 
the ‘behest of a State’26, is highly contested27. Some academics maintain that 
only those shielding ‘civilians and civil properties can enjoy VHS status’28. 
Several other IHL experts however, including the ICRC, Fenrick and Bouchié 
de Belle, understand the term VHS to refer to ‘civilians attempting to shield a 
                                                
19 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 334. 
20 Michael N. Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private 
Contractors or Civilian Employees’ Second Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities (25-26 October 2004) The Hague at 22. 
21 Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees’ at 22. 
22 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 60. 
23 Fusco ‘Legal Status of Human Shields’ at 25. 
24 She cites the following as examples of the hostage use of human shields: ‘U.N. observers 
used … in Sarajevo to stop Western air strikes, civilian hostages used by Saddam Hussein 
during the Gulf war …, and those used later by Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo in 1999’ (Haas 
'Voluntary Human Shields: Status and Protection Under International Humanitarian Law' at 
196). 
25 Sometimes VHSs act ‘without the active acquiescence, of the party on whose behalf they 
act’, as was the case for the civilians on bridges in Belgrade, Grdelica and Novi Sad during 
Operation Allied Force (BBC Online ‘Serb Media: NATO Lies Over Rapes’ (10 April 1999) 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/316147.stm (accessed 12 May 2012); 
Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 322; William J Fenrick ‘ICRC 
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2009) Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law 287 at 293. However, as Melzer correctly points out, aside from the ‘obvious cases on 
both ends of the scale, such as civilian activists publicly declaring their desire and intent to 
serve as human shields, or civilian hostages forcibly being chained to military objectives’, for 
the most part there is a large grey area which human shields occupy (Nils Melzer ‘Keeping 
the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2010) 42 
International Law and Politics 831 at 871). 
26 As was the experience of VHSs in Iraq (Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct 
Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 
325). 
27 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 334. 
28 Nada Al-Duaij ‘The Volunteer Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 12 
Oregon Review of International Law 117 at 126. 
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military objective’29, by deterring the enemy from attacking that objective’30, 
‘by their presence as persons entitled to protection against direct attack’31.  
 Sometimes the line between voluntary human shielding and prohibited 
human shielding is blurred. Bouchie de Belle cites as an example of an act of 
voluntary shielding ‘where civilians gather on a bridge of military value in 
order to protest against the enemy’s earlier destruction of other similar 
bridges’32. However, if the same civilians ‘set up camp (on the bridge) for a 
long period of time and the authorities take no action to remove them, then 
this inaction will lead to a clear presumption33 that the authorities intend to 
use the civilians’ presence to shield the bridge from an enemy attack’. While 
the effect of this inaction on the part of the belligerent party would constitute a 
violation of the obligation to remove civilians from the vicinity of military 
objectives34, it does not render the act of shielding involuntary on the part of 
the civilians35.  
 In the final analysis, it is the voluntariness of their actions which 
distinguish VHSs from the hostage type of human shields. Lyall expresses it 
well when he says that VHS operate ‘as civilian actors in, rather than as 
passive subjects of, armed conflict36. Furthermore, Schmitt gets to the crux of 
the issue when he writes ‘"voluntary shielding” only occurs, as a matter of 
law, consequent to the shield's intent to frustrate enemy operations’37. There 
may be many reasons for civilians to stay in close proximity to a military 
objective38 ‘whatever the rationale for their presence, it is only when they 
refuse to depart because they wish to complicate the enemy's actions that 
they qualify as voluntary shields’39. It is this subjective intent element implicit 
in the act of being a VHS, which in the end complicates the application of IHL 
to VHSs40. 
In this chapter I will write from the premise that the actions of VHSs are 
by definition un-coerced, and that VHSs may choose to shield military, civilian 
                                                
29 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 56; Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 293. 
30 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
31 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 56; Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 293. 
32 ‘Since these civilians have not been placed here by a belliegent party there is insufficient 
evidence of the required intention to engage in prohibited use of civilians as human shields’ 
(Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields 
in International Humanitarian Law’ at 889). 
33 ‘An even clearer presumption of intention will arise where the civilian volunteers are briefed 
by the armed forces on which military sites are to be “protected”’ (Ibid). 
34 ‘In addition to the absolute negative obligation never to do so, the authorities also have 
positive obligations … to take various precautionary measures, including keeping civilians 
away from military targets’ (Ibid). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 316. 
37 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 316.  
38 They may be too elderly, unwell, too scared or wanting to ‘safeguard their property and 
possessions’ (Ibid). 
39 Ibid.  
40 Idem at 334. 
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and dual-use sites. I will address the issues of whether the specific 
classification of the shielded site (e.g. as military or civilian) impacts on the 
IHL status of VHSs, and whether their voluntariness and the specific site 
which they shield renders their shielding to be direct participation in hostilities.  
 
7.3 IHL on the subject of human shields 
 
The prohibition against the use of human shields in international armed 
conflicts has a long history in IHL. It is mentioned in the Hague Regulations41 
of 1907 and has been re-stated in IHL treaties ever since. In the 1949 
Geneva Conventions pertaining to the protections afforded prisoners of war 
(POWs) (GC III) 42 and civilians (GC IV)43 IHL dictates that: ‘no POW may … 
be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations’44, 
and ‘the presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain 
points or areas immune from military operations’45. Consequently, in 1949 the 
ban on using human shields ‘was limited to the scope of the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions, and therefore concerned only POW’s and protected 
persons’46. 
 In 1977, when the ICRC convened a conference to draft the first 
Additional Protocols47 to the earlier Geneva conventions, the provisions which 
dealt with human shields were not only more numerous, but also extended 
the scope of protection. Under both Additional Protocols the protection 
expanded from an approach ‘ratione personae’ (which had prevailed in the 
Geneva law), to include protection ‘ratione materiae’48, which in effect 
‘protects the civilian population as a whole’49, thereby extending the prior 
protection offered under Geneva law.  
                                                
41 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to 
the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1910 
U.K.Treaty Series 9 (‘Hague Regulations’/HR), opened for signature 18 October 1907 and 
entered into force 26 January 1910.  
42 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12 1949 
(GC III) 75 U.N.Treaty Series 135, opened for signature 12 August 1949 and entered into 
force 21 October 1950, at article 23.  
43 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 
August 12 1949 (GC IV) 75 U.N.Treaty Series 287, opened for signature 12 August 1949 and 
entered into force 21 October 1950, at article 28. 
44 GC III article 23. 
45 GC IV article 28. 
46 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
47 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) 1977 1125 U.N.Treaty Series 
3 (opened for signature 8 June 1977 and entered into force 7 December 1978) and 1977  
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (AP II) 1977 1125 U.N. Treaty 
Series (1979) 609 (opened for signature 8 June 1977 and entered into force 7 December 
1978). The two APs added in 1977, have not achieved universal acceptance, but many 
provisions are accepted as having achieved customary status. The aim of the APs was to 
reaffirm the principles set out in the four GCs and to incorporate the 1907 Hague laws that 
preceded the GC.  
48 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
49 Idem at 886. 
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 So, for example, AP I article 12(4) ‘prohibits50 the use of medical units in 
an attempt to shield military objectives from attack’, while AP I article 28(1) 
prohibits the use of ‘medical aircraft in an attempt to shield military objectives 
from attack’51, while AP I article 75(2)(c) lists the taking of hostages as a 
prohibited act. Probably, the article which is most often cited as authority for 
the prohibition against the use of human shields is AP I article 51(7), which 
states: 
 
‘The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual 
civilians shall not be used52 to render certain points or areas immune 
from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military 
operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of 
the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.’  
 
From this provision, it is clear that not only is the ‘forcible movement of 
civilians’ prohibited, where such actions are motivated by the intent to use 
civilians as human shields, but moreover ‘the placement of military objectives 
within close proximity of civilians or civilian objects’, is now also listed as a 
violation of the prohibition against the use of human shields53. 
The prohibition against human shielding is so fundamental to the 
foundational tenets of IHL, that AP I article 51(8) states that ‘[a]ny violation of 
these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal 
obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians ...’54. This 
provision reflects the tu quoque principle (principle of reciprocity), which 
maintains that when it comes to IHL, an attacker’s obligations are not ‘depend 
on the adversary’s compliance’ with IHL55. In short, the prohibition is absolute 
and non-derogable.  
  Any discussion on the prohibition against the use of human shields 
would be incomplete without reference to the provisions contained in AP I 
which establish the obligations on belligerent parties when responding to 
                                                
50 The words ‘under no circumstances’ used in article 12(1), indicate that the prohibition is 
absolute (Ibid). 
51 Ibid. 
52 This provision is 'intended to cover cases where the civilian population moves of its own 
accord', but 'implies that the civilian population or persons concerned have acted under 
duress or, at minimum, without knowledge of the way in which they are being manipulated to 
shield a military objective' (Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities 
and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 315). 
53 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
54 Michael Schmitt (2010) ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’ (Chapter 9) in Susan Breau and 
Agnieszka Jachec-Neale (eds) Testing the Boundaries of International Humanitarian Law 
277 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610016 (accessed 12 May 2012) at 
299. 
55 This is reflected in article 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which rules out the suspension of a treaty for wrongful conduct of a party in the case of 
‘provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a 
humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against 
persons protected by such treaties’. 
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attacks. AP I article 58, entitled ‘Precautions against the effects of attacks’, 
states that: 
  
‘The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible: 
a) without prejudice to article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to 
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects 
under their control from the vicinity of military objectives; 
b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated 
areas;  
c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control56 against the 
dangers resulting from military operations’. 
 
The absolute nature of the prohibition against the use of ‘civilians or other 
protected persons to shield’57 objects or personnel from attack, has not only 
expanded in its IHL application since its expression in the HRs58, but it is now 
firmly recognised as having achieved the status of customary IHL59, and 
consequently is binding on all belligerent parties in times of armed conflict. 
Moreover, international jurisprudence resulting from the prosecution of those 
found in violation of the prohibition, endorse the seriousness with which the 
prohibition is viewed60. In the words of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, AP I article 58 ‘do[es] not appear to be contested by 
any State, including those which have not ratified the Protocol’61. Not 
surprisingly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists ‘the 
use of human shields during an international armed conflict’ as a war crime62.  
Whether the ‘protected persons’ are ‘placed on or close to military 
objectives’, encouraged to move into the vicinity of ‘military operations’63, or 
                                                
56 ‘These obligations bind any party having control over the civilian population concerned, be 
they members of its own population or foreigners, refugees or any other persons’ (Bouchié 
de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields in 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 890). 
57 Idem at 886. 
58 ‘The absolute nature of this prohibition is not limited to the use of patients or staff of 
medical units as human shields, but applies to the general prohibition on use of human 
shields, be they civilians or POW, which brooks no exception’ (Ibid). 
59 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 337.  
60 Student Case (Case No. 24) British Military Court Luneberg (6-10 May 1946) 4 L.R.T.W.C. 
118 (United Nations War Crimes Commission His Majesty’s Stationery Office 1947); Trial of 
Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others (Case No. 72 High Command Trial) U.S. Military 
Tribunal Nuremberg (30 December 1947–28 October 1948); 12 L.R.T.W.C. United Nations 
War Crimes Commission His Majesty’s Stationery Office 1949 at 105; Prosecutor v Blaskic 
ICTY Trial Chamber Judgement (3 March 2000) IT-95-14-T at para 716; Prosecutor v 
Aleksovki ICTY Trial Chamber Judgement (25 June 1999) IT-95-14/1-T at para 229; 
Prosecutor v Karadzic and Mladic ICTY First Initial Indictment (July 1995) IT-95-5-I para 47. 
61 Prosecutor v Kupreskic ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment (14 January 2000) IT-95-16-T 
paras. 524-25, Michael N Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ 2008 
38 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 18 at 33). 
62 2187 U.N.Treaty Series 3 article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) (entered into force 1 July 2002) 'Rome 
Statute'; Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
63 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 885. 
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whether ‘military objectives are placed in the midst of civilians’64, ‘legal 
experts seem to agree that it is an absolute obligation of result’65. That said, 
there are two aspects of the prohibition that deserve highlighting: one is that 
there needs to be intention to use the presence of civilians as a human 
shield, and the second is that the shielded site must be a military objective. 
As the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes stipulates: ‘the 
mental element’ of the crime ‘is the intention to shield a military objective from 
attack or to shield, favour or impede military operations’66. Ascertaining the 
mental intent of the violator, and the military status of the objective or 
operation which is the subject of the shielding, is key to ascertaining a 
violation of the prohibition67. In short, this intent element means that ‘no 
violation of the human shielding prohibition occurs in situations involving truly 
consenting shields’. Moreover, Schmitt argues that in instances of truly 
consensual shielding, belligerent parties are not legally ‘obliged under API 
article 58 to prevent them from acting in this manner’68. 
 
7.4 IHL on the subject of VHSs 
 
While IHL has approached the issue of human shields with a direct and 
absolute prohibition, ‘it is unlikely that the shielding norm was originally 
devised to cover an event where individuals acted knowingly and on their 
own initiative’69. An examination of treaty law and customary international 
law, reveals no similar comprehensive treatment of the issue of civilians who, 
of their own volition, elect to position themselves near strategic sites, be they 
military, civilian or dual-use sites70.  
 That said, there are some IHL academics who maintain that ‘the mere 
fact that voluntary shielding was not in the contemplation of the drafters does 
not necessarily suffice to remove voluntary shielding from its reach’71. After 
all, IHL is and must ‘remain, responsive to the evolving nature of warfare’72 
and if VHSs are the new actors in international armed conflicts, then IHL 
needs to guide military commanders facing such actors. However, even these 
academics concede that it is ‘debatable’ whether the prohibitions against 
shielding generally, can simply be applied to VHSs73. So, for example, if we 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Idem at 886. 
66 One need not prove ‘ignorance on the part of the people concerned or that they be 
constrained’ (Ibid). 
67 Ibid.  
68 Schmitt bases this argument on the fact that AP I article 51(3) removes the ‘protection 
afforded by this section’ to those who engage in ‘direct participation’, which he concludes 
‘would relieve the defender of any such obligation under article 58’. Consequently, according 
to Schmitt, if ‘voluntary shields retain full civilian protection because they are not directly 
participating, then article 58 remains applicable’, which would oblige belligerents ‘only to the 
extent feasible’ to ‘prevent civilians from placing themselves at risk’ (Schmitt ‘Human Shields 
in International Humanitarian Law’ at 322). 
69 Idem at 316.  
70 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 886. 
71 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 316.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 315. 
 254 
examine the wording of AP I article 51(7), it is safe to conclude that this 
prohibition encompasses instances where civilians’ movements are directed, 
or where civilians are used (in a manner which appears to be of their ‘own 
accord'), but which in fact reveals some ‘duress or, at minimum, without 
knowledge of the way in which they are being manipulated to shield a military 
objective'74. 
  Even if the existing provisions dealing with traditional human shields 
cannot be applied directly to every situation involving VHSs, it is possible that 
other principles of IHL can be used to provide some guidance for military 
commanders faced by VHSs. What follows is a summary of IHL provisions 
which may have some bearing on the subject of VHSs: 
 
i. Acceptable collateral damage and the proportionality principle 
 
While IHL might not explicitly set out attackers’ obligations in instances where 
VHSs are situated at a military site, IHL is founded on the twin principles of 
‘distinction and proportionality’75. In short, these principles oblige a belligerent  
to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to ‘do "everything feasible" 
to verify that a target qualifies as a military objective’76, and only launch and 
attack ‘if and only if the potential damage to civilians is not “excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”’77.  
 So, in the case of civilian workers in a munitions’ factory, IHL experts 
are generally in agreement that ‘these civilians will bear the risk of falling 
victim to a legitimate attack’ on the munitions’ factory (as a legitimate military 
target)78, if the proportionality analysis concluded that the ‘military advantage 
is such that the collateral damage is acceptable’79. That said, it is also agreed 
that the workers themselves, once they have left the factory, ‘shed the risk of 
being subject to attack’, and they are not military objectives in and of 
themselves80. Furthermore, provided they do not ‘live within the “target area”’, 
they are fully protected as civilians ‘in their homes’81. 
 Similarly, when ‘military objectives’ are surrounded by human shields, 
they do not ‘cease to be legitimate targets for attack simply because of the 
presence of those shields’82. Therefore, if we presume that VHSs enjoy 
                                                
74 Ibid.  
75 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 897. 
76 AP I article 57(2)(a)(1), Henckaerts and Doswald Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law rule 16 at 55. 
77 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 900; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law at rule 14. ‘This means that the expected civilian losses must 
be weighed against the size of the concrete military advantage to be anticipated if the military 
objective is neutralised’ (Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their 
T-shirts: Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 900). 
78 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 897.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Although, as Bouchié de Belle points out, the cost of ‘conducting an attack despite their 
presence, may have a considerable media and political impact’ (Idem at 900). 
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civilian status83, their mere presence at a legitimate military objective will 
have to be factored in to any decision to target the site which they shield. A 
military commander faced with human shields ‘must reason, as in the case of 
any other legitimate military objective, an attack on which runs the risk of 
causing collateral damage to civilians’84. While this does not mean that VHSs 
‘lose their right to protection as civilians, they may lose de facto protection by 
staying close to a military target’85. In short ‘these civilians will bear the risk of 
falling victim to a legitimate attack on the shielded object’86, if the 
proportionality analysis concludes that the ‘military advantage is such that the 
collateral damage is acceptable’. As Bouchie ́de Belle correctly points out, 
‘given the significant military advantage that can generally be gained from the 
destruction of a strategically located bridge, relatively high civilian casualties 
would ordinarily be deemed a reasonable collateral damage’87. Consequently, 
‘in the case of human shields ... a sufficiently significant military advantage in 
relation to the danger to which human shields are exposed could render an 
attack on a military objective legitimate despite their presence’88. Moreover, 
under IHL, belligerent parties are obliged to ‘cancel or suspend an attack if 
the attack would be disproportionate’89 - in other words, if it became apparent 
that the target was surrounded by sufficient VHSs to tip the proportionality 
analysis in their favour. That said, collateral damage is only acceptable when 
it can be shown conclusively that the target is a legitimate military objective. If 
it were to be shown that VHSs were injured as a result of an attack aimed at 
a site which was not a military objective (for example a civilian objective), this 
would constitute a prohibited attack on ‘civilians and civilian property’90.  
 
ii. Precautions in attack  
 
Many IHL principles are firmly founded on the principle that belligerent parties 
are obliged to take precautions when attacking, to ensure that only military 
objectives are targeted, and that civilians are protected against the effects of 
hostilities91. This fundamental IHL ‘obligation to choose means and methods 
of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimising, incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects’92 lies at the 
                                                
83 I will explore the question of what IHL status VHSs enjoy, later on in this chapter. 
84 Yves C Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds) (1987) Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
ICRC/Nijhoff: Geneva/Dordrecht at para 2191. 
85 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 897. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Idem at 903. 
89 AP I article 57(2)(b). 
90 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 903. 
91 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 15; AP I 
article 57. 
92 AP I article 57(2)(a)(ii): Those planning or deciding on an attack must ‘take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any 
event to minimising, incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated’. 
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heart of IHL. Moreover, according to the ‘lesser evil’93 rule, ‘when there is a 
choice between two military objectives for obtaining a similar military 
advantage, commanders are obliged to choose the one which may be 
expected to cause the least danger to civilians’94. 
 Applying these precautionary principles to the situation of VHSs, ‘if 
human shields are not in front of the military objective all the time, an attack 
should be launched at a time when they are not present’95. Similarly, ‘where 
the military objective is protected by human shields, the attacker should use 
weapons that will destroy the target without harming the human shields 
around it or will harm them as little as possible’96. Furthermore, should a pilot 
receive an ‘order to bomb an objective but he realises at the last minute that it 
is protected by a human shield, he should suspend the attack and refer back 
to his command’97. 
 
iii. Effective advance warning of an attack 
 
Another of the IHL principles which could impact upon VHSs, is the obligation 
upon belligerents ‘to give effective advance warning of attacks which could 
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not so permit’98. 
Traditionally this has required warning ‘sufficiently in advance to allow the 
evacuation of civilians’, without being ‘too far in advance ... so that civilians 
may think that the danger has passed’99. Finally, it should be remembered 
that complying with the obligation to warn, does not release the attacker from 
his duty to observe all the other ‘precautionary measures’ set out in IHL100.  
 So, for example, if after ‘effective advance warning’, VHSs (assuming 
that they are civilians) elected to remain in the vicinity of the target, they 
would still ‘enjoy the same protection as any other civilians’, calling into play 
the proportionality calculations and all the precautions in attack101. As Schmitt 
points out, ‘the mere fact that the shields were acting voluntarily, and not at 
the behest of the defender, would not release that party from a duty to comply 
with the obligations’102 set out in IHL. Consequently, it is incumbent on 
belligerent parties to ‘express disquiet’ at the shielding movement of VHSs, 
because their ‘passive indifference’103 to even voluntary shielding activities 
will constitute a breach of IHL. In short, the IHL obligations to respect the 
principle of distinction and take precautionary measures in attack, and give 
advance warning, ‘applies both when the civilians are hostages and when 
                                                
93 AP I article 57(3). ‘For example, if human shields are positioned on a bridge and the 
communication line can be broken by attacking another bridge that is not surrounded by 
civilians, the obligation set out in article 57(3) obliges the attacker to take that option’ 
(Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields 
in International Humanitarian Law’ at 905). 
94 Ibid.  
95 Idem at 904. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 321-322.  




103 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 315. 
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they have volunteered to shield military targets’104.  
 That said, many of these provisions are intended to protect civilians in 
the theatre of armed conflict. Applying these protections to VHSs presumes 
that VHSs enjoy civilian status, in accordance with AP I article 50(1)’s 
presumption of protected civilian status. As with any presumption, there is 
always the possibility to rebut the presumption. If it were to be successfully 
shown that VHSs had by their actions compromised their civilian status (by 
potentially participating directly in hostilities), a different legal status and 
consequent legal regime would apply. I now turn my attention to exploring the 
various IHL status’, in an attempt to locate VHSs in existing IHL. 
 
7.5 The notion of IHL combatant/civilian status  
 
The concept, which underpins much of IHL, is that every individual in the 
theatre of war possesses a recognised primary status, as either a combatant 
or a civilian105. It is this primary status which informs the protections which 
they are afforded under IHL, as well as the legal rights and obligations which 
they bear106. Depending on their primary status, individuals are then granted 
or refused secondary prisoner of war (POW) status. Moreover, a primary 
status (as combatant or civilian) determines the legal consequences that flow 
from one’s actions107, and the legal obligations imposed by international law 
upon one’s captors108.  
I will now turn to the task of explaining and evaluating the 
characteristics and functions of these different IHL categories, in the hopes of 
arriving at a reasoned argument for the classification of VHSs: 
 
i. Combatants (belligerents)  
 
As a rule, the members of the armed forces109 are granted combatant status 
and are authorised to participate directly in hostilities, subject to the 
limitations imposed upon them by international law regarding methods and 
means of warfare110. Under IHL, the term ‘armed forces’ is understood to 
‘consist[s] of all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates ... and 
subject to an internal disciplinary system’111. In order to enjoy combatant 
                                                
104 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 886. 
105 Kurt Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook 
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 65. 
106 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65.  
107 For example, a civilian who participates directly in hostilities might face criminal 
prosecution for their actions, while combatants are not prosecuted for participating in 
hostilities, provided they observe the rules of war.  
108 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65. 
109 It is worth mentioning at this juncture, that in an armed conflict, only a recognised subject 
of international law can clothe their armed forces with authorised combatant status. This 
status is not given to the individual, but rather is granted as a result of his or her affiliation to 
a party to the conflict, which is a subject of international law (Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 66-67). 
110 Failure to observe these limitations will expose combatants to prosecution before a 
military tribunal (Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 68). 
111 AP I article 43. 
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status, an individual either needs to show that they are a member of the 
armed forces as defined by international law112, or that they are members of a 
volunteer corps or militia and then they need to satisfy the criteria for 
combatant status as listed in the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR)113, and 
developed through GC III114 and the AP I115. Those criteria require that 
combatants emanating from a volunteer corps or militia116 must ‘be 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates’; wear ‘a fixed 
distinctive sign recognisable at a distance’; ‘carry their arms openly’ during 
and in preparation for an attack; and ‘conduct their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war’117. Although members of the traditional 
armed forces acquire their combatant status without any further enquiry into 
their compliance with the criteria set out in GC III article 4A(2), they do as a 
matter of customary law nevertheless adhere to the four conditions. In API 
article 43(1) we find a new definition of ‘armed forces’, described as: 
 
‘all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates, 
even if that party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognised by the adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject 
to an international disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict’. 
 
In essence, what this new article achieved, was to do away with the prior 
‘distinction between regular and irregular voluntary corps, militia and other 
organised groups (that existed in the HR and GC III)’118. Instead, the six 
                                                
112 GC III article 4A(1). 
113 HR article 1. 
114 ICRC ‘Commentary on GC III Article 4’ available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf. (accessed 
12 May 2012). 
115 AP I article 43(1) reiterates the principle set out in article 1(a) of the HR IV. AP I article 44 
states that: 
 
‘combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while 
they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. 
Recognising, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to 
the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he 
shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his 
arms openly: (a) during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is 
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the 
launching of an attack in which he is to participate.’ 
 
116 GC III article 4 includes in this category organised resistance movements, provided they 
fulfill the four criteria set out in article 4A(2)(a-d). Also mentioned are civilians who are 
accompanying the armed forces, and crews of merchant marine or civil aircraft. For the 
purposes of this investigation into the status of VHSs, I shall deal with the category of 
civilians accompanying the armed forces further, below. 
117 It is worth noting that failure to observe the laws of war will not render the combatant an 
unlawful combatant. It will, however, expose them to military prosecution, provided they meet 
the other requirements for combatant status (GC III article 82ff). 
118 Robert Goldman and Brian Tittemore ‘Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in 
Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ (2002) ASIL Task Force Paper available at www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf 
(accessed 21 February 2012) at 17. 
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onerous requirement for combatant status, set out in GC III, are replaced by 
two conditions: ‘1. responsible command under a party to the conflict and 2. 
behaviour in accordance with the laws of war’119. As Rogers points out, ‘it is a 
matter of organisation and discipline, which goes to the root of the definition 
of armed forces’120.  
As a result of this authorisation, combatants enjoy two important 
privileges121. Firstly, those who enjoy primary combatant status are afforded 
secondary status as POWs in the event of capture, and consequently they 
enjoy special protections whilst interned122. Secondly, combatants who do not 
breach the laws of war123 cannot be prosecuted for their mere participation in 
hostilities, on account of their authorisation to participate in hostilities124.  
The most common way in which combatants assert their status is by 
their use of uniforms. It is this distinctive dress which distinguishes them from 
the civilian population. The obligation to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population, is one of the basic duties which combatants are trained to 
observe whenever they are engaging in military activities or preparing to 
engage in such activities125. This obligation is so fundamental that 
combatants who are not uniformed126, are still required to wear a ‘permanent 
distinctive sign visible from a distance and carry their arms openly’127. A 
failure to do so, will render them unlawful combatants or spies, guilty of 
perfidy, and being unable to claim POW status128.  
 
Non-combatant members of the armed forces 
 
As an exception to this general rule, that members of the armed forces are by 
definition ‘combatants’, there are a number of groups of service personnel 
within the ranks of the armed forces, who are denied authorisation (by 
national legislation) to ‘use a weapon or a weapons system’129, and are 
consequently called non-combatants130. Within this broader category of non-
combatants, we find ‘quartermasters, members of the legal services and 
                                                
119 Daphne Richemond-Barak (2011) ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict’ in William C. 
Banks (ed) (2011) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare 
Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at 2502-9 (ebook version). 
120 Anthony PV Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3 at 14-15. 
121 It must be noted that these privileges may be forfeited as a result of the actions of the 
particular individuals, for example engaging in spying (Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 65-66; HR article 3 and AP I article 43(2)). 
122 HR article 3(2), GC III article 4A(1-3), AP I article 44(1). POW status is afforded to all who 
fall within the categories listed in GC II article 4A(1-3) and (6), and AP I articles 43 and 44(1). 
123 The breach of the laws of war does not, however, result in the forfeiture of their secondary 
POW status, unless they also breached the fundamental obligation of distinction (AP I article 
44 (4); Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 81). This principle will be explored further 
under section on unlawful belligerents. 
124 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 93. 
125 AP I article 44(3). 
126 Although militia groups, volunteer corps and organised resistance movements are exempt 
from wearing uniforms, they are still required to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population (Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 76-77). 
127 GC I article 4A(2), AP I article 44(3). 
128 The status of ‘unlawful combatants’ will be explored further below. 
129 AP I article 43(2). 
130 HR article 3. 
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other non-fighting personnel’131 who, despite being members of the armed 
forces, are expressly prohibited from participating directly in hostilities, and 
enjoy special protection as a result of this limitation132. Others who fall within 
the category of non-combatants, are those who - but for their injuries - would 
be classified as ordinary combatants (e.g. the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked)133. For all of these individuals, their status as members of the 
armed forces, albeit non-combatant members, guarantees their secondary 
status as POW upon capture, and precludes them from being awarded 
civilian status134.  
As members of the armed forces, non-combatants do not enjoy the 
protection afforded civilians against the dangers inherent in an armed 
conflict135. Non-combatants are not protected by a prohibition against attack 
(as is the case with civilians), and remain fundamentally a ‘military 
objective’136. With the exception of the religious and medical personnel (who 
enjoy specific protections under IHL), all other non-combatants contribute to 
the achievement of a military advantage, and are a military objective open to 
attack, without special considerations or collateral-damage calculations137. All 
non-combatants are entitled to defend themselves against attack, despite the 
fact that they are not, by definition, authorised to participate directly in 
hostilities138. The authorisation to participate in hostilities is afforded to all 
members of the armed forces, and this right which attaches to non-
combatants (albeit in a de-activated form) is activated by an attack upon their 
person139. 
 
Medical and religious personnel 
 
As already mentioned, medical and religious personnel enjoy unique 
protections under IHL. Consequently, and despite being members of the 
armed forces, they are expressly prohibited from participating directly in 
hostilities, and enjoy special protection because of this limitation140. While 
medical and religious personnel wear the uniform of the armed forces - albeit 
with distinctive emblems denoting their religious or medical function - they 
are, however, not authorised to participate directly in hostilities. For the 
purposes of classification, they are not classed with traditional non-combatant 
members of the armed forces. Instead, these medical and religious personnel 
enjoy ‘special primary status141 under Geneva law’142.  
                                                
131 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 82. 
132 GC I articles 24, 26 and 27. 
133 The protections afforded these non-combatants, are explored comprehensively in GC I 
and GC II. 
134 AP I article 50(1) precludes this by its restrictive definition of a civilian (Ipsen ‘Combatants 
and Non-combatants’ at 84). 
135 AP I article 51(1); Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 84. 
136 ‘Those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’ (AP I article 52(2)). 
137 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 85. 
138 GC I article 22(1); GC II article 35(1); AP I article 13(2)(a). 
139 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 91. 
140 GC I articles 24, 26 and 27. 
141 GC I affords protected status to medical and auxiliary personnel who collect and care for 
the wounded, and who administer medical units (GC I articles 24-27). 
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During international armed conflicts, they are to be ‘respected and 
protected’ and can never form part of the military objective, as do other non-
combatant members of the armed forces. Any attack upon these specially 
protected personnel, is unlawful143. While they may not participate directly in 
hostilities, medical personnel in particular, are nevertheless entitled to use 
small arms to defend themselves and the injured in their care. Upon capture, 
they are granted the same legal protections afforded POW’s (although 
technically they are more correctly termed retainees144), and they can only be 




IHL defines civilians in the negative, as any person who is not a 
combatant146. There exists in IHL a presumption that where there is ‘doubt a 
person shall be considered to be a civilian’147, and consequently such person 
will enjoy protection from hostilities. Unlike combatants, civilians are not 
obliged to carry any form of identification, or to wear any symbols confirming 
their IHL status148.  
With the exception of the levée en masse (which shall be discussed 
further below), civilians are not authorised to participate directly in hostilities. 
It is this limitation that serves to shield the civilian population from being the 
target of direct military attack, as a matter of customary international law149. 
Provided they do not take part in the hostilities, civilians are to be 
respected150, shielded from attack, and may not be ‘taken prisoner without 
sufficient reason’151. This obligation demands not only that the armed forces 
refrain from acts which would cause harm to civilians, but also requires that 
steps are taken to ensure the safety of civilians152. Attacks which result in 
death or serious injury to civilians, are considered to be a grave breach of AP 
                                                                                                                                      
142 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 89. 
143 Ibid. 
144 However ‘if a physician or a chaplain refuses to employ his professional abilities…he will 
be removed from the category or retained personnel and be detained as an ordinary POW’ 
(Yoram Dinstein (2004) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 42). 
145 GC I articles 28 and 30; GC II articles 36 and 37; GC III article 33. For further material on 
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I153. Furthermore, all attacks on legitimate military objectives must first be 
assessed in order to establish that the loss caused to civilian life, is not 
‘excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’154. Incidental harm (often termed acceptable collateral damage), 
caused to civilians and their civilian objects, is only lawful when it is an 
‘unavoidable and proportionate side effect of lawful attacks on military 
objectives’155. In every attack, precautions must be taken to ensure that 
civilian losses are kept to a minimum; civilians are warned of imminent 
attacks, and where feasible, civilians should be removed from the vicinity of 
the military objective156.  
The immunity from attack which civilians enjoy, makes it tempting for 
combatants to use civilians to shield certain military targets from attack. 
Consequently, the taking of hostages or the use of human shields, are both 
expressly prohibited by IHL - because the use of protected civilians would 
grant a military advantage in circumstances where the order to attack would 
otherwise be lawful157.  
The laws of war dictate that persons who participate directly in 
hostilities158 are not permitted to enjoy the protections afforded civilians under 
IHL159. Civilians who play an active part in the hostilities, open themselves to 
attack from the opposition acting in self-defence during, ‘and for such time as, 
they continue to actively participate in hostilities’160. Even under such 
instances, combatants are obliged to resist such hostility from civilians in a 
way that will observe the principle of proportionality, shield other civilians from 
attack, and keep to a minimum the resultant civilian losses161.  
If civilians do participate directly in hostilities, they do not, as a result of 
their hostile actions, acquire combatant status. Once they are hors de 
combat, they are once again clothed with their primary civilian status162. 
Should they fall into enemy hands after such resistance, they will still be 
treated humanely as civilians, held to account for their unauthorised actions, 
and afforded the ‘regular and fair judicial guarantees extended to civilians’163.  
 
Levée en masse 
 
As just explained, civilians are expected to have no part in the hostilities. 
There is, however, one instance in which civilians may legitimately participate 
in hostilities, despite not being properly authorised to do so. When 
belligerents invade a territory and the local civilian inhabitants ‘spontaneously 
take up arms against invading troops; without having had time to form 
themselves into armed units’, they are permitted to participate in hostilities, 
provided ‘they carry their arms openly and respect the laws and customs of 
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war in their military operations’164. These individuals (more correctly referred 
to as the levée en masse) enjoy the secondary POW protections afforded 
traditional combatants165, despite the fact that they are not authorised by a 
‘State party to a conflict’166 to participate directly in hostilities. They enjoy this 
primary status as combatants on condition that they distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population, and carry their weapons openly. Unlike other 
civilians who elect to participate in hostilities, it is only the levée en masse 167 
who acquire POW status upon capture168. 
 
Persons accompanying the armed forces 
 
Nestled in the category of civilians, we find individuals who can often be 
found with combatants, but who do not wear the uniform of the armed forces, 
are not armed, and are not permitted to engage in hostilities in any direct 
way169. They do, however, carry an identity card confirming their function170. 
This category has come to be known as ‘persons accompanying the armed 
forces’, and in more recent literature are often referred to as civilian 
contractors171.  
Despite their close association with the armed forces, these civilian 
contractors enjoy primary civilian status as a consequence of their non-
combative function172. These civilians often provide the necessary specialised 
expertise173 which the armed forces might be lacking. Civilian contractors still 
retain their inherently civilian status, despite their activities aimed at 
‘maintaining the effectiveness of a piece of hardware’, which might be used to 
win a military advantage over the opposition174. Despite their civilian status, 
the assistance that they render to the armed forces exposes them to 
collateral injury, whilst providing support of weapons and infrastructure175.  
While these individuals can be detained for security reasons, they are 
only entitled to the privileges afforded traditional POWs, if they can produce 
the identity card issued by the armed forces which they are accompanying176. 
This is the only essentially civilian group who are afforded secondary POW 
status, without having primary combatant status177. 
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iii. The unlawful belligerent and spies 
 
There has emerged a practice amongst some IHL academics, to use the term 
unlawful belligerent/unlawful combatant to refer to persons who actively 
participate in hostilities, despite not being properly authorised to do so - the 
so-called ‘unlawful belligerents’178. The term is novel in that it ‘is not 
acknowledged or otherwise mentioned in the laws of war’, the Geneva 
Conventions or in any other IHL treaties179, or customary IHL180. Moreover, it 
does not create a third category of status in IHL181. The status quo remains 
that all participants in armed conflicts are classified as either combatants or 
civilians.  
Although civilians who participate in hostilities without authorisation 
have also been termed ‘unlawful belligerents’, the term is most often used to 
refer to combatants who disguise themselves as civilians or members of the 
opposition’s armed forces, in order to gain a special military advantage182. So, 
for example, AP I article 44(3) demands that the principle of distinction be 
observed at all times, even when plain-clothed Special Forces and spies are 
operating in the adversaries’ territory. Failure to distinguish oneself from the 
civilian population - even by the minimum requirements of distinction set out 
in AP I article 44(3) - while launching an attack, is perfidious and can result in 
the forfeiture of combatant status183. 
Rather than give rise to a new category, the label describes the 
unlawfulness of the actions of these civilians and combatants. In essence, 
although these individuals retain their primary status as civilians or 
combatants (as the individual case may be), their unauthorised conduct 
serves to undermine the protections ordinarily afforded them on the grounds 
of their primary status. Their unlawful actions result in the forfeiture of 
combatant/civilian privileges. Those combatants acting unlawfully might lose 
the right to claim POW status, and could be prosecuted under criminal law for 
their unlawful actions184, while civilians participating in hostilities without 
authorisation (or levée en masse status), lose the presumptive immunity from 
attack which attaches to civilian status. Despite this, they are still entitled to 
basic humane treatment, fundamental human rights guarantees, and fair 
judicial procedures, upon capture185. 
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7.6 Conclusion on the status of VHSs under current IHL  
 
There is a presumption which operates in IHL to afford every person who falls 
into enemy hands protected status, until a competent tribunal can accurately 
determine their status186. This presumes that, for every case brought before a 
tribunal, a particular recognised status will always be discernible. At present, 
IHL makes mention of human shields, but does not make any direct reference 
to human shields who act of their own volition (so-called VHSs), making it 
somewhat difficult to locate VHSs squarely within one of these recognised 
categories. What I turn to now, is assessing the reality of VHSs against the 
IHL categories (and sub-categories) set out in the previous section. In 
undertaking this comparative exercise, I will tease out a response to the 
question of what IHL status VHSs enjoy, in situations of international armed 
conflict.  
 
i. VHSs as combatants 
 
There are some IHL academics who argue that VHSs who deliberately locate 
themselves ‘in front of a military objective in order to protect it from attack’ are 
combatants187. That said, there are many characteristics which distinguish 
VHS from traditional combatants (as understood by IHL). Probably the most 
crippling argument against the conclusions that VHSs are combatants, is the 
fact that they simply ‘do not fit the definition of a combatant as set out either 
in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention or in article 43 of Protocol I’188.  
 Moreover, in many ways, VHSs do not fulfill the established criteria for 
belligerent status set out in IHL. VHSs are often an ad hoc collective of 
activists, both local and foreign in origin, and some even come from nations 
who are not party to the conflict. While they may arrange themselves in loose 
associations, like the Iraqi Peace Team and the International Action 
Centre189, they cannot be said to be subject to a command structure which 
bears responsibility for its subordinates190. In fact, the fluid manner in which 
volunteers came and went from Iraq during 2003 illustrates that there was no 
real command structure within any of the organising associations. Moreover, 
the associations, once on Iraqi soil, had little control over where their 
members would be positioned to carry out their shielding duties191. It was also 
apparent that these associations did not carry out, nor intend to convene 
disciplinary proceedings, against volunteers who chose to abandon the 
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cause. Their civilian attire and failure to don a uniform or wear a fixed 
distinctive emblem, made them indistinguishable from the civilian population, 
confirming that they clearly did not observe the fundamental rule of 
distinction, which is demanded of combatants. In fact, in instances where 
they did make use of a distinctive sign (or t-shirt printed with a protest 
slogan), their intention was to ‘indicate that they are members of the civilian 
population’192, not that they were combatants. As for the requirement that 
combatants are to carry their arms openly when preparing and engaging in 
an attack, VHSs shield sites by their presence alone, without arms, and 
without engaging in any offensive activities193. Fusco argues that since ‘in 
both the Hague and Geneva conventions, combatants, lawful and unlawful, 
are armed or in possession of weapons ... human shields cannot be 
considered as combatants, even if they are volunteers, acting in a “hostile 
way” against one of the parties in conflict’194 for the pure reason that they are 
unarmed. As Bouchié de Belle points out, ‘the whole point of a human shield 
is to play on the enemy’s concern not to take the risk of killing or wounding 
civilians, in order to ward off military attack’195.  
 
VHSs as the levée en masse 
 
VHSs will also not constitute a levée en masse196 because they have not 
‘spontaneously taken up arms against invading troops; without having had 
time to form themselves into armed units’197. In fact, frequently they are not 
citizens of the territory in which the conflict takes place, and they do not ‘take 
up arms’ and organise themselves into armed units to shield their sites. As 
such, under the HR IV, GC III and AP I, VHSs will not enjoy the right to 
participate directly in hostilities as a levée en masse198.  
 
VHSs and non-combatant members of the armed forces 
 
In one important respect, however, VHSs do share something in common 
with regular combatants: they find themselves in the cross-hairs of military 
hostilities. Given that VHSs adopt a passive shielding stance, coupled with 
the fact that they are not authorised to participate directly in hostilities, they 
would seem to be akin to non-combatant members of the armed forces. 
However, the fact that VHSs are not members of the armed forces is of 
fundamental importance in assessing their status, and this fact alone denies 
them primary non-combatant status, and secondary POW status. 
Furthermore, without special qualification and authorisation by the armed 
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forces, VHSs also fail to fall within the special protections afforded to medical 
and religious personnel.  
The upside of not being a member of the armed forces (even the non-
combatant variety), is that VHSs might possibly claim protection against the 
dangers inherent in armed conflicts, in a way that non-combatants may not. 
Without membership of the armed forces, VHSs cannot be considered a 
military objective. However, as we will explore further below, there is some 
debate around the whether VHSs, by their actions, might actually be making 
an ‘effective contribution to military action and whose partial destruction, 
capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage’199. If that is determined to be the case, these 
‘combatant’-VHSs then become ‘legitimate objects of attack’200. 
 
ii. VHSs as civilians 
 
As mentioned previously, IHL defines civilians negatively, as anyone who is 
‘not a member of the armed forces’. Given this definition, and since VHSs ‘do 
not fall within any of the categories of persons referred to in article 4 A (1), (2) 
and (3) of the Third Geneva Convention, and in article 43 of the Additional 
Protocol I’201, they will always be categorised as civilians. Moreover, for so 
long as there remains any doubt as to the definitive status of VHSs under 
IHL, a legal presumption operates to clothe them with civilian status202. 
Importantly, if it is established that the VHS ‘is a civilian, he enjoys the 
protection associated with civilian status, and cannot be targeted during an 
attack’203.  
 That said, IHL is founded on the belief that civilians do not participate 
directly in hostilities. VHSs challenge this assumption, in that they operate ‘as 
civilian actors in, rather than as passive subjects of, armed conflict’204. Herein 
lies the conundrum: while VHSs play a passive and defensive role in 
hostilities, they are nevertheless contributing (sometimes in a significant way) 
to the manner in which the conflict plays itself out. Sometimes, perhaps even 
quite unintentionally, VHSs by their presence ‘enhance the survivability of 
belligerents, their weapons systems, command and control facilities, and 
infrastructure’, and consequently support ‘a belligerent State’s war effort’205. 
However, as innocuous a group of unarmed VHSs shielding a site may seem, 
the reality remains that their presence impacts upon the decision by 
opposition forces to target that particular site.  
 Technically, as civilians, VHSs could claim all the protections 
traditionally afforded civilians, provided they do not compromise their status 
by participating directly in hostilities. That said, exactly what activities amount 
to direct participation in hostilities is still highly debated. The courts decision 
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in PCATI v Government of Israel206 is analysed by Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, 
who conclude that ‘the Palestinian militants fail to meet the qualifying 
conditions set in the Hague Regulations and in the Geneva Conventions for 
combatants. Consequently, they are civilians. They are not, however, entitled 
to the full protection granted to civilians who do not take a direct part in the 
hostilities’207. Kenneth Anderson ‘argues that VHSs have compromised their 
civilian status and if killed or seriously injured should not be regarded as 
civilian collateral damage because they have volunteered to be at the military 
target’208. Having said that, he ‘adds that this does not mean that they are 
combatants’209. 
  The concern that IHL will adopt a notion that there can be varying 
degrees of civilian status, motivated the ICRC to hold successive 
conferences with legal experts - aimed at clarifying what amounts to ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’210. At the first expert meeting, participants ‘diverged 
on the issue of distinguishing between classes of civilian on both practical 
and jurisprudential grounds’211. I will return to explore the finding of these 
expert discussions later on.  
 
VHSs as persons accompanying the armed forces 
 
Parrish argues that ‘VHSs are neither combatants nor civilians’ and instead 
proposes that they are akin to ‘civilian personnel who accompany armies in 
the field’, because the exploitation of their ‘presumed civilian status’ means 
that they have ‘become involved in combat, albeit not in any traditionally 
recognised way’212. What Parrish misses, however, is that legally speaking 
these ‘persons accompanying the armed forces are in fact civilian213. 
Admittedly, like these ‘persons accompanying the armed forces,’ VHSs do 
not wear the uniform of the armed forces, are not armed, and are not 
permitted to engage in hostilities in any direct way. Unlike ‘persons 
accompanying the armed forces,’ VHSs do not possess a recognised identity 
card confirming their essentially civilian status under IHL. However, it is 
accepted that when the Geneva Convention drafters included the provision 
regarding the identity card for those accompanying the armed forces, it was 
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agreed that ‘possession of one was a supplementary safeguard for the 
person concerned, but not an indispensable prerequisite for being granted 
POW status’214. Like civilian contractors, VHSs are intent on prolonging the 
effectiveness of a piece of infrastructure and thereby securing some military 
advantage for the party whose infrastructure they shield. It is this involvement 
in the war effort which has raised concerns as to whether VHSs might 
actually be found to be participating directly in hostilities. As Parrish put it, 
‘even though the human shield is not actually armed, he has implicated 
himself in the war-making apparatus of a belligerent party’215. It could be 
argued that the assistance which the VHS render to the armed forces, by 
shielding a particular site (provided the site has some military importance), is 
akin to the assistance that civilian contractors render to the military. It is this 
act of assistance which exposes the civilian contractor to collateral injury, 
whilst providing support of weapons and infrastructure. By analogy, one could 
make a case that VHSs might also be exposed to collateral injury, while they 
shield sites of military importance216.  
Unfortunately for VHSs, without the authorised accompanying status 
(irrespective of whether they are in possession of a designated identity card 
or not) VHSs will be unable to claim POW status upon capture. Moreover, 
belligerent parties are not permitted to authorise otherwise-protected persons 
(like civilians) to position themselves as human shields in an attempt to 
safeguard legitimate military targets from attack217. Consequently, it would be 
a prosecutable offence under IHL for a belligerent party to authorise a VHS to 
engage in these activities.  
 
iii. VHSs as unlawful belligerents 
 
It might be argued that VHSs, like so-called ‘unlawful belligerents’, are also 
guilty of using their civilian appearance to convince the adversary that they 
enjoy protected status under IHL. However, where VHSs differ from 
traditional unlawful belligerents, is that the latter use this ruse to their 
advantage, while they intend to harm the enemy. It is their unlawful perfidious 
actions, which forfeit unlawful belligerents their right to claim protected POW 
status upon capture.  
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While VHSs also do not wear a uniform, the crucial distinction remains, 
that unlawful belligerents possess weapons and intend to use them to harm 
the enemy. For VHSs, the opposite is true. They do not carry weapons, and 
‘their only intention is the protection of certain potential targets by virtue of 
their unarmed presence there’218. VHSs do nothing more then position 
themselves at a particular site; they do not lure belligerent powers by their 
appearance of protected civilian status, and then act in a perfidious way.  
 In the end, different academics locate VHSs in different IHL categories: 
Accoring to Schmitt, Dinstein labels VHSs 'unlawful combatants' on account 
of what he perceives to be their direct participation in hostilities219. Schmitt 
agrees to a degree, concluding that VHSs have 'a status similar to that of 
illegal combatant'220. Parrish conceded that VHSs are not 'traditional civilians', 
but concludes that they are also 'neither lawful nor unlawful belligerents'221. 
Even at the first ICRC meeting of legal experts gathered to settle on a 
definition of what actions amount to direct participation in hostilities, VHSs 
‘were included in the 'unclear situations' that … could not [be] categorised’222. 
James Ross223 maintains that ‘human shields, even if they were volunteers, 
maintained their civilian status. They were not combatants’224. This is also the 
view favoured by Haas225.   
 The controversy is further complicated by the fact that under IHL, 
‘breaches of the law do not strip individuals of their status, but affect the 
nature of the rights and protections that individuals can rely on’226. So, for 
example, when civilians take an active part in hostilities, they do not forfeit 
their inherent civilian status - they merely compromise their ‘immunity from 
direct attack’227. In short, if we conclude that VHSs are inherently civilian in 
characterisation, then they cannot (by their actions) 'acquire combatant 
status’228. Moreover, for as long as they continue to participate directly in 
hostilities, while they might ‘lose protection from attack’, they will not lose 
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their ‘civilian status’229. Even if it is concluded that VHSs are participating 
directly in hostilities, whether or not they can be labelled unlawful 
combatants’230 as Dinstein proposes, and whether in fact such a classification 
exists under IHL, is debatable. 
Irrespective of the conclusion reached regarding the IHL status of 
VHSs, one thing is certain - their presence in the theatre of armed conflict 
‘seriously jeopardises the protection of the civilian population’231. Moreover, 
their ‘proximity to a lawful target’ exposes them to the increased risk of being 
injured as a result of acceptable collateral damage 232. 
 
7.7 VHSs and the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
 
i. Introducing the concept and controversies surrounding the IHL notion of 
‘direct participation in hostilities’  
 
The phrase ‘direct participation in hostilities’233 is used in IHL to describe 
‘combat-related activities’ that would normally be undertaken only by 
members of the armed forces’234. The phrase emerged from the treaty-law 
expression given to the IHL principle that ‘civilians are protected persons for 
so long as they do not act to compromise their protected status by engaging 
in ‘combat related activities’235. Initially, the treaties used the phrase ‘active 
part in the hostilities’236, but more recently the phrase has evolved into ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’, as is evidenced by the text in AP I article 51(3). As 
the ICRC commentary on AP I article 51(3) explains: ‘a civilian who takes part 
in an armed combat, either individually or as part of a group, thereby 
becomes a legitimate target, though only for as long as he “takes part in 
hostilities”’237. It is clear from the commentary that there are two aspects to 
this concept, and its legal consequences. The first is that only some specific 
                                                
229 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 209. 
230 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 321.  
231 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’at 869. 
232 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 897. 
233 This phrase is sometimes used interchangeably with the phrases ‘taking a direct part’ and 
‘taking an active part’ in hostilities (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 43).The commentary on 
AP I and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Rwanda (in The 
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR (2 September 1998) ICTR-96-4-T at 629) considered 
these various legal formulations to be synonymous. 
234 Rogers cites the following examples of actions that amount to ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’: ‘attacks with roadside bombs on military patrols, sabotage of military 
communications installations, electronic interference with weapons systems or capturing 
members of the armed forces’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19). These 
activities must be distinguished from ‘support activities, such as provision of supplies and 
services … which do not amount to taking a direct part in hostilities’ (Ibid). 
235 Michael Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 697 at 714. 
236 GC I–IV common article 3. 
237 Eric Talbot Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ in William C. Banks (ed) New 
Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare at 1996-2004 (ebook 
version). 
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actions238 will result in the civilian losing their immunity, and secondly that 
their loss of protection is limited to the ‘length of time’239 during which they 
persist in their direct participation’240. 
The phrase ‘direct participation in hostilities’ (in its various forms), has 
been bandied about in IHL treaties and customary law for many years, yet 
‘despite the serious legal consequences involved, neither the Geneva 
Conventions nor their Additional Protocols241 provide a definition of what 
activities amount to “direct participation in hostilities”’242. In addition, at 
present, ‘experts are very divided on the question of whether or not acting as 
a VHS is tantamount to taking direct part in hostilities’243. On the one hand, 
the actions of a VHS ‘do not square easily with what we can consider as 
taking a direct part in hostilities’244. On the other hand, if we were to conclude 
that their actions amounted to direct participation in hostilities, then they 
themselves would become legitimate military targets, and their intended 
‘civilian’ shielding ‘presence in front of a military target would therefore be 
entirely pointless’245.  
 Historically, there have been jurists arguing vociferously both for and 
against a conclusion that the actions of VHSs amount to direct participation in 
hostilities246. Those in the ‘yes’ camp argue that VHSs, much like anti-aircraft 
defence systems247, are ‘deliberately trying to ward off an attack on a military 
objective’, which they claim ‘is indeed tantamount to taking direct part in 
hostilities’248. Proponents of this position argue that since IHL understands 
                                                
238 The ICRC’s commentary on AP I article 51(3) ‘takes a narrow interpretation of the phrase 
“direct participation in hostilities”, requiring an act that causes “actual harm” to the equipment 
or personnel of the opposing military forces’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 
2006-2004). 
239 The ICRC commentary on AP I article 51(3) concedes ‘that this would include “preparation 
for combat and the return from combat”, but then adds “once he ceases to participate, the 
civilian regains his right to the protection under this section … and he may no longer be 
attacked”’ (Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2006-2004) 
240 Jensen ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 2004-13. 
241 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 292. 
242 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12. 
243 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 893; ICRC ‘Summary Report: Second Expert 
Meeting on Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law’ (25-26 
October 2004) The Hague available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participation-hostilities-ih1-311205 
(accessed 27 May 2012) at 6. 
244 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 895; ICRC ‘Summary Report: Second Expert 
Meeting on Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 6. 
245 Ibid.  
246 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 293. 
247 According to Schmitt, VHSs are 'deliberately attempting to preserve a valid military 
objective for use by the enemy' and 'are no different from point air defenses' (Schmitt 
'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian 
Employees' at 541). 
248 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 893; Michael N Schmitt ‘Targeting and 
Humanitarian Law: Current Issues’ 2004 (34) Israel Yearbook on Human Rights at 95; 
Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 130; 
Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees’ at 23. 
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the term ‘attack’ to include both offensive and defensive acts249, and 
moreover that hostile acts do not ‘necessarily involve the use of weapons’250, 
that VHSs ‘who place themselves unarmed in front of military objectives, in 
order to ward off an attack, in other words to defend it, are taking a direct part 
in hostilities’251. By his intentional actions, a VHS ‘contributes to military 
action in a direct causal way; it is difficult to style his behavior as anything but 
direct participation’252. Some even argue that VHSs are more effective in 
hindering an attack on a legitimate military target than if they actually took up 
arms against the opposing forces, and once a sufficiently large number of 
VHSs have surrounded an intended target, their presence can de facto 
‘absolutely immunise a target from attack’253 by what is sometimes referred to 
as the ‘CNN effect’ 254. As Schmitt explains, ‘in an era when civilian casualties 
become instant global news’, the presence of VHSs at the site of a military 
objective, can ‘be more effective than kinetic defences’ or ‘traditional 
defences such as anti-aircraft artillery or surface-to-air missiles’255.  
With regard to deciding what actions amount to direct participation in 
hostilities, the ‘liberal school256 of thought proposes an approach … which 
essentially encompasses all conduct that functionally corresponds to that of 
government armed forces, including not only the actual conduct of hostilities, 
but also the activities such as planning, organising, recruiting and assuming 
logistical functions’257. Those who support this liberal interpretation, argue 
that VHSs make targeting decisions ‘politically complex, but not ... legally 
difficult [because in] attempting to defend an otherwise legitimate target from 
attack VHSs make themselves part of the defense system of the objective 
they seek to shield’258. Consequently, those in this school of thought conclude 
that VHSs ‘who seek to exploit their presumed civilian status to enhance the 
survivability of belligerents, their weapons systems, command and control 
facilities, and infrastructure that directly supports a belligerent State's war 
effort, have clearly become involved in combat, albeit not in any traditionally 
                                                
249 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 894; AP I article 49. 
250 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 894; Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 at para 1943. 
251 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 894. Parrish suggests that VHSs are analogous 
to military-employed contractors 'due to their attempts to protect, and thus increase the 
effectiveness of, war-waging equipment' (Parrish ‘The International Legal Status of Voluntary 
Human Shields’ at 13).  
252 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 318.  
253 Schmitt ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’ at 299. 
254 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 318.  
255 Schmitt ‘Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues’ at 96. 
256 See for example: Michael N Schmitt (2004) 'Direct Participation in Hostilities’ and 21st 
Century Armed Conflict’ In Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection: Festschrift 
fur Dieter Fleck. Fischer Horst: Berlin 505 available at 
http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/Schmitfinal.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012); Ricou 
Heaton J ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed 
Forces’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 155. 
257 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 338. 
258 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 320. 
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recognised way’259. 
  On the other hand there are those who consider that the actions of 
VHSs do not amount to direct participation in hostilities260. They consider that 
‘it would be incorrect to state that people who place themselves voluntarily in 
front of a legitimate target are taking direct part in hostilities’261. They draw 
attention to the fact that the VHS does not ‘pose a direct risk to opposing 
forces’262, they do ‘not strike the enemy forces’, rather ‘he merely protects by 
a passive attitude the personnel or hardware of his own armed forces’263. At 
most, they concede that VHSs participate indirectly by contributing ‘to a 
State’s war capabilities’264. Moreover, they point to the very fact that ‘States 
perceive the presence of VHSs as a legal obstacle to their military 
operations’, as support for their conclusion that the actions of VHSs are not 
considered ‘direct participation in hostilities’265. Instead they adopt ‘more 
restrictive interpretations of the term “direct participation in hostilities”266, 
equating actual combat operations with direct participation in hostilities’267. 
 
ii. IHL treaty-law references to the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
 
The concept of direct participation in hostilities has a longstanding history in 
many treaty provisions of IHL268. It’s most often cited in reference to the fact 
that ‘civilians lose their protection against attack when and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities’269. Early legal commentaries on this 
phrase explain that ‘direct participation means acts of war which by their 
nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and 
                                                
259 Parrish ‘The International Legal Status of Voluntary Human Shields’ at 8. 
260 Including Haas ('Voluntary Human Shields: Status and Protection Under International 
Humanitarian Law' at 203 and 205), Human Rights Watch, and Laurent Colassis (a legal 
advisor to the ICRC). 
261 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 894;  
262 Michael N. Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private 
Contractors or Civilian Employees’ at 22. 
263 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 894. 
264 Idem at 895. 
265 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 872. 
266 See for example: Orna Ben-Naftali and Keren R Michaeli ‘We Must Not Make a 
Scarecrow of the Law: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings’ (2003) 
Spring Cornell International Law Journal at 233; Roy S Schondorf ‘Are “Targeted Killings” 
Unlawful? The Israeli Supreme Court’s Response: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2007) May 
Journal of International Criminal Justice at 301. 
267 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 335. 
268 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 12; GC I-IV common article 3; AP I article 51(3). 
269 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23. There 
were no reservations made to this provision, when states signed up to AP I, and ‘at the 
diplomatic conference leading to the adoption of the Additional Protocols, Mexico stated that 
article 51 of API was so essential that it “cannot be the subject of any reservations 
whatsoever since these would be inconsistent with the aim and purpose of Protocol I and 
undermine its basis”’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law at 23). 
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equipment of the enemy armed forces’270, or ‘present an immediate threat to 
the [adverse] party’271. Moreover, these early legal commentaries are at pains 
to point out that ‘direct participation’ is to be distinguished from general ‘war 
effort’272. Consequently, direct participation does not extend to every act that 
might result eventually in a threat to the enemy273.  
If we trawl through the commentaries on the IHL conventions, we find 
the overwhelming tendency is towards a causal enquiry274 when assessing 
what amounts to ‘direct participation in hostilities’. In the final analysis, the 
commentary to AP I ‘suggests a narrow interpretation of direct participation in 
hostilities’275, albeit without a treaty-law based definition of ‘direct participation 
in hostilities’276, or a list of examples of actions which ‘might amount to ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’277. Haas argues that in applying this interpretation 
found in the commentary to AP I, ‘VHSs do not take a direct part in hostilities 
because they do not perpetrate acts “which by their nature or purpose are 
likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy 
armed forces”’278. 
 
iii. The customary IHL approach to direct participation in hostilities 
 
The principle that civilians who participate in hostilities lose their immunity 
against attack is evidenced by several national military manuals279, reported 
                                                
270 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
711. 
271 Michael Bothe , Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A Solf New Rules for Victims of Armed 
Conflicts : Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (1982) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague at 301 (para 2.4.1). 
272 Pilloud et al (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 at para 1679. As Schmitt points out in modern conflicts, 
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Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 711).  
273 Civilians employed in industries which support the war effort (like those working in an 
armaments factory) are not considered to be engaging in a ‘military activity’ (Gasser 
‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211 and 233), although the ammunitions factory itself 
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where the activity occurs’ (ICRC ‘Commentary to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Convention of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts’ (1997) 16 International Legal Materials 1391 at para 1679). Elsewhere the 
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et al Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
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and its immediate consequences.’ (Idem at para 4787). 
275 Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces’ at 177. 
276 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41. 
277 Idem at 12. 
278 Haas 'Voluntary Human Shields: Status and Protection Under International Humanitarian 
Law' at 205. 
279 See for example the military manuals of: Australia; Belgium; Ecuador; El Salvador; India; 
the Netherlands; the United States; and Yugoslavia (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
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State practice and judicial decisions280, even by States that were not party to 
AP I281. According to the ICRC’s investigation into the customary international 
law status of IHL, no ‘official contrary practice was found’282, and on the 
whole the principle that civilians lose their immunity from prosecution when 
they participate in hostilities, is seen as a ‘valuable reaffirmation of an existing 
rule of customary international law’283.  
At a regional level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
understand the term ‘direct participation in hostilities’ as being ‘generally 
understood to mean “acts which, by their nature or purpose, are intended to 
cause actual284 harm to enemy personnel and materiel”’285. Moreover, the 
Commission points out that activities which only indirectly serve to support 
the armed forces, and do not ‘pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the 
adverse party’, cannot amount to direct participation in hostilties’286.  
 When one looks at State practice, it is apparent that there is no agreed 
interpretation as to exactly what activities amount to direct participation in 
hostilities287. As Henckaerts points out, ‘despite the references made to the 
fact that civilian ‘use of weapons or other means to commit acts of violence 
against human or material enemy forces is prohibited … a clear and uniform 
definition of direct participation in hostilities has not been developed in State 
practice’288. Moreover, the ICRC’s study into customary international law 
confirms that ‘a precise definition of the term “direct participation in hostilities” 
does not exist’289. This leaves States having to interpret ‘the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities … in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to its constituent terms in their context and in light of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Customary International Humanitarian Law at 22). Some states’ military manuals ‘give 
several examples of acts constituting direct participation in hostilities, such as serving as 
guards, intelligence agents, lookouts on behalf of military forces279… spies or couriers’ (Idem 
at 22-23).  
280 The Israeli Supreme Court concluded in PCATI v Israel (s37) that: 
‘the “direct” character of the part taken should not be narrowed merely to the person 
committing the physical act of attack. Those who have sent him, as well, take “a direct 
part”. The same goes for the person who decided upon the act, and the person who 
planned it. It is not to be said about them that they are taking an indirect part in the 
hostilities. Their contribution is direct (and active)’ (Melzer Targeted Killings in 
International Law at 337). 
281 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 23. 
282 Ibid. 
283 This was the expressed opinion of the United Kingdom (Ibid).  
284 These acts were to be distinguished from ‘civilians whose activities merely support the 
adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities, such 
as selling goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of 
one of the parties or, even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the 
armed parties’ (Idem at 23). 
285 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ‘Third Report on Human Rights in 
Colombia’ (cited in Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law at 22). 
286 Ibid. Having said that, ‘it is clear, however, that international law does not prohibit States 
from adopting legislation that makes it a punishable offence for anyone to participate in 
hostilities, whether directly or indirectly’ (Idem at 23). 
287 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41. 
288 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 23. 
289 Idem at 22. 
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object and purpose of IHL’290. Admittedly ‘so far, there has been no generally 
accepted State practice of directly attacking VHS separately from the 
shielded objective’291, suggesting that for States anyway the idea that VHSs 
are participating directly in hostilities is not settled. This led Melzer to note 
that the liberal approach ‘stands in contradiction not only to the prevailing 
opinion in the doctrine, but also to State practice, and to the express 
distinction drawn in convention law between “direct participation in hostilities” 
on the one hand, and work of a military character, activities in support of 
military operations and an activity linked to the military effort, on the other 
hand’292. 
 As for international judicial writings, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić case, adopted a case-by-case 
approach, concluding that it was necessary to ‘examine the relevant facts of 
each victim and to ascertain whether, in each individual’s circumstances, that 
person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant time’293. The Israeli 
High Court of Justice, in the Targeted Killing case (PCATI), concluded that if 
VHSs ‘do so of their own free will, out of support for294 the terrorist 
organisation, they should be seen as persons taking direct part in the 
hostilities’295. However, as Kalshoven correctly points out regarding the task 
of discerning a VHS’s intent, ‘on the spot … the distinction probably is 
imperceptible, or to all intents and purposes unverifiable’296. 
 
iv. ‘Direct participation in hostilities’ as interpreted by the ICRC 
 
In 2009, the ICRC published an Interpretive Guide297 on the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities, in an attempt to ‘reflect the ICRC’s institutional 
position as to how existing298 IHL should be interpreted in light of the 
                                                
290 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 41. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 339. 
293 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 895. ICTY The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić ICTY 
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294 Schmitt 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors 
and Civilian Employees' at 533; Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 25. The 
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war' (Gabriel H Teninbaum 'American Volunteer Human Shields in Iraq: Free Speech or 
Treason?' (2004) 28 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 139 at 157-8).  
295 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 893; The Public Committee v The Government 
of Israel (Judgment) High Court of Justice of Israel (14 December 2006), para 36, available 
at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (accessed 27 May 
2012).  
296 Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld (2011) Constraints on the Waging of War (4th ed) 
ICRC: Geneva at 103. 
297 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 9. It must also be stated that the Interpretive Guide is not 
legally binding, as ‘a legally binding interpretation of IHL can only be formulated by a 
competent judicial organ or, collectively, by the states themselves’ (Idem at 10). 
298 The guide expressly stated that it was not intended to change the existing and ‘binding 
rules of customary or treaty IHL’ (Idem at 9). 
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circumstances prevailing in contemporary armed conflicts’299. The ICRC 
hoped that their recommendations would have ‘substantial persuasive 
effect’300 ‘for States, non-State actors, practitioners, and academics alike’301. 
Some argue that the guidance ‘may even be viewed as a secondary source 
of international law … analogous to writings of the “most highly qualified 
publicists”’302. 
 While there has been much academic critique303 levelled at the 
Interpretive Guide, Melzer (the ICRC’s appointed author of the guide) 
maintains that the guidance adopted a neutral, impartial and balanced 
approach, resisting proposals coming from both extremes, whilst ensuring ‘a 
clear and coherent interpretation of IHL consistent with its underlying 
purposes and principles’304. He argues that much of the critique directed at 
the Interpretive Guide comes from a position which favourse concerns around 
military necessity, without being ‘balanced by equally important 
considerations of humanity’305. 
 
Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in hostilities 
 
According to the ICRC Interpretive Guide, ‘in order to qualify as direct 
participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet three cumulative 
criteria306: 
 
‘1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to 
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus)’307. 
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The first criterion, which is referred to as the ‘threshold of harm’ determination 
requires that harm308: 
a) of a specifically military nature, or309  
b) harm (by inflicting death, injury or destruction’310) of a protected person 
or object, 
must be reasonably expected to result from a civilian’s actions before the 
civilian can be said to be participating directly in hostilities311. The Interpretive 
Guide expressly recognises the need for the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities to be interpreted to include not only the obvious individual armed 
activities, but also the ‘unarmed activities adversely affecting the enemy’312. 
Moreover, all that is required is the ‘objective likelihood313 that the act will 
result in such harm’, not necessarily the actual ‘materialisation of harm’314, 
and it is not the ‘quantum of harm caused the enemy’ which determines 
whether it reaches the necessary threshold of harm criterion315.  
 Already at the second round of ICRC expert meetings, which was 
convened to draft the Interpretive Guide, the issue of VHSs found its way into 
the discussions316. Moreover, ‘whether an act of “human shielding” qualifies 
as direct participation in hostilities depends on exactly the same criteria as 
would apply to any other activity’317. This three-pronged test provides the 
                                                                                                                                      
307 Idem at 47. 
308 The degree of harm includes ‘not only the infliction of death, injury, or destruction on 
military personnel and objects, but essentially any consequence adversely affecting the 
military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict’ (Ibid). 
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310 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
311 Ibid. 
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Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 882. 
313 In other words ‘harm which may reasonably be expected to result from an act in the 
prevailing circumstances’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 47). As was discussed at the expert 
discussions, ‘wherever a civilian had a subjective “intent” to cause harm that was objectively 
identifiable, there would also be an objective “likelihood” that he or she would cause such 
harm’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ 
at 724). 
314 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 33. Schmitt concedes that this is a sensible requirement, 
since it would be ‘absurd to suggest that a civilian shooting at a combatant, but missing, 
would not be directly participating because no harm resulted’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 724) 
315 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
716. 
316 ICRC ‘Summary Report: Second Expert Meeting on Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 23; Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct 
Participation in Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 
321. 
317 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 869. 
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‘means of determining when their actions result in the loss318 of their 
otherwise-protected civilian immunity’319. 
 For the purposes of exploring the role played by VHSs in armed 
conflicts, I will restrict my focus to the ‘military harm’ aspect of the threshold 
test, since it seems unlikely that VHSs will be engaging in acts (attacks320) 
which result in the ‘death, injury or destruction’321 of a protected person or 
object. While it is unlikely that VHSs will be inflicting ‘death, injury, or 
destruction on military personnel and objects322’, it is entirely possible that 
their presence at a site will have an adverse consequence ‘affecting the 
military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict’323. Several 
activities which are generally accepted as satisfying the threshold of harm 
requirement324 might be imputed to the shielding actions of VHSs. For 
example, causing ‘functional damage to military objects, operations or 
capacity’325; sabotaging military capacity and operations; restricting or 
disturbing military ‘deployments, logistics and communications’326; exercising 
any form of control or denying the military use of ‘military objects and territory 
to the detriment of the adversary’327; and engaging in ‘sabotage or other 
unarmed activities [which], …restrict or disturb logistics or communications of 
the opposition in a conflict328. In fact, the Interpretive Guide goes so far as to 
state that ‘where civilians voluntarily and deliberately position themselves to 
create a physical obstacle to military operations of a party to the conflict, they 
could directly cause the threshold of harm required for a qualification as direct 
participation in hostilities’329. That said, the ICRC also concede that 
‘depending on the circumstances, it may also be questionable whether 
voluntary human shielding reaches the required qualitative threshold of 
                                                
318 Since the ‘loss is temporary’ Melzer suggests that it is ‘better described as a “suspension” 
of protection’ (Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 347). 
319 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
704. 
320 The Interpretive Guide relies on AP I article 49’s definition of ‘attack’, which ‘does not 
specify the target, but the belligerent nexus of an attack, so that even acts of violence 
directed specifically against civilians or civilian objects may amount to direct participation in 
hostilities’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent 
Elements’ at 723). Legal precedence for this position can be found in the jurisprudence 
emerging from the ICTY, where it was concluded that ‘sniping attacks against civilians and 
bombardment of civilian villages or urban residential areas’ constitutes an ‘attack’ in the IHL 
sense (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ 
at 723). 
321 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
322 Schmitt argues that ‘it only applies to objects which “contribute militarily” and not to civilian 
objects’, even if they may sometimes contribute to one belligerent’s success in the conflict 
(Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 717). 
323 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
324 Most of these examples proved uncontroversial (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 715). 
325 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 47-48. 
326 Idem at 48. 
327 For example: ‘denying the adversary the military use of certain objects, equipment and 
territory’ (Ibid). 
328 Ibid. 
329 Idem at 56. 
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harm’330, since they (VHSs) ‘rarely pose a direct physical risk to combatants, 
and seldom physically obstruct their operations’331. 
  The second requirement of the three criteria for a finding of ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’, is termed the ‘direct causation’ test, and its 
purpose is to ensure ‘a relatively close relationship between the act in 
question and the consequences affecting the ongoing hostilities’332, in order 
for it to amount to direct participation in hostilities333. According to the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide, ‘direct causation should be understood as meaning that 
the harm in question must be brought about in one causal step’334. Clearly 
excluded are activities that only indirectly cause harm, and mere temporal or 
geographic proximity cannot on their own, without direct causation, amount to 
a finding of direct participation in hostilities335. As far as activities that satisfy 
the direct causation requirement and the case of VHSs go, while ‘a 
coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such harm’336 and 
‘engaging in sabotage of military installations’337 would satisfy the direct 
causation test, it is generally felt that ‘voluntary human shielding’338 does not 
meet the direct causation test.  
This conclusion is not uncontroversial. Other IHL experts argued that 
where (as in the case of VHSs) the ‘subjective intent’ to hamper military 
operations was discernable, their ‘conduct constitutes direct participation in 
hostilities’339. However, this interpretation was rejected for fear that it might 
‘lead to VHSs easily being placed on the same footing as people taking direct 
part in hostilities’, which would mean, as some experts have pointed out, that 
they could be attacked ‘during their preparation, namely when moving 
towards the military objective to be shielded by their presence’340. Schmitt 
was also critical of the guide’s interpretation of direct causation necessarily 
being linked to a physical act causing harm, when in modern warfare ‘acts 
                                                
330 Idem at 57. 
331 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 317-318.  
332 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
725. 
333 Ibid. 
334 The act must not only be causally linked to the harm, but it must also cause the harm 
directly. For example ‘the assembly and storing of an improvised explosive device (IED) in a 
workshop, or the purchase or smuggling of its components, may be connected with the 
resulting harm through an uninterrupted causal chain of events, but, unlike the planting and 
detonation of that device, do not cause that harm directly’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 54 and 
55). In short, where an ‘individual’s conduct … merely builds up or maintains the capacity of 
a party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, is excluded 
from the concept of direct participation in hostilities’ (Idem at 53). 
335 Ibid. 
336 Idem at 55. 
337 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
338 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865 
339 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 324. 
340 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 895. ICRC ‘Summary Report: Second Expert 
Meeting on Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 6 
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that directly enhance the military capacity or operations of a party, without 
resulting in direct and immediate harm to the enemy’341 may have a marked 
effect on the belligerent’s capacity to win342. In this regard, the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide does caution that civilians must be careful not to disclose 
any tactical-targeting information which they might have gathered whilst 
shielding sites343. Van der Toorn opines that voluntary human shielding ‘is a 
ruse of war, solely designed to defend a locality from attack … (which) seeks 
to advance a party’s military aims to the detriment of the enemy’344. 
Consequently, he concludes that ‘if the attacking forces are able to determine 
that individuals are posing as human shields, they should be deemed to be 
participating in hostilities and may be targeted’345. When all is said and done, 
however, it is nevertheless true that VHSs ‘are in practice considered to pose 
a legal - rather than a physical346 - obstacle to military operations’, precisely 
because they ‘are recognised as protected against direct attack’. 
Furthermore, while ‘the presence of VHSs may eventually lead to the 
cancellation or suspension of an operation by the attacker, the causal relation 
between their conduct and the resulting harm remains indirect’347.  
The third and final requirement for an act to amount to direct 
participation in hostilities, is the requirement which is termed the belligerent 
nexus. In short, this leg of the test requires that ‘an act must be specifically 
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party 
to the conflict and to the detriment of another’348. So, for example, if civilians 
are found causing ‘harm in individual self-defence or defence of others … 
[this] lacks the belligerent nexus required for a qualification as direct 
participation’349, and must be dealt with by means of the regular law-
enforcement mechanisms350. Moreover , as Lyall correctly points out, VHSs 
‘who unambiguously do not support any party to a conflict, but act out of 
opposition to the conflict per se, arguably have a strong case for retaining full 
                                                
341 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
736. 
342 Idem at 725. 
343 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 49. 
344 Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of the 
ICRC Guidance’ at 34. 
345 Idem at 35. 
346 Van der Toorn argues that ‘acting as a VHS in order to create a physical obstacle to the 
ground operations of the adversary would constitute direct participation’ (Idem at 15). 
347 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 57; Van der Toorn ‘“Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A 
Legal and Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 15. 
348 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’at 872. 
349 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 64. ‘For example, although the use of force by civilians to 
defend themselves against unlawful attack or looting, rape, and murder by marauding 
soldiers may cause the required threshold of harm, its purpose clearly is not to support a 
party to the conflict against another’ (Idem at 61). 
350 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 873. 
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immunity from direct attack’351 - for the simple reason that their actions lack a 
belligerent nexus. In short, none of the examples of activities352 which satisfy 
the belligerent nexus requirement, ring true for VHSs. That said, Schmitt is in 
favour of formulating the belligerent nexus test in the alternative, to read ‘in 
support of a party to the conflict or to the detriment of another’353. Further, 
Melzer argues that if ‘either element is missing’ (support for a party to the 
conflict and the intention to act to the detriment of another party), the 
‘violence in question becomes independent of the armed struggle taking 
place between the parties to a conflict’354.  
 Probably the most common criticism levelled at the Interpretive Guide, is 
that there are ‘deficiencies’ to be found in each of the elements (of the three-
pronged definition), and that these flaws are ‘typically faults of under-
inclusiveness’355. The Interpretive Guide’s alleged pro-humanitarian treatment 
of the concept of direct participation reflects, in Schmitt’s view, ‘ a troubling 
ignorance of the realities of 21st century battlefield combat’356.   
 In defence of the Interpretive Guide, Melzer maintains that the 
Interpretive Guide correctly excludes the actions of VHSs from the 
parameters of what constitutes direct participation in hostilities, because ‘the 
decisive question must be whether the presence of human shields directly 
adversely affects the enemy’s capability, and not merely his willingness, to 
attack and destroy the shielded objective’. That said, where VHSs ‘attempt to 
give physical cover to fighting personnel or to impede the movement of 
opposing forces, they would, most likely, be regarded as engaging in direct 
                                                
351 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 332. 
352 Activities which satisfy the threshold of harm requirement include: ‘acts of violence against 
human and material enemy forces’; causing ‘physical or functional damage to military 
objects, operations or capacity’; sabotage of military capacity and operations; restricting or 
disturbing military ‘deployments, logistics and communications’; exercising any form of 
control or denying the military use of ‘military personnel, objects and territory to the detriment 
of the adversary; ‘sabotage or other unarmed activities qualify, if they restrict or disturb 
logistics or communications of an opposing party to the conflict’; clearing mines placed by the 
opposition, ‘guarding captured military personnel to prevent them being forcibly liberated’; 
even electronic interference, exploitation or attacks of ‘military computer networks’; 
‘wiretapping the adversary’s high command or transmitting tactical targeting information for 
an attack’; ‘violent acts specifically directed against civilians or civilian objects, such as sniper 
attacks or the bombardment of civilian residential areas, satisfy this requirement’; ‘building 
defensive positions at a military base certain to be attacked’; and ‘repairing a battle-damaged 
runway at a forward airfield so it can be used to launch aircraft’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 47-
49; Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
715; Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 203; Melzer 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 859). 
353 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
736. 
354 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 873. 




participation in hostilities’357. ‘On the other hand, where VHSs ‘have 
voluntarily placed themselves around or on military objectives which might be 
subject to air or artillery attack, they would not be regarded as engaging in 
direct participation in hostilities’358. So, while for the most part VHSs will not 
be considered to be participating directly in hostilities, Melzer concedes that 
VHSs might be classified as direct participants where their presence 
‘impedes the visibility or accessibility of a legitimate target, but not where it 
poses an exclusively legal obstacle to an attack’359. For those who support 
this conclusion, ‘simply causing the attacker moral pause or creating a legal 
barrier (through operation of the proportionality principle or precautions in 
attack requirements) is insufficient’ to amount to direct participation in 
hostilities360. 
 
The ‘temporal scope of the loss of protection “for such time as” civilians take 
a direct part in hostilities’361 
 
Once an individual is classified as a civilian, their direct participation in the 
hostilities does not result in the loss of their primary civilian status362. The 
temporary ‘suspension of a civilian’s immunity from attack’363, is only afforded 
civilians who participate in hostilities on a ‘spontaneous, unorganised or 
sporadic basis’364, and only ‘”for such time” as they participate in 
hostilities’365. 
 Where no prior deployment is required, the loss of civilian immunity ‘will 
be restricted to the immediate execution of the act and preparatory measures 
forming an integral part of that act’366. However, where the specific act 
requires ‘prior geographic deployment’, that preparatory deployment ‘already 
constitutes an integral part of the act in question’ and results in the loss of 
civilian immunity367. Dinstein maintains that ‘since not much preparation is 
required for either “deployment” or “disengagement” of VHSs - they can only 
be attacked “for such time” as they are physically in or near the lawful 
target’368, and I would add for such time as they are actually directly 
participating in hostilities. As far as VHSs are concerned, were their actions to 
satisfy the three-pronged test for a particular hostile act which amounts to 
direct participation in hostilities, their loss of civilian immunity from attack 
would only persist for such time as they persisted in acts which amount to 
direct participation in hostilities. 
 
                                                
357 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 293. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 869. 
360 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 317.  
361 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 71. 
362 Idem at 70. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Idem at 71. 
365 Idem at 70. 
366 Idem at 68. 
367 Idem at 67. 
368 Dinstein ‘The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict’ at 154. 
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v. Conclusions regarding VHSs and direct participation in hostilities 
 
What we can glean from the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, as well as IHL treaty-
law commentaries and customary international law, is that it is impossible to 
conclude in ‘absolute terms that a VHS is, or is not taking a direct part in 
hostilities’369. As Bouchie ́de Belle correctly points out, ‘this can only be 
ascertained by an appraisal in concreto of the way in which the human shield 
indeed tries to protect the military objective in question’370. So, for example, to 
her mind ‘a small number of human shields standing near a military objective 
to protect it from an air strike do not constitute a real obstacle for the 
attacking party in the material sense of the word’371. For the most part, 
‘civilians acting as human shields, whether voluntary or not, contribute 
indirectly to the war capability of the State … because they are not directly 
engaged in hostilities against an adversary, they retain their civilian immunity 
from attack’372. 
 What we can conclude, however, is that although VHSs may give their 
attackers pause to consider the media impact of a decision to target a site 
shielded by civilians, it does not constitute direct participation on the part of 
VHSs373. Moreover, because of the fundamental importance of the principle 
of distinction, and ‘in order to avoid the erroneous or arbitrary targeting of 
civilians’, there is a presumption in favour of protective civilian status374 in all 
assessments as to whether an individual has directly participated in 
hostilities. In other words, ‘in case of doubt as to whether a specific civilian 
conduct qualifies as direct participation in hostilities, it must be presumed that 
the general rule of civilian protection applies and that this conduct does 
not’375 amount to direct participation in hostilties. Consequently, any 
interpretation which ‘increases the risks to the innocent, uninvolved 
civilian’376, must conflict with a reading of the ‘terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’377, and with the presumption 
of civilian status. In light of this, it is probably safe to conclude that in most 
instances the action of VHSs will not amount to direct participation in 
hostilities, and that consequently they retain ‘the full protection due to their 
civilian status’378. 
 
                                                
369 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 896. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Ibid.  
372 Haas 'Voluntary Human Shields: Status and Protection Under International Humanitarian 
Law' at 203. 
373 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 896. 
374 ‘In case of doubt, the person must be presumed to be protected against direct attack’ 
(ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law at 74 and 76). 
375 Idem at 75. 
376 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 886. 
377 Ibid.  
378 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 896. 
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7.8 The nature of the shielded sites (civilian objects, single-use military 
objects, and dual-use installations) 
 
i. Civilian and other protected sites 
 
It is uncontroversial that VHSs located at purely civilian sites379, or otherwise 
protected sites like schools, churches and hospitals, could never constitute a 
direct, immediate military threat to the belligerent party. This is endorsed by 
AP I articles 51 (1) and (2)380. Moreover, AP I article 52(3) establishes a 
presumption ‘in cases of doubt whether an object is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or another dwelling or 
a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it 
shall be presumed not to be so used’381. Consequently, VHSs at civilian sites 
will never constitute a legitimate military target, and will retain their essentially 
civilian status, together with its attendant immunity from attack - because they 
do not participate directly in hostilities. In practice, many VHSs position 
themselves around these specific sites, precisely because they did ‘not trust 
the opposing party to refrain from attacking these civilian targets, so they 
lived in them during the conduct of hostilities in an attempt to dissuade 
attacks’382. 
 
ii. Military objectives  
 
While VHSs positioned at civilian sites might be safe, the same will not be 
true of VHSs who position themselves at purely military objectives, like an 
armoury or military command centre. Moreover, it is entirely possible for 
belligerents to occupy an otherwise civilian structure and use it for military 
purposes, which will have the effect of rendering the site a military objective, 
for so long as their occupation and use continues383. Some jurists would take 
the uncompromising position that ‘VHSs who, through their presence at a 
legitimate military target, aid the war effort and can be said to be participating 
directly in hostilities … [which] effectively revokes their civilian protected 
status and exempts military commanders from considering his welfare further 
when calculating the collateral damage likely to result from an attack’384. On 
                                                
379 AP I article 52(1) states that ‘civilian objects are all objects which are not military 
objectives as defined in paragraph 2’. Paragraph 2 then goes on to define military objectives 
as ‘objects which make a contribution to military action’. 
380 AP I article 51: 
1. ‘The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the 
following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international law, 
shall be observed in all circumstances’. 
2. ‘The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object 
of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population are prohibited’. 
381 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 98. 
382 Parrish ‘The International Legal Status of Voluntary Human Shields’ at 13. 
383 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 98. 
384 Ibid. Dunlap comes to the same conclusion when writing about Serb citizens acting as 
VHSs on bridges in Belgrade during the Balkan war. ‘In attempting to defend an otherwise 
legitimate target from attack - albeit by creating a psychological conundrum for NATO - the 
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the other hand, others maintain that even when VHSs are located at purely 
military objectives, commanding officers are still obliged to factor their 
presence into their calculations of collateral damage385. The latter view is 
reminiscent of the approach taken towards workers in munitions factories, 
and in fact the situation of the VHSs has often been likened to such 
workers386, who 'contribute indirectly to the war capability of a State'387. While 
workers in munitions factories may not be targeted personally - because they 
retained their civilian immunity from attack - the military objectives where they 
work remain open to attack. This of course remains ‘subject to the attacking 
party’s obligations under IHL to assess the potential harm to civilians against 
the direct and concrete military advantage of any given attack, and to refrain 
from attack if civilian harm would appear excessive’388. Practice seems to 
suggest that war planners adhered to this latter view, rather then taking the 
hardline approach that VHSs not be afforded any consideration when making 
targeting decisions. In fact, commanding officers considered themselves 
under a duty to ‘apply basic targeting principles to ensure a minimal loss of 
civilian life’ when faced with VHSs in Iraq389. However, the fact remains that 
even at purely military sites, VHSs will still be civilians, albeit participating in 
hostilities, and thereby undermining their protected status. 
 
iii. Dual-use installations 
 
I suspect the greatest area for confusion regarding the targeting of VHSs, lies 
at neither civilian sites or purely military objectives, but rather concerns 
instances when VHSs position themselves at dual-use390 installations. VHSs 
                                                                                                                                      
bridge occupiers lost their noncombatant immunity. In essence, they made themselves part 
of the bridges’ defense system. As such, they were subject to attack to the same degree as 
any other combatant so long as they remained on the spans.’ (Charles J Dunlap Law and 
Military Interventions: Preserving humanitarian values in 21s Century conflicts (29 November 
2001) Prepared for the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference (Carr 
Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government: Harvard University) 
available at http://www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf. (accessed 27 May 2012)). 
385 Human Rights Watch ‘International Humanitarian Law Issues in a Potential War with Iraq’ 
(20 February 2003) available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm. 
(accessed 27 May 2012). 
386 Stefan Oeter (1995) ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook 
of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 163; Bouchié de 
Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields in 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 897; Human Rights Watch ‘International Humanitarian 
Law Issues in a Potential War in Iraq’. Dinstein for one ‘does not appear to share this opinion: 
‘these civilians enjoy no immunity while at work’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under 
the Law of International Armed Conflict at 124-5). 
387 Human Rights Watch ‘International Humanitarian Law Issues in a Potential War in Iraq’. 
388 Ibid.  
389 Daniel Schoenekase ‘Targeting Decisions Regarding Human Shields’ (2004) September-
October Military Review at 29. 
390 A prime example of the targeting of dual-use sites was illustrated in Operation Desert 
Storm, when the Iraqi electrical-power facilities were hit:  ‘while crippling Iraq’s military 
command and control capability, destruction of these facilities shut down water-purification 
and sewage-treatment plants. As a result, epidemics of gastroenteritis, cholera, and typhoid 
broke out, leading to perhaps as many as 100,000 civilian deaths, and a doubling of the 
infant mortality rate’ (Kenneth Rizer ‘Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal 
Perspectives’ (1 May 2001) Air & Space Power Chronicles available at 
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Rizer.html. (accessed 27 May 2012)). 
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located at communications networks, power sources, oil refineries, 
transportation infrastructure and the like - which serve both the civilian 
population and the armed forces - pose the real problem cases. It seems 
intuitively right that VHSs located at dual-use sites, be afforded greater 
protection then those located at single-use military installations. Article 52 of 
AP I states that, ‘in case of doubt whether an object which is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house, or other 
dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to 
military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.’ There is a clear 
presumption in favour of protected status for sites, which may be used for 
military gain. I would argue that this presumption would transfer to VHSs as 
well, assuming them not to be participating directly in hostilities, until such 
time as the status of the installation can be deemed to be definitely military in 
nature.  
In conclusion, it would appear that VHSs at any location retain their 
civilian status. That said, if their actions amount to direct participation in 
hostilities, they would lose their civilian immunity from attack for so long as 
they continue to participate in hostilities. VHSs at single-use military sites are 
exposed to greater risk of collateral damage then those positioned at purely 
civilian sites. The risk to VHSs located at dual-use sites will be somewhere 
inbetween - given that the presumption in favour of protected status for dual-
use sites affords the site civilian object status, until such time as the status of 
the installation can be deemed to be definitely military in nature. VHSs, 
provided they refrain from direct participation in hostilities, are not themselves 
legitimate military targets, and there is no legitimate military advantage to be 
gained by targeting VHSs in their personal capacity, independently of the site 
which they shield391. That said, the reality remains that their mere presence at 
a legitimate military target, has increased their vulnerability to attack.  
 
7.9 Targeting decisions regarding VHSs  
 
Any targeting decision in the theatre of armed conflict, has to take into the 
consideration the IHL principles of military necessity, distinction, humanity 
and proportionality. The principle of military necessity would demand that 
attacks are only directed at legitimate military targets392. AP I article 52(2) 
                                                
391 Fenrick ‘ICRC Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 293. 
392 ‘Legitimate military targets include: armed forces and persons who take part in the 
fighting; positions or installations occupied by armed forces as well as objectives that are 
directly contested in battle; military installations such as barracks, war ministries, munitions 
or fuel dumps, storage yards for vehicles, airfields, rocket launch ramps, and naval bases. 
Legitimate infrastructure targets include: lines and means of communication, command, and 
control - railway lines, roads, bridges, tunnels, and canals - that are of fundamental military 
importance. Legitimate communications targets include: broadcasting and television stations, 
and telephone and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance. Legitimate 
military-industrial targets include: factories producing arms, transport, and communications 
equipment for the military; metallurgical, engineering and chemicals industries whose nature 
or purpose is essentially military; and the storage and transport installations serving such 
industries. Legitimate military research targets include: experimental research centres for the 
development of weapons and war matériel. Legitimate energy targets include: installations 
providing energy mainly for national defence, such as coal and other fuels, and plants 
producing gas or electricity mainly for military consumption. Attacks on nuclear power 
stations and hydroelectric dams are generally, but not always, prohibited by the laws of war.’ 
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defines legitimate military targets as ‘those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’. The 
principle of distinction, as codified in AP I articles 51 (4) and (5)393, demands 
that commanding officers distinguish between civilians and combatants, and 
then direct their attacks only at specific military targets. Any attack which may 
have an incidental effect on civilians, must satisfy the further criterion of 
proportionality. The principle of proportionality, spelt out in AP I articles 
57(2)(a)(iii) and (b)394, requires commanding officers to weigh up the ‘direct 
military advantage’ they anticipate from an attack, against the incidental injury 
or damage caused to civilians. Where the loss caused to civilians would be 
‘excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’, AP I directs that the attack should be halted (even if the attack 
has already been initiated). Lastly, the principle of humanity demands that the 
‘means and methods of warfare’395 used are calculated to cause the minimum 
unnecessary suffering and to ‘minimise civilian losses’396. The interconnected 
nature of these four principles, is evident in the justifications demanded of 
commanding officers who face criminal prosecution for war crimes for their 
targeting decision. Commanding officers must show not only that the attack 
‘tended toward the military defeat of the enemy’, but also that the attack could 
be carried out without causing ‘harm to civilians or civilian objects that is 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ 
(the principles of distinction and proportionality) and without violating ‘other 
rules of IHL’ (the principle of humanity)397.  
 I turn now to explore the issue of what effect VHSs have on targeting 
decisions in the theatre of armed conflict. I begin from the starting point that 
‘civilians shielding a military objective exclusively with their own legal 
entitlement to protection against direct attack do not thereby render attacks 
                                                                                                                                      
(David Rieff ‘Legitimate Military Targets’ (1999) Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know 
available at http://www.crimesofwar.org. (accessed 27 May 2012). 
393 AP I article 51: 
 ‘4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat, which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single 
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located 
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or 
civilian objects; and 
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. 
394 A similar formulation of this rule, as it pertains to the protection of the civilian population, 
can be found in AP I article 51(5)(b). 
395 AP I article 57. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Rieff ‘Military Necessity’. 
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against the military objective illegal under IHL’398. Their presence does, 
however, impact on the considerations which inform a decision to attack a 
target. 
 
VHSs who are found to be ‘directly participating in hostilities’  
 
As is the case with any civilian, a VHS who is determined to be participating 
directly in hostilities, will lose their protection against the effects of hostilities, 
and can in fact be legitimately targeted (without concerns for issues of 
proportionality399). In short, this effectively relieves the ‘attacking 
commanders of the obligation to apply the principle of distinction’400, for so 
long as they continue to play and active role in the hostilities. Accordingly, 
‘voluntary shields ... are excluded in the estimation of incidental injury when 
assessing proportionality’401. That said, harming VHSs, ‘even if the result is 
death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no other less harmful 
means’ of achieving the military objective402. VHSs, like any civilians who 
take an active part in hostilities, open themselves to direct targeting from the 
opposition acting in self-defence, while they continue to actively participate in 
hostilities403. Having said that, VHSs may be found to be participating in 
hostilities by their shielding activities. As Schmitt points out: 
 
‘their military contribution only emerges at the point that they are 
shielding the military objective; thus, they enjoy no military significance 
distinct from the objective itself. This being so, there is no military 
necessity for attacking them when they are not engaged in shielding. 
Furthermore, even when they are shielding a target, there is no military 
rationale for attacking them directly instead of, or in addition to, the 
actual military objective. It is the target that they shield which can be 
targeted’404. 
 
Schmitt’s argument is endorsed by the ICRC, who also have concluded that 
‘the fact that some civilians voluntarily and deliberately abuse their legal 
entitlement to protection against direct attack in order to shield military 
objectives does not, without more, entail the loss of their protection and their 
                                                
398 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 346; Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian 
Population’ at 247. 
399 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constituent Elements’ at 
703; Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors 
or Civilian Employees’ at 541. 
400 Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel at 60. 
401 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 901. 
402 Public Committee against Torture in Israel ('PCATI') v Government of Israel at 60.  
403 AP I article 51(8). 
404 Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees’ at 522. On this point, Schmitt correctly argues that ‘children who act as 
voluntary shields would be an exception to this rule, for as a general matter of law they lack 
the mental capacity to form the intent necessary to voluntarily shield military objectives’ ( 
Schmitt ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees’ at 522).Without the necessary voluntary intent, children must be treated 
as one would treat an individual compelled to act as human shield: retaining their protected 
civilian status and demanding a proportionality analysis.  
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liability to direct attack independently of the shielded objective’405. Others like 
Al-Duaij argue that ‘those who shield legal targets automatically lose 
immunity and turn into targeted personnel because they are considered direct 
participants in the hostilities’406.  
 
VHSs deemed not to be participating directly in hostilities 
 
There is only one way that a civilian can ‘forfeit their protected status’, and 
that is by ‘direct participation in hostilities’407. Until civilians compromise their 
immunity from attack through their direct participation in hostilities, AP I 
articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) place the onus on attacking commanders to 
determine whether or not 'incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof' would be 'excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated'.' That said, 
it is a simple reality of war that one’s presence (even as a civilian with full 
immunity) near military objectives will expose one to increased risk of 
‘suffering incidental death or injury during attacks against those objectives’408, 
and the VHS is no exception. Melzer argues that ‘as long as these VHSs do 
not actually defend military objectives or attempt to physically hamper military 
operations … they do not lose immunity from direct attack’409. However, as 
Haas correctly points out, ‘they may lose de facto protection by staying too 
close to a military target … like journalists embedded in military units’410. 
Consequently, working from the position that VHSs were to be categorised as 
civilians, and were not found to be participating directly in hostilities, then 
harm to a VHS would only be condoned where a ‘concrete and direct military 
advantage’411 would result from an attack, and the harm caused to the VHS is 
an ‘unavoidable and proportionate side effect of a lawful attack upon a 
military objective’412. As civilians, albeit inconveniencing the opposition, VHSs 
‘retain their immunity from direct attack and may not be entirely discounted in 
applying the proportionality principle’413. Moreover, as Schmitt concedes 
‘there is no difference in evaluating excessiveness as between voluntary 
shields and incidentally present civilians’414. In fact, evidence from the Iraq 
and Serbian theatres of conflict endorse the conclusion that ‘operational 
decision-makers factored VHSs into proportionality evaluations in both Serbia 
and Iraq’415, as did their presence feature as a ‘key factor in CENTCOM's 
                                                
405 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 57. 
406 Nada Al-Duaij ‘The Volunteer Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 126. 
407 Schmitt ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’ at 299.  
408 The Interpretive Guide ‘accepted that such civilians would be incurring an increased risk 
of incidental death or injury because of their voluntary presence near military objectives’ 
(ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 57). 
409 Melzer Targeted Killings in International Law at 346. 
410 Haas ‘'Voluntary Human Shields: Status and Protection Under International Humanitarian 
Law' at 210. 
411 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 214. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 902. 
414 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 325.  
415 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
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targeting process’416.  
 That said, some academics like Dinstein, maintain that VHSs ‘ought to 
be excluded in the estimation of incidental injury when assessing 
proportionality’, since he claims ‘it is impossible to hold the attacking force 
liable for the fact that civilians have deliberately decided to put their lives at 
risk’417. Others don’t push the case so far, and instead argue for a discounted 
application of the proportionality calculation (i.e. one that is easier to satisfy) 
in instances where human shields are in play. VHSs are after all a 
fundamentally different category of civilian than those envisaged in the IHL 
conventions. They are clearly not wholly innocent civilians going about their 
daily routine, caught in the crossfire. They have, after all, deliberately chosen 
to place themselves in the line of fire, in an attempt to have an impact on the 
outcome of hostilities in a manner which is 'deliberately imprudent'418. 
Dinstein argues that this discounting of civilian harm is even applicable where 
belligerents have intentionally made use of human shields - in other words 
where the shielding is not wholly voluntary. He says, rather pragmatically, 
that ‘the appraisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that … 
civilian casualties will be higher than usual’419. Dinstein maintains that this 
relaxation of the proportionality analysis is actually borne out in practice: in 
the words of Doswald-Beck ‘the Israeli bombardment of Beirut … resulted in 
high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so, given the fact that 
military targets were placed amongst the civilian population’420.  
 However, if we are to accept the notion that VHSs are entitled to a 
lesser degree of protection against attack, then we place an added burden on 
military commanders to ‘discern whether the individuals had the requisite 
intent to act as a shield’421, and secondly ‘whether they are acting 
voluntarily’422, while all the time remembering that ‘should doubt arise as to 
whether shielding is taking place, the norm would mandate a presumption in 
favor of non-shielding'423. This seems to be a burdensome obligation, to 
expect a military commander to be able to satisfy in the heat of hostilities. 
Before imposing these extra demands, we need to be sure that they are an 
accurate reflection of IHL, and I am not sure that this is in fact the case. 
                                                                                                                                      
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 329; Kathleen Knox 'Iraq: "Human Shields" 
Hunker Down In Baghdad' (28 February 2003) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Czech 
Republic) available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1102379.html (accessed 27 May 
2012). 
416 Jefferson D Reynolds ‘Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation 
of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a moral High Ground’ (2005) Air Force Law 
Review 1 at 54. 
417 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 153. 
418 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 902 
419 Idem at 897.  
420 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 155; 
Louise Doswald-Beck ‘The Civilian in the Crossfire’ (1987) 24 Journal of Peace Review 251 
at 257. 
421 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 335. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Idem at 334. 
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Those opposed to any discounted application of the proportionality test 
- like the ICRC424 - point to GC IV article 8, which states ‘protected persons 
may never renounce ... the rights secured to them by that Convention’, 
suggesting a degree of ‘alienability of rights’ in IHL425. Mostly, they argue that 
‘although a distinction based on willingness could have some relevance in a 
criminal case, it has no place in the conduct of hostilities as it cannot be 
applied on the ground’426. For those rejecting a discounted proportionality 
calculation, there is only one ‘basis for excluding civilians from a 
proportionality analysis’, and that is by actions which amount to ‘direct 
participation’ in hostilities427. For so long as their actions do not amount to 
direct participation in hostilities, VHSs enjoy full immunity from attack, and the 
full benefit of the proportionality calculation. In the words of Schmitt ‘if all 
shields deserve full civilian treatment … everyone counts and counts 
equally’428. Melzer maintains that in ‘the proportionality assessment, the 
relevant standard of excessiveness’ is flexible enough to take account of the 
fact that these civilians exposed themselves voluntarily to the risk of 
incidental injury or death’429. Oeter also notes that it is not clear in IHL 
whether ‘collateral damage to civilians working in military objectives … is of 
lesser weight in striking a balance with the military advantage that potential 
damage to “innocent” civilians’ might achieve430. What this means, is that ‘by 
operation of the rule of proportionality, a sufficient number of VHSs at a 
military objective, if not treated as direct participants, could absolutely 
immunise the target as a matter of law because their death or injury would be 
excessive in relation to the military advantage likely to result from the 
attack’431.  
 Even when the proportionality requirements are fulfilled, belligerents are 
still obliged to observe the IHL precautions432 in attack, and to ensure that 
losses to VHSs are kept to a minimum, and that VHSs are moved from the 
vicinity of the military objective433. Consequently, an attacker is expected to 
minimise the harm they cause ‘by employing alternative means or methods of 
warfare434. 
                                                
424 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 57. 
425 Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 902. 
426 Idem at 903. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 334. 
429 Melzer Targeted Killing in International Law at 346. 
430 Oeter ‘Methods and Means of Conflict’ at 187. 
431 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 
732. 
432 Parties to a conflict are obliged to do 'everything feasible' to: 'verify that the objectives to 
be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects'; 'remove the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military 
objectives'; 'avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas'; 'take 
the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations'; and 
'avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects' (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at 51). 
433 AP I articles 57 and 58(a). 




7.10 IHL obligations upon the captors of VHS: prosecution and 
detention  
 
As IHL stands at the moment, VHSs will not enjoy primary combatant status 
and the consequent privilege of secondary POW status, because they are not 
members of the armed forces. Consequently, according to the IHL 
presumption of civilian status, VHSs will be categorised as civilians. It is 
worth noting that ‘at the first ICRC meeting, however, some participants 
argued that civilians directly participating in hostilities 'constituted a de facto 
"intermediate" category' unprotected by either GC III or GC IV’435. This 
conclusion is not supported by IHL, which has always maintained that every 
individual in the theatre of war possesses a recognised primary status as 
either a combatant or a civilian436. There is no middle ground between these 
two statuses: if a detained combatant were denied POW status, they would 
automatically ‘become protected persons under GC IV’437. As Dinstein writes 
‘you are either a combatant or a civilian, you cannot be both’438, and I would 
add that you cannot be neither. Assuming that VHSs are civilians, and are 
aliens in the territory of conflict, they fall within a narrower category of 
protected persons, and benefit from more ‘detailed rules regarding their 
treatment in the hands of the enemy’439. Alien civilians - a rather common 
occurrence when considering VHSs - enjoy diplomatic protection because of 
diplomatic relations between their nation State and the State on whose 
territory they find themselves440. Over and above that, IHL protects aliens 
against military operations, by virtue of their civilian status, and they remain 
protected by GC IV articles 13-26 and enjoy the additional rights as set out in 
GC IV article 38441. 
                                                
435 ICRC ‘First Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2 June 
2003) The Hague available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2003-03-report-dph-
2003-icrc.pdf (accessed 27 May 2012) at 8. 
436 Ipsen ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 65. 
437 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 235. ‘If an 
individual is not entitled to the protections GC III as a POW (or of GC I or II) he or she 
necessarily falls within the ambit of GC IV, provided that its article 4 requirements are 
satisfied’ (Garth Abraham ‘“Essential Liberty” versus “Temporary Safety”: The Guantanamo 
Bay Internees and Combatant Status’ (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 829 at 847). 
438 Solis The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War at 233; 
Prosecutor v Delalic et al (Celebici case) at para 271. 
439 Lindsey Cameron ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military 
Companies’ (February 2007) Plenary Lecture given at Conference on Non-State Actors as 
Standard Setters: The Erosion of the Public-Private Divide available at 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Cameron.pdf (accessed 27 
May 2012) at 5. 
440 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 281. 
441 ‘With the exception of special measures authorised by the present convention, in 
particular by articles 27 and 41 thereof, the situation of protected persons shall continue to 
be regulated, in principle, by the provisions concerning aliens in time of peace. In any case, 
the following rights shall be granted to them:  
‘1. They shall be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent 
 to them.  
2.  They shall, if their state of health so requires, receive medical attention and 
 hospital treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.  
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While they might enjoy rights under IHL, VHSs are also obliged to 
respect IHL. Therefore, VHSs who are found to be playing more then a 
shielding role, and actively participating in hostilities, will retain their civilian 
status, although they are exposed to potential prosecution upon capture442. 
Since VHSs are not classified as combatants, once captured, they ‘will not be 
considered POWs443 and therefore would not enjoy immunity from legal 
proceedings under domestic law for acts committed during hostilities’444. This 
was the fate of ‘US citizens who acted as VHSs in Iraq in 2003’445; there was 
even serious consideration ‘given to the question of whether they might be 
charged with treason’446 under the domestic laws of some States. If tried for 
these activities, VHSs must be afforded a ‘regularly constituted court 
respecting the generally recognised principles of regular judicial 
procedure’447, extended to those who are captured during armed conflict, 
whether or not they enjoy secondary POW status. This right is afforded even 
the unlawful combatant and the spy, and there is no reason why it should be 
denied the VHS448 While they may face domestic prosecution, they will not 
likely face prosecution before the ICC for their actions, because voluntary 
human shielding (or to put it another way ‘misusing their status as a civilian’) 
is not in itself a war crime in terms of article 8(2)(b)(xxiii)449 of the Rome 
Statute.  
 Whether they are prosecuted or not, there are a variety of obligations 
which rest upon captors when they have civilians in detention. The detaining 
power is obliged to report the identity of captured civilians to their State of 
                                                                                                                                      
3.  They shall be allowed to practise their religion and to receive spiritual assistance 
 from ministers of their faith.  
4.  If they reside in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall be 
 authorised to move from that area to the same extent as the nationals of the State 
 concerned.  
5.  Children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children under 
 seven years shall benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the 
 nationals of the State concerned.’ 
442 In terms of GC IV article 38, aliens accused of violations of the laws of war, or engaging in 
hostilities without the authorisation, can be criminally prosecuted, provided that all the 
international human rights conventions applicable to the prosecuting state are observed in 
respect of the proceedings brought against them (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 12). 
443 Although Parrish has argued that ‘captured, authorised, VHSs should be treated as 
POWs’ (Parrish ‘The International Legal Status of Voluntary Human Shields’ at 14). 
444 AP I article 43(2). 
445 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 324; Alfred J Sciarrino and Kenneth L Deutsch, 
'Conscientious Objection to War: Heroes to Human Shields' (2003-04) 18 Brigham Young 
University Journal of Public Law at 59. 
446 Teninbaum 'American Volunteer Human Shields in Iraq: Free Speech or Treason?' at 139; 
Sciarrino and Deutsch 'Conscientious Objection to War: Heroes to Human Shields' at 105. 
447 AP I article 75(4). 
448 GC IV article 5(3) and AP I article 75, Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211. 
449 The ‘Elements of Crimes’ which flesh out the specific legal requirements for the crimes 
falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC, require the perpetrator of the crime of human 
shielding to have ‘moved or taken advantage of the presence of protected persons to shield a 
military objective’, which does not occur in the case of VHSs (ICC ‘Elements of Crimes’ 
(2000) U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 available at http://www.icc-cpi.in (accessed 27 May 
2012). 
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origin within two weeks450. Civilians451 may only be interned in exceptional 
cases, where it is necessary for reasons of security452 or as a penalty 
imposed on civilians453. Moreover, ‘decisions regarding such internment shall 
be made according to regular procedure and subject to regular review’454, 
and the treatment of internees is regulated by GC IV article 79-135455, which 
in essence corresponds to the treatment of POWs. Whatever the final 
analysis might reveal, however, IHL demands that VHSs who are captured 
are to be treated humanely in accordance with basic fundamental guarantees 
of humane treatment enshrined in AP I article 75456, GC IV article 27 and 
common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions457.  
 
7.11 Conclusion  
 
The fast pace at which the theatre of war is changing, is placing greater 
demands on commanding officers to make targeting decisions in instances 
where IHL is unable to provide a clear directive. The recent emergence of the 
VHS as a new actor in international armed conflicts, has highlighted another 
lacunae in the laws of war458, which to date have only considered the plight of 
the involuntary human shield. 
 A cursory investigation into the IHL status of VHSs, reveals that they do 
not fulfill even the most basic requirements459 which IHL demands of 
combatants, and consequently will not enjoy primary combatant status, and 
therefore cannot be classified even with the non-combatant members of the 
armed forces. The current body of IHL (expressed in ‘opinion, limited judicial 
consideration and even more limited State practice’) does little but presume 
that VHS retain their civilian status, until a competent tribunal dictates 
otherwise460. As Lyall correctly points out, ‘under the current definitions, 
                                                
450 GC IV article 136(2). 
451 In the case of a combatant who falls into enemy hands, the enemy can detain him for the 
duration of the conflict, without the need for any reason other than his combatant status. 
(Bouchié de Belle ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields 
in International Humanitarian Law’ at 891). 
452 GC IV articles 41-43 and 78(1), provided the security concerns cannot be addressed by 
less severe measures; Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 288; Bouchié de Belle 
‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-shirts: Human Shields in International 
Humanitarian Law’ at 891. 
453 GC IV article 68. 
454 GC IV articles 43 and 78(2). 
455 For a comprehensive discussion of these duties, see Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian 
Population’ at 288-292. 
456 In essence, these provisions protect those in detention from ‘torture, corporal punishment, 
[and] outrages upon personal dignity’ (Ibid). 
457 ICRC 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts' (26 to 30 November 2007) Official working document of the 30th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/ihl-30-international-conference-
101207.htm (accessed 27 May 2012) at 727. 
458 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 338. 
459 They are not members of the armed forces, subject to a command structure responsible 
for internal discipline; they do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population by way 
of a uniform or emblem; they do not carry their weapons openly; and they cannot be 
classifies as a levée en masse. 
460 Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in Hostilities and the International 
Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ at 332. 
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VHSs cannot be said to make the transition from civilian to combatant’461. 
While affording then civilian status goes someway to assisting military 
commanders in their targeting decision, the real crux of the debate revolves 
around whether it can be said that VHSs are participating directly in 
hostilities. This notion of direct participation is informed largely by the sites 
which the VHS are found shielding. VHSs at civilian locations cannot be said 
to be participating directly in hostilities, since the site they are shielding can 
never amount to a military objective. The presumption in favour of protected 
status for dual-use sites, should afford VHSs - located at such sites - 
immunity against a legitimate attack, until the status of the installation can be 
deemed to be definitely military in nature. VHSs located at single-use military 
objectives are exposing themselves to the greatest risk of harm, as a result of 
collateral damage. Even if it is ascertained that VHSs have participated 
directly in hostilities by, for example, impeding ‘the visibility or accessibility of 
a legitimate target, then they do not lose their civilian status but compromise 
their civilian immunity against attack for so long as they persist in 
participating, but not where it poses an exclusively legal obstacle to an 
attack’462. It is not considered direct participation in hostilities when VHSs 
‘simply causing the attacker moral pause or creating a legal barrier (through 
operation of the proportionality principle or precautions in attack 
requirements)’463. All three prongs of the test for direct participation in 
hostilities (proposed by the ICRC) must be satisfied, before these civilian 
VHSs forfeit their civilian immunity. 
Should VHSs fall into enemy hands, they will still be entitled to 
humane treatment and the basic fair judicial guarantees extended to 
civilians464. Where VHSs are found to have been participating directly in 
hostilities without authorisation, they might be held to account for their 
unauthorised actions. However, quite what offences they might be 
prosecuted for remains questionable - they are after all unarmed, playing a 
largely passive role and probably seeking more media attention than 
intentionally engaging with the armed forces. Commanding officers who give 
orders to attack sites shielded by VHSs will, nevertheless, still be called upon 
to justify their actions in accordance with the targeting principles of military 
necessity, discrimination/distinction, humanity and proportionality. Despite the 
hard-line approach suggested by Schmitt and others, the practice of 
commanding officers faced with VHSs in their cross-hairs, suggests that 
VHSs do enjoy a form of protected status in the theatre of war. Just how far 
commanding officers will be required to go in justifying such attacks, will 
remain to be determined by the physical location of the VHSs. 
  
                                                
461 Idem at 333. 
462 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 869. 
463 Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ at 317.  





 CHAPTER 8  
 
ASSESSING THE COMBATANT STATUS OF JOURNALISTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 1 
 
8.1 Introduction 
During the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, NATO bombed the Radio 
Televisija Srbije’s head office in Belgrade, alleging that it was ‘being used to 
transmit propaganda supportive of Milosevic’2. As a result of ‘considerable 
disagreement between the United States and French governments, regarding the 
legality and legitimacy of the target’3, the attack was repeatedly postponed. By 
the time NATO forces conducted the attack, some eleven days after the initial 
warnings to vacate the target were issued to foreign journalists using the facility, 
the Yugoslav ‘authorities were no longer taking the threats seriously’4. In the 
process, NATO killed sixteen technicians and support staff, and injured sixteen 
others5. Human Rights Watch condemned the attack as unjustifiable6, and 
distinguished it from the lawful attack launched against the Rwandan Radio-
télévision libre des Mille Collines, which was destroyed to prevent its further use 
to incite genocide7. The attack on the Serbian broadcaster was so controversial, 
that it prompted the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to conduct an enquiry into whether NATO's strike might 
constitute a war crime8. Four years later, U.S. cruise missiles rained down on 
Iraq's main television station, shutting down transmission for a few hours9.  
                                                
1 This chapter is an updated version of a prior article entitled: ‘Journalists: Shielded from the 
Dangers of War in their Pursuit of the Truth’ (2009) 34 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 70. These revisions have been made with the kind permission of the SAYIL 
editorial board. 
2 Jefferson D Reynolds ‘Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation of 
the Law of Armed conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground’ (2005) 56 Air Force Law 
Review 1 at 38. 
3 Idem at 39. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Crimes of War Project ‘In America’s Sights: Targeting Decisions in a War with Iraq’ (6 March 
2003) available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/iraq-print.html (accessed 27 July 
2009). 
6 Human Rights Watch maintain that it would have been possible to disrupt communications 
with less cost to civilian life, had the transmitter equipment been made the target of the 
attack, rather then ‘the building and its occupants’ (Reynolds ‘Collateral Damage on the 21st 
Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed conflict, and the Struggle for a 
Moral High Ground’ at 38-39). 
7 Idem at 39.  
8 Shannon Bosch ‘Geneva Under Siege’ (2004) 37:3 Comparative and International Law 
Journal of South Africa 294. 
9 Anthony Dworkin ‘Iraqi Television: a Legitimate Target?’ (27 March 2003) available at 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/iraq/brief-tv.html (accessed 27 July 2009). 
 300 
 While journalist may not be armed with weapons, their reporting of 
armed conflicts often ‘often begets violence against journalists’10, particularly 
when they are documenting the perpetration of war crimes and genocide, or 
exposing the tactics and strategic positions of enemy forces. The UNESCO 
Report on The Protection of Journalists, concluded that ‘journalists are 
exposed to danger not only in covering armed conflicts, but everywhere … 
[they are] threatened, arrested, harassed, tortured, maltreated, beaten, 
kidnapped, imprisoned and even murdered’11. Since 1992, the Committee to 
Protect Journalists12, has recorded and documented 926 deaths of journalists 
whilst carrying out their function, with many of these deaths having occurred 
in situations of armed conflict13. 
As early as 1968, the International Committee of Jurists drafted the 
Preliminary Draft Convention for the Protection of Journalists on Dangerous 
Missions (which is commonly referred to as the Montecatini Draft)14. 
Regretfully, the draft convention never found its way to the United Nations 
(U.N.) for consideration15. Pursuant to the disappearance of seventeen 
journalists in Cambodia in 1970, the International Professional Committee for 
the Safety of Journalists was tasked with issuing identity cards for journalists 
on dangerous missions in Southeast Asia. Journalists issued with 
identification cards were required to sign a statement agreeing to only use the 
identification card whilst on professional assignments, and not to participate in 
hostilities, carry weapons, or wear a uniform16. Those critical of the 
identification card regime point out that not only does it not necessarily 
prevent violence, but it can also expose journalists to targeted attacks, aimed 
at silencing unfavourable media reports17. This identification card regime was 
                                                
10 Nathan Taback and Robin Coupland (2006) ‘Security Of Journalists: Making the Case for 
Modelling Armed Violence as a Means to Promote Human Security’ (chap 9) in John Borrie 
and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds)Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and 
Arms Control Negotiations, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: Geneva at 
195. 
11 UNESCO Report ‘Protection of Journalists’ (1982) New Communication Order No. 4 at 5.1. 
12 Other institutions who document the ‘violent events involving journalists and media workers’ 
include: International News Safety Institution (INSI) and Reporters Without Borders (Taback 
and Coupland ‘Security Of Journalists: Making the Case for Modelling Armed Violence as a 
Means to Promote Human Security’ at 195). 
13 Available at http://cpj.org/killed/ (last count done at 25 July 2012). 
14 The Montecatini Draft proposed the establishment of an independent International 
Committee for the Protection of Journalists on Dangerous Missions Under the U.N. banner. 
The committee was tasked with the job of issuing official identification cards to all journalists. 
Under the Montecatini Draft it was envisaged that journalists proceeding on a dangerous 
mission were supposed to inform the committee, and wear a recognisable emblem which 
served to distinguish them as journalists (Dylan Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the 
Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for the International Protection of Journalists’ 
(2002) 30 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 505 at 514-515). 
15 Amit Mukherjee ‘The Internationalisation of Journalists' "Rights": An Historical Analysis’ 
(1995) 87:4 Journal of International Law and Practice 87 at 101. For more on the history 
behind the failed attempts to secure special protections and status for journalists, see: 
Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for 
the International Protection of Journalists’. 
16 Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for 
the International Protection of Journalists’ at 515. 
17 Idem at 524. As was the case in January 1999, when the ‘Revolutionary United Front 
entered Freetown, Sierra Leone with a target list of journalists and hunted down four 
journalists’ (Ibid). 
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never successfully expanded to other regions, before the plan was 
abandoned in 197518.  
During the same time period, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a 
resolution19 on the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions. 
Drawing on provisions in the Geneva Conventions, the resolution mandated 
the Human Rights Commission to prepare a draft international agreement on 
the protection of journalists20. Pursuant to that, the Diplomatic Conference on 
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts21 recommended in 1973 that a new article 
(article 79) be included in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.  
In the end, all attempts during the 1970s and 1980s, by the ‘Soviet 
Union, Eastern European allies and the countries of the Third World’ to clothe 
journalists with a specific status or some form of ‘protective licensing’, were 
opposed by the West22. Consequently, what we are left with, is a protection 
regime where journalists are not afforded any distinct recognition in the form 
of a specialised convention. 
Not only are journalist exposed to very high levels of risk when they 
report on armed conflicts, but they are also viewed as a strategic tool. 
Belligerents are acutely aware that ‘controlling the way war is represented has 
acquired the same strategic importance as the ability to disrupt the enemies’ 
communications’23. During WWI ‘the war ministries assigned officials to the 
various newspapers as a means of keeping reporting under strict control’24. 
Since then, belligerents in some countries have kept a tight reign on the 
media’s ‘output’25, imposing strict censorship, intimidation26, detention, 
prosecution, torture, and even execution27 on those journalists who do not toe 
the official line28. In States like Chechnya, ‘journalists are banned from the 
theatre of operations … and murdered if they defy the prohibition’29.  
The 1991 Gulf War saw the introduction of the ‘pool system’30, in which 
journalists were organised ‘into small groups’, and afforded limited access to 
the front lines at the military’s discretion, although often ‘no access was given 
to the actual fighting31. These journalists then ‘shared the information 
                                                
18 Idem at 515. 
19 See G.A. Res. 2673 (1970) U.N. GAOR 25th Session Supp. No. 28 at 78 U.N. Doc. 
A/8028. 
20 Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for 
the International Protection of Journalists’ at 516. 
21 G.A. Res. 3008 (1972) U.N. GAOR 27th Session. 
22 Lyombe Eko ‘Bombs and Bombast in the NATO/Yugoslav War 1999: The Attack on the 
Radio Television Serbia and the Laws of War’ (2002) Communications and the Law 1 at 38. 
23 Arnaud Mercier ‘War and Media: Constancy and Convulsion’ (2005) 87:860 International 
Review of the Red Cross 649 at 649. 
24 Idem at 650. 
25 Idem at 649. 
26 When the premises of Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV were targeted by the U.S. in 2003, 
these ‘incidents were described as intended to intimidate and punish journalists who dared 
criticise the U.S. invasion’ (Idem at 650). 
27 Idem at 649. 
28 Idem at 650. 
29 Idem at 649. 
30 Christiane Eilders ‘Media Under Fire: Fact and Fiction in Conditions of War’ (2005) 87:860 
International Review of the Red Cross 639 at 643. 
31 Ibid.  
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gathered with their colleagues left behind’32. All this was done on the ‘pretext 
of ensuring the journalists’ safety, and preventing the information-gathering 
from hindering the operation under way’33. For many it was clear that the real 
goal was to ‘limit the journalists’ access to the front as far as possible’34.  
In Iraq, in 2003, the media refused to be part of this ‘sham information’ 
system, and forced the U.S. military to devise a new scheme of accrediting 
journalists and embedding them within combat units35. Once again the 
intention was to maintain some control over what journalists reported36. For 
this ‘privilege’, journalists were subject to ‘fairly restrictive rules, including an 
absolute prohibition on anything that could make it possible to locate the 
troops’37. Not surprisingly, ‘Iraq has cost the highest number of journalists’ 
lives in any conflict so far’38. Interestingly, ‘by dint of rubbing shoulders with 
the soldiers, living with them, and owing one’s safety to them, the situation 
was ripe for journalists to end up sharing the point of view of their hosts, in 
keeping with the “Stockholm syndrome”’39. What was initially instigated by the 
press in order to permit greater journalistic freedom, resulted in journalism rich 
with ‘patriotism, empathy and self-censorship’40. In the end, the ‘embedded 
journalist’ became ‘the instrument of a vast public relations strategy’41. 
Furthermore, in still other instances (as was the tragic case in the internal 
armed conflict in Rwanda), war is ‘waged thanks to the media … by means of 
direct propaganda’, as was the case of Radio-télévision libre des Mille 
Collines 42. 
The reality remains that journalists have a ‘peculiar propensity to seek out 
situations of acute danger’43 in which the rules of international humanitarian 
law (IHL) are already strained. In doing so, not only are ‘media professionals 
more and more at risk of being directly targeted in violation of IHL’, but ‘by far 
the greatest danger they face is that of deliberate acts of violence against 
them’44. To this end, there have been questions raised as to the IHL status of 
                                                




36 Eilders ‘Media Under Fire: Fact and Fiction in Conditions of War’ at 643.  
37 Mercier ‘War and Media: Constancy and Convulsion’ at 657. 
38 Roland Huguenin-Benjamin ‘Can Public Communication Protect Victims?’ (2005) 87:860 
International Review of the Red Cross 661 at 663. 
39 Mercier ‘War and Media: Constancy and Convulsion’ at 657. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Idem at 658. 
42 Operating as ‘a well-oiled propaganda machine’, it …’aggravated existing tensions and 
called on people to stand ready, then to take up arms, and when the time came for genocide 
it coordinated the work of the killers, informing them for example of common graves that had 
been dug but not yet filled and urging them not to spare children, broadcasting arguments day 
after day to justify the bloodshed and congratulating the butchers on the results so far 
achieved. On 2 July 1994, the following announcement was made: “Friends, we can be 
proud! They have been exterminated. My friends, let us rejoice. God is just!”’ (Idem at 651). 
43 Fritz Kalshoven and Lisbeth Zegveld (2001) Constraints on the Waging of War: An 
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (3rd ed) International Committee for the Red 
Cross: Geneva at 131.  
44 ICRC ‘How does International Humanitarian Law Protect Journalists in Armed-conflict 
Situations’ (27 July 2010) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/protection-journalists-interviews-270710 
(accessed 14 July 2012). 
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journalists, and whether journalists need a special regime of protection under 
IHL. Much of the debate around the protections afforded journalists under IHL, 
hinges on the determination of whether the actions of journalists amount to  
direct participation in the hostilities. This chapter seeks to explore these 
questions by exploring the: 
• Categorisation of journalists under IHL;  
• Existing legal regimes applicable to journalists under IHL; 
• Primary IHL status of journalists (both those embedded in the military 
and those reporting without accompanying the armed forces);  
• Impact that a journalist’s primary status and presence has upon 
targeting decisions; 
• The notion of direct participation in hostilities and its impact upon 
journalists; and 
• Legal consequences which result when journalists elect to participate 
directly in hostilities. 
8.2 Understanding the term ‘journalist’ under IHL 
 
Before explaining the existing legal regime applicable to journalists under IHL, 
it is important to note that within the broader category ‘journalist’, IHL 
differentiates three further sub-classifications: military journalists, war 
correspondents, and ‘journalists who neither form part of, nor accompany the 
armed forces’45. Each of the sub-classifications enjoys different treatment 
under IHL - which impacts on their primary status, protections under IHL, and 
their treatment if captured. 
 
i. Military journalists46 
 
These are essentially ‘communication personnel who form part of the armed 
forces’ and work ‘in the information services of the armed forces’47.  
 
ii. War correspondents 
 
These are ‘representatives of the media … who are formally accredited to the 
armed forces’48, and who ‘accompany the armed forces without being 
members of the armed forces’49. They get a special mention in GC III article 
4A(4), under the category of civilians who are ‘persons who accompany the 
                                                
45 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 94.  
46 Since my focus throughout all the chapters is on the status of a variety of non-State actors, 
I will not focus much further attention on this category, since they are essentially State actors. 
47 Rikke Ishøy (2008) Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law 
Danish Red Cross: Kobenhavn (revised edition) at 93.  
48 Hans-Peter Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 257; GC 
III article 4A(4). 
49 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 94; Knut 
Dörmann ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals Working 
in Armed Conflicts’ Legal article (1 December 2007) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/media-protection-article-.htm 
(accessed 1 August 2012). 
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armed forces without actually being members thereof’. ‘Not each and every 
journalist who reports from the conflict zone falls within this category’50. In 
order to enjoy the protection of the military unit to which they are accredited, 
war correspondents are obliged to stay within their assigned  military unit, and 
are answerable to the unit’s commander51. In order to call oneself a ‘war 
correspondent’, ‘a journalist must get the necessary authorisation, namely, to 
be accredited as such’52. Proof of this accreditation needs to be furnished in 
the form of a special identity card (based on the template found in Annex IV A 
to GC III) - ‘which confirms their status’53. 
 In recent international armed conflicts (in particular in the 2003 Iraqi 
conflict), some belligerents began to make use of the term ‘embedded 
journalists’. This terminology ‘does not occur in any provision of IHL’ … and ‘it 
is not clearly defined’54. That said, the ICRC has concluded that ‘embedded 
journalist’ is a modern day reference to what IHL has traditionally called ‘war 
correspondents’55. The process of ‘embedding’ merely replaces what was 
always understood as official accreditation56. It does not amount to ‘induction 
into the armed forces’57. 
 
iii. ‘Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions’58 
 
These are effectively the balance of the journalists who ‘neither form part of 
nor accompany the armed forces’59. 
 
8.3 Journalists under IHL 
 
i. 1863 Lieber Code 
 
As early as 1863 we find that ‘special provisions were made to protect 
newspaper reporters who were captured during the course of war’60. 
According to API article 50, ‘editors, or reporters of journals ... if captured, 
may be made prisoners of war (POWs), and be detained as such’61. 
 
ii. Hague Law 
 
In 1899 and 1907 The Hague Convention IV on Land Warfare, adopted the 
Lieber Code approach to protected journalists in article 13, which states that: 
                                                
50 Yoram Dinstein (2010) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict (2nd ed) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 167. 
51 Dörmann ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals 
Working in Armed Conflicts’.  
52 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 167. 
53 Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 228. 




57 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 167. 
58 Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 256-257. 
59 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 94.  
60 Amit Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ (1995) 17 
Communications and the Law 27 at 28. 
61 Idem at 29. 
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‘persons who follow the armed forces without directly belonging 
thereto, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters ... who fall 
into the enemy's hands, and whom the latter thinks expedient to 
detain, are entitled to be treated as POW, provided they are in 
possession of a certificate from the military authorities of the army 
which they were accompanying’62. 
 
iii. Geneva Conventions (GC I-IV) 
 
Under Geneva law, the Lieber Code position was once again reproduced in 
article 81 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners-of-War Convention63. Later, in 1949, 
the III Geneva Convention ... re-iterated most of the Lieber Code position in 
article 4A(4)64. There was one ‘important modification’65 made to the Lieber 
Code position - it made allowances for the fact that journalists might lose their 
identification cards in the theatre of conflict, and consequently GC III only 
requires that journalists ‘establish that a card had been issued’, or that they 
were authorised to accompany the armed forces66 in order for them to be able 
to claim POW status67. Moreover, any journalist, regardless of their 
nationality, could claim the protections afforded under GC III, provided one of 
the belligerent parties had issued them with the required identification card, 
and they need not be a national of the issuing State68. 
 Up to this point, ‘non-accredited journalists and their equipment’ enjoyed 
no special status under IHL69. They were subject to the protections afforded 
ordinary civilians by virtue of the ‘presumption of civilian status which exists in 
IHL’. Consequently, it was simply presumed that journalists who did not enjoy 
official accreditation from the armed forces (irrespective of their nationality70), 
were presumed to have civilian status71. The difficulty with treating non-
embedded journalists as civilians, is that this regime offers no special 
protection against the types of ‘punitive acts72 which journalists face at the 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 GC III equates war correspondents with ‘civilian members of military aircraft crews and 
other non uniformed participants in the greater military enterprise’ (William A Orme ‘Protection 
of Journalists’ (1999) in Roy Gutman and David Rieff (eds) Crimes of War Project: The Book, 
available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/journalists-protection.html (accessed 1 
August 2010). 
65 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 29. 
66 Hans-Peter Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional 
Missions’ (1983) 232 International Review of the Red Cross 3-18 available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/review-1983-p3 (accessed 26 March 2009).  
67 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 29. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Alexandre Balguy-Gallois ‘The Protection of Journalists and News Media Personnel in 
Armed Conflict’ (2004) 86:853 International Review of the Red Cross 37 at 38. 
70 The protection afforded civilians is not conditional upon their specific nationality, so a 
journalist, ‘be he a national of a State involved in the conflict or a national of a neutral State, is 
protected’ (Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional 
Missions’). 
71 GC IV article 99; Balguy-Gallois ‘The Protection of Journalists and News Media Personnel 
in Armed Conflict’ at 38. 
72 Including ‘detention, torture, and harassment’ (Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 31). 
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hands of governmental agents and the armed forces’, whilst reporting in 
situations of armed conflict. As Mukherjee spells out: 
 
‘the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were found 
inadequate because (1) journalists were not protected against the 
physical dangers of war, (2) protection granted to journalists only 
applied to the period of detention, (i.e. to the period following capture), 
and (3) only journalists accredited to the military forces (i.e. war 
correspondents) were protected’73. 
 
iv. Additional Protocol’s (AP I and AP II) 
 
In 1977, two Additional Protocols were added to the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949. AP I article 79, which deals with the issue of journalists, attempts to 
address some of the shortcomings in the GCs. 
  
‘1. Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas 
of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians within the meaning 
of article 50, paragraph 1. 
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this 
Protocol, provided that they take no action adversely affecting their 
status as civilians, and without prejudice to the right of war 
correspondents accredited to the armed forces to the status provided 
for in article 4 (A) (4) of the Third Convention. 
3. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of 
this Protocol. This card, which shall be issued by the government of 
the State of which the Journalist is a national or in whose territory he 
resides or in which the news medium employing him is located, shall 
attest to his status as a journalist’. 
 
What we can glean from this provision, is that it is aimed at those journalists 
who ‘without being accredited to the armed forces as war correspondents, are 
engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict’74. 
These journalists enjoy primary IHL civilian status, with the attendant civilian 
protections, provided they do not compromise their civilian status75 (by, for 
example, participating directly in hostilities, ‘spying, smuggling weapons and 
other actions’76.) The provision also notes that the provision will not prejudice 
the special POW privilege which war correspondents enjoy if captured (a 
privilege usually reserved solely for combatants).  
 Once again we see the repetition of the identification requirement which 
was introduced under GC III. ‘Although API article 79 did not alter the civilian 
status of journalists, it did mandate the implementation of an identity card 
program’77. The identification card may be provided by the State of which the 
                                                
73 Ibid.  
74 Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 141. 
75 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 167.  
76 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 94.  
77 Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for 
the International Protection of Journalists’ at 517. 
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journalist is a national, the State where the journalist is employed, or the State 
where the journalist’s employing news corporation is located78. ‘The identity 
card reproduced in Annex II of the protocol is only a model for the guidance of 
national authorities who have the task of issuing such cards’79. Possessing a 
journalist’s identification card merely ‘creates a presumption in his or her 
favor’ that they are ‘not a spy or a saboteur but, rather a respectable person 
doing a respectable job’80 . Possession of the identity card is not, however, a 
legal requirement81, it is ‘up the individual journalist whether they choose to 
obtain such identification’82. ‘If a journalist does not have it with him or her in a 
war zone, the authorities cannot treat him or her unfavorably because of 
that’83. 
 
v. Customary international law 
 
According to the ICRC study of customary international law, ‘civilian 
journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must 
be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in 
hostilities’84. This finding is based on ‘official statements and reported State 
practice’85 (as evidenced by numerous military manuals) and the fact that 
there were no reservations made to AP I article 7986.  
 The UN has condemned ‘deliberate attacks on journalists’87, and on 
numerous occasions the U.N. General Assembly and Commission on Human 
Rights has reminded States to ensure that journalists are respected and 
protected, and not subjected to intimidation, ‘acts of reprisal, abductions and 
other acts of violence’88.  
 
8.4 The primary IHL status of journalists, and the legal consequences 
which flow from their status 
 
IHL is founded upon the principle that ‘every individual found in the theatre of 
war possesses a recognised primary status, as either a combatant or a 
                                                
78 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 94; GC III article 
4A(4); GC III annex IV; AP I article 79; and AP I annex II.  
79 Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 141. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 37.  
82 Kalshoven and Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International 
Humanitarian Law at 142; Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous 
Professional Missions’. The criticisms levelled at the identity card proposal are that in many 
instances identification might in fact be counterproductive, as was the tragic case of four 
journalists hunted down in Freetown in 1999 (Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the 
Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for the International Protection of Journalists’ at 
525). 
83 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 37; Gasser 
‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions’.  
84 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (2005) Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules Cambridge University Press at rule 34. 
85 Idem at 115. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Idem at 116. 
88 Ibid. 
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civilian’89. It is this primary status that determines the protections the 
individual enjoys under IHL, including whether or not they are granted 
secondary status as a prisoner of war (POW)90. Moreover, it is ones primary 
status (as either combatant or civilian) that dictates whether one might 
participate directly in hostilities, and the IHL obligations upon ones captors in 
so far as prosecuting detainees for their actions91. 
 
i. Journalists with combatant status92 
 
The label ‘combatant’ is given to all members of the States ‘armed forces’, as 
well as ‘all organised armed forces, groups and units which are under a 
command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates … and 
subject to an internal disciplinary system’93. Put another way, to enjoy 
combatant status, an individual needs to show that they are either a member 
of the State’s armed forces94, or a member of a volunteer corps or militia that 
satisfy the requirements for combatant status set out in the 1907 HRs95, and 
developed through GC III96 and the AP I97.  
 Generally speaking, it is the State’s armed forces98 which are granted 
combatant status and are authorised to participate directly in hostilities, 
subject to the rules of war99. Having said that, there are within the ranks of 
these armed forces’ non-combatant service personnel like ‘quartermasters, 
members of the legal services and other non-fighting personnel’100 (such as 
                                                
89 Kurt Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 65. 
90 POW status is afforded to all who fall within the categories listed in HR article 3(2), GC III 
articles 4A(1-3) and (6), and AP I articles 43 and 44(1). Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 65. 
91 For example, a civilian who ‘participates directly in hostilities might face criminal 
prosecution for their actions, while combatants are not prosecuted for merely participating in 
hostilities - provided they observe the rules of war’ (Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-
combatants’ at 81, 65 and 93). 
92 As explained earlier on in this chapter, I will not focus on this category any more than to 
explain how they differ from civilian journalists, since the focus of this dissertation is on non-
State actors. 
93 AP I article 43. 
94 GC III article 4A(1).  
95 1907 Annex to the Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and 
its Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf. (accessed 12 May 2012) at articles 1 and 2. 
96 GC III article 4(A)(2); ICRC ‘Commentary on GC III: article 4’ available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590007?OpenDocument (accessed 12 May 2012). 
97 AP I article 43(1) reiterates the principle set out in article 1(a) of the HR IV, and AP I article 
44 states that: 
‘combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they 
are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognising, 
however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the 
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as 
a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) during 
each military engagement, and  
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military 
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.’ 
98 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 66-67. 
99 Failure to observe the law of war will expose combatants to prosecution before a military 
tribunal (Idem at 68). 
100 Idem at 82.  
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medical and religious personnel)101, who are denied authorisation102 to ‘use a 
weapon or a weapons system’103. These ‘non-combatant’104 members of the 
armed forces enjoy special protections as a result of this limitation on their 
actions105. Their status as members of the armed forces, albeit non-
combatant members, guarantees their secondary status as POWs upon 
capture106. As ‘members of the armed forces’, albeit non-combatant members, 
military journalists ‘have combatant status’107. Consequently, all ‘journalists 
who opt to work for the information services of the armed forces become 
combatants’108. 
 
ii. Journalists with civilian status 
 
With the exception of those journalists who work for the armed forces’ 
information department, all other journalists in the theatre of war have 
historically been classified as civilians under IHL. Some authors go so far as 
to say that they are necessarily ‘non-combatants’ who enjoy ‘unambiguous 
status as civilians’109. While they may all enjoy primary civilian status, there 
are subtle differences which impact on the way they are viewed in terms of 
IHL, based upon whether they are embedded (or accompany the armed 
forces), or elect not to accompany the armed forces. 
 
Civilian journalists with POW status upon capture 
 
Those journalists who are accredited to the armed forces, or to put it another 
way - who are embedded110 in the armed forces, are referred to under IHL as 
‘war correspondents’. While they might carry out their reporting from within the 
ranks of the armed forces, they nevertheless are, and remain, civilians111, 
since they are not integrated into the armed forces like their colleagues in the 
                                                
101 HR article 3. 
102 Often this is done by way of national legislation. 
103 AP I article 43(2). 
104 HR article 3. 
105 GC I articles 24, 26 and 27. 
106 Ishøy Handbook on the Practical Use of International Humanitarian Law at 94. 
107 Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 257. 
108 Alex Obote Odora ‘Criminal Responsibility of Journalists Under International Criminal Law: 
The ICTR Experience’ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 307 at 313. 
109 Taback and Coupland ‘Security of Journalists: Making the Case for Modeling Armed 
Violence as a Means to Promote Human Security’ at 195. 
110 Some academics, like Fisher, argue that it is possible for a journalist to be embedded 
without fulfilling the requirements for full accreditation. According to the ICRC, the act of 
embedding amounts to accreditation and the term embedding is a modern day reference to 
the activities traditionally carried out by a war correspondent (Horst Fisher (2008) ‘The 
Protection of Prisoners of War’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in 
Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 372). 
111 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 167; 
Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 256-257; Mukherjee ‘Protection of 
Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35; Dale Stephens and Angeline Lewis 
‘The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed Conflict’ (2006) 9 Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law 25 at 34. 
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military information units112. They are not deprived of civilian status, despite 
their affiliation with the armed forces113.  
 These journalists ‘work on their own responsibility’114 under their editor 
or an agency, and ‘are permitted to carry out all those activities in the area of 
operations which normally form part’115 of their job, (including: ‘looking around, 
taking notes, making visual and audio recordings’)116. These normal 
journalistic activities ‘may not be considered hostile acts justifying military 
action against the person’117. As civilians, it is imperative that war 
correspondents do ‘not under any circumstances take a direct part in 
hostilities’118. 
 Embedded journalists are treated much like ‘civilian contractors’119 who 
accompany the armed forces. Traditionally, civilian contractors who provided 
the necessary specialised expertise which the armed forces might be lacking, 
were not armed, were not permitted to participate directly in hostilities, and 
were issued with an identity card confirming their function120. Like embedded 
journalists, these civilian contractors enjoy primary civilian status, despite their 
close association with the armed forces121.  
 What is unique about war correspondents and civilian contractors - as 
opposed to other civilians - is that despite their civilian status, they are 
afforded POW status (pursuant to GC III art 4(A(4)) should they be injured or 
captured by the enemy armed forces122. This is unusual, in that traditionally 
POW status was reserved for combatants. In order to claim this privilege, they 
do need to produce the identity card issued by the armed forces which they 
are accompanying123. 
These war correspondents can only be detained when ‘imperative 
reasons of security’ demand their detention. If they are captured by the 
opposition, they enjoy the ‘same treatment as members of the regular armed 
                                                
112 Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions’; 
Balguy-Gallois ‘The Protection of Journalists and News Media Personnel in Armed Conflict’ at 
39. 
113 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 167; 
Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 256-257; Mukherjee ‘Protection of 
Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35. 





119 HR IV article 13; GC III article 4A(4) and AP I article 50(1). These might include civilian 
members of military aircraft crews; war correspondents; supply and reconstruction 
contractors; and those providing services for the welfare of the armed forces (Ipsen (1995) 
‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95). 
120 GC III Annex IV A. It is accepted that when the Geneva Convention drafters included the 
requirement of an identity card for those ‘accompanying the armed forces’, it was agreed that 
‘possession of one was a supplementary safeguard for the person concerned, but not an 
indispensable prerequisite for being granted POW status.’ (Emanuela-Chiara Gillard 
‘Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2006) 88:863 International Review of the Red Cross 525 at 537). 
121 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95. 
122 Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 256-257; ICRC ‘How does 
International Humanitarian Law Protect Journalists in Armed-conflict Situations’. 
123 Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95. 
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forces’124, including ‘internment in POW camps’125, ‘respect for their persons 
and their honor’126, the ‘right not to respond to interrogation’127, ‘contact with 
their families’128, the right ‘to be visited by representatives of the protecting 
power or the ICRC’129, and importantly the right to be ‘repatriated, at the 
latest, when fighting ceases’130 - unless they are seriously injured in which 
case they ‘must be repatriated immediately and unconditionally'131.  
 While they are treated as POWs, at no time do they lose their civilian 
status132. Essentially, ‘war correspondents accredited to the armed forces’ are 
entitled to ‘the status of persons accompanying the armed force without being 
members thereof’133. Some argue that it is more correct to say that ‘they are 
to be treated as POW without actually having POW status’134. As such, 
embedded journalists will have access to the myriad of privileges that are 
afforded POWs, and which are not normally afforded ordinary civilian 
detainees. In this one way embedded journalists are better off then their 
unaccredited counterparts.  
 
Civilian journalists without POW status upon capture 
 
There remain journalists who report on hostilities, in the theatre of war, 
without being accredited or embedded in the State’s armed forces. They have 
come to be known as ‘journalists engaged in dangerous professional 
missions’135, and like their embedded colleagues they too are treated as 
civilians by IHL136. Although AP I states that these journalists should be 
considered as civilians, academics argue that in fact: 
 
‘they should not merely be considered as a civilian, he or she is a 
civilian. There can, therefore, be no doubt on this topic. Journalists who 
undoubtedly are civilians do not lose this status by entering a 
battleground for professional purposes’ ... AP I ‘article 79 does not 
protect journalists qua journalists, but only as civilians’137.  
 
These ‘non-embedded journalists’ are encouraged by IHL to obtain an identity 
card (modelled after the draft provided by the Protocol) to ‘attest to their 
profession as journalists’138, although they enjoy no special status in IHL, and 
                                                
124 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 ‘Although their notebooks and film might legally be confiscated by military personnel’ 
(Orme ‘Protection of Journalists’). 




132 Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 257. 
133 Odora ‘Criminal Responsibility of Journalists Under International Criminal Law: The ICTR 
Experience’ at 313. 
134 Balguy-Gallois ‘The Protection of Journalists and News Media Personnel in Armed 
Conflict’ at 39; Ipsen (1995) ‘Combatants and Non-combatants’ at 95. 
135 Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 256-257. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35. 
138 Ibid. 
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will always be presumed to retain their civilian139 status. This is an usual 
requirement, since civilians are not obliged to carry any form of identification, 
or wear any symbols verifying their civilian status140. That said, the fact that 
these journalists are working in the theatre of hostilities, often after other 
civilians have been evacuated, can potentially lead to confusion as to their 
status. However, as Mukherjee points out, this identification does not ‘create a 
civilian status’141.  
Provided they do nothing to compromise their inherent civilian’s status 
(i.e. by participating directly in hostilities), they enjoy full civilian protection 
from hostilities142. In short ‘they and their possessions143 are to be 
respected144and shielded from attack’145. As is true of any civilians, 
‘intentionally directing an attack’ against journalists ‘amounts to a war crime 
under the Rome statute of the ICC’146. That said, as is the case with any 
civilian, they are entitled to ‘possess small arms for self-defense in case of 
attacks’147 by non-combatants. They can, however, not ‘use fire arms against 
combatants even if they are in danger of being taken captive’148. 
 By classifying journalists as civilians, ‘States agree to let them do their 
job (take photographs, shoot films, record information or take notes) without 
this constituting a reason for attacking them or depriving them of their rights 
as civilians’149. Although classifying journalists as civilians150 ensures them a 
wide range of humane protections afforded civilians under the GCs, ‘they fail 
to address the particular difficulties facing journalists, who are typically more 
directly involved with the conflict than are ordinary civilians’151. 
As civilians, if these journalists fall into enemy hands, they remain 
entitled to all the protections granted civilians152 (either under AP I article 45 
or on the basis of GC IV, the law in force before 1977153). If they are ‘arrested 
in their own country (in territory occupied by the enemy)’154 they ‘must be 
detained in that occupied territory and not transferred to the territory of the 
                                                
139 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 115-118.  
140 Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the civilian population’ at 210; GC IV article 27(1). 
141 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35 
142 Ibid; Gasser (2008) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 275. 
143 AP I article 52. 
144 GC I article 27(1). This means that they are ‘entitled to respect for their persons, their 
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions, their manners and customs’ (GC IV 
article 27(1), and their property (HR article 46(2). 
145 AP I article 51(2). Attacks which result in death or serious injury to civilians are considered 
a grave breach of AP I, and can be prosecuted as war crimes (AP I article 85(3)(a) and (e)); 
ICRC ‘Covering War and Disaster’ (18 December 2007) available at 
http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nnsf/htmlall/media-ihl-report-261107/ (accessed 14 July 
2012). 
146 ICRC ‘How does International Humanitarian Law Protect Journalists in Armed-conflict 
Situations’. 
147 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35. 
148 Ibid. 
149 ICRC ‘Covering War and Disaster’.  
150 Howard ‘Remaking the Pen Mightier that the Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need 
for the International Protection of Journalists’ at 512. 
151Ibid. 
152 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 35. 
153 Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions’. 
154 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 37.  
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occupying power’155. If ‘a journalist [is] captured in enemy territory’, they may 
be ‘arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict’156, 
or ‘for imperative reasons of security’157. Moreover, ‘civilian journalists and 
their crews must be informed promptly of the reasons why these measures 
have been taken’158, subjected to a ‘penal inquiry’159, ‘ or released as soon as 
the reasons or circumstances justifying the detention have abated’160. On the 
other hand, ‘journalists who are citizens of a non-belligerent State that has 
normal diplomatic relations with the State that has captured them, are covered 
by normal peacetime law; that is to say, they are not "protected persons" 
under the Geneva Conventions of 1949’161. ‘They may be detained only if 
there are sufficient charges against them. If not, they must be released’162. In 
particular, there are precise rules aimed at ensuring that detainees are treated 
humanely and afforded all the necessary legal guarantees, if they are to be 
tried for penal offences163. As with other detainees, journalists enjoy the right 
to contact their relatives and their diplomatic or consular representatives164. 
They are, however, not extended the same POW privileges which are granted 
to their embedded colleagues.  
 
8.5 Targeting decisions in international armed conflicts where 
journalists are implicated  
All targeting decisions taken in the theatre of war are required to withstand the 
testing of three related principles: distinction, military necessity and 
proportionality. Added to these three principles is the further requirement that, 
when civilian objects are targeted, there must be advanced warning so that 
civilians can be evacuated from these facilities. So too when civilian 
journalists are in the firing line, commanding officers will be required to justify 
their orders on the basis of satisfying these four requirements. 
i. Distinction 
‘Distinction’ is shorthand for the notion that civilians and civilian objects are to 
be distinguishable from military objects and personnel, in accordance with the 
strict IHL prohibition against attacking civilian targets. The principle is neatly 
summed up in AP I as follows: ‘parties are required at all times to distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian 
                                                
155 Ibid. 
156 Dörmann ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals 
Working in Armed Conflicts’. 
157 Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions’; AP I 
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159 Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions’; 
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objectives and military objectives and, are only entitled to direct their 
operations against military objectives’165. IHL defines ‘military objectives’ as 
those sites or objects that ‘make an effective contribution to military action,’ 
and whose destruction offers ‘a definite military advantage in the 
circumstances ruling at the time’166. The principle of distinction forms the 
foundation upon which many IHL rules are built. It is the principle of distinction 
which demands that combatants wear an identifying mark and carry their 
weapons openly167. Likewise, it dictates that attacking and defending forces 
must not locate military objectives in areas populated by civilians168, and 
orders the evacuation of civilians from the vicinity of military objectives169. 
Lastly, it is the principle of distinction which prohibits the use of weapons 
which might endanger civilians indiscriminately170.  
ii. Military necessity 
 
The notion of military necessity follows on from the rejection of the practice of 
‘total warfare’171, and in short requires that all acts of warfare are to be 
motivated only by absolute military necessity172. The principle of military 
necessity dictates that the only legitimate goal in armed conflict is to 
overpower the enemy armed forces demands, consequently the use of 
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, and the 
targeting of objects which are not ‘military objectives’173, would fall foul of the 
requirement of military necessity174. This principle is summed up in AP I175 as 
follows: ‘only those objects which by their nature, location176, purpose or 
use177 make an effective contribution to military action178, and whose total or 
                                                
165 AP I article 48. Despite being enshrined in AP I, this principle constitutes an ‘ancient and 
established rule of customary law and not a new principle created by recent conventional law’ 
(Stefan Oeter (1995) ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 113). 
166 AP I article 55(2); Crimes of War Project ‘In America’s Sights: Targeting Decisions in a 
War with Iraq’. 
167 Kenneth Anderson ‘Who Owns the Rules of War?’ (24 April 2003) available at 
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172 HR article 22; AP I article 35(1). 
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function of a building. Where a building might be used to lodge military personnel or serve as 
a field headquarters, but there are doubts about the current use or immediate purpose of a 
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partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage179 may justifiably satisfy the 
requirements of military necessity when attacked’. This definition of a military 
objective, as set out in AP I article 52, is widely regarded as having achieved 
customary status, and consequently is binding on even those States which 




The third principle, of proportionality, attempts to strike a balance between the 
competing concerns of humanity and military necessity. It can be summed up 
as follows: in all decisions regarding the means and methods of warfare, the 
damage caused to the adversary must be proportionate to the military 
advantage sought181. Any attack that has a manifestly disproportionate 
collateral impact on the civilian population, facilities necessary for their 
survival, the environment, and cultural heritage sites - will fail to satisfy the 
requirement of proportionality and will be deemed illegitimate182. API, articles 
57(2)(a)(iii) and 51(5)(b), stipulate that where incidental loss to civilian lives or 
objects will result, and such loss will ‘be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated’ - the attack must not be carried 
out183. Even if the adversary uses the civilian presence at a dual-use target to 
shield an otherwise military objective from attack, article 51(8) of AP I 
expressly states that this violation of IHL does not exempt the attacker from 
his legal obligations vis-à-vis the civilians184.  
iv. Advance warning 
The rule of effective185 and advanced warning, in instances when attacks 
potentially have an impact on the civilian population, found expression in the 
1863 Lieber Code186. Since then, this rule has been endorsed in a myriad of 
IHL treaties187, and can, based on relatively consistent State practice188, be 
                                                
179 This enquiry is a subjective one (Oeter (1995) ‘Means and Methods of Warfare’ at 157). It 
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180 Anthony Dworkin ‘The Iraq War in Retrospect’ (14 September 2003) available at 
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Brussels (27 August 1874) article 16; The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of 
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said to have crystallised into a principle of customary law. The main purpose 
of the rule is to give civilians the opportunity to evacuate the area of a planned 
attack189. Actual implementation of the rule is hampered by its wording, which 
allows for ‘concerns of military necessity’ (as seen through the eyes of the 
reasonable military commander)190 to sometimes trump the need to give 
advance warning191. The obligation is then further diluted by the fact that 
where ‘the element of surprise is a condition of the success of an attack’192, or 
where there is no point in providing a warning because it would be 
counterproductive from a military point of view to do so193, the requirement of 
advanced warning can be dispensed with. Once effective advance warning 
has been given, journalists who choose to remain in the theatre of war - 
despite forewarning of an attack - might form part of acceptable collateral 
damage. 
v. The principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality and 
advanced warning, and their impact on targeting decisions involving 
journalists 
If the cumulative effect of these four principles is to restrict military operations 
to proportionate attacks on legitimate military objectives - which satisfy the 
requirements of military necessity and advanced warning - then the question 
which begs asking is whether a civilian broadcaster and its journalists can 
ever be categorised as a military objective, or be subject to an attack which 
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would be proportionate and justifiable in terms of the requirements of military 
necessity. Next we must ask whether the conclusion reached would be any 
different if those journalists were embedded within the ranks of the armed 
forces.  
Civilian broadcasting facilities: the dual-use dilemma  
While civilian sites are generally immune from attack, the risk remains that 
even a primarily civilian site may have dual uses194. Such dual-use sites may 
qualify as a ‘legitimate military target where they contribute, in part, to 
concrete military aims’ and their destruction or neutralisation ‘in the 
circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage’195. The 
spirit and letter of AP I re-iterates that it is lawful to attack a dual-use object, 
provided the criteria set down in AP I article 52 (2) are met. Having said that, if 
there is any doubt, the IHL presumption operates in favour of preserving the 
civilian status of the site196. 
 Interestingly, ‘means of communication’ are specifically singled out as 
targetable dual-use sites, precisely because they can contribute to the military 
action197. In the english text of The Hague Air Warfare rules, ‘lines of 
communications’ are categorised as a military objective198. Notably in the 
German text, there is particular reference to ‘radio stations and other news 
media’199 qualifying as military objectives. There are similar indications in the 
Convention for the Protections of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict - that broadcasting stations are in fact legitimate military targets200. 
Moreover, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) Draft Rules 
of 1956, list under the category of military objectives: ‘broadcasting and 
television stations’201.  
It seems therefore safe to conclude that IHL recognises that television 
and radio stations can make a ‘contribution to military action when they form 
                                                
194 Examples of dual-use sites include ‘political sites (like government ministries) that are not 
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part of the network of command, control and communication’202, and 
consequently might be legitimate targets under certain limited conditions. 
Interestingly, this was the conclusion which the ICTY review committee 
reached after the NATO bombing of Radio Televisija Srbije in 1999. The 
Committee’s conclusion was based on the finding that Radio Televisija 
Srbije’s ‘installations were indeed being used as radio transmitters and relays 
for the armed and special police forces of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’203, thereby categorising them as legitimate military targets. When 
the cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Television station was confirmed on 
Wednesday 26 March 2003, the U.S. Pentagon’s spokesperson maintained 
that their ‘intention was to damage the regime’s command and control 
capability’204, while the British Defence Secretary announced ‘that the targets 
were part of the military command and control structures’, and that they were 
treated ‘as other parts of the communications system that allowed the military 
to operate in and around Baghdad’205. Similarly, if Al-Jazeera’s Kabul 
premises contained offices used by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, then they were 
a legitimate target for bombing on 12 November 2002206.  
The difficulty with determining whether a site is really being used for 
military purposes, is that in modern industrial societies, just about any aspect 
of the economic or social infrastructure could conceivably contribute to the 
war effort207. The added complication, when the status of broadcasting sites is 
under consideration, is that often they are targeted so as to silence damaging 
propaganda. Anthony Dworkin notes that ‘there is no consensus about where 
to draw the line between military communication and propaganda, particularly 
when Saddam Hussein is shown on television in military uniform, exhorting 
his supporters to rise up and “slit the throats” of U.S. troops’208. It is unclear 
whether honest reporting by the media of embarrassing violations committed 
by the enemy, is sufficient to label the broadcaster an integral part of the 
military communications’ apparatus. Unfortunately the line between military 
communication (which would make the broadcaster a valid target for attack) 
and propaganda is a fine one, and the spin doctors know this. Moreover, it is 
almost impossible to assess whether they are being targeted for their military 
contribution, ‘or because of their propaganda value in undermining the morale 
of enemy civilians, or turning the population against the regime’209.  
This then begs the question: does the production of damaging 
propaganda by a civilian enterprise make it a military object contributing to 
military action?210 While inhibiting the enemies propaganda machine may 
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demoralise the ‘local population, and undermine the government's political 
support, neither purpose offers the concrete and direct military advantage’ 
necessary under IHL to make civilian broadcast facilities a legitimate military 
target’211. To this end, the British defence doctrine stipulates that ‘the morale 
of the enemy’s civilian population is not a legitimate target’212. Human Rights 
Watch concluded that ‘attacks on civilian TV or radio stations are prohibited if 
they are designed primarily to undermine civilian morale or to psychologically 
harass the civilian population’213. These opinions are supported by a closer 
reading of AP I article 52, which ‘specifically precludes propaganda as the 
sole justification for a military attack against the media’214. Meyerowitz also 
supports this conclusion, stating ‘that attacks launched solely for the purposes 
of breaking the enemy civilian population’s determination to fight are 
prohibited, as are attacks of a purely political purpose, whether to 
demonstrate military strength, or to intimidate the political leadership of the 
adversary’215. 
 Despite the well reasoned support for the position that propaganda 
broadcasting by the media is not sufficient to make it a legitimate military 
target, this position is not unanimously held. The official U.S. Air Force 
position is that the ‘morale of the civilian population may, in itself, be a 
legitimate target since it weakens the will to fight and thereby offers a military 
advantage216. During the U.S. air campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11, the U.S. 
attacked a radio station controlled by the Taliban on the basis that it was a 
propaganda vehicle for the Taliban leadership217. Amnesty International has 
criticised the U.S. position regarding the attainment of a definite military 
advantage, particularly where the transmission was only interrupted for a 
mere three hours, as was the case in June 1999 when NATO bombed Radio 
Televisija Srbije218. The ICTY committee tasked with investigating the incident 
concluded unequivocally that neither the media nor the morale of the 
population constituted ‘a legitimate target merely because they spread 
propaganda, even though that activity constitutes support for the war effort’219. 
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This view is reiterated in 1996 in the British Defence Doctrine220, and again in 
1999 in Volker Kröning’s submission to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly221. 
Having said that, it must be recognised that some forms of propaganda might 
well lead to the media being made a legitimate target for attack. For instance, 
‘propaganda that incites people to commit grave breaches of IHL, or acts of 
genocide or violence’222 does amount to a direct participation in hostilities, and 
accordingly suspends the protection that is ordinarily afforded the civilian 
media223. In the words of the ICTY committee: ‘[i]f the media is used to incite 
crimes, as in Rwanda, it can become a legitimate military objective’224.  
 In conclusion, unless civilian broadcast facilities are used for ‘military 
purposes or to incite people to commit grave breaches of IHL, acts of 
genocide or acts of violence’225, they remain immune from attack, even if they 
are broadcasting propaganda. Having said that, even when involved in any of 
these illegal acts, it is still incumbent upon commanding officers to limit 
‘civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects’226, by observing the 
requirements of military necessity, proportionality, distinction and effective 
advance warning.  
 
Civilian journalists (not accredited to the armed forces) 
 
Provided civilian journalists (who do not accompany the armed forces) do not 
take part in the hostilities, they retain their civilian immunity against attack. 
Furthermore, even if attacks on the broadcasting facilities where these 
journalists work, have been designated a ‘legitimate military objective’, 
because of their use by the military, any subsequent targeting must first be 
assessed to establish whether the incidental loss caused to civilian life is not 
excessive or disproportionate in relation to the ‘concrete and direct military 
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advantage anticipated’227. This assessment is particularly revealing where 
broadcasters are only off air for a short period of time, making the military 
advantage minimal, and the resultant civilian casualties relatively 
excessive228. In the aftermath of the NATO bombing of the RTS, the ICTY 
committee was asked to evaluate the proportionality of the civilian casualties 
as measured against the anticipated military advantage achieved by disabling 
the station’s transmissions. The committee concluded ‘that the collateral 
damages, while high, were not disproportionate’229. Other observers 
concluded that the principle of proportionality was not satisfied, and that the 
human death toll (sixteen deaths in this incident) ‘was too high when weighed 
against the limited advantage obtained by the attack’230. This is an extremely 
difficult balancing act, particularly in modern, industrialised societies where 
civilian populations depend heavily on dual-use infrastructure231.  
 Furthermore, in every attack, precautions must be taken to ensure that 
civilian losses are kept to a minimum, civilians are warned of imminent 
attacks, and where feasible removed from the vicinity of the military 
objective232. When the U.S. bombed the Bagdad offices of Al-Jazeera and 
Abu Dhabi TV on 8 April 2003 – killing one journalist while injuring another, 
the attack was carried out without any prior warning if the imminent attack233. 
Consequently, this attack can be said to fall foul of the legal requirements 
established under IHL. As for the NATO strike against Radio Televisija Srbije, 
doubts were voiced by Amnesty International as to whether NATO had upheld 
the obligation to give advance warning of the strike to the civilian journalists at 
work in the buildings. NATO maintained that advance warning was given, in 
that the ‘President of CNN, Western journalists working at Radio Televisija 
Srbije’s headquarters, and the Yugoslav officials’234 were made aware of the 
potential for an impending strike235. However, according to Radio Televisija 
Srbije’s employees and the representatives of the Yugoslav government, they 
no longer viewed the warnings seriously because of the time lapse after the 
warnings had been issued236. In the end, the ICTY committee investigating 
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the matter concluded that ‘the advance warning given by NATO may have 
been sufficient under the circumstances’237.  
In conclusion, provided civilian journalists do nothing to compromise 
their inherent civilian status (i.e. by participating directly in hostilities), they 
enjoy full civilian protection from hostilities238. Consequently, they may not be 
‘the object of an attack or a terror campaign’239, and care must be taken when 
attacks directed at legitimate military objects implicate these journalists, and 
their possessions must be respected unless they are ‘used for military 
purposes’240. 
War correspondents 
As civilians, these war correspondents cannot be targeted, despite the fact 
that the members of the armed forces, whom they accompany, do constitute a 
legitimate military target. That said, ‘war correspondents can only be spared if 
they are clearly recognisable as civilian’, which is not possible ‘if journalists 
wear uniform-like clothing or ride on a military vehicle’241. Moreover, ‘if they 
are close to a military target or if they accompany a military unit on patrol, they 
accept the risk of becoming victims of (lawful)military operations’242. In reality, 
the close relationship between the embedded war correspondent and the unit 
to which they are affiliated, is often what places them squarely in harms way 
during armed conflicts. The presence of one or two civilian war 
correspondents is not going to be sufficient to warrant calling off an attack 
upon those armed forces, on the grounds of distinction, proportionality, 




As for those journalists who are officially incorporated into the armed forces’ 
information services, as members of the armed forces, they are precluded 
from enjoying the protections afforded ordinary civilians against the dangers 
inherent in the theatre of war243. Even as non-combatant members of the 
armed forces, they are not protected by a prohibition against attack (as is the 
case with civilians), and they remain essentially part of a legitimate ‘military 
objective’ as defined in AP I article 52(2). With the exception of the religious 
and medical personnel244 (who enjoy special protections under IHL), all other 
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non-combatants contribute to the achievement of a military advantage, and 
are part of a military objective, and open ‘to attack without special 
considerations or collateral damage calculations’245. Since non-combatants 
can be targeted in an attack, they are entitled to defend themselves, and 
these defensive actions do not amount to unauthorised direct participation in 
hostilities246. 
  
8.6 The activities of journalists in light of the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities 
 
The immunity against hostilities that attaches to civilian status is based on the 
‘fundamental principle of the laws of war, that those who do not participate in 
the hostilities shall not be attacked’247. According to the ICRC’s study into 
customary IHL, the principle that civilians lose their immunity from prosecution 
when they participate in hostilities, is seen as a ‘valuable reaffirmation of an 
existing rule of customary international law’248. For these reasons, the 
protections afforded journalists (as civilians) under AP I 249, operates for so 
long as these journalists refrain from any individual, direct participation in 
hostilities. 
 Given that the legal consequences which follow from a finding that a 
civilian has participated directly in hostilities are serious, there is a 
presumption250 in IHL which favours protective civilian status251 in all 
assessments as to whether an individual has directly participated in hostilities. 
In other words, ‘in case of doubt as to whether a specific civilian conduct 
qualifies as direct participation in hostilities, it must be presumed that the 
general rule of civilian protection applies and that this conduct does not’252 
amount to direct participation, and any ‘intended attack must be 
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suspended’253. That said, it is possible that a civilian’s actions ‘poses a grave 
threat to public security, law and order, without clearly amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities’, and in such instances ‘the regular law enforcement 
mechanisms as well as the legal regime applicable to individual self defence 
will prevail’254.  
 The phrase ‘direct participation in hostilities’ has a very specific 
meaning in the realm of IHL, and refers in short to ‘combat-related 
activities’255 that would normally be undertaken only by members of the armed 
forces’256. Although the phrase ‘direct participation in hostilities’ can be found 
in many IHL provisions257, none the four Geneva Conventions or either of the 
two Additional Protocols provide any clear definition of what actions might 
amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities’258. At most, studies reveal that an 
‘assessment of direct participation has to be made on a case-by-case basis’, 
without actually explaining what amounts to direct participation259. Some 
States military manuals ‘give several examples of acts constituting direct 
participation in hostilities, such as serving as guards, intelligence agents, 
lookouts on behalf of military forces260… spies or couriers’261. That said, the 
ICRC’s study into customary international law, confirms that ‘a precise 
definition of the term “direct participation in hostilities” does not exist’262. This 
leaves States having to interpret ‘the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
… in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its 
constituent terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose of 
IHL’263. 
Given the realities of contemporary warfare, where non-State actors 
are challenging the once clearly defined distinction between combatants and 
civilians264, the need for clarification of the concept of direct participation in 
hostilities is long overdue. In response to this need, the ICRC convened five 
meetings of forty-plus legal experts, drawn from ‘academic, military, 
governmental, and non- governmental circles’, between 2003 and 2008. The 
resultant discussions informed the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide265, which was 
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intended to offer assistance266 in interpreting the term ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’267.  
 
i. Specific hostile acts which amount to direct participation in hostilities. 
 
‘In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, the specific hostile act 
must meet three cumulative criteria: 
 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to 
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus)’268. 
 
I turn now to explore these criteria a bit further, in light of the role that 
journalists play in the theatre of war.  
 
Threshold of harm requirement 
 
The first criterion, which is referred to as the ‘threshold of harm’ determination, 
requires that harm: 
 
a) of a specifically military nature269, or270  
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b) harm (by inflicting death, injury or destruction’271) of a protected person or 
object272, 
must be reasonably expected to result from a journalist’s actions, before the 
journalist can be said to be participating directly in hostilities273. Or to put it 
another way, in order for a journalist to lose their immunity from direct attack, 
‘they must either harm the enemy’s military operations or capacity, or they 
must use means and methods of warfare directly against protected persons or 
objects’274. All that is required is the ‘objective likelihood275 that the act will 
result in such harm’, not necessarily the actual ‘materialisation of harm’276. 
 In short, if a journalist was found committing ‘acts of violence against 
human and material enemy forces’, or causing ‘physical or functional damage 
to military objects, operations or capacity’277, this would satisfy the threshold 
of harm requirement for a finding of ‘direct participation in hostilities’278. Also 
possible, but less likely, is if journalists are found to have inflicted injury on a 
protected person or object. If we examine the activities which journalists are 
likely to engage in, the following might satisfy the threshold of harm 
requirement: where journalists, by their civilian presence restrict or disturb 
military ‘deployments, logistics and communications’279 by ‘voluntarily and 
deliberately positioning themselves to create a physical obstacle to military 
operations of a party to the conflict, they could directly cross the threshold of 
harm required for a qualification as direct participation’280. Similarly, when 
journalists by their civilian presence exercise any form of control over ‘military 
personnel, objects and territory, to the detriment of the adversary’, this also 
reaches the required level of harm281. Of particular relevance to journalists is 
the ICRC’s interpretation that ‘electronic interference with military computer 
networks could also suffice, whether through computer network attacks or 
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International Humanitarian Law at 47. 
272 ‘In the absence of such military harm, however, a specific act must be likely to cause at 
least death, injury, or destruction’ (Idem at 49).  
273 Idem at 47. 
274 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 862. 
275 In other words, ‘harm which may reasonably be expected to result from an act in the 
prevailing circumstances’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 47). 
276 Idem at 33. 
277 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 48. 
278 Idem at 47. 
279 Idem at 48. 
280 Idem at 56. 
281 Idem at 48. 
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exploitation282, as well as ‘wiretapping the adversary's high command or 
transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack’283. In short, journalists 
must be careful that when gathering information they do not ‘interfere with 
military deployments, wiretap military command centres or disclose any 
tactical targeting information which might be used for an attack’284, or be used 
as lookouts whilst reporting on hostilities. While the aforementioned activities 
might compromise a journalist’s civilian protection, their refusing ‘to engage in 
actions that would positively affect one of the parties, as in the case of a 
civilian who refuses to provide information’285, will not amount to direct 
participation in hostilities. 
 Once an action has reached the required threshold of harm, it will only 
amount to direct participation in hostilities if the action ‘additionally satisfies 
the requirements of direct causation and belligerent nexus’286. 
 
The direct causation requirement 
 
The second requirement of the three criteria for a finding of ‘direct 
participation in hostilities’, is termed the ‘direct causation’ test. Much 
controversy has surrounded questions around whether ‘general war effort’287, 
and activities aimed at sustaining war 288, would satisfy the threshold criteria 
and amount to direct participation in hostilities289. It is certainly true that war-
sustaining activities are indispensable to the war effort, which in effect does 
harm the adversary. However, in order to avoid depriving much of the civilian 
population of their protected status, there must be ‘a sufficiently close causal 
relation between the act and the resulting harm’, for it to amount to direct 
participation in hostilities290. According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, 
‘direct causation should be understood as meaning that the harm in question 
must be brought about in one causal step’291. Where a specific act does not 
                                                
282 This includes ‘the ability to gain access to information hosted on information systems and 
the ability to make use of the system itself’ (Ibid). 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 
719; ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 49. 
286 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 50. 
287 This includes all activities ‘objectively contributing to the military defeat of the adversary’, 
for example ‘design, production and shipment of weapons and military equipment, 
construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure 
outside the context of concrete military operations’ (Idem at 53). 
288 This would additionally include ‘political, economic or media activities supporting the 
general war effort’ (Ibid at 53). 
289 Idem at 52. 
290 Idem at 53. 
291 Idem at 54-55. Schmitt is critical of the ‘one causal step ‘ requirement, because it excludes 
from the parameters of direct participation, a range of ‘capacity-building activities’ (Melzer 
‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865-867). Schmitt proposed that ‘it is necessary to ... extend participation as far 
up and downstream as there is a causal link’ (Ibid). Melzer warns that Schmitt’s approach is 
‘extremely permissive’ and that ‘essentially any act connected with the resulting harm through 
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‘on its own directly cause the required threshold of harm, the requirement of 
direct causation would still be fulfilled where the act constitutes an integral 
part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such 
harm’292. So, for example, where journalists are involved in the gathering293 of 
‘intelligence on the army’294 in ‘enemy- controlled territory’295; the transmission 
of ‘tactical intelligence to attacking forces’296 for immediate use297; or simply 
‘the identification and marking of targets’298 - their actions will have the 
required direct causation to amount to direct participation in hostilities. 
 On the other hand, their temporal or geographic proximity cannot on its 
own, without direct causation, amount to a finding of direct participation in 
hostilities299. So, where journalists are acting as ‘voluntary human shields’300; 
‘providing an adversary with supplies and services’301; ‘participating in 
activities in support of the war or military effort’302; or ‘ expressing sympathy 
for the cause of one of the parties to the conflict’303 - these activities do not 
amount to direct participation in hostilities. 
 
The belligerent nexus requirement 
 
In short, the belligerent nexus requirement, requires that ‘an act must be 
specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in 
support of a party to the conflict and304 to the detriment of another’305. In other 
                                                                                                                                      
a causal link would automatically qualify as “direct” participation in hostilities’, no matter how 
far removed the act may be from the final harm caused (Idem at 867). 
292 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
293 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
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step”’ (John Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 155 at 177-8). 
294 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 
708. 
295 Ibid. 
296 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
297 Kenneth Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 641 at 
707. 
298 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 55. 
299 Ibid. 
300 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 865 
301 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 
728. 
302 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. These activities must be distinguished from ‘support 
activities, such as provision of supplies and services … which do not amount to taking a direct 
part in hostilities’ (Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ at 19). 
303 Watkin ‘Opportunity Lost: Organised Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guide’ at 707. 
304 Schmitt is in favour of formulating the belligerent nexus test in the alternative, to read ‘in 
support of a party to the conflict or to the detriment of another’ (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct 
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words, ‘in order to amount to direct participation in hostilities, an act must not 
only be objectively likely to inflict harm that meets the first two criteria, but it 
must also be specifically designed to do so in support of a party to an armed 
conflict and to the detriment of another’306. Consequently, if journalists are 
found causing harm in individual self-defence or defence of others, while that 
will meet the required threshold of harm, it fails to meet the belligerent nexus 
test, and the use of necessary and proportionate force in such situations 
cannot be regarded as direct participation in hostilities’307. Moreover, were a 
journalist to be ‘totally unaware of the role they are playing in the conduct of 
hostilities’, or ‘when they are completely deprived of their physical freedom of 
action308… these activities do not amount to direct participation in hostilities, 
‘despite the belligerent nexus of the military operation in which they are being 
instrumentalised’309. So, for example, if a journalist were found to be involved 
in the ‘preparatory collection of tactical intelligence’310, this activity would meet 
the belligerent nexus test. On the other hand, were journalists to be providing 
‘financial or political support of armed individuals’311, this would fail to rise to 
the level required of the belligerent nexus test. 
 
ii. Conclusions on the role of civilian journalists and the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities  
 
Non-embedded civilian journalists 
 
Non-embedded civilian journalists do not forfeit their IHL civilian status merely 
‘by entering an area of armed conflict on a professional mission, even if they 
are accompanying the armed forces … provided that they do not undertake 
any action which could jeopardise their civilian status’312. According to the 
ICRC, ‘civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed 
                                                                                                                                      
Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 736). Melzer cautions against a 
‘disjunctive reading of the two elements’ for the reasons that it can give rise to situations 
where it would be permissible to respond with military force against criminal elements who 
had no connection to the armed conflict ‘(Melzer ‘‘Keeping the Balance Between Military 
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 873). 
305 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 58. 
306 Ibid. 
307 As a general rule, ‘harm caused (a) in individual self-defence or defence of others against 
violence prohibited under IHL, (b) in exercising power or authority over persons or territory, 
(c) as part of civil unrest against such authority, or (d) during inter-civilian violence lacks the 
belligerent nexus required for a qualification as direct participation in hostilities’ (ICRC 
Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law at 62-64; Van der Toorn ‘”Direct Participation in Hostilities”: A Legal and 
Practical Evaluation of the ICRC Guidance’ at 19). 
308 For example ‘when they are involuntary human shields physically coerced into providing 
cover in close combat’ (ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 60). 
309 Ibid. 
310 Gary Solis (2010) The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War 
Cambridge University Press: New York at 204-5. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Dörmann ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals 
Working in Armed Conflicts’. 
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conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a 
direct part in hostilities. State practice establishes this rule as a norm of 
customary international law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts’313. By categorising journalists as civilians, States 
implicitly agree that ‘being on the spot’314, ‘taking photographs, shooting films, 
recording information, taking notes’, ‘conducting interviews’315, and 
‘transmitting their information and materials to the public via the media, can 
never amount to unlawful direct participation in hostilities’316. Since the 
adoption of AP I, journalists have been cautioned that the privileges extended 
to them under the four GCs might be forfeited ‘if their clothing too closely 
resembles that of combat personnel’317. While journalists do not lose their 
right to protection as a civilian, they do act at their own risk, and may lose ‘de 
facto protection if they stay too close to a military unit’318 or approach a 
military target in respect of which the proportionality rule would permit an 
attack with minor collateral damage319. In this way, while their actions might 
not amount to ‘direct participation in hostilities’, their location may ‘expose 
them to an increased risk of incidental death or Injury’320. 
On the other hand, it is suggested that any acts, not traditionally 
associated with the role of a journalist, which make a ‘direct and effective 
contribution to the military action’, will give rise to the withdrawal of 
protection321. Moreover, broadcasting the strategic positions of enemy forces 
might well amount to direct participation in hostilities.  
 
Embedded journalists/war correspondents 
 
The situation of embedded journalists/war correspondents is more 
complicated, because of their close affiliation to the armed forces. Embedded 
journalists who are accredited to the armed forces, are afforded a special IHL 
status (provided for in GC III article 4A(4)) as individuals ‘who follow the 
armed forces without actually being members thereof’. These embedded 
journalists are essentially civilian non-combatants322. Having said that, the fact 
that embedded journalists accompany the armed forces, increases the risk 
that they might be targeted as part of a legitimate military objective. Because 
of this increased risk of falling into enemy hands, they carry an identification 
card which affords them POW status upon capture.  
 
                                                
313 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 34. 
314 Mukherjee ‘Protection of Journalists Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 36.  
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316 Dörmann ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals 
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318 Gasser ‘The Protection of Journalists Engaged in Dangerous Professional Missions’. 
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International Humanitarian Law’ at 36. 
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International Humanitarian Law at 16. 
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322 This category is dealt with further below. 
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8.7 The temporal scope of the loss of civilian immunity and the legal 
consequences for journalists found participating directly in 
hostilities 
 
Once a civilian journalist carries out a ‘specific hostile act’323 which amounts to 
direct participation in hostilities, their actions compromise their civilian 
immunity from attack. While they never lose their primary civilian status324, 
IHL condones the temporary suspension of their civilian ‘protection against 
direct attack’325, for so long as the civilian engages in direct participation in 
hostilities326. As the ICRC commentary on AP I article 51(3) explains: ‘the 
immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to an overriding condition, 
namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts . Thus a civilian who takes 
part in an armed combat, either individually or as part of a group, thereby 
becomes a legitimate target, though only for as long as he takes part in 
hostilities’327. The notion that civilian immunity from attack can be suspended, 
‘for such time as’ they participate in hostilities, is widely recognised as 
constituting customary international law328.  
 While the ‘for such time’ criterion might reflect customary international 
law, its practical implementation has not been without controversy. For the 
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International Humanitarian Law at 70; Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 
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326 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 70; The ICRC Commentary on AP I article 51(3) ‘allows 
that this would include “preparation for combat and the return from combat”, but then adds 
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section … and he may no longer be attacked”’ (Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in 
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327 AP I article 51(8); Jensen (2011) ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 1995-2003. 
328 Boothby, in his criticism of the concept, points to the U.S. and Israel as evidence that the 
‘for such time as’ requirement is not uncontroversially accepted as having crystallised into 
customary international law. However, even after citing these examples, Boothby himself 
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of The First Protocol express customary international law.”’ (Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance 
Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 885). In short, 
‘Boothby’s doubt as to the customary nature of the phrase “unless and for such time” remains 
unsubstantiated’ (Idem at 886). 
 332 
most part, the controversy lies in the fact that when such a civilian is no longer 
engaged in direct participation (and consequently no longer poses a threat to 
the opposition), they reclaim their full civilian immunity329 from direct targeting 
- giving rise to the what is called the ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection330. 
The net effect of the ‘for such time as’ requirement, is that ‘civilians lose and 
regain protection against direct attack in parallel with the intervals of their 
engagement in direct participation in hostilities’331. The temporary suspension 
of a civilian’s immunity from direct targeting, is only afforded civilians who 
participate in hostilities in a ‘spontaneous, unorganised or sporadic basis’332.  
 The concept of direct participation in hostilities, includes not only the 
obvious individual armed activities, but also the ‘unarmed activities adversely 
affecting the enemy’333. Moreover, owing to the ‘the collective nature and 
complexity of contemporary military operations’, direct participation in 
hostilities must be understood to include those activities which only result in 
the cause of harm ‘in conjunction with other acts’334 According to the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide, the scope of the ‘for such time’ window will also include 
‘measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act’ … ‘as well as the 
deployment to and the return from the location of its execution’335. What the 
Guide does stipulate, however, is that these preparatory measures must be 
linked to ‘specific hostile acts’336 of direct participation, before they amount to 
direct participation in hostilities337. These preparations for a specific hostile act 
are to be distinguished from preparatory activities which merely establish ‘the 
general capacity to carry out hostile acts’ (which do not amount to direct 
participation in hostilities)338. Preparations which are part of a generalised 
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‘campaign of unspecified operations’339, or general ‘capacity building to 
undertake military activity’, do not fall within the scope of the activities for 
which civilian immunity can be forfeited. Where the specific act requires ‘prior 
geographic deployment’, that preparatory deployment ‘already constitutes an 
integral part of the act in question’, and results in the loss of civilian 
immunity340. For an activity to amount to a deployment which will compromise 
civilian immunity, ‘the deploying individual’ … must undertake a physical 
displacement’ with the aim of carrying out the specific act’341. Civilian 
immunity is only restored ‘once the individual in question has physically 
separated from the operation, for example by laying down, storing or hiding 
the weapons or other equipment used, and resuming activities distinct from 
that operation’342. 
 It is worth noting that when journlists regain full civilian immunity from 
attack, they may nevertheless still face ‘prosecution for violations of domestic 
and international law they may have committed’343. The mere fact that they 
participated in hostilities without the requisite ‘combatant privilege’, exposes 
them to potential prosecution - even if during their participation they observed 
the laws of war regarding the means and methods of warfare344. 
 
Civilian345 journalist found participating directly in hostilities 
 
Not only does a civilian journalist lose their immunity against the  unfortunate 
consequences of hostilities when they choose to participate directly in 
hostilities, but they can in fact be legitimately targeted346 by the opposition 
forces acting in self-defence, for the duration of their participation in the 
hostilities347. If journalists are found to be participating directly in hostilities, 
they do not on account of that acquire combatant status - they remain 
civilians, albeit participating illegally in hostilities348. Moreover, once captured, 
they can furthermore face prosecution for their unauthorised participation in 
                                                                                                                                      
fighter’s position and conceals them there without taking any other active role in the 
hostilities, may be regarded as not participating in the hostilities’ (Boothby ‘”And For Such 
Time As”: The Time Dimensions to Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 747). 
339 ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law at 66. 
340 Idem at 67. For an activity to amount to a deployment which will compromise the civilian 
immunity, ‘the deploying individual’… must ‘undertake a physical displacement’ with the aim 
of carrying out the specific act (Ibid). 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Idem 83. 
344 Nils Melzer (2009) Targeted Killing in International Law Oxford University Press: Oxford at 
329. 
345 The restrictions against direct participation in hostilities is aimed at civilians, and 
consequently I will not deal with military journalists in this section, since, as members of the 
armed forces, they are categorised as combatants.  
346 Having said that, combatants are still obliged to observe the principle of proportionality; 
shield other civilians from attack; and keep to a minimum any resultant civilian losses (Gasser 
(1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211; Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 703). 
347 AP I article 51(8); ICRC Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law at 12.  
348 Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 233. 
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hostilities349, although they should still be treated humanely as civilians, and 
afforded the ‘regular and fair judicial guarantees extended to civilians350.  
 
Embedded journalist found participating directly in hostilities 
 
As for embedded journalists, the comments above regarding civilian 
journalists are also applicable to them. That said, they have the added 
complication that if they infiltrate the opposition’s territory, they might be 
suspected of spying, particularly if they ‘overstep their role and the limits of 
their professional mandate’351. If they are captured whilst disguising 
themselves as anything other then war correspondents, and using that 
disguise to gain a military advantage for the unit to which they are associated, 
they can face prosecution on grounds of spying. This might be true, 
particularly in instances when embedded journalists report back to the 
commanding officer (of the unit to which they are attached) on the 
opposition’s position, military capacity, or other information which might be 
used to gain a military advantage. By acting as spies for the armed forces, 
embedded journalists may forfeit the otherwise civilian privileges that they 
enjoy. In particular, they may be tried for perfidy if captured by the opposition, 
because they disguised themselves as regular civilians, and something other 
than embedded journalists. 
 
8.8  Conclusions  
 
The work of the press during international armed convicts will always involve 
risks, which journalists often choose to take. The law cannot always protect 
them from the consequences of their own free decisions, or from the dangers 
they themselves seek to face352. What the law can do is to offer them a 
particular IHL status, which will bring with it obligations which will have to be 
observed by the belligerent parties. 
 As a profession, journalists and their equipment enjoy no special 
professional status in IHL. Those journalists who opt to work for the military’s 
information services, will be classified as non-combatant members of the 
armed forces. All other journalists, both those embedded in the armed forces, 
and those who do not accompany the armed forces, will always be presumed 
to retain their civilian status in international armed conflicts353. Embedded 
journalists enjoy the benefits afforded POWs upon capture, because they are 
grouped with ‘persons accompanying the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof’.  
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With regard to targeting decisions, where journalists are implicated, 
only those decisions which result in proportionate attacks on legitimate 
military objectives which satisfy the requirements of military necessity and 
advanced warning, will be defensible under IHL. IHL is clear that civilian 
broadcasting operations can in some instances be classified as military 
objectives, particularly when they are dual-use sites being utilised for both 
civilian and military purposes. For the remainder, unless the media are used 
for ‘military purposes or to incite people to commit grave breaches of IHL, acts 
of genocide or acts of violence’354, they remain immune from attack - even if 
they are broadcasting propaganda. Having said that, even when involved in 
any of these illegal acts, it is still incumbent upon commanding officers to limit 
‘civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects’355, by observing the 
requirements of military necessity, proportionality, distinction and effective 
advance warning. The risk which embedded journalists run is that they may 
lose their ‘de facto civilian protection if they stay too close to a military unit or 
approach a military target’356 in respect of which the proportionality rule would 
permit an attack. They also run the risk of being categorised as spies if 
captured, while disguising themselves as anything other then war 
correspondents, and using that disguise to gain a military advantage for the 
unit to which they are associated.  
All civilian journalists will enjoy immunity from direct attack and the 
general humane protections afforded civilians, provided they refrain from 
participating directly in hostilities. Any acts not traditionally associated with the 
role of a journalist - which meet the three criteria of threshold of harm, direct 
causation and belligerent nexus - will give rise to the temporary withdrawal of 
protection. In particular, journalists who act as lookouts, or gather intelligence 
in enemy-controlled territory, which assists the opposition in the identification 
and marking of military targets - will be considered to be participating in 
hostilities. If civilian journalists are found to be participating directly in 
hostilities, they do not acquire combatant status, but they can temporarily 
compromise their civilian immunity against attack for so long as they persist in 
their participation in the hostilities. Should they fall into enemy hands after 
such participation, they may be held to account and prosecuted for their 
unauthorised actions. However, at all times they will have to be treated 
humanely and afforded the fair judicial guarantees normally extended to 
civilians.  
 Sadly, the risks which journalists face in situations of armed conflict 
often make them the topic of news headlines, rather then their author.  
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ASSESSING THE COMBATANT STATUS OF RELIEF WORKERS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, IN LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 






On 19 August 2003, a suicide bomber drove a truck into the ‘undefended, 
quintessentially soft target’ of the United Nation’s (U.N.) Baghdad headquarters, 
housing international aid workers and their offices’2. The explosion killed twenty-
three relief workers3. Only nine weeks later on 27 October 2003, suicide bombers 
targeted the ICRC’s Baghdad headquarters, killing thirty-five relief workers and 
wounding two hundred more4. More recently, in the early hours of 31 May 2010, 
an Israeli military operation5 targeted two vessels6, staffed with six hundred 
civilians (allegedly neutral relief workers) from thirty-two nation states, bearing 
educational, medical and construction materials aimed at ending the Israeli 
blockade around Gaza. The world watched in amazement as media reports 
showed civilians fending off blackclad Israeli forces as they rappelled onto the 
vessels. Before taking full control of the vessels and the cargo, the Israeli forces 
killed ten civilians and injured thirty others7.  
                                                
1 This chapter is an updated version of a published article entitled ‘Relief Workers: the Hazards of 
Offering Humanitarian Assistance in the Theatre of War’ (2010) 35 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 56. The revision of this published piece has been made with the kind 
permission of the SAYIL editorial board. 
2 Kenneth Anderson ‘Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and 
Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts’ 
(2004) Spring Harvard Human Rights Journal 41 at 45. 
3 Felicity Barringer ‘Questions About the Role of World Agencies in Hot Spots’ (20 August 2003) 
New York Times at A9. One month later a second suicide bomber detonated a bomb outside the 
U.N. headquarters in Baghdad on 22 September 2003, killing himself and another civilian and 
wounding nineteen others. (Ian Fisher ‘Suicide Attacker Who Struck at U.N. Carried Two Bombs’ 
(23 September 2003) New York Times at A13).  
4 Dexter Filkins and Alex Berenson ‘Suicide Bombers in Baghdad Kill at Least 34’ (28 October 
2003) New York Times at A1; Rajiv Chandrasekaran ‘Car Bombs Kill at Least 35 in Baghdad; 
Red Cross, 3 Police Stations Hit, Killing 1 American; Foreign Fighters Blamed’ (28 October 2003) 
Washington Post at A1. 
5 Supported by Israeli naval ships and helicopters. There are competing views as to how to 
classify the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. One view, endorsed by Antionio 
Cassese and the Israeli Supreme Court in the Targeted Killings case (HCJ 769/02 (11 December 
2005) is that ‘the entire conflict, including during December 2008 - January 2009 in the Gaza 
Strip, is an international armed conflict’ (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Projects available at 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_state=113 
(accessed 21 May 2013). 
6 The Turkish-registered Mavi Marmara and the Greek-registered Sfendonii.  
7 U.N. SC ‘Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in Civilian Deaths During Israeli Operation 
Against Gaza-bound Aid Convoy, Calls for Investigation, In Presidential Statement’ (June 2010) 
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When neutral and impartial relief workers are targeted in these ways, the 
response is often one of sheer disbelief. The words of the Deputy Secretary-
General of the U.N., Malloch Brown, convey this sentiment: ‘we do this out of 
vocation. We are apolitical …. why us?’8. Sadly, these incidents reveal that not 
only are relief workers exposed to collateral damage in the theatre of armed 
conflict, but they are now also viewed as ‘potential political targets’9.  
 Prior to the 1990s ‘the ICRC was virtually alone in working in active 
conflict zones’10. Other relief workers11 ‘remained largely at the periphery, 
working in government-held territories or in neighbouring countries where 
conflict-affected populations sought asylum as refugees’12. The end of the Cold 
War saw ‘a more interventionist approach’… [aimed at reaching] ‘populations on 
all sides of a conflict’13. Post Cold War, relief workers from all parts of the world 
began ‘to work within wars, not simply around them’14. 
 Regrettably, studies show that in recent years the ‘deliberate targeting of 
civilians, large scale population displacement, grave violations of international 
humanitarian law … and restrictions on humanitarian access to civilians’15, have 
increasingly been a feature of international armed conflicts. Together with the 
increased demand that this has placed on the need for humanitarian relief, has 
come a dramatic increase16 in the deliberate targeting17 of relief workers. In a 
study undertaken by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) in 2008, it was found 
                                                                                                                                            
SC 9940. For a complete discussion of this incident in light of IHL see Shannon Bosch ‘Israel 
Attacks an “Aid” Flotilla Bound for Gaza: A Dark Day for International Law’ (2010) 35:2 Journal for 
Juridical Science 1. 
8 Barringer ‘Questions About the Role of World Agencies in Hot Spots’. 
9 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 4. 
10 Idem at 20. 
11 Including those affiliated to the U.N. and those belonging to international NGO’s (Ibid). 
12 Idem at 21. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Rebecca Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law’ (2009) 91:874 International Review of the Red Cross 371 at 372. 
16 During the period 1997-2006 ‘there were 408 reported acts of major violence against aid 
workers … involving 941 victims and resulting in 434 fatalities’ (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver 
‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations’ at 1). In the three-year 
period between 2002-2005, the statistics reveal that violent acts directed at aid workers were 
double those from the four year period preceding 2002 (Ibid; ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’ (28 
January 1998) Official statement available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JP2C (accessed at 28 November 2010) at 1). 
Those mandated by the U.N. appear to be the most susceptible, consequently other NGO’s have 
started to paint their traditionally white utility vehicles ‘yellow, pink, anything as long as it has no 
military connotations’ in the hopes that they will not be associated with the U.N. relief workers 
(Kate Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89:865 International 
Review of the Red Cross at 125). 
17 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 372. 
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that relatively18 speaking, the rates of attacks directed at aid workers had 
increased by sixty-one percent’19. 
 This alarming increase in attacks targeting relief workers, is challenging 
the longstanding international humanitarian law (IHL) position that neutral relief 
organisations, be they U.N. official agencies or private humanitarian agencies 
(such as the ICRC), were immune from attack20. It seems that the ‘protected 
status’21 they once enjoyed under IHL is not only insufficient to protect them 
against acts of violence, but they in fact appear to be ‘especially vulnerable for a 
variety of reasons beyond their control’22.  
 Given the ‘resources at their disposal, humanitarian agencies make 
particularly tempting targets’23. Belligerents see ‘humanitarian assistance as 
something to control, reap or deny’24. In failed states they are particularly 
vulnerable to being hijacked for their supplies. So, for example, in Bosnia ‘aid 
commodities were treated as spoils of war’, making the relief workers targets for 
attack25. Moreover, they are often ‘especially vulnerable’26 and ‘soft targets’27, 
given that they are unarmed and in some case operate without a security detail. 
Their presence at the frontline of armed conflict, and their interactions with the 
civilian population, often make them ‘inconvenient witnesses’28 to ‘instances of 
war crimes and genocide’29, - witnesses whom the belligerents would rather 
silence. 
                                                
18 In other words the ‘number of attacks per aid workers in the field’. 
19 According to Barber ‘the average annual number of attacks in 2008 was almost three times 
higher than the annual average for the preceding nine years’ (Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian 
Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ at 373). Moreover, ‘cases in 
which the ICRC has been deliberately targeted have increased steadily, from three percent to 
twenty percent’ (ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’); ‘In 2003 alone, seventy-six [non UN] 
humanitarian workers were killed by hostile action’ (Peter Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private 
Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian 
Community’ in Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer (eds) Resetting the Rules of Engagement: 
Trends and Issues in Military–Humanitarian Relations (2006) 22 HPG Report at 6). 
20 Provided they acted with impartiality in offering humanitarian assistance, the persons, property 
and missions of relief workers were immune from targeting in the theatre of operations (Anderson 
‘Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO 
Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts’ at 42; Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
and Louise Doswald-Beck (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at rules 31 and 32). 
21 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 23. 
22 Ibid. 
23 ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’.  
24 Christopher Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private 
Security Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’ (2008) 39 Security Dialogue 363 available at 
http://www.cociscampagnapace.it/materiali/SPEARIN2008.pdf (accessed 24 August 2012). 
25 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 23. 
26 Idem at 1. 
27 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’. 
28 ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’. 
29 Ibid. 
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This reality is especially true given the ‘culture of impunity’ which thrives in 
a ‘failed state’30 environment as was the case in Afghanistan. Sometimes, as in 
the case of the Israeli raid upon the ‘aid’ flotilla bound for Gaza, those targeting 
so called ‘relief workers’, question their claims of neutrality and their right to enjoy 
the IHL protections afforded humanitarian relief31. In other instances, relief 
workers are targeted ‘because of the larger values and foreign presence they 
represent’32. Increasingly, relief workers are identified with a ‘Western pursuit’33, 
and ‘an attack on the humanitarian enterprise may simply be viewed as a strike 
against one of the ‘tools’ of the enemy’34. This is particularly true when states are 
funding the relief work and thereby pushing their own political agenda in the 
conflict. Several prominent relief organisations place ‘considerable reliance upon 
State funding’35, while others go to great lengths to ‘maintain a degree of financial 
independence from State sources’36. Furthermore, as relief workers are more 
often than not drawn from foreign states, they are often seen by belligerents as 
useful for their hostage potential, and their capacity to draw the world’s attention 
to the belligerents’ cause.  
 When Colin Powell infamously announced that ‘international NGOs in 
Afghanistan were ‘force multipliers’37 in the war on terror’, he unwittingly 
‘politicised their role’, endorsed ‘perceptions of partiality’, and undermined their 
claims to ‘neutrality’38. With integration between relief workers and the armed 
forces comes the ‘perception of complicity and association’39. When relief 
workers are forces operating with the blessing of the military force on the 
                                                
30 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 23. 
31 SC Resolution 9940 (2010) available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9940.doc.htm (accessed 4 September 2012). 
32 ‘Islamists Kill Aid Workers Because they are Part of the Infidel Project’; Spearin ‘Private, Armed 
and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security Companies and Shifting 
Humanitarianism’. 
33 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 21. 
34 Idem at 23. 
35 Save the Children U.S.A., International Rescue Committee, and CARE U.S.A. receive between 
sixty-one to eighty-three percent of its funding from government sources (Spearin ‘Private, Armed 
and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security Companies and Shifting 
Humanitarianism’). 
36 Oxfam (Great Britain) limits to twenty-five percent, the funding it receives from the British 
government, and ‘Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) generally receives only thirty percent of its 
funding from government sources, and has rules in place to prevent this amount from going 
beyond fifty percent’ (Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International 
Private Security Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’). 
37 Raj Rana ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or 
Incompatibility?’ (2004) 86:855 Internation Review of the Red Cross 565 at 567. 
38 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 23. 
39 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’. 
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ground40, and when ‘multinational armed forces assume roles that go beyond 
providing security or engaging in combat’41, this kind of military affiliation blurs 
the distinction between the combatant and non-combatant42. The conflict in Iraq 
and Afghanistan mark a high water mark43 for the dilemma faced when the 
‘armed forces are increasingly active in roles typically filled by civilians’44. When 
this happens in armed conflicts, ‘the impression is created that humanitarian 
organisations and their personnel are merely tools within integrated approaches 
to conflict management’45 and ‘nation-building agendas’46. The more military, 
political and humanitarian agendas are integrated, the ‘greater the difficulties 
faced by genuine ‘humanitarian, neutral and independent’47 relief workers, who 
are viewed with suspicion, placed in ‘uncomfortable situations’48, and exposed to 
greater risk of being directly targeted49. In the end, this state of affairs ‘threatens 
the integrity of the humanitarian’s ethical principles of neutrality and impartiality50 
- if not directly, then at least potentially in the eyes of various indigenous actors in 
theatre’51. When the relief worker is helped by my enemy, or ‘helps my enemy, 
                                                
40 As was the case when ‘humanitarian actors followed the NATO-led ground forces into Kosovo’ 
(Rana ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or 
Incompatibility?’ at 566). 
41 Idem at 856. ‘In one moment in time our service members will be feeding and 
clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be 
holding two warring tribes apart — peacekeeping. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-
intensity battle. All in the same day, all within three city blocks’ (Idem at 577). Spearin ‘Private, 
Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security Companies and Shifting 
Humanitarianism’. 
42 ‘From the tentative attempts of the 1990s to conduct humanitarian activities, 
armed forces have now moved on to consider such tasks as their mainstream 
responsibilities in all contexts’ (Rana ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: 
Complementarity or Incompatibility?’ at 568). Admittedly the ‘the concept of civil-military 
cooperation’ is not new, during the Vietnam War ‘Special Forces personnel were deployed 
alongside USAID civilian representatives in a hearts and minds campaign to provide development 
assistance while waging a counter-insurgency campaign’ (Idem at 573). In 2001, the ICRC 
adopted ‘Guidelines for Civil-Military Relations (CMR), for multinational military missions 
engaging in humanitarian activities or deployed under a humanitarian mandate, while potentially 
becoming an active participant in hostilities’ (Idem at 566 - 570). I will not focus any further on the 
issue of the military providing humanitarian relief, since my focus is on relief workers and how 
affiliations with the military complicate their claim to neutrality and independence. 
43 Idem at 856.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Idem at 856 and 566. 
46 Ibid. 
47 ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’. 
48 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’. 
49 Rana ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or 
Incompatibility?’ at 586.  
50 Idem at 582. 
51 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’. 
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he becomes my enemy too’52. ‘If you are perceived as an enemy, the danger you 
face automatically increases’53.  
By definition, relief workers are required to offer humanitarian assistance 
without favouring any particular party to a conflict. Determining exactly what 
constitutes favouring one belligerent party, is proving more taxing, particularly 
when the civilian population of one of the belligerent parties might be more 
severely affected by the conflict, and consequently more in need of relief 
assistance. In such instances, it is easy for belligerents to accuse relief workers - 
who are merely seeking access to vulnerable civilians - of favouring one party in 
the conflict. Similarly, when relief workers are involved in rebuilding economic or 
social infrastructure, and reconnecting severed amenities (such as electricity and 
water supplies), there is the potential to argue that relief workers are 
inadvertently aiding the opposition forces, along with the intended civilian 
beneficiaries. Moreover, it is not unheard of for relief workers to find themselves 
(whether purposely or coincidentally) at dual-use sites like electricity and water 
supplies, effectively shielding these sites from military targeting, much like 
voluntary human shields54.  
 Their presence in the theatre of hostilities, while permitted by IHL, hinders 
military deployments and complicates targeting assessments. Consequently, in 
modern conflicts it is often difficult to distinguish genuinely neutral humanitarian 
assistance from disguised assistance to belligerent parties. 
 In this chapter I explain the legal status of relief workers under IHL while 
they are deployed in the theatre of international armed conflicts. In undertaking 
this investigation, I begin with a brief definition of a relief worker. I then turn to 
examine the existing IHL regime applicable to relief workers and the 
unsuccessful attempts at granting relief workers special protection by virtue of 
international treaty law. Following that, I examine the legal implications and 
limitations that default civilian status might have for relief workers, and the 
complications which follow when relief workers make use of private military and 
security contractors (PMSCs) to provide security in the theatre of armed conflict. 
The issue of whether the actions of relief workers might in fact amount to direct 
participation in hostilities, and what consequences might flow from this possible 
conclusion, in light of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide on direct participation in 
hostilities, is then explored. Lastly, I look at the obligations upon those who hold 






                                                
52 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’ (19 
January 1998) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp85.htm 
(accessed 29 August 2012). 
53 ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’. 
54 For more on the role of voluntary human shields in armed conflict see Shannon Bosch 
‘Voluntary Human Shields: Status-less in the Cross Hairs?’ (2007) 40:3 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of South Africa at 322. 
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9.2 Defining ‘relief workers’ 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century the face of humanitarian assistance has 
undergone a remarkable transformation55. At the end of the Cold War,  
humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) became the prominent 
actors in the field of relief work. These private, non-state entities56 were driven by 
the motivation to act with neutrality and impartiality, independently of states57 and 
their ulterior motives and interventionist agendas58. 
How one determines what actions amount to humanitarian assistance, has 
been the topic for much debate under IHL. The meaning of exactly what can be 
said to amount to relief work or humanitarian assistance, ‘has become elusive, as 
a new set of actors has claimed it as part of a new, more interventionist 
international order’59. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) faced this 
controversial issue in Nicaragua v. United States of America60 when it had to 
determine whether the actions on the part of the U.S.A. amounted to 
humanitarian assistance or unlawful intervention in Nicaragua’s State 
sovereignty. In canvassing the issue, the court defined ‘humanitarian assistance’ 
as aid that is given ‘without discrimination to all in need … to prevent suffering … 
and to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being’61.  
 Not surprisingly, we find that the quintessential humanitarian organisation 
- the ICRC – describes its mandate as follows: ‘to impartially protect and assist 
victims of conflict, without any discrimination as to nationality, race, religious 
beliefs, class or political opinions’62. Many relief organisations: 
  
‘contend that preserving the humanitarian ethic …serves to maintain and 
protect their personnel in the field. Not being linked to other actors, 
especially those that are armed or who have a political agenda, and 
concentrating solely on handling the plight of the needy allows NGOs 
                                                
55 Philippe Ryfman ‘Non-governmental Organisations: An Indispensable Player of Humanitarian 
Aid’ (2007) 89:865 International Review of the Red Cross 21 at 22.  
56 Id at 24-25. 
57 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) Judgment (1986) ICJ Rep at para 243. 
61 Ibid. Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 116.The Institute of 
International Law in its ‘Humanitarian Assistance’ Resolution of the 16th Commission (2003) 
defines humanitarian assistance more extensively as including ‘all acts, activities and the human 
and material resources for the provision of goods and services of an exclusively humanitarian 
character, indispensable for the survival and the fulfilment of the essential needs of the victims of 
disasters’ (article 1) (Kate Mackintosh ‘Reclaiming Protection as a Humanitarian Goal: Fodder for 
the Faint-Hearted Aid-Worker’ 2010 1 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 382–396 at 393). 
62 Rana ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or 
Incompatibility?’ at 581; Jennifer White ‘IEEPA'S Override Authority: Potential for a Violation of 
the Geneva Conventions’ Right to Access for Humanitarian Organisations?’ (2006) 104 Michigan 
Law Review 2019 at 2029. 
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greater access… their very weakness seemingly makes their presence 
more acceptable’63.  
 
What is troubling, however, is that relief workers often remain in the theatre of 
hostilities, so as to assist the most vulnerable, and yet they have no special IHL 
status (like that afforded medical and religious personnel)64. While IHL demands 
that they act with neutrality - as will be explained in what follows - that very 
requirement often places them outside the scope of the IHL provisions aimed at 
protecting civilians found in the theatre of operations65. Similarly, pursuing those 
who violate the protections extended to relief workers, is also constricted by 
international criminal law. So, for example, under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), ‘war crimes can only be committed against protected 
persons fulfilling the nationality requirement’66; that is, persons who are from 
nation states that are involved in the conflict. As far as independent relief workers 
go, they are effectively excluded from the protections afforded by the ICC 
Statute, unless their nation State is party to the conflict67. Even more disturbing is 
the growing perception amongst belligerents that relief workers are, by their so-
called humanitarian actions, actually participating in hostilities, and therefore 
subject to direct targeting for their direct participation in hostilities. 
 
9.3 Existing international law provisions aimed at protecting relief workers 
 
Relief workers operate to fulfil a legitimate international law mandate to provide 
victims of international armed conflict with ‘humanitarian assistance’ (in the form 
of food, medicines and medical equipment). While this obligation should usually 
be shouldered by the territorial State or the occupying power68, the reality is such 
that it is often left to ‘impartial humanitarian relief operations’69 who step in with 
the ‘explicit, implicit or at least tacit agreement of the warring factions’70. 
                                                
63 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’. 
64 Walter Rabus ‘Protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 308; 
Walter Rabus ‘Religious Personnel’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in 
Armed Conflict (1995) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 369. 
65 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian Organisations 
and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 129. 
66 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (UN doc. S/25704) 2187 U.N. Treaty Series 3 
also available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (accessed 14 July 2012) 
at article 8; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 31. 
67 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian Organisations 
and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 121. 
68 ‘Parties to a conflict and/or occupying powers have the obligation to ensure that the civilian 
population under their control is adequately provided with food, medical supplies, clothing, 
bedding, means of shelter and other items essential to its survival’ (Rana ‘Contemporary 
Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or Incompatibility?’ at 573). 
69 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
70 According to the ICRC, a ‘failure to obtain the necessary consent will render the humanitarian 
action unauthorised and potentially in violation on IHL’ (Ibid).  
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 There are some protections provided for those providing relief assistance 
in times of international armed conflict in both IHL71, human rights treaty law and 
international criminal law72. While the ‘fundamental responsibility for the security 
of aid personnel lies with the host State’73, the reality is that this simply does not 
happen in situations of failed States, who lack the capacity and political will to 
provide such security for relief workers at the height of an international armed 
conflict74.  
 




The Geneva conventions state categorically that the civilian population is entitled 
to receive humanitarian relief75. The necessary corollary to this is that under 
Geneva law, States are obliged to permit (despite blockade conditions76) the ‘free 
passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores … essential 
foodstuffs, clothing and tonics’77. These consignments are, however, not only 
limited in their substance, but also in their intended beneficiaries. The medical 
consignments can only be intended for the civilian population, and the food and 
clothing is further limited to ‘children under fifteen, expectant mothers and 
maternity cases’78. In order to ensure that both the civilian’s right to receive aid 
and the relief worker’s right to enjoy free passage to provide the permitted aid, 
Geneva law ‘requires that all States guarantee the protection of relief supplies 
intended for occupied territories’79. Where the detaining or occupying power 
‘cannot provide the necessary humanitarian assistance’ ‘to persons not of their 
nationality but within their effective control’ they ‘shall request or shall accept ... 
the offer of the services of a humanitarian organisation ... to assume the 
humanitarian functions performed by the protecting powers’, and unconditionally 
cooperate so as to ‘facilitate the relief schemes of third parties’ when the 
                                                
71 The focus of this piece will be on the IHL protections.  
72 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 381. 
73 Not only is this principle of host state responsibility ‘embodied in IHL’ but it has also been 
‘reaffirmed in several U.N. resolutions’ [and] … ‘formally adopted by seventy-nine state 
signatories to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’ 
(Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 4). 
74 Ibid. 
75 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) 
of 12 August 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 at article 30(1); Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 199. 
76 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
77 GC IV article 23. 
78 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 194; GCIV article 
23; Yoram Dinstein (2004) The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed 
Conflict Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 226.  
79 GC IV article 59; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
110. ‘Unfortunately no similar obligation exists outside of occupied territories’ (Dinstein The 
Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 226). 
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occupying power is unable to meet these demands80. ‘In short, occupying powers 
must not only consent to, but must seek out and actively facilitate humanitarian 
assistance’81. Moreover, across all four of the Geneva Conventions one finds a 
common provision (expressed in article 3) that IHL acknowledges the right of 
‘impartial humanitarian bodies like for example the ICRC, ‘to offer its services to 
the parties to the conflict’82. 
 Additional Protocol I also states explicitly that where the civilian population 
is ‘not adequately provided with [food and supplies essential to survival] ... relief 
actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without 
any adverse distinction shall be83 undertaken, subject to the agreement of the 
parties concerned in such relief actions’84. In the words of the ICRC, ‘offers of 
assistance fulfilling these conditions shall not be regarded either as interference 
in the armed conflict or as hostile acts’85. Once again we see that relief work not 
only requires the ‘approval of the party in whose territory that relief is being 
carried out’86, but that States are obliged to facilitate their access87 to the civilians 
in need88 and that ‘only in the case of imperative military necessity may the 
activities of relief personnel be limited or their movements temporarily 
restricted’89. In short, ‘relief operations must not be allowed to interfere with 
military operations, lest the safety of humanitarian relief personnel be 
endangered’90. While the party from which consent is required, is permitted under 
IHL to ‘exercise control over the relief action’91, it is prohibited from refusing the 
required consent on ‘arbitrary grounds’92. Once again States are obliged to 
facilitate those authorised93 to provide humanitarian assistance (including 
‘transportation, administration and distribution of relief consignments’94) and 
                                                
80 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’; GC IV 
article 55 and 59. 
81 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 384. 
82 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
83 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 383. 
84 Ibid; API article 69; ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian 
Organisations’.  
85 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
86 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 383; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 196; 
API article 71(1) ‘participation of such personnel in relief action is subject to the approval of the 
Party in whose territory they carry out their duties’ (Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the 
Law of International Armed Conflict at 166). 
87 API article 71(3); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
200. 
88 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 199. 
89 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 383; ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
90 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 202. 
91 Idem at 197. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Idem at 109. 
94 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 166. 
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ensure that relief personnel are ‘respected and protected’95. Relief workers for 
their part, are entitled to this assistance, provided their do not exceed their 
mission96. 
 What is novel about the provisions in the Additional Protocol is that they 
expand the previously limited entitlement to relief assistance, ‘to the whole 
population and not only to vulnerable segments’97. Also new to AP I is the 
broadened obligation upon all States (not just those States party to the conflict), 
‘to provide rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment 




The ICRC study undertaken to assess the customary law status of the provisions 
found in IHL treaties, confirmed that many of these provisions pertaining to 
humanitarian assistance, have risen to the level of customary IHL. 
 The study endorsed the position that ‘humanitarian relief personnel must 
be respected and protected’99 against attack, ‘harassment, intimidation and 
arbitrary detention’100. This position is reiterated in the ‘military manuals of many 
States’101, ‘supported by official statements and reported practice’102, and several 
states (even those states not party to AP I103) make it an offence under domestic 
legislation ‘to attack humanitarian relief personnel’104. The study affirms that, not 
only are the personnel themselves to be respected, but the ‘objects105 used for 
humanitarian relief operations must [also] be respected and protected’106 against 
destruction, misappropriation and looting107 according to State practice108’, official 
                                                
95 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’; API article 
71(2). 
96 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’ API article 
71(4) ‘relief personnel must not exceed the terms of their mission’. 
97 Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict at 227. 
98 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 194 and 198; 
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1979) 1125 U.N. Treaty Series 1391 
article 70(2). 
99 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 31. It is a 
necessary ‘corollary of the prohibition of starvation’ (Idem at rule 53), ‘as well as the rule that the 
wounded and sick must be collected and cared for’ (Idem at 109-110). 
100 Idem at 108. 
101 Idem at 106. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Idem at rule 31. 
104 Idem at 106. 
105 Idem at 111. ‘Objects involved in a humanitarian relief operation are, in principle, civilian 
objects and as such enjoy protection from attack’ (Idem at rule 7). 
106 Idem at rule 32. 
107 Idem at 111. 
108 Idem at 109. ‘This rule is a corollary of the prohibition against starvation (rule 53)108…because 
the safety and security of humanitarian relief objects are an indispensable condition for the 
delivery of humanitarian relief to civilian populations in need threatened with starvation. This rule 
is also a corollary of the prohibition on deliberately impeding the delivery of humanitarian relief 
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statements109 and resolutions of international organisations’110. Both States and 
international organisations have been quick to condemn instances of ‘alleged 
violations of these rules’111. 
 The study further maintains that ‘the parties to the conflict must allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in 
need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse 
distinction, subject to their right of control’112 as a matter of customary IHL. Rule 
56 goes on to state that as a corollary to Rule 55113, ‘the parties to the conflict 
must ensure the freedom of movement of authorised humanitarian relief 
personnel essential to the exercise of their functions’, and that only ‘imperative 
military necessity’ might result in ‘their movements being temporarily 
restricted’114. The study revealed this rule was evidenced by military manuals115, 
‘state practice’116 and repeatedly reiterated statements and resolutions117 by the ‘ 
U.N. Security Council118, U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights’119. Moreover, ‘violations of these rules have been condemned’120 
and on the whole, ‘no official contrary practice was found’121. 
As for the treaty law provision requiring that organisations seek out the 
authorisation of the State before commencing their humanitarian operation, the 
study revealed that ‘most practice does not mention the requirement…but [that] it 
is self-evident that a party to the conflict cannot be required to ensure the 
freedom of movement of an organisation it has not authorised’122. In this regard 
the study made special mention of the ICRC and the special recognition that they 
enjoy in the theatre of armed conflicts and their entitlement to be ‘respected at all 
times’123.  
 Across both the treaty law provisions and the customary law expressions 
of many of these provisions, the fundamental motivator is that to refuse access to 
                                                                                                                                            
(rule 55) because any attack on, destruction or pillage of relief objects inherently amounts to an 
impediment of humanitarian relief’ (Ibid). 
109 Idem at 110. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Idem at 107 and 111. 
112 Idem at 193 and rule 55 
113 Idem at 200. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Idem at 194-195. 
116 Idem at 194. 
117 Idem at 201. 
118 Idem at 194-195, SC Resolutions 1261(1999) and 1265 (1999) available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm (accessed 4 September 2012); and SC Resolution 
1296 (2000) available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm (accessed 4 September 
2012). 
119 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 198. 
120 Idem at 201 and 195. 
121 Idem at 201. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Idem at 202. 
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humanitarian assistance, ‘would risk causing starvation or otherwise threaten the 
survival of a civilian population’124. 
 
Soft law  
 
Many U.N. resolutions and declarations speak to the importance which the 
international community attaches to the principles that relief workers are to be 
given ‘access to the victims of armed conflicts’ and, that in carrying out their 
mandate, these relief workers are to be respected and protected125. The U.N. 
Security Council has ‘on several occasions demanded that the necessary 
conditions be created for the unimpeded distribution of humanitarian supplies, 
urged the parties to cooperate with humanitarian organisations in allowing relief 
to be delivered in complete security and demanded that the parties to the conflict 
take the necessary steps to guarantee the safety of the personnel responsible for 
delivering humanitarian aid’126. In some instances the U.N. Security Council has 
even ‘authorised forces participating in U.N. military operations or certain 
Member States "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations"’127. In 1991 the General 
Assembly published the ‘Guiding Principles on Humanitarian Assistance’ which 
‘emphasise that “states in proximity to emergencies are urged to participate 
closely with the affected countries in international efforts, with a view to 
facilitating, to the extent possible, the transit of humanitarian assistance”’128. 
 There are also a number of international declarations like the 1969 ICRC 
Declaration of Principles for International Humanitarian Relief of the Civilian 
Population in Disaster Situations’129, which reiterates the importance of these IHL 
principles. Furthermore, within the U.N.130 there have been several initiatives ‘to 
                                                
124 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 372. 
125 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. U.N. GA 
A/RES 51/195 (Afghanistan) U.N. GA Resolution 59/211 on the Safety and Security of 
Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of U.N. Personnel (2004); General Assembly Optional 
Protocol 60/123 (2006). 
126 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. SC 
resolution 1296 (2000) ‘called upon all parties to armed conflict …to ensure the safety and 
security and freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 109). SC Resolution 1502 (2003), ‘which 
condemned all forms of violence against those participating in humanitarian operations and urged 
states to ensure that crimes against such personnel did not go unpunished’ (Stoddard, Harmer 
and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations’ at 34); 
Security Council Presidential Statement on the Protection of U.N. Personnel in Conflict Zones 
(2000); Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel – Report of the Secretary-General 
(October 2000). 
127 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. SC 
Resolution 794/1992 (concerning Somalia). 
128 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 199. 
129 Resolution XXVI, XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross (Istanbul, 1969). 
130 Under the auspices of the UNDSS, IASC and in 1988 the U.N. established the first Security 
Coordination Office (UNSECOORD) which ‘devised a UN-wide security management system, in 
which all agencies were obliged to follow the same basic rules and procedures’ (Stoddard, 
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sensitise member states to security issues’131 faced by relief workers, and foster 
‘collaboration between the U.N., NGOs and inter-governmental organisations’132, 
in order to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel. 
In 1994 the ICRC published its Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in 
Disaster Relief133 and in 1999 the ICRC produced its safety and security 
guidelines – entitled ‘Staying Alive’134, aimed at minimising the negative effects 
on field security of humanitarian organisations135.  
 
ii. International criminal law 
 
There is also a range of treaty provisions which criminalise inhumane treatment 
of workers catering to the needs of non-military personnel in the field of 
international criminal law. For instance, the ICC Statute lists as a war crime 
‘willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva 
Conventions’136, and ‘intentionally directing attacks against personnel involved in 
humanitarian assistance missions … in international armed conflicts as long as 
such persons are entitled to the protections given to civilians under IHL’137. 
Similarly, it is a ‘crime against humanity’ when attacks on relief workers are 
‘intended to impede humanitarian activity’138.  
                                                                                                                                            
Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations’ at 
22). 
131 Which dealt with guidelines on ‘security management checklists, templates for security plans, 
telecoms handbooks, vehicle safety and security measures and guidelines for surviving 
abductions and hostage situations’ (Ibid). 
132 IASMN (2006) ‘Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements 
Among IGOs, NGOs and U.N. in the Field, to Better Reflect its Purpose and Intent’ available at: 
www.humanitarianinfo.org/ (accessed 16 October 2012); Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing 
Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations’.  
133 Admittedly the code has not been without its own controversies. At the heart of much of the 
resistance to the code is the debate around whether relief workers should be engaging in 
development work, for fear that this necessarily conflicts with the principle of neutrality. 
134 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 22. 
135 ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’. 
136 Rome Statute at article 8.2.b (xxv) which reads: ‘intentionally using starvation of civilians as a 
method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully 
impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions’. While this is also 
prohibited by API, although not classified in either as a war crime. The ICRC customary law study 
confirms this provision as having achieved customary international law status, applicable in all 
conflicts (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 53). 
137 From the wording of the rule it is clear that ‘members of the armed forces delivering 
humanitarian aid are not covered by this rule’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law at 105); Rome Statute article 8(2)(b)(iii). 
138 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 121. Furthermore where such 
interference is intended to ‘deliberately inflict conditions of life on a group which are calculated 
physically to destroy it in whole or in part’, this would constitute genocide (Mackintosh ‘Beyond 
the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian Organisations and their Staff in 
International Humanitarian Law’ at 122). 
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 In short, IHL (both treaty-based and customary) has many ‘robust’ 
provisions aimed at protecting the relief worker in international armed conflicts139. 
That said, ‘IHL, however, has been increasingly flouted, and the environments in 
which aid agencies work today, bear little resemblance to the experiences of war 
upon which IHL was originally conceived’140. 
 
9.4 IHL and relief workers: the consequences and limitations of default 
civilian status 
 
All persons who find themselves in situations of international armed conflict are 
classified by IHL as either combatants or civilians141, and the latter is the default 
position ‘in case of any doubt as to a person’s IHL status’142. The chief benefit, to 
those enjoying civilian status in situations of armed conflict, is that IHL stipulates 
that civilians and their possessions are to be respected143 by the warring parties, 
and are immune from attack144. This complete immunity from attack flows from 
the understanding that no legitimate military purpose can be served by targeting 
those that play no direct part in the hostilities. Consequently, with the sole 
exception of the ‘levée en masse’, civilians (and therefore relief workers) are not 
authorised to participate directly in hostilities145.  
At first glance it would seem that these limitations should not serve as a 
stumbling block to relief workers, since they are after all, by definition, required to 
act with impartiality and neutrality. In fact it seems almost impossible that anyone 
mandated to ‘prevent suffering … and to protect life and health and ensure 
                                                
139 Barber ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law’ at 382. 
140 Stoddard, Harmer and Haver ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and 
Operations’ at 1. 
141 A civilian is defined as ‘any person who is not a combatant’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 5). 
142 AP I article 50(1); Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent 
Humanitarian Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’at 117.  
143 This means that ‘they are entitled to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, 
their religious convictions, their manners and customs and their property’ (1949 Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (GC I) of 12 August 1949 (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 31 at article 27; The Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (HR) of 18 October 1907 (1910) 9 Cd U.K. Treaty Series 
5030 at article 46; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
Part I; Hans-Peter Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) (1995) The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press: Oxford at 210. 
144 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1; AP I article 
52. 
145 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 6; Gasser 
‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 210. The corollary, of course, is that once civilians do 
play a direct part in hostilities they lose their immunity from direct targeting and the consequent 
privileges which attach to their civilian status (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law at rule 6; AP I article 51(3). Moreover, for so long as they 
continue to actively participate in hostilities, they open themselves up to a defensive response 
from the armed forces (Ibid).  
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respect for the human being’146 could ever be found to be participating in 
hostilities. Surely participation in hostilities necessarily involves favouring one of 
the belligerent parties, which would in turn result in the revocation of their 
mandate as to provide humanitarian assistance.  
 Unfortunately, as I will explain further, the way IHL protects those with 
civilian status, fails to provide the specific protections which relief workers need 
in situations of international armed conflict. Assuming that the ‘very general 
protection afforded to the civilian population’147 will be sufficient to cover the 
personnel of humanitarian organisations, does not account to the fact that ‘this 
form of protection, though real, is not well defined’148 and not particularly 
sensitive to the special need of relief workers. So, for example, Geneva 
Convention IV (which pertains to the protection of civilians in times of war) 
discriminates between civilians on the basis of their nationality. While GC IV 
offers special protections to enemy nationals149, the dilemma for relief workers 
was that they very often are nationals of a neutral State, and consequently do not 
fall within the ambit of the protections afforded by GC IV150. Ironically, if relief 
workers were nationals of one of the belligerent parties they would be able to 
access the protections contained in GC IV151, although one would be entitled to 
question whether their impartiality might be compromised by their link to one of 
the belligerent parties. It seems historically that in terms of IHL, the truly neutral 
relief worker, emanating from a State which is not party to the hostilities, is not 
only without any special IHL status but is also not protected by the provisions in 
GC IV152. 
When the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) was 
                                                
146 Nicaragua v United States of America at par. 243. 
147 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. 
148 Ibid.  
149 That is ‘persons … who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, 
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of 
which they are not nationals.’ The rationale behind the restrictions placed on those claiming the 
protections afforded civilians under GC IV is that ‘only nationals of the enemy states, or those 
whose state has no diplomatic representation on the territory, need supplementary international 
protection. Others can be protected through the usual interstate channels’ (Mackintosh ‘Beyond 
the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian Organisations and their Staff in 
International Humanitarian Law’at 118). 
150 GC IV article 4. While part II of GC IV applies ‘to the whole population of the countries in 
conflict’, there are no specific provisions in part II aimed at protecting relief workers over and 
above the more generalised provisions which ensure protection for  vulnerable groups. 
151 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 118. This nationality-based 
right to protection has been expanded through international jurisprudence to include ‘persons 
whose allegiance lies with a party to the conflict’ (Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic ICTY Judgment 
(Appeals Chamber) (15 July 1999) ICTY IT-94-1-A at para 166: ‘[N]ot only the text and the 
drafting history of the Convention but also, and more importantly, the Convention’s object and 
purpose suggest that allegiance to a Party to the conflict and, correspondingly, control by this 
Party over persons in a given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test’). 
152 Having said that, GC IV does make a special exemption for the rare instance when the civilian 
relief worker hails from a ‘state of nationality which has no diplomatic representation in the 
country of the mission’. In these exceptional instances the relief worker enjoys the protections 
afforded ‘civilians’ under GC IV, although the likelihood of this situation arising in practice is slim.  
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drafted, specific reference was made to ‘relief workers’ in article 71153 in a bid to 
rectify the unsatisfactory position which existed under GC IV. In AP I article 71, 
irrespective of nationality, all personnel carrying out relief work154, with the 
approval of the State on whose territory they are carrying out these duties, are to 
be respected and protected. The crystallisation of AP I article 71 into customary 
IHL relieves relief workers of having to satisfy the demanding nationality 
requirements which existed under GC IV. It does however still require relief 
workers to show that they are carrying out their mission with the approval of the 
territorial state, which is no mean feat when the most dire humanitarian needs 
often occurs in failed states. 
For those relief workers who are fortunate enough to be able to show the 
consent of the territorial state, there remains an important limitation which flows 
from their IHL status as civilians: they must refrain from anything which might be 
perceived as direct participation in hostilities. The difficulty for relief workers lies 
in the fact that, unlike ordinary civilians, relief workers often choose to remain in 
the theatre of hostilities, working along with the medical and religious personnel 
of the armed forces, offering humanitarian assistance with no more than the 
ordinary protections which IHL offers civilians155. As will be seen in the following 
analysis, this proximity to the theatre of hostilities has fuelled speculation that 
relief workers might be in violation of the restrictions placed upon their direct 
participation in hostilities. Speculation aside, this proximity to hostilities does 
place relief workers at greater risk156 in that, much like journalists, they may lose 
‘de facto protection if they stay too close to a military unit’157 or approach a 
military target. In these instances it is entirely possible that they might be 
considered acceptable collateral damage158 in achieving a particular military 
advantage159. 
Unfortunately all this leaves relief workers in the unenviable situation that, 
while they enjoy protection under IHL as civilians, they are especially vulnerable, 
in that their occupation places them squarely in harm’s way. Since IHL restricts 
military operations to proportionate160 attacks on legitimate military objectives161, 
                                                
153 Under Part IV entitled: ‘Civilian population’. 
154 Particular mention is made of transportation and the distribution of relief consignments as 
constituting such relief work. 
155 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 210.  
156 Even the ICRC concedes that the ‘fact remains that humanitarian personnel working in a war 
situation must be prepared to face certain risks’ (ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the 
Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’).  
157 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 428. 
158 Ibid; AP I article 51(5)(b); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at rule 14. 
159 Incidental harm caused to civilians and civilian objects is only lawful when it is an ‘unavoidable 
and proportionate side effect of lawful attacks on military objectives’ (AP I article 51(b)); Gasser 
‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 214; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary 
International Humanitarian Law at rule 14. 
160 AP I articles 57(2)(a)(iii) and 51(5)(b); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at rule 14; Stefan Oeter ‘Methods and Means of Warfare’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) 
The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) Oxford University Press: Oxford at 
106,119 and 180; Anthony PV Rogers Law on the Battlefield (1996) Manchester University Press: 
Manchester at 57.  
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which satisfy the requirements of military necessity162 and advance warning163, 
the question that begs asking is whether relief workers can ever be categorised 
as a military objective, or subject to an attack which would be proportionate and 
justifiable in terms of the requirements of military necessity164. The answer to this 
question must depend on the conclusion reached regarding claims that the 
actions of relief workers might amount to direct participation in hostilities. If the 
actions of relief workers do constitute direct participation in hostilities, then not 
only would attacks which implicate them be justifiable in terms of the IHL 
requirements of distinction, military necessity, proportionality and advance 
warning, but IHL in fact permits belligerents to respond defensively for so long as 
civilians partake in hostilities165.  
 
9.5 Relief workers: a case for special status? 
  
While classifying relief workers as civilians is the simple answer to the question 
as to the IHL status of relief workers, it is an altogether unsatisfactory response 
given the particular risks that they face in international armed conflicts. It is 
especially disappointing when one appreciates that IHL does choose to 
recognise certain categories of individuals as enjoying special recognition and 
privileges in situations of armed conflict. For example, medical and religious 
personnel (despite being ‘uniformed members of a state’s armed forces’166) are 
nevertheless not classified as combatants or civilians. They are afforded special 
privileges, immunity and access in the theatre of hostilities, because of the non-
combatant role that they play in seeing to the humanitarian needs of the 
troops167. This leads one to ask: if there is a longstanding customary168 and 
treaty169 IHL obligation upon states to permit relief workers access to the theatre 
of operations, in order to provide food, medical supplies, and articles necessary 
to preserve life170, and if those ‘relief operations can only be carried out if the 
security of the humanitarian personnel involved is guaranteed’171, why then 
                                                                                                                                            
161 IHL defines ‘military objectives’ as those sites or objects that ‘make an effective contribution to 
military action,’ the destruction of which offers ‘a definite military advantage’ in the circumstances 
ruling at the time (AP I article 52(2)). 
162 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 50; HR 
article 22; AP I article 35(1); Oeter ‘Methods and Means of Warfare’ at 106 and 119.  
163 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 20.  
164 For a fuller discussion on the concepts of distinction, proportionality, military necessity and 
advance warning in the context of relief workers deployed in African armed conflicts see Shannon 
Bosch ‘Relief Workers in African Conflict Zones: Neutrals, Targets or Unlawful Participants?’ 
(2010)19:3 African Security Review at 78. 
165 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 6. 
166 Rabus ‘Protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked’ at 308; Rabus ‘Religious 
Personnel’ at 369. 
167 Idem. 
168 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rules 31; 32 and 
55. 
169 GC IV articles 23 and 59; AP I articles 70(2), 70(4) and 71. 
170 White ‘IEEPA'S Override Authority: Potential for a Violation of the Geneva Conventions’ Right 
to Access for Humanitarian Organisations?’ at 2020.  
171 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. 
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should relief workers not enjoy special IHL status (distinct from that afforded the 
civilian population in general) as well?172  
 
The U.N. Convention on the Safety of U.N. and Associated Personnel 
 
After ‘considerable losses of U.N. personnel [were] suffered …in the early 1990s’ 
the U.N. General Assembly responded in 1996 by the adoption of the Convention 
on the Safety of U.N. and Associated Personnel173. The scope of application of 
the convention is limited to United Nations and ‘associated personnel,’ (i.e. ‘staff 
of non-governmental organisations associated with U.N. operations under a 
special agreement’)174 who operate under United Nations control’175. The 
Convention stipulates that ‘ U.N. and associated personnel, their equipment and 
premises shall not be made the object of attack or of any action that prevents 
them from discharging their mandate’176. Furthermore, it obliges States to ‘take 
all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of the personnel in question’177. 
In an attempt to extend the application of the Convention, an Optional 
Protocol to the Convention was adopted on 8 December 2005178. The original 
convention applied only to U.N. operations ‘to maintain or restore international 
peace and security and those declared by either the Security Council or the 
General Assembly … to constitute an exceptional safety risk’179. The Optional 
Protocol extends the ambit of the application of the Convention to ‘ U.N. 
operations to deliver humanitarian, political or development assistance in peace 
building and to emergency humanitarian assistance operations’180. Notably, 
article 7(3) of the Convention allows relief workers to ‘call on member states to 
use military intervention to ensure their safety’181.  
                                                
172 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 122.  
173 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. The 
Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December 1994 and entered into 
force on 15 January 1999.  
174 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. ‘Relief 
workers who are deployed under an agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
or with a specialised agency or with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to carry out 
activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of a United Nations operation’ (article 1(b)(iii); 
Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian Organisations 
and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 123). 
175 Article 1(c); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 105. 
176 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/csunap/csunap.html (accessed 28 November 
2010); the protocol has not yet entered into force (ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the 
Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’).  
179 Article 1(c)(ii). 
180 Preamble. 
181 This permits a party to the Convention to cooperate in the implementation of the Convention’s 
provisions, ‘particularly in any case where the host State is unable to take the required measures’ 
(Adam Roberts ‘Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action’ 
(2000) 839 International Review of the Red Cross 683). 
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It was provisions like those expressed in article 7(3) of the Convention that 
have posed ethical difficulties for humanitarian organisations like the ICRC, 
whose efficacy is strongly tied to their ability to act with complete neutrality and 
impartiality182. Moreover, the use of armed escorts (as provided for by article 7) 
might increase the risk of relief workers being mistaken for the armed group 
accompanying them, ‘paradoxically increasing their vulnerability to attack’ rather 
than providing legal protection’183. Furthermore, there is a perception among 
relief workers that any association with the U.N. not only undermines their 
independence, but might in fact serve to increase the risks that they face in the 
theatre of war184. Since the increased level of threat to U.N. mandated relief 
workers, other non-U.N. humanitarian NGOs now regard it as ‘downright 
dangerous’ to be associated in any way with any U.N. endeavours185. As a 
consequence of this, other NGO’s have started to paint their traditionally white 
utility vehicles ‘yellow, pink, anything as long as it has no military connotations’ in 
the hopes that they will not be associated with U.N. relief workers186. Thus, many 
relief NGO’s feel their safety is highly dependent on their ability to distance 
themselves from any perceived association with the U.N.187 Even the ICRC, the 
quintessential independent and neutral relief organisation, have rejected the 
application of the U.N. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel to their ICRC personnel. The Protocol does not, however, 
alter the fact that the Convention (and its Optional Protocol) only applies to 
‘associated personnel’, thereby offering no special protective status to those 
relief workers who shun any association with the United Nations. 
 
Symbol of humanitarianism 
 
While the ICRC personnel rely on the special protections afforded by the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols’188, and make use of the Red Cross/ 
Red Crescent emblem in order to distinguish their staff as being entitled to this 
protective regime, other humanitarian organisations are not in principle permitted 
to use the ‘protective identifying sign, like the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
emblem’189. Similarly, they are also not eligible to the special protections which 
the ICRC enjoys under the GC and AP I. Moreover, at present there is no 
                                                
182 When the 1994 Convention was being negotiated the ICRC maintained that it did not want 
ICRC personnel to be protected under the U.N. Convention ‘partly because ICRC personnel 
already have international legal protection deriving from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 
partly because the ICRC’s role as neutral humanitarian intermediary might be jeopardised if the 
ICRC were perceived as closely linked with the United Nations’ (Roberts ‘Humanitarian Issues 
and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action’ at 684). 
183 Mackintosh ‘‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 121. 
184 Idem at 124.  
185 Idem at 125. 
186 Ibid at 125. Merlin paints their cars yellow and Medecins Sans Frontierers (MSF) painted its 
cars with a wide pink stripe. 
187 Ibid. 
188 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
189 Ibid. 
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equivalent for relief workers to the press card held by journalists. There have 
been moves from within the ranks of relief organisations to claim a special 
protected status without tying it to U.N. affiliations. Médecins sans Frontières 
(MSF) has proposed a ‘symbol of humanitarianism’190, ‘which would be used to 
identify relief workers based purely on the neutral humanitarian character of their 
work’191.  
While these recent developments are encouraging, ‘the problem of the 
identification of the plethora of non-governmental organisations present in conflict 
situations …remains unresolved’192. States are obliged to grant relief workers 
access to meet the humanitarian needs which arise in situations of armed 
conflict, and yet, despite their vocational vulnerability, they remain heavily reliant 
on the provisions prohibiting attacks against civilians to ensure their safety. It is 
noteworthy that in 2003, following a litany of U.N. resolutions193, a Security 
Council resolution ‘exhorted states and warring parties to ensure the safety of 
humanitarian personnel and U.N. and associated personnel’194. Some have 
argued that the wording of the resolution suggests that independent humanitarian 
relief workers are a separate recognised group, perhaps ‘leaving the door open 
to finding a solution to appropriate legal protection, not based on political control 
or U.N. association’195. 
 
9.6 Private military and security contractors (PMSCs) ensuring the safety of 
relief workers 
 
Both the ICRC and many relief organisations operate from the starting point that 
‘humanitarian workers should be unarmed’196, because that will alleviate the risk 
that relief workers are ‘perceived as a threat to any armed faction or criminals’197. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that their use of weapons and armed escorts 
might undermine the perception of their ethical claim to impartiality and complete 
neutrality198. Instead, they have relied upon the acceptance of the local 
                                                
190 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 124.  
191 Fabrice Weissman ‘Military Humanitarianism: A Deadly Confusion’ (2003) 4 MSF Activity 
Report; Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 124. 
192 ICRC ‘Respect For and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations’.  
193 A/RES/52/167; A/RES/53/87; A/RES/54/192; A/RES/55/175; A/RES/56/217; A/RES/57/155; 
A/RES/58/ 122; A/RES/59/211; A/RES/60/123; A/RES/61/133. The resulting reports of the 
Secretary-General can be found at A/53/501; A/55/494; A/56/384; A/56/469; A/57/300; A/59/332; 
A/60/223 and A/61/463 available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/resolutions.shtml (accessed on 28 
November 2010). 
194 S/RES/1502 (2003) available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ (accessed on 28 November 2010). 
195 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 124. 
196 Kjell Bjork and Richard Jones ‘Overcoming Dilemmas Created by the 21st Century 
Mercenaries: Conceptualising the Use of Private Security Companies in Iraq’ Reconstructing 
Post-Saddam Iraq: A Quixotic Beginning to the `Global Democratic Revolution' (2005) 26:4/5 
Third World Quarterly 777 at 785. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid; Rana ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or 
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communities to ensure their safety and access to those in need. While the ICRC 
‘employs armed guards to protect its premises against criminal activity’199, the 
organisation has stated that they ‘have no intention - except in certain rare cases 
- of using armed escorts to protect our work itself. We remain convinced, as I 
have pointed out, that a clear distinction must be maintained between 
humanitarian operations and military operations - for security reasons!’200 Having 
said that, when the ICRC adopted its recommended Code of Conduct in 1994, 
intended to guide the actions of those undertaking humanitarian operations, no 
mention was made of the use of armaments201. In terms of IHL, relief workers (as 
is the case with all non-combatants or civilians), are entitled to be armed for their 
own personal self-defence202. 
 Singer points out that ‘while neutrality is a guiding principle, it is offering 
less and less protection’203 and ‘death is becoming a significant occupational 
hazard’204. Not surprisingly, recent ‘international armed conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have seen an increasing number [of relief workers] … choosing to 
arm themselves’205 and PMSCs are increasingly being contracted as a ‘matter of 
routine’206 to ‘provide security to humanitarian NGOs’207 and ‘this project has 
accrued some success’208. Despite warnings in the U.N. 2004 guidelines that 
‘PMSCs are also themselves increasingly seen as targets’209, both the U.N. 
                                                                                                                                            
Incompatibility?’ at 859. 
199 For example, in situations where crime is rife.  
200 ICRC ‘Protecting the Protectors’. 
201 Bjork and Jones ‘Overcoming Dilemmas Created by the 21st Century Mercenaries: 
Conceptualising the Use of Private Security Companies in Iraq’ Reconstructing Post-Saddam 
Iraq: A Quixotic Beginning to the `Global Democratic Revolution' at 785. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military 
Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 7. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Bjork and Jones ‘Overcoming Dilemmas Created by the 21st Century Mercenaries: 
Conceptualising the Use of Private Security Companies in Iraq’ Reconstructing Post-Saddam 
Iraq: A Quixotic Beginning to the `Global Democratic Revolution' at 785. 
206 Åse Gili Østensen ‘ U.N. Use of Private Military and Security Companies’ (2011) 3 SSR Paper 
available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-
Practices-and-Policies (accessed 4 September 2012) at 49. PMSC have contracts to supply 
humanitarian security and humanitarian services (like demining) ‘on all the world’s continents’ 
(with the exception of Australia and Antarctica). ‘ArmorGroup alone had conducted operations of 
this sort in eighteen countries as of July 2006’ (Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? 
States, NGOs, International Private Security Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’). 
207 Human Rights Council ‘Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development’ (2010) 
A/HRC/15/25 (Report of the Chairperson/Rapporteur: José Luis Gómez del Prado) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/A.HRC.RES.15.25_en.pdf (accessed 14 
July 2012) at 18. In Afghanistan the use of ‘static armed guards supplied by PMSCs has become 
standard procedure for most international actors and organisations’ (Østensen ‘U.N. Use of 
Private Military and Security Companies’ at 47). 
208 Spearin ‘Private, Armed and Humanitarian? States, NGOs, International Private Security 
Companies and Shifting Humanitarianism’ 
209 Østensen ‘U.N. Use of Private Military and Security Companies’ at 48. 
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department of Safety and Security (established in 2005)210, and the ‘ U.N. 
assistance mission in Iraq’, make use of PMSC, although with a more ‘low profile 
approach’211. For example, the ‘world food programme …is an agency that 
recurrently relies on a broad range of security services supplied by private 
security companies’212. 
 Where the host State is unable to ensure the safety of relief workers, with 
their assets vulnerable to looting, and ‘operational access rendered 
impossible’213, these organisations are electing to hire armed protection in the 
form of PMSCs to stave off ‘regular criminal activity’ directed at their offices, 
accommodation and warehouses214. ‘In extreme situations this may imply 
provision of a proactive armed presence’215. PMSCs have reportedly been 
providing ‘threat and context assessments, security audits, policy development 
for risk control and evacuation, security training, and the provision of security 
management and guards for convoys, compounds’216 and personnel217. So, for 
example, ArmorGroup, RONCO Consulting and DynCorp International are the 
‘humanitarian de-miners of choice for DFID and the U.S. State Department’s 
Humanitarian Mine Action Program’218.  
 While relief workers are clearly making greater use of PMSCs, they are 
slow to publicly admit this 219 and PMSCs are often bound by confidentiality 
agreements which preclude them from revealing that they have ‘humanitarian 
clients’220. Relief organisations risk losing ‘their funding if it were publicised that 
they were working with the peace and stability industry, no matter what the 
humanitarian benefits’221. ‘Some agencies have dealt with the problem by 
instructing their staff to avoid contact with PMF personnel whenever possible’222. 
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222 Idem at 11. 
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Given the increasing presence of PMSCs in the theatre of international armed 
conflicts however, this ‘don’t talk to strangers’ philosophy will be of little 
assistance to relief workers faced with the real security threats that now see them 
being specifically targeted. Several humanitarian organisations have advised 
their personnel to ‘deal with PMF employees as they would any other armed 
combatants’223. Only ‘Oxfam, Mercycorps and the ICRC’ have formal policies in 
place instructing their personnel how to deal with PMSCs224. There are ‘no 
specific U.N. general guidelines for humanitarians on the use of PMSCs, except 
those limited to criteria when PMSCs can be used for convoy protection225.  
 Some PMSCs ‘advertise security services specifically tailored to fit 
humanitarian needs’226, but ‘many humanitarians tend to have doubts about the 
compatibility of the often somewhat militaristic security approach favoured by 
PMSCs’227, which are …’perhaps at odds with paradigms adhered to by the 
humanitarian clientele’228. PMSCs, who see ‘humanitarianism as a future  
market opportunity’229 argue that they can provide the security necessary to carry 
out the humanitarian function, preventing relief workers from having to turn to 
‘traditional State military assistance’230.  
 Unfortunately, when PMSCs are at times indistinguishable from the armed 
forces of the military, their presence ‘may present more danger than protection’ 
and may in fact result in belligerents singling out ‘their facilities and staff for 
targeting’231. Sometimes the armed presence results in the increased risk of 
‘losing the perception of neutrality that they rely on to maintain their access and 
ensure their immunity from attack’232. Any military-like presence calls into 
question the perceived civilian role of providing humanitarian relief, and often 
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9.7 The notion of direct participation in hostilities and the role of relief 
workers 
 
International law is clear that, by definition, humanitarian assistance must be 
given with complete neutrality234. Having said that, the Nicaragua case also 
makes it clear that humanitarian assistance can ‘be given by a state, through its 
military arm or otherwise’235. While that may be the case in terms of IHL, there is 
a strong suspicion that ‘if relief is provided by a state, especially one with military 
or strategic interests in an area, it cannot be truly humanitarian’236. Unfortunately, 
the suspicion with which state-sourced relief is perceived, has begun to spill over 
and taint the neutrality and benevolence with which non-state humanitarian relief 
is received. Many belligerents now view relief workers as ‘agents of outside 
powers’237, offering aid with an ulterior agenda. This perception is only growing 
as relief workers extend their mandate from ‘crisis relief to post-conflict 
reconstruction’238 and nation building. As Anderson argues, relief workers cannot 
expect the same level of inviolability from hostilities if they persist in engaging in 
activities which call their neutrality into question239. The recent increase in attacks 
directed at relief workers has not only severely undermined the ‘respect (and 
protection) usually accorded humanitarian work’240, but it has also fuelled debate 
around what constitutes legitimate humanitarian assistance, and what amounts 
to direct participation in hostilities.  
Against this backdrop it is imperative that IHL gives some direction as to 
what tasks relief workers can undertake, without compromising their impartiality 
and infringing the notion of direct participation in hostilities241. It is not surprising, 
given the high stakes242, that a great deal of controversy has surrounded the 
issue of precisely when the actions of a civilian (and in our particular case relief 
                                                
234 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 125. 
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workers) can be said to amount to direct participation in hostilities. When the 
ICRC convened a group of IHL experts to draft an Interpretive Guide on this topic 
it was hoped that a consensus document243 would result, replacing the 
unsatisfactory case-by-case analysis which had been adopted in practice244. The 
fruits of the six-year process have already been the subject of vigorous academic 
debate245, and only time will tell if State practice and opinion juris supports the 
guide’s drafters, or their critics. What follows is an analysis of the position of relief 
workers in light of the Interpretive Guide’s assessment of direct participation in 
hostilities246, as well as an assessment of their position in light of views proposed 
by the Guide’s critics. 
The Interpretive Guide begins from the standpoint that where doubt exists, 
an individual must be presumed to be civilian and, moreover, they must be 
‘presumed not to be participating directly in hostilities’247. It then goes on to 
postulate a three-part, cumulative test which states that in order to amount to 
direct participation in hostilities: 
 
1. ‘The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, 
injury, or destruction of persons or objects protected against direct attack 
(threshold of harm)248, and 
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to 
result either from that act, or from a co-ordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
                                                
243 Michael Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ 
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exercising control over military personnel, objects and territory to the detriment of the adversary’ 
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transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack’ (ICRC ‘Interpretive Guide on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’ at 48).  
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3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment 
of another (belligerent nexus)’249. 
 
i. The threshold of harm requirements 
 
Under the Guide’s first criterion, which is referred to as the ‘threshold of harm’ 
determination, relief workers must refrain from bringing about harm250 of a 
‘specifically military nature, or causing harm of a protected person or protected 
objects251. In essence, a relief worker found committing ‘acts of violence against 
human and material enemy forces’, or causing ‘physical or functional damage to 
military objects, operations or capacity’ would meet and satisfy the first of the 
three criteria252. When one recalls that relief workers are by definition only 
permitted to offer ‘aid...without discrimination to all in need … to prevent suffering 
… and to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being’253, it 
seems unlikely that the same genuine relief workers might be engaging in acts 
aimed at causing harm of a military nature, or aimed at harming civilians or 
civilian objects. Having said that, according to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, any 
actions on the part of relief workers which sabotage military capacity, or restrict 
military ‘deployments, logistics and communications’254, would also satisfy the 
threshold of harm criteria. Relief workers, by the very nature of their vocation, 
often remain in the zone of hostilities, even once most of the civilians have been 
evacuated. To this end, their presence near ‘military personnel, objects and 
territory’ may well restrict military deployments, complicate targeting 
assessments (on account of the IHL principles of distinction and 
proportionality255) and require belligerents to give advance warning of potential 
attacks256. Certainly if relief workers were to disclose any tactical targeting 
information, which they might have gathered while offering assistance257, they 
would fall foul of the ‘threshold of harm’ requirement258. 
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Those, like Schmitt, who criticises the ICRC’s interpretation, argues that 
the ‘threshold of harm’ requirement is under-inclusive259. Schmitt argues that the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guide unnecessarily excludes acts that benefit one of the 
belligerent parties (as would be the case with support activities), and that alone is 
likely to have an adverse effect on the opponent, although ‘the causal 
relationship between such support and the resulting harm [to the opponent] may 
not always be direct’260. The danger for relief workers in adopting this more 
inclusive interpretation, is that many of their neutrally intended activities might 
well fall within the ambit of the required threshold of harm. According to Schmitt’s 
interpretation relief workers who ignore an illegal maritime blockade, relief 
workers located at dual use sites261, those relief workers who by their presence 
hinder targeting decisions and certainly those who are coerced into divulging any 
tactical information would satisfy the threshold of harm requirement, by virtue of 
the fact that their actions benefit one of the belligerent parties. 
 On the other hand, those like Melzer, who reject Schmitt’s all-inclusive 
interpretation, argue that this overly inclusive interpretation ‘extends the loss of 
protection to a potentially wide range of support activities, regardless of whether 
they are likely to cause any harm to the enemy or the civilian population’262. 
Melzer points out that there is nothing in practice to suggest that states in fact 
favour Schmitt’s more inclusive legal interpretation, against the ICRC’s 
interpretation263. Moreover, Melzer argues that lowering the threshold (as Schmitt 
proposes) will only serve to undermine the longstanding recognised ‘distinction 
between direct participation in hostilities and mere involvement in the general war 
effort’264.  
 
ii. The direct causation requirement 
 
Even prior to the publication of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, much controversy 
already surrounded questions as to whether ‘general war effort’265, and activities 
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aimed at sustaining war266, would constitute direct participation in hostilities. It is 
not disputed that war-sustaining activities267 are indispensable to the war effort, 
which in effect do eventually harm the adversary. In an attempt to draw a clear 
line between pure ‘conduct of hostilities and general war effort’ or ‘war-sustaining 
activities’, the drafters of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide formulated the direct 
causation test (the second cumulative requirement for a finding of direct 
participation)268. In order to avoid depriving much of the civilian population of their 
protected status, the Guide proposed that ‘there must be a sufficiently close 
causal relation between the act and the resulting harm’ (preferably in one causal 
step269, or at least ‘where the act constitutes an integral part of a concrete and 
coordinated tactical operation that directly causes such harm’)270. Activities that 
only indirectly cause harm were not considered sufficient to amount to direct 
participation in hostilities. The Guide is clear that merely being in the vicinity of 
hostile action is not sufficient to constitute direct participation in hostilities, as 
temporal or geographic proximity cannot on its own, without direct causation, 
amount to a finding of this nature271. Similarly, rebuilding infrastructure or 
reconnecting severed amenities, even though they could potentially assist with  
the general war effort, is not part of a tactical operation designed to cause harm 
(assuming relief workers have purely humanitarian concerns as their motivation). 
But relief workers will fall foul of the direct causation test if they divulge tactical 
information or are used as lookout for combatants. 
 Once again the Guide’s critics were quick to point out that this direct 
causation test, which requires that the ‘harm must be caused in a single causal 
step’ ... and ‘result from a physical act’, gives rise to an ‘under-inclusive’ result272. 
Schmitt argues that the direct causation test fails to take cognisance of the 
‘nature of modern combat operations’273, and he prefers instead to include within 
the ambit of direct participants those that engage in capacity building and play an 
                                                
266 This would additionally include ‘political, economic or media activities supporting the general 
war effort’. For example ‘political propaganda, financial transactions, production of agricultural or 
non-military industrial goods’ (Ibid). 
267 For example, providing ‘finances, food and shelter to the armed forces and producing weapons 
and ammunition’ (Ibid). 
268 During the expert meetings, emphasis was placed on the idea that direct participation in 
hostilities is ‘neither synonymous with "involvement in" or "contribution to" hostilities, nor with 
"preparing" or "enabling" someone else to directly participate in hostilities, but essentially means 
that an individual is personally "taking part in the ongoing exercise of harming the enemy" and 
personally carrying out hostile acts which are "part of" the hostilities’ (Ibid).  
269 The act must not only be causally linked to the harm, but it must also cause the harm directly. 
For example, ‘the assembly and storing of an improvised explosive device (IED) in a workshop, or 
the purchase or smuggling of its components, may be connected with the resulting harm through 
an uninterrupted causal chain of events, but, unlike the planting and detonation of that device, do 
not cause that harm directly’ (Idem at 54 and 55). 
270 For example ‘the identification and marking of targets, the analysis and transmission of tactical 
intelligence to attacking forces, and the instruction and assistance given to troops for the 
execution of a specific military operation (Idem at 55). 
271 Ibid. 
272 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 726. 
273 Idem at 725. 
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‘integrated part’ in the resulting harm274. Unfortunately for relief workers, their 
involvement in rebuilding amenities, which may be commandeered by a 
belligerent party, might be sufficient to satisfy Schmitt’s preferred interpretation of 
the direct causation test. It is unclear whether merely being in the theatre of 
hostilities, and consequently hindering the opposition’s unfettered ability to 
engage with the opposition, would satisfy Schmitt’s ‘integrated part’ test. It is 
probably fair to say that relief workers who deliberately locate themselves at dual 
use sites, with the hope of shielding the site from attack for civilian benefit, may 
be playing an integrated part in hostilities, where belligerents are seeking to use 
or deny access to these sites in furtherance of the war effort. When one 
considers the repercussions, it seems astute to heed Melzer’s warning that an 
overly relaxed causal link, such as is proposed by Schmitt, might expose civilians 
to ‘targeting policies prone to error, arbitrariness and abuse’275. Moreover, as 
Melzer points out, there is no opinion juris to suggest that states favour such a 
broad interpretation of acts as constituting direct participation, however remotely 
linked they may be to the resultant harm276. 
 
iii. The belligerent nexus test 
 
The third and final requirement set out in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide is termed 
the ‘belligerent nexus’ test, and requires that ‘an act must be specifically 
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm, in support of a party to 
the conflict and to the detriment of another’277. Once again the critics of the 
ICRC’s Guide reject the need for the ‘act to be in support of a party to the conflict 
and to the detriment of another’, speculating that it is possible for participating 
civilians to oppose both sides in a conflict and yet still be participating directly in 
hostilities278. Instead, Schmitt recommends that this criterion be relaxed so as to 
only require that the act either supports one party to the conflict, or that it 
opposes a party to the conflict279. If we adopt this less demanding requirement, 
relief workers could find themselves in violation of IHL. While, by definition, relief 
workers are required to act with neutrality, it can appear as if their assistance is 
favouring one particular party to a conflict. For example, when relief workers offer 
aid to the civilian population of one of the belligerent parties, the effect can be an 
increased civilian willpower to resist an invasion. Likewise, breaking an illegal 
maritime blockade might appear as if one belligerent party is being favoured, 
even if the relief worker’s real intention is to get the necessary humanitarian aid 
to the civilian population. Relief workers who deliberately position themselves at 
dual-use sites, appear to be assisting the local armed forces. Moreover, as relief 
workers go about their humanitarian tasks, their very presence in the theatre of 
                                                
274 Idem at 729. 
275 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 




278 Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ at 736. 
279 Ibid. 
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hostilities may prohibit and hinder the opposition engaging with the local armed 
forces. When relief workers and their supplies fall victim to hijacking, they 
inadvertently contribute supplies and negotiating power to the hijacking 
belligerent party. Simply put, if one adopts Schmitt’s position on the belligerent 
nexus requirement, then relief workers will often satisfy this leg of the test for 
direct participation in hostilities. 
In conclusion then, it is unlikely that the activities of genuine relief workers 
will ever satisfy the ICRC’s three cumulative criteria for ‘direct participation in 
hostilities’. It is implausible that relief workers will satisfy the threshold of harm 
requirements since they are unlikely to be committing ‘acts of violence’280 of any 
kind, or causing ‘damage to military objects, operations or capacity’281. At most 
their presence in the theatre of hostilities might sabotage military capacity, or 
restrict military deployments by virtue of the obligation to observe the principles 
of distinction282 and proportionality. Moreover, those relief workers involved in 
rebuilding infrastructure are exempt from a finding of direct participation by virtue 
of the causal connection leg of the enquiry, as are those located at dual-use 
sites. Lastly, the belligerent nexus test will exclude all legitimate humanitarian 
actions, since by definition relief workers are not permitted to favour any one side 
in a conflict. In fact some writers go so far as to suggest that merely by 
categorising relief workers as civilians, States implicitly agree that the ‘offering of 
humanitarian assistance to civilians can never amount to unlawful direct 
participation in hostilities’283. Probably the only occasion relief workers would 
satisfy all three of the cumulative criteria, would be if they acted as lookouts or 
divulged tactical information to belligerent parties. 
Unfortunately, the outlook for relief workers in terms of Schmitt’s proposed 
criteria is not so forgiving. Applying Schmitt’s inclusive interpretation of the 
ICRC’s three-part test is more likely to find relief workers in breach of the notion 
of direct participation in hostilities, oddly by no more than their mere presence in 
                                                
280 If relief workers are found causing ‘harm in individual self-defence’, or in defence of vulnerable 
civilians, although that meets the required threshold of harm, it fails to meet the belligerent nexus 
test and the ‘use of necessary and proportionate force in such situations cannot be regarded as 
direct participation in hostilities’ (ICRC ‘Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’ at 62). 
281 Idem at 48. 
282 One of the ‘ancient and established rules of customary’ IHL is that civilians and civilian objects 
are to be distinguishable from military objects and personnel at all times, since it is strictly 
prohibited to attack civilians or civilian objects (AP I article 48; Oeter ‘Methods and Means of 
Warfare’ at 113). It is this principle of distinction which lies at the heart of many IHL rules, 
including the rules which demand that combatants wear an identifying mark and carry their 
weapons openly; rules that require attacking and defending forces to avoid locating military 
objectives near areas populated by civilians (GC IV article 28) and rules that stipulate the 
evacuation of civilians from the vicinity of military objectives (AP I at articles 57 and 58). 
Moreover, it is this principle of distinction that prohibits the use of weapons which might endanger 
civilians indiscriminately (AP I articles 51(4) and (5); Oeter ‘Methods and Means of Warfare’ at 
54). 
283 Knut Dörmann ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Media Professionals 
Working in Armed Conflicts’ (2007) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/media-protection-article-.htm (visited 
on 30 June 2009). 
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the theatre of operations. Certainly, relief workers engaged in re-building 
amenities might fall foul of Schmitt’s ‘integrated step’ requirement, provided the 
amenities in question could be used by belligerent parties. Moreover, in terms of 
Schmitt’s interpretation of the belligerent nexus test284, many relief workers could 
lose their civilian privileges as it is a common misperception that relief workers 
are aiding one side in a conflict, when that is not the intended design. It seems 
then that, on the whole, the Schmitt interpretation is unnecessarily punitive of 
those individuals (like relief workers) who operate in the theatre of hostilities. In 
my view, Melzer is correct to point out that the Schmitt interpretation seems to be 
‘almost exclusively driven by military necessity’ while giving insufficient 
consideration to the equally important balancing consideration of humanity285. To 
my mind Schmitt’s interpretation seems counter-intuitive, in that it gives rise to a 
situation in which IHL both clearly legitimises the work of humanitarian workers, 
and yet simultaneously punishes relief workers for carrying out their mandate. 
The only resolution which can sustain both positions: a humanitarian mandate 
and restrictions upon those participating directly in hostilities, is the interpretation 
found in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide.  
 
9.8 The issue of detention for relief workers with default IHL civilian status 
 
Not only may relief workers not participate directly in hostilities286, but as a 
consequence of this restriction, and their default civilian status, they may not be 
taken prisoner without sufficient justification287. Of course, the moment any 
civilian engages in any actions which amount to direct participation in hostilities, 
they open themselves up to a defensive response from opposition forces ‘for 
such time as they continue to actively participate in hostilities’288. Moreover once 
it is determined that they are participating in hostilities, they may be detained in 
terms of IHL. Given the serious consequences which flow from a determination 
that a civilian, and for our purposes a relief worker, has been actively 
participating in hostilities, it is imperative that IHL gives clear criteria for 
determining exactly when this might be said to have occurred. Unfortunately, if 
one adopts the Schmitt interpretation, the potential for relief workers to face 
detention in terms of IHL for direct participation in hostilities is not only greatly 
increased, but it is likely to land relief workers in detention for doing no more than 
carry out their humanitarian mission. Already statistics reveal that relief workers 
                                                
284 Requiring only that one party to the conflict benefits, or that one belligerent party is harmed by 
the relief workers actions (Schmitt ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements’ at 735). 
285 Melzer ‘‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four 
Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ at 
914. 
286 AP I article 51(3). 
287 Civilians may only be interned in exceptional cases where it is necessary for reasons of 
security, provided the security concerns cannot be addressed by less severe measures (GC IV 
articles 41-43 and 78(1); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law at rule 99). 
288 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 6. 
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are particularly vulnerable to unjustified detention at the hands of belligerent 
parties, often because belligerents want control of their relief supplies (doling 
them out to only those who support their cause), or because belligerents want to 
use their release as leverage in negotiations with other belligerents. Add to this 
the Schmitt interpretation on what amounts to direct participation in hostilities, 
and one potentially legitimises the actions of belligerents who take relief workers 
into detention for more nefarious reasons.  
Once in detention, their status under IHL has a direct impact on how relief 
workers can expect to be treated. Even if belligerents claim that relief workers 
have been participating in hostilities, and accordingly detain them, they remain 
classified as civilians, albeit participating illegally in hostilities289. As IHL stands at 
the moment, relief workers will not enjoy special prisoner of war (POW) status, 
on account of the fact that they are not members of the armed forces. Unlike their 
colleagues who are classified as ‘medical and religious personnel of the armed 
forces’, relief workers enjoy no special privileges, beyond those fundamental 
guarantees of humane treatment290 ordinarily granted to civilians, if they fall into 
enemy hands as prescribed by. The detaining power is obliged to report the 
identity of captured relief workers to their State of origin within two weeks291. 
Moreover, ‘decisions regarding such internment shall be made according to 
regular procedure and subject to regular review’292. As detained civilians, they 
‘shall be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to 
them’293. If their health needs demand ‘medical attention and hospital treatment’, 
that shall be afforded by the detaining power, ‘to the same extent as the nationals 
of the State concerned’294. Whilst in detention, ‘they shall be allowed to practise 
their religion and to receive spiritual assistance from ministers of their faith’295. 
For those relief workers who are aliens in the territory of conflict (which is most 
often the case), they fall within a narrower category of protected civilians, and 
benefit from more ‘detailed rules regarding their treatment in the hands of the 
                                                
289 Once they are hors de combat, or fall into enemy hands, they may be held to account for their 
unauthorised actions, but at all times they must be afforded the ‘regular and fair judicial 
guarantees extended to civilians’ (GC IV article 5; AP I article 75; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 100; Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian 
Population’ at 211). It is only the civilian levée en masse who acquire secondary POW status 
upon capture, despite their primary civilian status (1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III) (1950) 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135 at article 4A(6); Gasser 
‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 233). 
290 GC IV articles 79-135 (For a comprehensive discussion of these duties see Gasser ‘Protection 
of the Civilian Population’ at 288-292). 
291 GC IV article 136(2); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law at rule 123. 
292 GC IV articles 43 and 78(2); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law at rule 100. 
293 GC IV article 38(1). 
294 GC IV article 38(2); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
at rule 118. 
295 GC IV article 38(3); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law 
at rules 104 and 127. 
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enemy’296. Alien civilians enjoy diplomatic protection as a result of diplomatic 
relations between their nation State and the State on whose territory they find 
themselves297. However, when one considers that legal review proceedings 
might well be conducted in a foreign language, if at all, in a failed state, one 
begins to appreciate the plight of the detained relief worker. Moreover, promises 
of medical attention, to the extent which nationals of the detaining State are 
entitled, is cold comfort when these very relief workers are often those providing 
for the local citizen’s most basic medical needs and medical supplies. 
What is of even greater concern for relief workers who are detained for 
alleged participation in hostilities, is that they can be held to account for their 
‘unauthorised actions’ through judicial proceedings. While IHL prescribes that 
any civilian who is subject to trial for alleged participation in hostilities, be 
afforded the ‘regular and fair judicial guarantees’298, what is particularly 
concerning is that relief workers might be tried for nothing other than carrying out 
their humanitarian mission. The very real dilemma for relief workers is that 
without special IHL status, and especially in light of Schmitt’s proposed 
amendments to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, relief workers are more vulnerable 
than ever to detention and even prosecution as unlawful combatants.  
 
9.9 Conclusion  
 
The last decade has seen a marked increase in the incidences of major violent 
attacks on relief workers in the theatre of war. One reason for this increase could 
be because terrorist factions, insurgents and guerrilla forces appear to have no 
compunction in harming those providing relief; another could be because the 
relief workers’ vocation requires a close proximity to the theatre of war, thereby 
putting them in harm’s way. Whatever the reason, relief workers are, by 
definition, those offering humanitarian assistance without associating themselves 
with either side in an armed conflict, and it seems right that they should enjoy at 
least the same immunity from attack that IHL affords civilians, and possibly 
special status, given their particular vulnerability. Conversely,‘in an environment 
where there is “no empirical evidence that declaring yourself to be neutral 
actually enhances your security”299, relief workers are heavily reliant on IHL to 
provide them the necessary protection in the theatre of armed conflict. As it 
stands, IHL does no more than presume that all relief workers are civilians. There 
have been U.N.-led initiatives calling for a special status to be afforded relief 
workers under the auspices of the U.N. Ironically, relief NGO’s regard it as 
                                                
296 Lindsey Cameron ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Regulation of Private Military 
Companies’ (2007) Plenary lecture given at conference on Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: 
The Erosion of the Public-Private Divide available at 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Cameron.pdf (accessed 28 
November 2010) at 5. 
297 Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 281. 
298 GC IV article 5(3); AP I article 75, Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211; 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at rule 100. 
299 Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatised Military 
Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 6 
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‘downright dangerous’ to be in anyway associated with the U.N.300, and most 
NGO’s feel their safety is better ensured by disassociating themselves from the 
U.N.301. Understandably there has been resistance to this position, leaving relief 
workers in the theatre of operations with little more than an emblem to distinguish 
themselves from combatants.  
As relief workers have expanded their mandates to include post-conflict 
reconstruction, so has the number of attacks targeting relief workers increased, 
leading some academics to speculate that perhaps belligerents perceive relief 
workers as participants in hostilities, particularly when they employ the services 
of armed PMSCs. On the whole it is unlikely that the activities of relief workers 
will ever satisfy the three accumulative criteria for direct participation in hostilities 
as set out in the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide. What is more probable is that relief 
workers might get in the way of the normal conduct of hostilities, thereby 
restricting military deployments. Without more, this alone is not enough to 
constitute direct participation in hostilities, without proving that there is a 
‘sufficiently close causal relation between their interference in hostilities and the 
resulting harm’302. This causal connection would probably only be achieved by 
relief workers if they were to divulge tactical information regarding combatants or 
be used as lookouts. Everyday humanitarian relief work would probably not on its 
own amount to the direct causal source of harm to military objects, operations or 
capacity303. Moreover, it is unlikely that neutral relief workers will be engaged in 
acts ‘specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in 
support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another’304. In fact, by 
definition, relief workers are expected to offer humanitarian assistance without 
discrimination, and those who claim to be relief workers while falling foul of 
the three-pronged test for direct participation in hostilities, are not to be classified 
as relief workers within the definition set by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. It is 
entirely possible though, that in going about their jobs, relief workers may lose de 
facto protection, if they remain in close proximity to a military target. In these 
instances it may well be that, after assessing the risk to neutral relief workers, a 
commander might nevertheless order an attack on a military target in their 
vicinity. This alone is not unlawful, provided the proportionality test can be 
satisfied and the principles of military necessity, discrimination and advance 
warning are observed.  
Unfortunately, Schmitt’s proposed amendments to the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guide could have serious implications for relief workers. Not only are relief 
workers more likely to be found in breach of the IHL notion of direct participation 
in hostilities, but this is likely to result from their mere humanitarian presence in 
the theatre of operations. If they are believed to be participating in hostilities 
(according to Schmitt’s interpretation), these well-meaning relief workers could 
                                                
300 Mackintosh ‘Beyond the Red Cross: the Protection of Independent Humanitarian 
Organisations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’ at 125. 
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Humanitarian Law’ at 53. 
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face detention and even criminal prosecution at the hands of belligerents. With 
this prospect it is likely that states will begin advising their nationals that relief 
work is ill advised in modern conflict situations. In the interests of the civilians 
who rely heavily on the humanitarian relief traditionally provided by relief workers, 
I would hope that this piece prompts further thought into the need for special IHL 
status, immunity from prosecution and exemption from civilian detention for all 
genuine relief workers. I would certainly reject Schmitt’s interpretation of what 
actions amount to direct participation in hostilities, on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of IHL’s aim of minimising unnecessary 
suffering and protecting the vulnerable.  
Within forty-eight hours of the Israeli attack on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla 
on 31 May 2010, the U.N. Human Rights Council had established a committee to 
investigate the incident and appointed Philippe Kirsch (former International 
Criminal Court President) to head the investigation305. The speed of this 
response speaks to the seriousness with which the international community 
views attacks on those claiming to be humanitarian relief workers. I hope that 
what emerges from this investigation, gives States cause to consider the plight of 
the relief worker in today’s armed conflicts, although the track record for holding 
perpetrators ‘accountable in a court’, has been rather dismal306.  
 
                                                
305 Palestine News Network ‘U.N. to Investigate Flotilla Attacks’ (7 July 2010) available at 
http://english.pnn.ps/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8461&Itemid=29 (accessed 
28 November 2010). 
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Under-aged child soldiers recruited into non-State organised groups: 
 
‘I had a patrol that went into a village that had been wiped out. As the 
patrol was going through the village, the chapel doors opened and 
about 100 people were hidden inside… The sergeant in charge of the 
patrol called my headquarters and said he needed vehicles to move 
these people to a safe place. As he was on the radio calling, from one 
side of the village there were about 30 boys, 9, 10, 12, 14 [years of 
age]… who opened fire on the sergeant, clearly in uniform, and the 
soldiers and the people he was protecting. As he was reeling from that 
attack, from the other side of the village there were about 20 girls, the 
same ages; some of them pregnant. They were human shields behind 
which other boys were shooting at the sergeant, his soldiers and the 
people he was protecting’1. 
 
Private military and security contractors (PMSCs): 
 
‘On 31 March 2004 four American security contractors, accompanying 
a shipment of kitchen equipment through Iraq, were ambushed, killed, 
set on fire, dragged through the streets, and hung from a bridge before 
a cheering crowd in the city of Fallujah’2. 
  
Voluntary human shields (VHSs): 
 
‘Convoys of foreign peace activists (including students, a mother of 
three and a businessman who has given up his job), and led by former 
US marine and Gulf War veteran Ken Nichols O'Keefe, arrived in 
Baghdad to act as "human shields", hoping to deter a US-led 
bombardment of the country. They signed up to the cause despite the 
clear risks’3. 
                                                
1 Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire (retired) ‘Motion Urging the Repatriation of Omar Khadr’ 
(18 June 2008) available at http://romeodallaire.sencanada.ca/en/Vote-on-Senator-Romeo-
Dallaires-motion-urging-the-repatriation-of-Omar-Khadr/ (accessed 16 October 2012). 
Although this narrative, told by Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, played out in Rwanda 
(the scene of a non-international armed conflict) the reality remains that incidences of this sort 
have characterised conflicts of both international and non-international types. Retired 
Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire now heads up the ‘Roméo Dallaire Child Soldier Initiative’ 
and uses his accounts of these events to lobby for ending the use and recruitment of child 
soldiers worldwide in all forms of conflict. 
2 Suzanne Kelly ‘Confessions of a Private Security Contractor’ (27 December 2011)  
available at http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/27/confessions-of-a-private-security-
contractor/ (accessed 21 October 2012). For the most part it is uncontroversial and widely 
acknowledged that from March 2003 to June 2004 the armed conflict in Iraq ‘clearly 
constituted an international armed conflict under the scope of application provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions’ (David Turns ‘The International Humanitarian Law Classification of 
Armed Conflicts in Iraq since 2003’ in Raul Pedrozo (Ed) The War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis 
International Law Studies (2010) Vol 86 97 at 117). 





‘Terry Lloyd, a veteran correspondent with ITV News, was confirmed 
dead on 23 March 2003 after coming under fire from US or British 
forces while driving in convoy to the southern Iraqi city of Basra. US 
troops, who recalled opening fire on cars marked "TV", believed that 




‘In the aftermath of the bombing of the Baghdad UN headquarters 
…security barriers are being built or reinforced, bullet-proof vests line 
office hallways at the ready, and luggage of relief staffers is being piled 
up daily for flights out as agencies rein in their programs, or - in some 
cases - stop them altogether. UN officials say that they are evacuating 
more than 200 of their 350 Baghdad staff, many of whom were 
wounded in the blast. The ICRC this week also began sending home 
more than half its Baghdad staff of 200 - the culmination of a series of 
security measures launched when one field officer was murdered on a 
road south of Baghdad on July 22, 2003’5. 
When international armed conflicts break out in predominantly civilian 
locations, far from the sterile battlefields which were envisaged by the drafters 
of the Geneva Conventions6, it should come as no surprise that the theatre of 
hostilities is populated by a range of non-State actors. Moreover, when one 
considers that, with global military downsizing, many States have been forced 
to outsource to non-State actors a range of functions traditionally performed 
by the military, there is an understandable and significant increase in the 
prevalence of these non-State actors.  
While the notion that armed hostilities might impact on civilian locations 
is briefly referred to in International Humanitarian Law (IHL)7, the IHL 
conventions were drafted with a passive, non-participating civilian in mind, a 
far cry from the present day reality of relief workers (accompanied by convoys 
of much needed relief supplies and medicines); journalists and voluntary 
human shields (and their ability to draw the attention of the international 
                                                                                                                                      
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2771529.stm (accessed 1 October 2012). 
4 ITV News ‘Terry Lloyd’ (22 March 2003) available at http://www.cpj.org/killed/2003/terry-
lloyd.php (accessed  21 May 2013) 
5 Scott Peterson ‘Iraq Aid Groups Reduce Presence’ (28 August 2003) available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-106983751.html (accessed 21 May 2013). 
6 And their subsequent additional protocols. 
7 IHL concedes that when conflict breaks out in civilian locations, it is possible that, by their 
mere presence in the vicinity of military targets, civilians might de facto compromise their 
otherwise civilian immunity against attack, in a manner which is legally defensible under IHL. 
For example, after assessing the risk to civilians, a commander might nevertheless order an 
attack on a military target in their vicinity. This alone is not unlawful provided the 
proportionality test can be satisfied, and the principles of military necessity, discrimination and 
advance warning are observed. Moreover IHL makes allowances for the fact that, where 
civilians choose to remain near to military targets, that exercise of their free will brings with it 
an increased risk that they might be injured as part of collateral damage. 
 375 
media); heavily armed private military and security contractors; and under-
aged child soldiers, recruited into non-State organised armed groups.  
For a legal regime, like IHL, founded on the notion that civilians are to 
be respected and enjoy immunity from direct attacks on account of their non-
participation in the hostilities, this new reality is proving to be legally 
challenging. It simply was not considered, when the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols were drafted, that the principle of distinction (which 
distinguishes combatants from civilians) would not be readily observed. This, 
in turn, calls into question the continued effectiveness of the Geneva 
Conventions in modern international armed conflicts8. The non-State actors 
discussed in this thesis appear to occupy a hybrid ‘grey area’ (which 
technically is legally non-existent), between the two mutually exclusive IHL 
categories: combatant and civilian. During hostilities, commanding officers 
and legitimate combatants are finding themselves in the unenviable position 
of having to make targeting decisions in respect of individuals whose actions 
appear to vacillate between those performed by innocent civilians, and 
combat-related activities. This results in much controversy as non-State 
actors (who would otherwise be classified as civilian), behave in ways that 
may or may not be regarded as participating directly in hostilities. This legal 
ambiguity persists even after these non-State actors fall into enemy hands: 
very often the detaining powers simply do not know what legal regime to apply 
to them.  
The bleak narratives with which I opened this chapter illustrate to some 
extent the pressure IHL is under to provide clear directives to all parties in 
international armed conflicts. There are lacunae in existing IHL at three levels: 
the first is that of assessing and assigning primary IHL status to these new 
non-State actors, whose presence in the theatre of hostilities was never 
envisaged by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions (and their additional 
protocols). The second involves determining when the actions of these non-
State actors amount to direct participation in the hostilities. The third involves 
understanding the legal consequences which result from a determination that 
a civilian’s activities amount to direct participation in hostilities.  
 
i. Assigning primary IHL status 
 
As IHL stands at present, primary combatant status is only afforded to those 
individuals participating in an international armed conflict who can show both: 
a) membership of an armed force (which is subject to command 
responsibility), and   
b) observance of the principle of distinction by, at a very minimum, 
carrying their weapons openly during, and in preparation for, any 
military engagement. 
 
This inviolable primary IHL status clothes the individual with the necessary 
authorisation to participate directly in hostilities. While the combatant 
priviledge brings with it full immunity from prosecution for their lawful hostile 
acts (provided they observe the laws of war), and prisoner of war (POW) 
                                                
8 Daphne Richemond-Barak (2011) ‘Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict: Issues of Distinction 
and Reciprocity’ in William C Banks (ed) New Battlefields Old Laws: Critical Debates on 
Asymmetric Warfare (Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare) at 2355-47. 
 376 
status upon capture, it necessarily also exposes the individual combatant to 
continuous lawful targeting. It is this exposure to targeting which demands 
that combatants ensure that they distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population, or run the risk of forfeiting their POW status if they fall into enemy 
hands.  
For the purposes of assessing this primary IHL status, it does not 
matter that these individuals might be younger than the legal recruitment age 
of fifteen years, provided the armed group which they have voluntarily joined 
enjoys combatant status9. There is also no insurmountable legal barrier to 
individual PMSCs being afforded primary combatant status10 when they are 
either ‘formally incorporated into the States’ armed forces’11, or where ‘they 
fulfil the customary IHL criteria for combatant status’12. However, most 
commentators agree that the attainment of either of these conditions is likely 
to be rare13.  
As for VHSs14, relief workers and journalists15, they do not fulfil even the 
most basic requirements16 which IHL demands of combatants, and 
consequently they will not enjoy primary combatant status17. They, like all 
other individuals who find themselves in the theatre of armed conflict, but who 
do not qualify for combatant status, are clothed with presumptive default 
civilian status. This default civilian status is also afforded to child soldiers who 
                                                
9 Save to add that for those recruited under eighteen years of age, IHL dictates that upon 
capture, these combatants are to enjoy the full range of special protections afforded to 
children as a category. 
10 Renée De Nevers ‘Private Security Companies and the Laws of War’ (2009) 40 Security 
Dialogue available at http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/40/2/169 (accessed 10 July 2012) at 
176. 
11 ‘The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices 
for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed 
Conflict’ (Montreux Document) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf (accessed 14 June 2012) 
principle 26(b) at 39; Rikke Ishøy (2008) Handbook on the Practical Use of International 
Humanitarian Law (revised edition) Danish Red Cross: København at 107.  
12 Montreux Document at principle 26(b). 
13 Idem at 36; Banks ‘Introduction’ at 228-35. 
14 The current body of IHL (expressed in ‘opinion, limited judicial consideration and even more 
limited State practice’) presumes that VHSs retain their civilian status, until a competent 
tribunal dictates otherwise (Rewi Lyall ‘Voluntary Human Shields, Direct Participation in 
Hostilities and the International Humanitarian Law Obligations of States’ (2008) 9 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 313 at 332). 
15 Until such time as it can be said that the media broadcast facilities are being used for 
‘military purposes or to incite people to commit grave breaches of IHL, acts of genocide or 
acts of violence’, they remain immune from attack - even if they are broadcasting propaganda 
(Alexandre Balguy-Gallois ‘The Protection of Journalists and News Media Personnel in 
Armed Conflict’ (2004) 86:853 International Review of the Red Cross 37 at 56; Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Volume I: Rules Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 115-118). 
16 They are not members of the armed forces, subject to a command structure responsible for 
internal discipline; they do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population by way of a 
uniform or emblem; they do not carry their arms openly; and they cannot be said to constitute 
a levée en masse. 
17 Those journalists who opt to work for the military’s information services, will be classified as 
non-combatant members of the armed forces. All other journalists, both those embedded in 
the armed forces, and those who do not accompany the armed forces, will always be 
presumed to retain their civilian status in international armed conflicts (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law at 115-118).  
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are recruited in a non-State-armed group which do not satisfy the IHL 
requirements for combatant status, and for the majority of PMSC who are not 
formally incorporated into the State’s armed forces18.  
 
As for those civilian contractors who ‘accompany the armed forces’ (like 
embedded journalists), provided they are in possession of the necessary 
identity cards, they are afforded the unusual privilege of POW status upon 
capture, in light of the non-combative functions which they carry out in close 
proximity to hostilities.  There might then be room to argue that this is the 
case where States have contracted PMSCs to assist the armed forces, 
thereby affording them the status of ‘civilians accompanying the armed 
forces’.  
 
ii. Assessing the activities of non-State actors in light of the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities 
 
For those individuals in the theatre of armed conflict who enjoy presumptive 
primary civilian status, it is imperative that they desist from any activities 
which amount to direct participation in hostilities. Exactly what activities qualify 
as ‘direct participation in hostilities’ has been a cause for much controversy 
which has further heightened the perception of a lacuna in the law with regard 
to these non-State actors. It is this controversy which prompted the ICRC to 
publish a non-binding Interpretive Guide on the topic. The Interpretive Guide 
proposes a cumulative three-pronged test to determine whether a specific 
hostile activity rises to the minimum threshold of harm, has a direct causal link 
to the resultant harm, and is associated with the belligerencies. Each leg of 
the test is crafted to ensure that the principle of presumptive civilian status is 
observed, while overly broad and arbitrary targeting policies, aimed at general 
war effort and common criminal activities, are excluded from the scope of 
restricted activities.  
Applying the Interpretive Guide’s test to the five categories of non-State 
actors discussed here, it is safe to conclude that the active combat functions 
and a range of direct support functions19 which child soldiers and PMSCs 
have reportedly carry out, will amount to direct participation in hostilities, 
irrespective of whether it is performed by children under the minimum 
recruitment age of fifteen years. On the other hand, most the activities carried 
out by those who fall within the IHL definition20 of a neutral and independent 
                                                
18 In the end, it is misleading to say that PMSCs are without status under IHL. It is more 
accurate to say that ‘there is no single simple answer applicable to all’ (Emanuela-Chiara 
Gillard ‘Private Military/Security Companies: The Status of their Staff and their Obligations 
Under International Humanitarian Law and the Responsibilities of States in Relation to their 
Operations’ (2005) Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Geneva at 2; Singer ‘Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of 
the Privatised Military Industry for the Humanitarian Community’ at 24; Won Kidane ‘The 
Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 38:3 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 361 at 412). 
19 UNICEF (2003) Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict available at http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/option_protocol_conflict.pdf (accessed 
6 July 2011) at 14. 
20 As set by the ICJ in the Military and paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America) Judgment (1986) ICJ Rep para 273. 
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‘relief worker’, a VHS, and a journalist, would not ordinarily contravene the 
notion of direct participation in hostilities.  
Questions have been raised however as to the legal situation when 
relief workers restrict military deployments by getting in the way of hostilities, 
or when they engage in reconstructive work, particularly when they employ 
the services of armed PMSC. According to the Interpretive Guide, the 
interference alone that relief workers and journalists might unwittingly provide 
by their presence near to military objectives, is not sufficiently causally 
connected to any resulting harm so as to compromise their civilian immunity 
against attack. If, on the other hand, these same relief workers, VHSs and 
journalists were to gather intelligence in enemy-controlled territory (which 
assists the opposition in the identification and marking of military targets), 
divulge tactical information regarding combatants, or be used as lookouts, this 
would certainly satisfy the cumulative test and amount to direct participation in 
hostilities. Similarly, when VHSs intentionally impede access to a legitimate 
target, their actions amount to direct participation in hostilities. 
As for PMSCs, their use of camouflage fatigues together with the 
visibility of their weapons often creates the mistaken impression that they are 
active combatants. Legally speaking, civilian PMSC are permitted to carry 
‘light, personal weapons for their own self-defence, or the defence of those 
they are protecting’21, and this alone is not sufficient to infer direct 
participation in hostilities. Moreover many of the routine activities which PMSC 
perform are not considered hostile acts which fulfill the threshold of harm, 
direct causation and belligerent nexus tests. That said, when PMSC have 
been ‘hired for the explicit purpose of engaging in combat operations’22; 
sabotaging military capacity; operating weapons systems in the theatre of 
hostilities; guarding captured military personnel; gathering military intelligence 
for identifying military targets; and conducting training for predetermined 
hostile acts - these actions clearly satisfy the threshold of harm requirement.  
For the most part, however, PMSC are hired to provide guarding 
services in situations of armed conflict. In many ways the guarding role played 
by PMSC, and the shielding role played by VHSs is legally analogous. Neither 
PMSC nor VHSs are deemed to be participating directly in hostilities when 
they carry out defensive guarding23 and defensive shielding duties in respect 
of purely civilian sites24, civilian personnel, and even dual-use sites25. This 
status quo persists until the site they are guarding or shielding can be said to 
amount to a legitimate military objective. Even after a site is determined to be 
military in nature, it is still permissible for civilian PMSC to undertake to guard 
it defensively (provided, that is, that they are only guarding the military sites 
against criminal elements). Similarly, while the presence of VHSs at a military 
                                                
21 Anthony PV Rogers ‘Unequal Combat and the Law of War’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3 at 22. 
22 John Ricou Heaton ‘Civilians at War: Re-examining the Status of Civilians Accompanying 
the Armed Forces’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 155 at 188. 
23 Provided PMSCs use force only in a ‘defensive manner and employ no more force than 
was strictly necessary’ (Anthony Dworkin ‘Security Contractors in Iraq: Armed Guards or 
Private Soldiers’ (2004) available at www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-security.html 
(accessed 27 October 2010)).  
24 For example schools, churches, hospitals and reconstruction companies. 
25 Presumptive civilian status protects dual-use sites until the status of the installation can be 
deemed to be definitely military in nature. 
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installation poses an ‘exclusively legal obstacle to an attack’26, it does not of 
itself contravene the notion of direct participation in hostilities. In short, it is not 
considered direct participation in hostilities when the presence of VHSs or 
PMSC ‘simply causes the attacker moral pause, or creates a legal barrier’ 
(through operation of the proportionality principle or demanding precautions 
prior to an attack)27. And while PMSC and VHSs located at a military objective 
never become personally subject to attack, by their mere presence the military 
installation itself remains a permissible military objective28. As such their 
presence near to a military objective exposes PMSC and VHSs to a greater 
risk of collateral injury, provided an attack on the site satisfies the targeting 
principles of military necessity, discrimination/distinction, humanity and 
proportionality.  
 
iii. Exploring the legal consequences for non-State actors participating 
directly in hostilities 
 
The complete immunity from direct targeting which comes with inviolable 
civilian status is assured for all civilian non-State actors, for so long as they 
desist from any direct participation in hostilities. The moment a civilian 
breaches this proscription, they expose themselves to direct targeting. Their 
presumptive civilian status, with its attendant immunity against attack, is only 
restored (according to the revolving door phenomenon) once they desist from 
their direct participation. In the event that such hostile activities are being 
carried out by a group in a continuous combative manner (as might be the 
case with some PMSC and child soldiers), the Interpretive Guide precludes 
the immediate return to their full civilian immunity against attack for the entire 
‘duration of their formal or functional membership’29 of the group.  
At no time however do any of these civilian, non-State actors forfeit 
their primary civilian status30. Neither do they become ‘unlawful combatants or 
unlawful belligerents’, two terms which have recently been bandied about, but 
which are legally irrelevant and utterly misguided. As unauthorised 
participants, they only stand to lose their right to enjoy complete immunity 
against direct targeting, and that situation persists only until they cease their 
direct participation in hostilities, or fully disengage from the combative group.  
This subsequent resumption of their full civilian immunity does not 
preclude them from the very real possibility that they will face prosecution for 
their unauthorised participation in hostilities when they fall into enemy hands, 
                                                
26 Melzer N ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ (2010) 42 International Law and Politics 831 at 869. 
27 Michael N Schmitt ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ (2008-2009) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 292 at 317.  
28 Stefan Oeter (1995) ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 163. 
29 Melzer ‘Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to 
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities’ at 914. 
30 Hans-Peter Gasser (1995) ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford University Press: Oxford at 233. 
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or are rendered hors de combat 31. Nevertheless, when they fall into enemy 
hands, all participants (authorised or otherwise), including these civilian non-
State actors, retain the customary IHL right to be treated humanely, in 
accordance with the basic fair judicial guarantees extended to civilians32. For 
those non-State actors who may have had a claim to POW privilege (as may 
be the case for some PMSC, child soldiers performing support tasks and 
possibly some embedded journalists), on account of the fact that they 
‘accompany the armed forces’, they have the added penalty of forfeiting their 
POW privilege if they are found to have participated directly in hostilities. 
 
Concluding remarks: the way forward 
 
It has been my aim, in chapters 4-9, to provide some guidance for military 
commanders involved in international armed conflicts, when they are faced 
with making targeting decisions which implicate these five types of non-State 
actors.  It is my hope that in exploring the question of the primary IHL status of 
these non-State actors that the perceived ‘grey area’ has been brought into 
sharper focus, exposing misconceptions and unravelling the legal 
complexities.  
As for the controversy surrounding when the activities of these non-
State actors can be said to amount to direct participation in hostilities, I hope 
that by exploring the functions of each of the non-State actors in light of the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guide, this thesis goes some way to clarifying the issue. It 
was my aim to set out clearly what these non-State actors are permitted to do 
in the theatre of hostilities without compromising their civilian immunity against 
attack, and what activities would cross that line. Equally, military commanders 
might better understand when they may legitimately target non-State actors 
directly, and when these non-State actors resume full civilian immunity 
against attack. 
To date the Interpretive Guide provides the most useful, neutral and 
balanced interpretation of the important IHL concept of direct participation in 
hostilities, although it must be conceded the guide is merely a 
recommendation, and has no legal binding force at present. I would like to 
think that this thesis has provided a useful opportunity to test the practical 
application of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guide against real life scenarios. 
Moreover, I hope that this might provide a starting point for academics and 
military advisors to engage in dialogue around whether the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guide, in its application to these non-State actors, yields 
appropriate answers which might receive supportive state practice and 
opinion juris. 
Likewise I trust that this thesis might bring into bold relief the practical 
consequences which might result were States to reject the ICRC’s proposed 
Interpretive Guide in favour of a wider interpretation of direct participation in 
hostilities (such as that proposed by Schmitt). It is in the real life application of 
                                                
31 Kidane ‘The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law’ at 
400-401.  
32 GC IV article 5(3); AP I article 75; Gasser ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ at 211; 
ICRC (2012) ‘International Humanitarian Law and Private Military/Security Companies’ 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/pmsc-faq-150908.ht (accessed 
16 October 2012). 
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an over-inclusive notion of direct participation in hostilities – where for 
example the mere presence of relief workers, PMSC and journalists in the 
theatre of operations could very well find them in violation of the notion direct 
participation in hostilities – that support for the more cautious interpretation 
favoured by the ICRC will be found.  
I hope this thesis has also exposed some of the shortcomings of IHL, 
and that it will motivate further debate and remedial action. For example, while 
relief workers and journalist are for the most part afforded primary civilian 
status, and their activities seldom compromise their civilian immunity, the 
reality remains that this status quo has not proven effective in protecting them 
against kidnappings, assault and murder in armed conflict situations.  
Lastly it has been my aim, throughout chapters 4-9, to offer some 
guidance as to the legal obligations upon the detaining powers who hold non-
State actors in detention. Here I have covered the potential for criminal 
prosecution, the possibility of POW privilege, and the rights to humane 
treatment and fair trial guarantees. 
I wonder what Henri Dunant would say were he to walk amongst these 
non-State actors in the theatre of today’s international armed hostilities, and 
stumble upon the foreign peace activist chained to a hospital, in order to 
shield the site from direct targeting? What would he make of the myriad of 
journalists who risk their lives to broadcast images of the conflict directly 
around the globe? How would he look upon the relief worker, who is 
ambushed and kidnapped for her supplies and potential hostage value? No 
doubt the specter of the ever-burgeoning private military and security industry 
will take him by surprise, as will the youthful visage of the eight year old toting 
an automatic rifle. This is the reality of modern international armed conflicts, 
and while it may not have been envisaged by the drafters of the IHL 
conventions, international humanitarian law, as a growing organic body of law, 
needs to provide a response… lest the memory of Solferino be lost in the 
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